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ENGLAND IN THE MEDITEBEANEAN 

VOL. H. 






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■If.. I, • 

ENGLAND 
N THE MEDITERRANEAN 

A STUDY OF THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF 
BRITISH POWER WITHIN THE STRAITS 

160&-1718 

BY 

JULIAN S. CORBETT 

AUTBOB OP 
* ABABS ABD AD TUBOB BAYI 1 'TBI SUCCBMOBt OT VBABB' BTC. 



IN TWO VOLUMES 
VOL. II. 



HVr/f TfFO ILLUSTRATIONS 



LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. 

99 PATSBK08TBB BOW, LONDON 

NEW YORK AND BOMBAY 

1804 

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BY THE SAME AUTHOR. 



DRAKE AND THE TUDOR NAVY; with 
a History of tho Bis* of England m a Maritime 
Power. With Portrait*, Illustration* and Maps. 
8 volt. Grown 8ro. 16f . 

THE SUCCESSORS OF DRAKE. With 4 
Portrait* (8 Pbotogravom) and 18 Maps and 
Plan*. •*©. SI*. 



LONGMANS, GREEN, * CO., 89 Paternoster Bow 
Land**, K*w York, and Bombay. 



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CONTENTS 

or 

THE SECOND VOLUME 

CHAPTER FAOK 
XIXaH>UNKIRE AND TANGIER 1 

XX. The First Occupation of the Straits 28 

XXI. Tangier and its Enemies 44 

XXII. Tangier as a Natal Station . . 68 

XXIII. Louis XIV. and Sicily 83 

XXIV. Tangier and the Popish Plot 106 

XXV. The Evacuation op Tangier 124 

XXVI*— The Naval Strategy of William HX 14 *\ 

XXVIK— The Main Fleet in the Mediterranean . . 161 

XXVIII. The Spanish Succession . . 167 

XXIX. The Campaign of 1702 106 

XXX. Marlborough and the Navy 227 

XXXI. Gibraltar and Malaga 261 

XXXIL Gibraltar and Toulon . 277 

XXXIII. 'Minorca »» 

Appendix : Obioin of the Line of Battle • . . 617 

Index 661 



4 A Prospect of Tangier,' 1669 FrontupUc* 

From « Dr+ving ftp W*nce$laus iMIar, 

•A New and Exact Map of Gibraltar* .... To fact p. %M 
From mr Nmrw men's * DUcxmrt cvnotrning ikt MHU trr m Mm i 
1701. 



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'1.1 ■■» ,.: n 
• f - 1 -. . . • . ' 



ENGLAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 



CHAPTER XIX 

DUNKIRK AND TANGIER 

It has come to be the received opinion that Cromwell's 
influence on English history was almost wholly negative. 
He broke down much that cambered the ground, but of the 
structure he strove to raise on the ruins practically nothing, 
it is said, survived him. In all that concerns society, 
government, and religion, there is so much to support 
the judgment that it will probably stand, yet it is far from 
giving the whole truth. If it were applied to foreign 
affairs, so far from being just, it would involve a serious 
omission. In all that concerned the British attitude to the 
outside world he changed much and left much behind him. 
He found his country impotent and neglected in the councils 
of Europe, and taught her how to speak with a command- 
ing voice. He gave her, in the first place, the instrument 
—a perfected navy in the true modem sense — a navy of 
war ships wholly independent of merchant auxiliaries— a 
thing which had never yet been seen in modern times. It 
was a stride as great as that which Drake and his fellows 
made when they perfected a sailing navy, and the results 
for England were no less invigorating. But Cromwell 
gave still more. He gave the sentiment for using the 
instrument. For he bequeathed to the restored monarchy 

VOL. II. B 



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2 DUNKIRK. JuND TANGIER 1659 

; m \ . : v i s; " 
v a definite naval policy in tpp Mediterranean and an inde- 

1 structible ambition for what we now call imperial politics. 
The two things were intimately connected. It has been 

v said that Cromwell's war with Spain was an Elizabethan 
war, conceived on Elizabethan lines ; but this is not wholly 
true. There was a difference, and one of great import- 
ance. Cromwell's main strategical idea, like that of the 
Elizabethans, was to operate against the American colonies 
and Oceanic trade of Spain ; but, unlike theirs, it con- 
templated as a condition precedent the covering of those 
operations by the seizure of the Straits of Gibraltar and 

: the domination of the Mediterranean. The design was 
also to be enforced by a close alliance with Portugal that 
came near to being a protectorate, and had a shrewd eye to 

[ the gradual insinuation of England into her place in the 

t Far East. But this too was an Elizabethan idea. The 

* . main distinction of Cromwell's conception was that 

t - j Mediterranean power lay at the root of it. It is true, as 

I we have seen, that although he never let go this conception 
altogether, it fell to a subordinate place ; but this was when 
his religious zeal boiled to the surface and disturbed the 
level flow of his more practical and sagacious line of 
thought. When he saw a chance of leading a great 
Protestant war on Borne, his imperial policy lost its clear- 
ness, and the result was the occupation of Dunkirk instead 
of Gibraltar. Still it was but an aberration — a temporary 
reaction to an obsolete policy, which even Elizabeth had 
regarded with suspicion, and which had no real vitality. 
The visionary aim of the zealot died with him, and the 

, master current he had found resumed its flow. In this 

' way at least, if in no other, his imprint remained and still 
remains sharp and undefaced upon British polity. 

J When Stoakes and his fleet were recalled in the 
summer of 1659, it might have seemed that the situation 



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1659 VITALITY OF CROMWELL'S INFLUENCE 3 

which had been created in the Mediterranean was 
going to perish with the rest of the Protector's work. 
But it was not so; and of such vigour was the seed 
he had sown, that, though almost everything else was 
being changed or uprooted, this plant sprang up again 
with new exuberance. For awhile indeed there was no 
sign it was not dead. The republic was in its agony. 
Revolution succeeded revolution, and government govern* 
ment in rapid succession, and in the eyes of conti- 
nental diplomacy England was once more a quantity to 
be neglected. Upon Pheasant Island in the Bidasoa 
the French and Spaniard laboriously concluded the 
treaty of the Pyrenees, with no regard to her or her 
interests. In the interminable list of articles, which were 
finally agreed upon, everything was provided against for 
a century to come, as though the future of Europe lay 
entirely with France and Spain, and England's power to 
' interfere had passed away. Yet the ink, as it were, was 
, hardly dry when England was seem again standing with 
Cromwell's weapon in her hand, and both the great 
powers were once more feverishly bidding for her good- 
will. 

In the famous treaty of the Pyrenees, Spain had 
found herself compelled to give way at every point where 
Mazarin pressed her. It was a complete triumph for 
France. With Portugal in revolt, and declaring itself 
once more an independent kingdom, it was impossible 
for Spain to resist the pressure that was put upon her. 
It was for the sake of reconquering Portugal that she 
submitted to the humiliating conditions and the losses 
of territory that were forced upon her. The height of 
her greatness had dated from the time when, in 1680, 
Philip IL seized the vacant throne of Lisbon, and 
found himself, for the first time, a great power upon the 

»3 



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4 DUNKIRK AND TANGIER 1669 

ocean. With the loss of the Tagus and the Portuguese 
marine by the revolt of the Braganzas in 1640, the 
real troubles of Spain had begun, and it was clear to the 
Court that without Portugal her position could never 
be recovered. On the question of Portugal therefore she 
had been adamant, and Mazarin, who had been vigorously 
supporting the revolt throughout, found himself com- 
pelled to abandon his protigL Portugal seemed doomed. 
In despair an ambassador flew to England to try to renew 
with the new revolutionary Government Cromwell's old 
alliance. He found everything in confusion, and it was 
not till Monk had dominated all the warring factions, 
and was sitting like an uncrowned king in Whitehall, 
that he found a ray of hope. It was a time when, 
to all who could read the signs, the monarchy seemed ' 
unexpectedly on the brink of a restoration. It is true 
Monk had absolutely refused to have anything to do 
with the Stuart exiles. His single purpose was to 
preserve order with a rod of iron, so that none of the 
revolutionary elements could gain the upper hand, and to 
hold the balance true till a free Parliament could be 
elected to voice the will of the country. Every day it 
became clearer that that voice would be a summons to 
the King to return, and every day the desperation of the 
more intractable elements became more difficult to 
control Monk and his advisers began to doubt whether 
it would be possible for them to preserve their neutral 
attitude till Parliament could meet, and it was at this 
moment that the Portuguese Ambassador saw his chance. 
It had been an old idea of the Braganzas, dating 
back to the earliest days of their rebellion, to seek 
support for their cause in wedding a daughter of the 
House with the Prince of Wales. So long as the 
Bnglish monarchy kept its head above water, the project 



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1659 A PROPOSAL FROM PORTUGAL 6 

had never been lost sight of, and now that the Stuart star 
was once more rising to the ascendant it was immediately 
revived. 1 In the Portuguese Court there can have been 
little doubt as to the bait that should be offered. The 
two treaties of commerce, which England had already 
concluded with the new kingdom, sufficiently revealed 
the English desire for a share of the East Indian trade ; 
and when, after Cromwell's abandonment of the 
Gibraltar project, his covering fleet had been compelled 
to base itself on Lisbon, every one must have known 
what longing eyes England was casting on a naval 
station in the Straits. Bombay in the Ear East, and 
Tangier, the last of the Portuguese possessions in North 
Africa, must have naturally suggested themselves. The 
price was a large one to pay even for the English 
alliance ; but without that alliance there was every 
probability that both places would be lost — Bombay to 
the Dutch, and Tangier to the Spaniards or the Moors. 
It was clearly the wisest policy to spend them while they 
were still in hand, and to spend them in the market 
where they would be most highly valued. 

These then were the terms, together with the 
unprecedented marriage portion of 300,000/., that the 
Ambassador had to offer Monk as the price of Charles's 
hand if he were restored to the British throne. He was 
able to point out to the General — so the story goes — that 
' besides the greatest portion in money that ever queen 
had, the Infanta was to bring with her Tangier, which 
would make the English masters of the trade in the 
Mediterranean, and Bombay, which would give them 
the like advantage in the East Indies; and over and 
above all would serve to humble the proud Spaniard, 
which the General, according to the notions he imbibed in 

1 Dictionary of National Biography, tub voce • CfttheriiM of ] 



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6 DUNKIRK AND TANGIER 1660 

his younger days, thought to be the greatest advantage 
of all.* l The story rings true. In his boyhood Monk 
had been brought up in the midst of the hot anti-Spanish 
feeling that surrounded Ralegh down in Devonshire. 
He had himself a score to wipe off, for his first taste of 
military service was at the miserable failure before 
Cadiz in 1625. There, it is worthy of note, he had served 
as a volunteer under his kinsman, Sir Richard Grenville, 
who was the moving Bpirit in the attack that was made 
on Lord Wimbledon for not attempting Gibraltar. The 
Ambassador's proposal must at least have awakened some 
vivid old memories. The whole scheme moreover exactly 
hit the soldierlike if crude ideas of statecraft which the 
great soldier of fortune had expressed in his ' Observa- 
tions on Military and Political Affairs/ the work he had 
written during his imprisonment in the Tower. Indeed 
there is reason to believe that it was the brilliant 
prospect which this proposal opened up that finally 
stirred him from his neutrality. Immediately after the 
interview he sent his cavalier cousin, that arch-intriguer 
John Grenville, with whom he had long refused to speak 
a word on politics, to open communications with the 
King in Flanders. 2 On the General's advice Charles 
immediately made his escape from Spanish territory and 
sought refuge in Holland. At the Hague the Portuguese 
envoy met him, and subsequently followed him to 
Ixmdon. What ensued is hidden, but Monk, it is said, 
took the first opportunity of recommending the proposal 
to Charles, and with so much weight that in the autumn 
the exultant envoy was able to return to Lisbon with 



it*s Register, pp. 91, 898, on the authority of Sir Robert South* 
well, a tew yean later Ambassador to Portugal. 

• Sir John Giemrflle, afterwards Earl of Bath, was the son of Monk's 
aunt, Ones, by her marriage with 8ir Betil Grenrille, the elder brother of 
his lathcc-in-arme, 8ir Richard. 



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1661 OPPOSITION TO THE POKTUttUESE MATCH 7 

assurances that set the whole of Portugal wild with 
delight. 

At the last moment, to all appearance, the struggling 
kingdom was saved from a second destruction, but in fact 
it was Btill far from safe. When the Ambassador returned 
in February ICtil with full power to negotiate the marriage, 
he found hostility had made its mark. The far-reaching 
importance of the project in hand is testified by the vigour 
and variety of the opposition it aroused. It is clear that 
at first it received but little support except from Cromwell's 
men, Monk and Montague, now respectively Duke of 
Albemarle and Earl of Sandwich. Clarendon even is said 
not to have been converted at once to the Protector's policy, 
while to the end it was hotly opposed by the Queen-mother 
and the Earl of Bristol, the son of the first Earl, who as 
John Digby had tried so hard to get James I. to use 
the Mediterranean lever. 

The opposition was natural enough. The Dutch, who 
were already well advanced in absorbing the Eastern 
possessions of Portugal, viewed the prospect of the English 
at Bombay as an intolerable check to their progress, while 
Spain, who had never recognised the new kingdom and 
still regarded Tangier as Spanish territory, openly an* 
nounced that an English occupation of the place would 
be regarded as a casus belli. At the back of all was the 
resistance of the Roman Church. In spite of the pressure 
France had put upon the Pope he had stubbornly held by 
Spain, and refused to recognise the Braganza Government ; 
the Inquisition was doing its best to crush the national 
movement; and in view of the frightening which the 
Vatican had recently received from Cromwell's cruising 
squadron, a Protestant porter at the gates of the Mediter- 
ranean could only be an abiding menace to Borne. So 
great was the danger which these influences seemed to 



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* DUNKIRK AN]) TANGIER 1061 

threaten, that it is doubtful whether Cromwell's men — 
powerful and dreaded as they still were — would have 
been able to hold Charles to their views, had not France 
come to the rescue. It was only with the greatest reluc- 
tance that she had abandoned her Portuguese friends at the 
treaty of the Pyrenees, and probably she had always meant 
to use the first opportunity of coming to their assistance 
underhanded. In Charles's dilemma Louis XIV. saw his 
opportunity. Mazarin was just dead, and almost the first 
move which the young King made on his own initiative 
in foreign politics was to assure Clarendon in the pro- 
foundest secrecy that if Charles took the contemplated step 
it would have the support of France. With this assurance 
the ground of the opposition, inspired as it was by the 
Queen-mother, was cut from under it. Till the last hour 
the momentous resolution was kept a close secret; but 
when finally the full Council was summoned to pronounce 
upon the Portuguese marriage, not a single vote was cast 
against it. 

So, as it were, from its ashes the English Mediterranean 
policy sprang again into being, and once more it was the 
breath of France that gave it life. What more dramatic 
irony can history show V It was at this very moment that 
Colbert was preparing to found the only true navy that 
Fiance had ever possessed. The day of its most glorious 
achievements was breaking, and the evil star that hung 
persistently over her heroic efforts to achieve the dominion 
of the sea glittered malignantly in the dawn. Once more 
we see England hanging back irresolutely from her 
destiny, and once more it is France who thrusts her on. 
We are on the threshold of a new era — European politics 
aie pausing for a fresh departure — and this is the first 
step that France takes. 

In the changing aspect of continental affairs it must 



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1661 THE MARRIAGE ANNOUNCED 

have seemed natural enough. The era of the Thirty Years' 
War was at an end, and the age of Louis XI^V. had begun. 
On the morrow of Charles's landing at Dover the young 
French King, by virtue of the treaty of the Pyrenees, had 
married the Infanta Maria Theresa, and the seeds of the 
great wars of succession were sown. Thenceforth France 
was to fill the place that Spain had filled, but as yet her 
advance must be halting. Her navy was still to create. 
For the moment Louis's ambitions were set upon the 
Spanish Netherlands, and it was for the time inevitable 
that he should follow Mazarin's policy of using the 
English fleet. If England were strong in the Medi- 
terranean, it was as yet a safeguard to France and her 
trade, and not a curb, and as things stood Louis's resolve 
was as statesmanlike as it was bold. 

Whether the English Government fully grasped the 
meaning of the step is doubtful. Men like Monk and 
Sandwich, who had had to do with the navy in Cromwell's 
time and been in touch with Blake, may have felt, even 
if they could not formulate, the strategical importance of 
Tangier; but in the public declarations of ministers it 
is not clearly defined. When, on May 8, 1661, the King 
announced the marriage to an enthusiastic Parliament, 
Clarendon explained to them its meaning and intention ; 
but he justified the match mainly on commercial grounds 
and as a defiance to Spain. He did not even mention 
Tangier or Bombay. 1 It is quite possible, however, that the 
intended occupation was to be kept a secret until it was an 
accomplished fact. In any case, what Clarendon revealed 
was enough, and both in Parliament and throughout the 
country the news was received with acclamation. 

So the new Stuart monarchy boldly stepped out upon 

1 See the report of his speeoh in Parliamentary History, It. 190; 
and Kennet'e Register, 438. 



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10 DUNKIRK AND TANGIER 1661 

the road which the Bepublic had begun to tread, and it did 
so deliberately at the risk of almost certain war with Spain, 
* risk from which the King in his still unstable seat might 
well have flinched. Among the many causes which had 
led to the -remarkable Royalist reaction was certainly the 
belief that a restoration would mean peace with Spain — 
the most valued field of English commerce. To reopen 
the war was to alienate the all-powerful merchant influence, 
which was looking forward to a period of quiet and pro- 
sperous business on the time-honoured lines. Though the 
promised support of France was enough to convince the 
King, it was not generally known, and the opposition in 
Parliament might have been serious had not the Spanish 
Ambassador himself come to the rescue by an excess of 
zeal. A pamphlet had been issued pointing out that the 
commercial advantages which would flow from the 
Portuguese alliance would outweigh the loss of Spanish 
friendship. The Spanish Ambassador answered it by 
printing a counter-declaration which he had presented to 
the Council. His arguments were weighty enough, but he 
unwisely presented them in such a manner that he seemed 
to arrogate to his master the right to dictate to the King 
of England the choice of a wife. 1 The blunder was easily 
turned against him with the result that the innocent little 
Princess of Braganza became for the moment the heroine 
of British national sentiment, and Tangier the stronghold 
of the most violent feeling that can rouse Englishmen to 
adventurous action. So, when the Spanish Ambassador 
went so far, as was reported, as plainly to threaten war 
if the King persisted, Charles could safely reply, short and 
sharp, that * the King of Spain might do what he pleased- 
he valued it not. 9 f 

■ LtfUn of Sir Richard Famhaw, p. 67. 

• H«vfr]*tar, UMtth 1% Treniham MSS« Hist. M88. Cow. ▼. 169. 



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1661 THE TWO GREAT SECRETS 11 

The action taken was prompt and determined. A power- 
ful squadron for the Straits was already well forward under 
the old colour of a demonstration against Algiers. Since 
the withdrawal of Stoakes's squadron the corsairs had 
become troublesome again, and moreover a Dutch squad- 
ron with the same ostensible object was also about to sail 
for the southward and would require watching. 1 

* This month ends/ wrote Pepys on the last day of 
February 1661, ' with two great secrets under dispute, but 
yet known to very few : first, who the King will marry ; 
and what the meaning of the fleet is that we are now 
sheathing to set out to the southward. Most think 
against Algiers, against the Turk, or to the East Indies 
against the Dutch.' A little later the excitement was in- 
creased by a second and still larger fleet being ordered. 
On June 10 Lord Sandwich, who was now joint 
Commander-in-Chief with Monk, informed Pepys that he 
had been appointed Ambassador Extraordinary to bring 
home the Queen. First, however, he was to proceed to 
Algiers to settle the business with the Dey, and then, 
having seen his squadron revictualled and refreshed, to 
return to Lisbon with three ships, and there meet the fleet 
that was to follow him. Not a word was yet disclosed of 
seeing that England was not forestalled at Tangier, but 
already measures had been taken. It was known that 
Henry Mordaunt, now Earl of Peterborough, was to be re- 
warded forhis heroic but hare-brained plotting against 
the Protectorate by the governorship of Tangier, and was 
to be given fifteen companies of foot from the garrison of 
Dunkirk. 1 

This appointment is the first intimation of another 

1 Trentham MSS« HUU MSS. Com. ▼. 166, 170, and tea S**. Nicholas to 
OarttM, May 10, 1661, Dom. Col 5S6. 
* Ibid. v. 908. 



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12 DUNKIRK AND TANGIER 1661 

and most serious step that was necessary to round off the 
policy which Charles had adopted. Of all wise actions 
few perhaps have been more mercilessly misrepresented 
than the sale of Dunkirk. Justice in recent times has 
been done to the good motives of the Government, but 
the intimate connection of the surrender with the oc- 
cupation of Tangier and the return to a strong Mediter- 
ranean policy has passed unnoticed. Yet it is certain 
that in the final stages of the marriage negotiations the 
two ideas were so intimately related as to form one strate- 
gical whole, and there is reason to believe that from the 
first they were regarded as inseparable. 1 Owing to the 
passions which the sale afterwards aroused the published 
accounts of the affair wear different colours, but all of 
them agree that Monk was from the first and throughout 
the firm advocate of the surrender, and that Sandwich was 
no less sore. Indeed Sandwich UBed to say that he was 
actually the first to propose it, on the ground that Dunkirk 
was wholly nnsuited for a naval port. 9 All the known 
facts of the case go to confirm Clarendon's own account 
of the transaction. According to him it was arranged by 
Lord Southampton, the Lord Treasurer, who was at his 
wit 9 8 end to make both ends meet, in consultation with 
Monk and 'the best seamen, 9 and its expediency was 
practically decided on before the question was ever 
brought before him. There seems indeed no doubt what- 
ever that the whole of expert opinion regarded the project 
as highly desirable on strategical grounds. Clarendon 
however was shocked, and, when first approached by his 
colleagues, begged the matter might go no further till the 

• Kennel's ifcfttfcr, pp. 91, 770; Eehard, History, Oar. IL p. 84. 

• Southwell to GUrendoa {L4ybourn*-Popham MS 8. p. 260). Pepys 
ale* aajs Sand wieh declared, Mf it should in Parliament be inquired into 

I of Dunkirk, he will be found to be the greatest adviser of it' 



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1«61 THE SALE OF DUNKIRK 13 

King's opinion was taken. Whereupon Southampton 
persuaded Monk to come with him to Whitehall and 
broach the subject to the King and the Duke of York. 
After several discussions it was so far approved that 
Charles decided it should be brought before the secret 
committee of the Council. Besides the King and his 
brother and the Chancellor, it consisted of Southampton, 
Monk, Sandwich, Sir George Carteret, who had already 
won considerable reputation abroad as an admiral and was 
now Treasurer of the Navy, and the two secretaries— one 
being Monk's kinsman and right-hand man, Sir William 
Morice, who had originally arranged the first meeting 
with the Portuguese Ambassador. As Clarendon was ill 
they met at his house. The result of the conference was 
a unanimous opinion that on financial and strategical 
grounds Dunkirk ought to be given up. 

The political reasons were no less strong. The Crom- 
wellian policy to which they were recurring in the Por- 
tuguese marriage involved a close alliance with France, 
and with the almost certain prospect of war with Spain 
this was more than ever necessary. But so keen was 
Louis to secure Dunkirk that its retention would pro* 

^bably mean war with France as well as Spain, while its 
cession would almost certainly buy a French alliance of 
the closest description. Moreover, Charles was by no 
means satisfied with the mere secret assurance of support 
for his Portuguese policy that he had received from 
Louis, and this was only wise of him. For by a secret 
article in the treaty of the Pyrenees France had an en- 
gagement with Spain in precisely the opposite sense. 

' Obviously, then, seeing the far-reaching nature of the 
policy on which England was about to embark, there was 
everything to gain and very little to lose by giving up 
Dunkirk to France. It was getting rid of an incumbrance 



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14 DUNKIRK AND TANGIER 1661 

which had no place in the new world-wide scheme of 
empire, and acquiring something that for the time at 
least was an essential part of it. The decision of the 
secret committee therefore was to lay the matter before 
the Privy Council, where it was approved with but one 
dissentient voice. 

Such then is the story as Clarendon tells it, and there 
seems no valid reason for doubting its general truth. 1 On 
the other hand there are many, as will be seen, for believing 
it Though Clarendon himself gives no dates at which the 
prolonged deliberations about Dunkirk, so circumstantially 
related, took place, it is certain they must have practically 
accompanied the marriage negotiations. The match was 
finally announced to Parliament on May 8. Sandwich, 
who was present at all the meetings about Dunkirk, left 
London to join the fleet on June 10, and did not return to 
town till the end of the following year. The meetings 
must therefore have begun at latest immediately after the 
question of the King's marriage was settled. There is 
farther the fact that the marriage treaty actually contained 
a clause by which Charles bound himself not to surrender 
Dunkirk to Spain. It is difficult to believe that such a 
proviso could have been admitted had not the King 

1 The only serious contradiction comes from Clarendon's own lips. 
When the Comte d'Estrades came over from France as Ambassador Extra- 
ordinary to arrange the marriage of Charles's sister with the Due d'Orllans, 
he had secret instructions to negotiate the sale. At the outset he was staggered 
by the high price Clarendon asked. Clarendon told him that as yet he had 
only gained over the King and the Duke of York. He had yet to convince 
Honk, Sandwich, and the Treasurer, and it was only by Louis*s promising a 
high price he could hope to do so. Clarendon clearly gave Estrades to under. 
stand that the tale was his own idea, and that the other three men were not 
yet in the secret. A week later he told the Ambassador, to Louis's regret, 
that they had been informed of what was going on. Clearly, however, 
Clarendon, In holding his three powerful colleagues in the background, was 
only using an ordinary device to drive a hard bargain* {Lettres et Mimoiru 
oraefrvflst, August 17, SI, 27, 1662, Combe's Sals of Dunkirk, pp. 7, 11, 



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1661 TRUE REASON OF THE SALE , 15 

already decided, in principle at least, to give up Crom- 
well's conquest and to give it np to France. It is 
certain at any rate that Charles lost no time in 
broaching the subject. In July the Comte d'Estrades 
came over to settle the marriage of the King's sister 
with the Due d'Orl£ans. Before even he had made 
his public entry Charles sent for him for a confidential 
interview. After speaking of the special subject of his 
mission Charles casually mentioned Dunkirk and began 
to talk big about its being a place (Tarmes from which 
he could step to further conquest. The Ambassador, how- 
ever, would not rise to the cast. He put the matter off 
by saying bis master attached little importance to the 
' place strategically, and then proceeded to encourage the 
King in the dreams of distant empire to which the 
possession of Jamaica and the Portuguese alliance seemed 
to open the way. 1 

There can then be practically no doubt that here in 
Charles's feint and the Ambassador's riposte we have 
the real meaning of the sale of Dunkirk. It was a 
vital factor in the return to the same policy which the 
Protector had adopted when he found his dream of a 
Protestant crusade impracticable, and which he abandoned 
when his crusading hopes revived. As the zealot in him 
had sacrificed Gibraltar for Dunkirk, so now Monk's level 
head forced the surrender of Dunkirk for Tangier, and 
swung the country definitely into the course that was to 
lead it to empire. There was but one serious man who 
is known to have doubted the wisdom of the exchange, 
and that was Schomberg. The famous soldier was 
passing through London on his way to take command 
of the Portuguese army, and he seized the moment to 
press Charles to keep Dunkirk. But he did not deal with 
1 Lettret et Ulmoxrtt fEitrndea. Estradas to Louis, Jolj 11-31, 1*61. 



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16 DUNKIRK AND TANGIER lHtfl 

the seamen's objections or the financiers'. His reasons . 

were purely military and his aim religious. The place, 

he contended, was a point of entry always tenable by a 

power that had command of the sea. The value he 

attached to such a point of entry is perfectly clear. He 

was a Calvinist, and his advice to hold Dunkirk was 

accompanied by an earnest appeal to the King to put 

himself at the head of a Protestant league. Thus his 

advocacy only confirms the wisdom of the other great 

soldier whose opinion was against him. It was but fresh 

testimony that Dunkirk was valueless except in view of the 

visionary policy of a Protestant crusade. The Elector of 

Brandenburg, when the sale was known, rightly read it as 

an abandonment of that policy. He too bewailed it, but 

only on political grounds. It would, he said, have served 

as a bridle both to France and Spain. In answer to his 

reproaches he was assured that it was to make the curb 

• more severe that the step had been taken. England's 

immediate object was to strengthen her naval position, 

and from that point of view Dunkirk was a hindrance 

t and not a help. It requited a costly garrison, and as 

, a naval station it was useless. Its surrender was an 

\ economy of strength and money, and the price was to be 

I spent mainly upon the navy or laid up as a war fund. 1 

1 Banke, iii. 891, ci Burnet, 173. Burnet's account goes far to confirm 
Clarendon, though he differs in details. • The military men/ he says, • who 
were believed to be corrupted by France, said the place was not tenable do. 
The Earl of Clarendon said he understood not these matters, but appealed to 
Hook's judgment, who did positively advise the letting it go for the sum 
thai France offered. To make the business go the easier the King promised 
he would lay up all the money in the Tower and that it should not be 
touched but upon extraordinary occasions.' This reads almost like an echo 
of Monk's idea expressed in cap. xxix. of his Observations, • showing how 
it is for England • • . providently to prepare a rich public 
oforehand, either lor the defence of themselves or offending their 
For a curious story that Monk 'agreed to and pressed the 
I Dunkirk because Sir Edward Harley , the Governor, was timid,' see 




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1661 CHARLES'S IMPERIAL AMBITIONS 17 

This was certainly the idea and intention of Monk 
and the seamen. Probably Charles meant it too. His 
head at this time was full of imperial aspirations, to 
which his marriage seemed to open the way. ' I remember/ 
says Bishop Burnet, writing of Tangier, ' when I knew 
the Court first, it was talked of at a mighty rate as the 
foundation of a new empire, and he would have been a 
very hardy man that would have ventured to have spoke 
lightly of it. 9 1 The King's instructions to the men he 
sent out to take possession of his new acquisition fully 
bear out Burnet's remark, and show that Charles did not 
think of stopping short at Tangier or Bombay. They 
disclose, as the Bishop says, dreams of a gradually v^ 
expanding empire in North Africa and another in the Far 
East, together with the domination of the Mediterranean, 
and the hope of absorbing the whole trade of Brazil. 
1 You know/ wrote Charles to Sir Bichard Fanshaw on 
the eve of his departure as Ambassador to Portugal, 
1 You know one of the principal advantages we propose to 
ourself by this entire conjunction with Portugal is the 
advancement of the trade of this nation and the enlarge-, ^ 
ment of our own territories and dominions.' Fanshaw 
himself was wholly with his preceptor and his imagination 
ranged higher still. He saw in a rosy future the male 
line of the House of Braganza fail, and England, even if 
Portugal itself slipped from her, succeeding by right and 
might to the vast trade and empire that centred at Lisbon. 1 

Hubert Hurley to Sir Edward Hurley, Wclbeck MSS. lii. 616, March 14, 
1700. 

1 Foxcroft, Supplement to Burnet'* History, p. 80. Burnet first came 
to London in 1668 ; he was not actually about the Court till tan years later. 
Ibid. p. 468. 

* Charles II. to Fanshaw, August 28, 1661, HeatheoU MSS. (Hut. 
MSS. Com.) p. 18. Fanshaw's instructions, ibid. p. 90. Fanshaw to 
Clarendon, ibid. p. 87. Peterborough's oommission for Tangier, September 6, 
1661, DaTis, History of the Second Queen 9 * Royal Hegimmttp.lt. 

VOL. n. 



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18 DUNKIRK AND TANGIER 1061 

Well might the Brandenburg Ambassador assure his 
master that the real reason of the step which the 
English were taking was to be found in the tradi- 
tional belief — mistake he calls it — that Great Britain 
was a separate world. In truth England was embarked 
upon a world-wide policy, and in truth it was an idea 
that had been growing ever since the days when the 
Elizabethans taught her to know herself. But the 
German did not see how the idea had been modified by 
the work of Cromwell and Blake. He did not see bow 
they had found in the Mediterranean a firmer grip on the 
vitals of Europe than any North Sea port could give. 

It is then with this great departure, and not with the 
humiliation that immediately followed it, that we should 
associate the sale of Dunkirk. It should be remembered 
for what it meant at the time — and what it came at last to 
be — the final departure of England upon her true career. 
We should honour the King for his great intention and 
the men who brought him to it: Southampton, who 
justly measured the resources at his disposal ; Sandwich, 
the admiral, who had learned the value of the Mediter- 
ranean; and above all Monk, the strategist and statesman, 
without whom in those early days the King would not 
move a finger, and at whose nod he felt that at any 
moment he might have to start on his travels again. It 
was these three men who, with Clarendon the Chancellor, 
were appointed the secret commissioners to carry out the 
sale — a fact which leaves no room for doubt that they 
were the real moving spirits in the affair. 1 

If we look closely at the men themselves, there remains 
as little doubt of the purity and loftiness of their intention. 

1 Sennet's Begister. They were appointed on September 1, 1662, while 
the negotiation* were still a profound secret The matter was not settled 
till three months later. Hanks, Mi. 890. 



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1661 THE KESTOti/lTlON MINISTEKS 19 

In their several persons they typified all the leading forces 
and ideas of which Charles's imperial policy was the latest 
expression. t Southam pton, was the son of the man who 
was Shakespeare's patron and Essex's second self, and 
the sharer of all his ventures against Spain. One of the 
most ardent vessels of the Elizabethan spirit, he had 
become under James the promoter of every colonial 
enterprise and the embodiment of the national feeling 
which regarded Spain implacably as the hereditary enemy, 
and her colonial empire as the promised land. The 
alarm caused in Madrid when, in 1617, his name was con- 
nected with the first proposed expedition of an English fleet 
into the Mediterranean will be remembered. 1 Thomas 
Wriothesley, the fourth Earl, though bred under these hot 
passions till the age of fourteen, was of a more stable 
temperament. A pattern of sober thought and lofty 
integrity, a convinced constitutionalist yet loyal subject, 
he had won the. confidence of all parties. His appoint- 
ment as Lord Treasurer at the Restoration was as quieting 
as that of Monk f»s Captain-General, and from the first 
the purity of his administration shone like the survival of 
a golden age. Of ^Sandwich it is enough to say he was 
the pupil of Blake and may be taken as representing the 
great admiral's ideas of the higher naval strategy, and 
those of the leading men of his school. But it is Monk 
whose life most curiously covers the period of develop- 
ment and accentuates its most prominent points. Born 
and bred in the very womb of Elizabethan romance, he 
had fed on the new spirit with his mother's milk. He 
was related to all the greatest names of that age from 
Grenville to Howard. Their exploits were his nursery 
tales. His uncles had fought and died under Drake and 
Vere, and at the house of his Aunt Stukeley, hard by 
1 Supra, toL L p. 59. 

el 



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20 DUNKIRK AND TANGIER 1061 

the place where he was educated, he must have had the 
son of Pocahontas for a playfellow and worshipped 
Kalegh in the flesh as his boyish hero. A childhood 
so coloured was never quite outgrown. When scarcely 
out of boyhood he had served throughout Buckingham's 
ill-starred attempts to revive the glories of the past age. 
Then, like his fathers, he had gone to serve the Dutch 
against their oppressors, and after ten years' distinguished 
service he returned to England with the reputation of 
the pattern Low Country soldier. It was the eve of the 
troubles, but as yet all was quiet. The old spirit was 
still strong within him and Monk could not rest. Pining 
for adventure, he joined the wild scheme by which a 
thousand gentlemen, under the leadership of Prince 
Bupert and with a million of capital, were to sail away to 
conquer Madagascar, and from there to carve out, like 
Alexander, a mighty empire in the East. The civil wars 
put an end to all such dreams. But when they were 
over and Monk had risen to be Cromwell's right hand, it 
was intended that he should lead the career of conquest 
in the West Indies ; and could he have been spared from 
Scotland he might well, as the greatest military adminis- 
trator and one of the finest strategists of his time, have 
written a very different page on the Commonwealth 
history. As it was, he remained to build up a fresh 
reputation as an admiral against the Dutch, to command 
single-handed the most powerful fleet that had ever sailed 
the sea, and to lead it to victory against the greatest of 
the Dutch seamen. In his new sphere he lived to com- 
plete Blake's work and perfect the soldier's influence on 
the naval art. By him it was raised to the position of a 
true science, and posterity has recognised him as the real 
father of modern naval tactics. 

When, therefore, we see such men as these proposing 



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1««1 THE HOW OF CROMWELL 21 

and carrying through the Portuguese alliance and the_ 
surrender of Dunkirk, as it were in one movement, it is_ 
dear that, as was always asserted at the time, the two 
transactions were parts of one great design. It is clear 
too that that design was the expression of all that was 
most vigorous and sagacious in the expanding sentiment 
of the nation, the product of the forces and feeling that 
had been forming it for a century past, and the finger- 
post of the characteristic British policy whose most notable 
and enduring features are expansion beyond the Oceans 
and domination of the Mediterranean Sea. It was Crom- 
well who sounded the note and Cromwell who gave the 
means for carrying it to action — Cromwell who 9 as his 
.best historian has said, was the greatest because the 
most typical of Englishmen of all time. So it was the 
greatest and most typical of Englishmen who carried the 
idea into being — men who represented the central stream 
of British opinion — for, of the four, two were the most 
sober of the Stuart councillors, and two the most moderate 
of Cromwell's men-at-arms. 

The failure of the policy to secure the immediate and 
wide results that were very pardonably expected from it 
soon came to obscure its true intention, and, instead of 
being regarded as a loyal effort to take up the bow of 
Cromwell, it has survived as the emblem of the Stuart 
fatuity. But we have only to follow the history of the 
Tangier episode to see how unjustly posterity has 
judged it. We have only to see how profound was the 
impression in Europe, how nearly success was achieved, 
and how stoutly Charles clung to bis original idea while 
one after the other all his fondest illusions were shattered, 
to appraise the matter at its true value. 



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CHAPTER XX 

THE FIRST OCCUPATION OF THE STRAITS 

For the student of history there is no more dangerous 
pitfall than the temptation to attach too much reality to 
the periods which historians shape for the elucidation of 
their work. It is so easy to fall into the error of thinking 
that, because those periods are clearly defined to us, they 
were also apprehended by the men of the time. Yet 
there have been pauses in the great march of events which 
were always unmistakable, and such a one is that which 
is marked by the treaty of the Pyrenees. Followed as it 
was by Louis's assumption of power, by Charles's restora- 
tion, and the Portuguese marriage, it was obviously a fresh 
point of departure. Europe was plainly marshalled in a 
new order, and every one was watching for the first 
indication of its outcome. 

Since the signature of the treaty in 1(559 until the 
middle of the year 1661 the statesmen of Western Europe 
had been occupied exclusively with the setting of the 
board. It was the sailing of Sandwich's fleet that was 
the first move, and as on June 19 he weighed for the 
Mediterranean' every eye was upon him. It is true his 
ostensible mission was nothing more serious than to bring 
Algiers to reason, and doubtless the alleged object was 
more than a mere pretence. The security which Crom- 
well had given to the Levant trade had done much to 
reconcile the powerful merchant interest to his govern- 
ment, and Charles could not afford to do less. But no 



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1661 A WARLIKE OUTLOOK 23 

one believed there was not much beyond. Estradas 
assured his master that the design on Algiers was a mere 
blind to cover an attempt to intercept the Spanish Plate 
fleet which Sandwich was to make in concert with a 
Portuguese squadron. ' It will certainly happen/ he added, 
' if things do not change.' l 

Indeed it seemed that the step that England was 
about to take was of so high an import that it must in- 
evitably precipitate a war between the chief maritime 
powers. The Spanish Ambassador in London, as we 
know, was openly threatening hostilities if Charles per- 
sisted in his design to occupy Tangier. In Holland the 
sky was scarcely less stormy. The Dutch were still in a 
state of war with Portugal over affairs in the Far East 
and in Brazil, and the English marriage treaty naturally 
left it uncertain as to how far Charles intended to make 
the Portuguese cause his own. Like him therefore they 
determined to fit out a squadron to act against the cor- 
sairs in the Mediterranean, and De Ruyter was given the 
command. Against the Barbary states they had griev- 1 
ances enough, but it is clear they were not De Buyter's 
first object any more than they were Sandwich's. A fleet 
of East Indiamen was due to arrive in the Texel. In view 
of the stormy relations with England, it was coming home 
North-about round Scotland, and instead of proceeding to 
the Straits De Ruyter was ordered to the Doggerbank to 
cover its home-coming. This duty accomplished he re- 
turned to the Texel, where he was met with the news that 
Sandwich had sailed to the southward, and that with the 
utmost speed he was to prepare his fleet to follow him. 
His corsair story, as usual, was nowhere believed. Every 
one smelt a fresh attack on Portugal in the wind. 1 Nor 
were they far wrong. The idea in the mind of the States 
1 Uttru ffitiitrades, 144, July M, 1601. • HuL MS8. Com. ▼. 1ft 



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21 FIRST OCCUPATION OF HIE STRAITS 1661 

was that De Bay ter should endeavour, in concert with the 
Spaniards, to prevent Sandwich molesting the Plate fleet. 
To this end a second squadron under Cornelia Evertzen 
was being brought forward to reinforce him, and on 
July 19, just a month after Sandwich had sailed, De 
Buyter stood down Channel after him, bound for Cadiz, 
but fully expecting to have to fight his way into the port 
through an Anglo-Portuguese fleet. 1 To this delicate 
situation must be added the fact that the Dutch had just 
concluded a successful war in the Baltic. They were in- 
deed fast recovering from the blows which Cromwell had 
dealt them, and it was a moment when they were little 
likely to sit down quietly under the new bid that England 
was making for maritime supremacy in the Levant and 
the Far East. Nothing therefore looked more probable 
than a great naval war, in which England and Portugal 
would be arrayed against Spain and Holland. Such a 
catastrophe was all that France could desire, and, judging 
by the line which Louis was soon to take, it is even 
possible that the prospect had no little to do with the 
encouragement he had given to the English King. 

Thus, as the Earl of Sandwich's fleet swept southward, 
it could only appear as the opening move of a naval drama, 
of which no one could foresee the end. He was first in 
the field, and, finding that as yet all was quiet, he held 
on straight for Algiers. The weather, however, proved so 
adverse that he could not make the place, and as he was ill 
it was decided to run for Alicante. It was only a bout of 
fever, and so soon as the admiral was better they sailed 
again and appeared before Algiers at the end of July. 
The Dey proved obdurate, and as a bombardment failed 
to bring him to reason it was decided to make a formal 

1 0. BADdt, La Tude Xlichtl de Rniter, Amsterdam, folio, 1698, p. 159. 



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1661 SANDWICH AND DE RUYTER »5 

attack on the mole. For a week, however, the weather 
kept obstinately foul, and by the end of that time, as 
in ManseU's case, the Algerines succeeded in making a 
formidable boom which seriously changed the prospects 
of the contemplated operation. In the existing state of 
affairs it was impossible to submit the fleet to any great 
risk, and in council of war it was decided to abandon the 
attempt. Sandwich, moreover, was now due at Lisbon to 
take up his mission as Envoy Extraordinary to settle the 
final details of the marriage. He therefore ordered 
Lawson, his vice-admiral, with ten sail to maintain the 
blockade and bring the Dey to reason by the destruction 
of his marine at sea, while he himself with five sail, in 
accordance with his original instructions, held away for 
the Tagus. 1 About the Straits he encountered De Buyter 
and politely returned his salute, though without lowering 
his flag. He even gave him a full account of his failure 
at Algiers, and then passed on his way. By this time 
De Buyter had received the whole of his reinforcements, 
but far from proceeding against the corsairs he was cleaning 
his ships in batches at Cadiz, ready for his real orders 
when they reached him. Scarcely had Sandwich left him 
when he received despatches that informed him of the 
mystery of his mission. With the utmost secrecy he was 
to open communications with the Duke of Medina-Celi, 
Governor of Andalusia, and to concert with him measures 
for defending the Plate fleet against Sandwich and the 
Portuguese. Thereupon he promptly followed in the 
British admiral's wake and put into Cadiz.* 

Some such move was of course expected by Sandwich, 

1 See three letters to Pepye, dated September 10-11, pnbllihed in 
Hodghin M88. (Hist. MSB. Cam. rr. ii.), p. 163-9, and Sandwich's 'Di*? • 
inKennet'tiieptfor. 

1 VitdeDeBuiUr.fr Ml. 



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36 FIR8T OCCUPATION OF THE 8TRATT8 1661 

but at present he had no instructions to bring pressure 
upon Spain. As yet she had given no sign of movement 
to resist the British occupation of the Straits. On the 
contrary, her Ambassador in London had been told to 
moderate his tone. Still that in no way relaxed Charles's 
warlike preparations. The second fleet, with a formidable 
military force, was being organised under the Earl of 
Peterborough. It could only be intended for Tangier, 
and there was little doubt that the quietness of Spain 
covered some deeper design to forestall him. Moreover, 
relations with Holland over the Portuguese question had 
become more strained than ever, owing to the presence of 
De Buyter at the storm centre and to Charles's opposing 
their claim to trade with his new ally on an equal footing 
with the English. 1 The cloud that hung over Western 
Europe was daily growing darker, and at the end of 
August Sir Richard Fanshaw was appointed Envoy 
Extraordinary to Lisbon in order to relieve Sandwich 
and free his hand for action, while in the following week 
Peterborough's commission to command the Tangier 
expedition was signed. The military force was to consist 
of four foot regiments numbering three thousand men 
and a troop of a hundred horse. Part were to be newly 
raised and part made up from the Dunkirk garrison, and 
the whole was to be accompanied by a powerful naval 
escort* Such a force took no little time to prepare. Thus, 
long before Peterborough could get away, De Ruyter's 
fleet, by still further reinforcements, had been brought up 
to its full strength of over twenty sail, besides vessels up 

1 Fanshaw's instructions, Heathcote MSS, p. 19. 

* For Peterborough** commission and details of the troops, see Colonel 
Davis, Bittory of the Second Queen'* Royal Regiment* a work in which the 
mother has printed or abstracted practically all the really important docn- 
ssssjts relating to the English occupation of Tangier from a military point 
of view* 



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1661 ON THE BRINK OF WAR 27 

the Straits on convoy service, and the situation had become 
in the highest degree critical. The English Government 
was fully sensible of the difficulties before them, and with 
a man like Monk as war minister they were well pre- 
pared to meet them. A peculiar danger was, as they had 
reason to fear, that in spite of the marriage treaty Peter- 
borough might not be admitted to Tangier. A clause 
in his instructions specially contemplates such an eventu- 
ality. In case he found it so he was to return home, if — 
and this is the significant condition — ' if upon joint advice 
with Lord Sandwich you shall not agree upon some 
further design for our service.' He had also, be it noted, 
express power to occupy any place that might be in a 
state of hostility to the British realm. Clearly, if Spain 
interfered, Spain was to suffer. She was especially 
anxious — and not without cause — not only about the 
Plate fleet but also about Gibraltar. Before she knew 
she could rely on a Dutch squadron, a message had been 
sent out to the Indies to divert the flota away from Cadiz 
and order it to Corana instead, while at the co6t of 
dislocating the military operations against Portugal large 
reinforcements were thrown into the Bock. 

As yet, however, nothing was done openly on either 
side. Lawson was still operating before Algiers, blockad- 
ing the port and playing havoc on its shipping with his 
cruisers. All September De Buyter, in accordance with 
his secret orders, lay about Cape St. Vincent to cover the 
Plate fleet, while Sandwich remained in the Tagus doing 
honour to the new Queen of England and gracing the 
marriage rejoicings. In the first days of October, how- 
ever, an alarm reached him that a combined Dutch and 
Spanish fleet was off Tangier. He had by this time ten 
sail under his orders, and in the midst of the festivities he 
suddenly put to sea and sent forward a despatch vessel to 



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28 FIRST OCCUPATION OF THE STRAITS 1661 

Algiers to summon Lawson to his aid. A week later he 
was before Tangier, bat not a sign of an enemy was to be 
seen, and in five days Lawson appeared. Tangier was 
still safe, but the situation was 'as strained as ever. 
De Bnyter had moved down to the Straits. Lawson, on 
his way from Algiers, had actually spoken with him off 
Malaga. The Dutch admiral informed him that he was 
there to make war on the corsairs. As a matter of fact, 
although De Buyter bad no intention of leaving the Straits 
till further orders, he was for the moment devoting his 
attention to the pirates. By the end of September he had 
been informed that the Plate fleet was safe in Coruna, and 
be had at once taken steps to employ his squadron in the 
business upon which it had ostensibly come out. Lawson 
was engaged in the same quest, and with rough ingenuity 
begged De Buyter to communicate his private signal that 
they might co-operate more easily. De Buyter, too old 
a hand to be drawn by so barefaced a confidence trick, 
refused, and with this information Lawson had joined 
Sandwich at Tangier. 1 

Clearly in the eyes of the two British admirals De 
Buyter was not to be trusted, and all October and Novem- 
ber they lay where they were, watching, with a division 
continually out in the ' Gut ' of the Straits. Their force 
was none too strong nor their stores too plentiful, and as 
the weeks passed by without any news of Peterborough 
having sailed, Sandwich began to grow anxious. It was 
not till December 9 that the Dunkirk regiments were em- 
barked, and tbis week the situation at Tangier grew in 
excitem e nt. Sandwich's cruisers had got touch with a 
Dutch fleet in the Straits. One of his captains came in 
to report that Sir John Lawson had been seen ' flying to 

1 Vk d§ De Rutier, p. 168. 



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1661 CRISIS AT TANGIER 29 

windward amongBt several of the Dutch fleet/ and that he 
had sighted seven of their men-of-war coming oat of the 
Straits close aboard the Spanish coast, as though making 
for Cadiz. 1 The tension now grew extreme. A combined 
Dutch and Spanish squadron might appear at any 
moment to force an action before Peterborough could 
join. De Buyter's ships were continually being seen 
hovering about, and Sandwich and Lawson, with the 
fleet in two divisions, took up positions on either side of 
the Straits in keen expectation of a fight. There they 
watched day after day, shadowing the Dutch ships and 
ready for immediate action, till at last it was known that 
De Ruyter, with the bulk of his squadron, had retired to 
Port Mahon in Minorca to careen. 1 The crisis passed, 
Lawson was despatched back to Algiers, and Sandwich 
remained on guard alone. 

No sooner, however, was one danger over than another 
arose in its place. Just as the home Government had 
anticipated, the Moors were pressing round Tangier in a 
way that began to look ugly, and presently Sandwich 
received word from the 'Emperor of Fez 9 that the 
Spaniards were urging him to prevent the English getting 
hold of Tangier. 3 Similar information came in from 
other quarters. The admiral, according to a correspon- 
dent, was continually getting intelligence of the great 
endeavours in all parts of the world to prevent his 
Majesty possessing so considerable a place. 4 So serious 
indeed did the Moorish attitude grow that the Portuguese 
Governor, who was sullenly opposed to giving up the place 
to any one, was compelled to apply to Sandwich for a 
promise of assistance if his position became really 

1 Davis, 36. 

• Sandwich's « Journal' in Rennet's Reguter; VisdsDe Ruitmr, p. ISA. 

• Kstrades to Louis, February ft, 1663 (Lettru et Mima** cP Ettromm). 
« Luke's Loiter, February 17, 1663 (ALP. Colonial, Tangier*). 



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» FI11ST OCCUPATION OP THE STRAITS 1602 

dangerous. There was a growing suspicion that a secret 
understanding with the Moors was the real means by 
which Spain in her helplessness hoped to prevent the 
surrender of Tangier. But if it was really on Moorish 
activity she relied for her end, her hand was ill -played, 
and it suddenly turned the game against her. On 
January 12, 1662, the Portuguese Governor, galled by the 
increasing pressure about him, sallied out for a foray. 
On his way he fell into an ambush and was killed. The 
result naturally was to embolden the hovering enemy still 
further, and a panic seized the garrison. In despair they 
sent to beg the British admiral for help. Sandwich was 
no man to let such an opportunity slip. Without a 
moment's hesitation he landed a large force of seamen 
under Sir John Stayner, his rear-admiral, and from that 
moment was practically in possession of the coveted port. 
At the same time Peterborough, with a fleet of nineteen 
sail, besides transports, was sailing at last from the Downs, 
and before January was out he had anchored in Tangier 
Bay. 

Thus England had won the first point in the great 
game that was developing, and so far from Charles's 
policy having destroyed his prestige, the strength and 
decision he had displayed pointed quite the other way. 
No other power could show a success to put beside the 
hold which Charles had fixed upon the gates of the 
Mediterranean, nor had one of them seen its way to 
lifting a finger against him. Holland had threatened 
with De Buyter's fleet, and it had accomplished nothing. 
The impotence of Spain was proclaimed aloud as her 
treasure fleet slunk home to a remote and inaccessible port. 
France had cut a scarcely more imposing figure. Through 
the greater part of the year 1661 a fleet had been in 
preparation in Brest and Bochelle under M. de Nieuchese 



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1662 TANGIER A BRITISH PORT SI 

and Du Quesne. It was destined for the Mediterranean, 
but not till the opening of 1662 was it able to assemble ; 
and when at last it sailed in February it was only to be 
shattered by a storm and driven back to Bochelle. The 
intention had been that it should be joined in the 
Mediterranean by a squadron from Touloq ; but there 
things were even more behindhand ; and when the 
English flag was raised over Tangier castle, Charles was 
undisputed master of the seas. 1 

The contrast between the maritime position which 
England had won and that of France quickly brought 
home to Louis the mistake he had made, and before the 
English had been in Tangier a month he began to repent 
the countenance he had given to the move. As has been 
said, he probably had no idea the thing would be accom- 
plished so easily. He had rather hoped to see the great 
maritime nations engaged in a mutually destructive 
struggle which would give breathing time for his own 
navy to grow up. Instead of this he found his naval 
position alarmingly weakened, and was face to face with 
the galling fact that the most formidable of the sea 
powers was securely established at the most important 
strategical point in the world. 

To appreciate his nervousness we must remember that 
it was only two years since Charles Gustavus had attempted 
to secure the domination of the Baltic by seizing both 
sides of the Sound, and so alarming was the prospect that 
all the sea powers had combined to frustrate his intention. 
It was on this business that Sandwich had been occupied 
when he was summoned back to England with his fleet 
by the events which immediately preceded the Restora- 
tion. Now it happened that while the French Atlantic 
and Mediterranean squadrons lay helpless in port the 

1 Jal, Du Qimjm*, L 846 §t «g« 



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32 FIRST OCCUPATION OF THE STRAITS 1662 

young King was informed that Sandwich's captains, 
operating from Tangier, were surveying and taking 
sonndingB in places, which aroused his gravest suspicions. 
He was convinced that the English meant to establish 
themselves in the Straits in such a way that they would 
be able to make of it another Sound, and exact a toll from 
every ship that passed. With Colbert already at his 
elbow his hopes of power were based on the expansion of 
French commerce. Here at the outset was the prospect 
of an intolerable check, and he wrote to his Ambassador in 
England to impart his fears and bid him find out what 
was intended. 1 The results of the Ambassador's inquiries 
appear to have done little to quiet his master's appre- 
hensions. Whatever else Sandwich and his captains 
were doing they had certainly already taken soundings to 
determine the position of a great mole which Peterborough 
was authorised to commence at Tangier, and experts 
and skilled masons were being sought for in Genoa and 
Leghorn, where the two most recent harbours had been 
constructed. 

The energy and directness which the English Govern- 
ment were displaying in the matter are startling to us 
who know to how low a level Charles's administration 
was to sink. To the men of that day it must have seemed 

1 Lettrts et Mtmoire* d*E strode*, Feb. 26, 1662. Louis's words arc 
carious. He speaks of a suspected project of the English to take the 
• Alboosiennes Islands. 1 By this he can only mean either * Alboran Island,' 
which lies midway between Capes Oata and Tres Furcas, or what is now 
called 'Albucemas Island/ on the Biff coast about a hundred miles within 
the Straits. In eighteenth century charts it is marked as ' Albousemez.' 
Is is difficult to see how the occupation of either place could have increased 
the strength of the English position. The inference is either that Louis 
■Mffcunlr the character or position of the islands, or else that he had reason 
to believe that Tangier would not be given up to the English, and was afraid 
thai* in spite of the schemes that were on foot to prevent them, they were 
I to establish themselves somewhere or other in the mouth of the 
n— if not at Tangier, then at Albucemas or Alboran* 



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A ROSE-COLOURED DAWN 33 

that England was destined to rise only higher and higher 
from the point to which Cromwell had raised her, and 
Charles's dream of empire must have begun to look very 
like reality. ' Our main design ' — so Peterborough's in- 
structions ran — ' in putting ourself to this great charge for 
making this addition to our dominions being to gain our 
subjects the trade of Barbary and to enlarge our dominions 
• in that sea, and advance thereby the honour of our crown 
and the general commerce and wealth of our subjects/ l 
So the pleasure-loving King, whom posterity has come 
to regard as a mere feather-headed libertine, announced 
a true Mediterranean policy. It was the first official 
declaration that England must become a Mediterranean 
power, a distinct and bold advance upon the idea of mere 
commerce protection that had preceded it. Nor must it 
be imagined that it was not in reality the voice of Charles 
that spoke. At this time his interest and earnestness in 
public aflairB, and especially in all matters connected with 
the navy and imperial expansion, were real and active. 
With a united nation at his back, as it seemed, and sur- 
rounded by the best of Cromwell's men and his own, it 
was natural for him to believe that the power behind him 
was irresistible and fully equal to the achievement of his 
high ambition. 

Everything seemed to give way before the prestige he 
had acquired. Lawson had done his work so thoroughly 
that in April he exacted a treaty from Algiers, and later 
in the year concluded similar arrangements with Tunis 
and Tripoli.' The French fleet, on the other hand, only 
further covered itself with contempt, and fell a prey to 
the evils which Mazarin had tried so hard to uproot. It 

1 S J\ Colonial, Tangier, i. No. 8. 

' Kennel's Regitter, 697 ; Fanshaw to See. Morlce, Dee. 11-11, 1661; 
Heathcot* MS8. 61 ; Pepyt' Diary, Nov. 80. 



VOL. II. 



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34 FIRST OCCUPATION OF THE STRAITS 1662 

will be remembered that in 1650, when things were going 
hard with him, he had found it necessary for the Queen- 
mother to resign the Grand Mastership of the Navy in 
order that it might be used to conciliate the powerful Due 
de VendAme, the King's uncle. Not only was it vested in 
him, but it was entailed on his issue ; and now his son, 
the young Due de Beaufort, had joined the fleet to serve 
his apprenticeship to the high office for which he was 
destined. With such a volunteer on board the admirals 
naturally soon found they were no longer in real com- 
mand, and discipline went by the board. It was not till 
March that they managed between them to get through 
the Straits and commence operations. Still Beaufort 
and the admirals did nothing but quarrel. The junior 
officers followed suit; and though Louis had declared 
war magnificently on all the Barbary states, the fleet did 
nothing but make an ineffective cruise along the African 
coast, and then ignominiously put into Toulon empty- 
handed. 1 The situation was all the more annoying be- 
cause Louis was bent on establishing a foothold in Africa 
similar to that which Charles had secured at Tangier, and 
the engineer he had sent out to select a spot had just 
returned with a report in favour of Stora, the modern 
Philippeville, between Tunis and Algiers. But such was 
the disorganisation at Toulon that there seemed little 
hope of getting an expedition started. The jealousy and 
suspicion which the French authorities displayed towards 
the English marks clearly the prevalent feeling. In 
March Lawson had been refused victual at Toulon. In 
July three other English vessels put in to refit, and Du 
Quesne was sure it was but an excuse to see what pre- 
parations were being made there. Possibly it was so ; for 
De Buyter, who still lay at the Balearic islands awaiting 

1 Jal, Du QttfifM, 807 #f «#j M and 184, n. 



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1662 TANGIER AND THE LANGUEDOC CANAL 

orders, had detached two ships thither, and it is possible 
the English were shadowing them. At any rate, Da 
Qaesne reported, with one of his spiteful snarls at his 
superiors, that he was taking the greatest care that the 
Englishmen saw nothing in the state of affairs which, 
might arouse their contempt for the French navy. ' If 
that should happen/ he wrote, 'nothing could console 
me. M 

It is, however, in another project which at this time 
began to occupy the French King's mind that we seem 
to see the most noteworthy effect of the English success. 
For some time past a provincial official called Bicquet 
had been making preliminary surveys to determine the 
possibility of connecting the Atlantic with the Mediterra- 
nean by a canal through Languedoc. Whether it was by 
the instructions of the Government is not clear, but 
in November 1662 he laid his scheme before Colbert, 
pointing out that if the project were put into effect the 
Straits of Gibraltar would cease to be a postage ntces- 
zaire for France, and that the bulk of the trade, which 
found an emporium in Cadiz, would be diverted to French 
ports. Heroic as was this remedy for the defects of the 
French position, it was immediately taken up in all 
seriousness. Detailed surveys were ordered ; by the 
spring of 1663 they were complete; and a commission 
was appointed to report on the execution of the gigantic 
work. 8 

Meanwhile the English were equally busy strengthen* 
ing their hold on the Straits. It became clearer every 
day that they were not to be permitted to enjoy calmly 
the vantage point they had gained. The Spaniards and 
Dutch were negotiating for a joint fleet against Algiers— 

1 Hodgkin MSS. 16S ; Jal, Du Quans, 275. 

* Eutoirs da Rkquet, p. 804 Ao.; L$Uru de Colbert, toL W. jmnm* 



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36 FIRST OCCUPATION OF THE STRAITS • 1668 

in itself a suspicious indication. In Cadiz the Duke of 
Albuquerque was preparing a powerful armada. Fan- 
shaw had reason to believe the Spanish Government was 
in communication not only with the Dutch but also with 
Guylan, the ' Emperor of Fez/ who by this time had 
made himself master of the whole of Morocco, with the 
exception of Salee, Tetuan, and the Spanish port of 
Ceuta. He had appeared in the neighbourhood of 
Tangier with a formidable army. Hostilities were con- 
stantly occurring between his men and the British 
garrison, till it was thought well to make a serious sally. 
On May 3 it was attempted ; the Moors were driven 
headlong from their advanced positions ; but so hotly did 
the English troops pursue their advantage that they 
eventually found themselves surrounded, and were beaten 
back with heavy loss. For the time, however, Guylan 
had had enough, and, moving off against Tetuan, began to 
make overtures for peace. Still he was not to be trusted. 
Fanshaw believed that the intention of the Spanish 
Government was that Albuquerque should blockade 
Tangier, while Guylan suddenly returned to attack it 
from the land side. He convinced himself that this was 
the meaning of Guylan's recent appearance before the 
place, and that it was only the opportune arrival of Law- 
son from a cruise up the Straits that had frustrated the 
design. 1 Under the circumstances it was determined to 
replace Peterborough by a more experienced officer. A 
man of the right stamp was at hand in Lord Rutherford, 
the late Governor of Dunkirk. A Scottish soldier of for- 
tune, who had risen with high distinction to the rank of 

' Fanshaw to Clarendon, October SI, 1662 (HtathcoU MSS. p. 87 ; 
cL Dora, Armada Etpafiola, t. cap. iv. and App. p. 446). Albuquerque's 
feet, according at least to Ms official orders, was intended to oarer the arrival 
of the Plate fleet and then to operate against Portugal. 



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l««3 IX)RD TEVIOT MADE GOVERNOR S7 

Lieutenant-General in the French service, he repre- 
sented the last word of the Low Country school of 
military science ; and with the surrender of Dunkirk he 
was free for employment. A fat pension induced Peter- 
borough to resign, while an earldom persuaded Ruther- 
ford to take his place. In the spring of 1663 all was 
ready to make the occupation of Tangier a reality. 
Lawson had come home in the winter to replace his 
spent ships, and was ready with a fresh fleet to take out 
the new Governor with reinforcements and everything 
that was necessary for establishing a naval station. In 
spite of his growing financial embarrassments Charles 
had decided to set aside 30,0002. a year for constructing a 
harbour, and a contract to that effect had been signed. 
The contractors were Rutherford, now Earl of Teviot, 
Lawson the admiral, and Sir Hugh Cholmley, an engi- 
neer who had recently completed a pier at Whitby. 

They were welcomed at their destination by the news 
that Schomberg, at the head of his Anglo-Portuguese 
army, had inflicted a crushing defeat at the frontier upon 
Don John of Austria, the Spanish General. The victory 
greatly relieved the situation by crippling the power of 
Spanish interference at Tangier. Teviot, moreover, at 
a first view, expressed himself as highly contented with 
the place, 1 and got to work at once upon the fortifica- 
tions. Two advanced forts were commenced, and the 
whole line of outworks strengthened with calthrops, 
mines, retrenchments, and every device which the latest 
military science could suggest. Scarcely were the 
additions complete when Guylan, who had received the 
submission of Tetuan, appeared in force, and made a 
determined attack upon the new works. As the assault 

^ ■ Faaihaw to 8m. Bennet, Jane 7, 1668, HeathcoU M88. p. 110. 



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88 FIRST OCCUPATION OF THE STRAITS 1663 

was delivered between twelve and one, when the men 
were dining, it was to some extent a surprise; but, thanks 
to Teviot's scientific preparation, and the energy with 
which the troops showered hand-grenades upon the 
Moors, they were driven back with heavy loss. So soon 
as the Moors had retired, Teviot, being a man of grim 
humour, sent Guylan a letter complaining of the way he 
had chosen to pay his visit of welcome. He objected to 
being disturbed at his meals, and reminded the Moor that 
it was not customary or polite to pay calls at dinner 
time. Guylan appears to have been very favourably 
impressed. He replied in the same spirit, and a corre- 
spondence ensued which resulted in a truce for six 
months. 1 

The cessation secured, Teviot, after seeing the works 
on the mole fairly started, went home to report to the 
King and obtain the men and stores which the place 
required. His chief demand was for two hundred horse, 
for already he had grasped the importance of the offen- 
sive in oriental warfare. Nothing was denied him. He 
was thoroughly trusted, and Tangier, as Fanshaw put it, 
was regarded as one of the best cards in the English 
hand, ' which must not be trumped.' * It had been consti- 
tuted a separate department of state under what was 
called the Tangier Council, of which the Duke of York, 
Prince Bupert, Monk, Southampton, the Governor, the 
Master of the Ordnance, the Treasurer of the Navy, and 
Samuel Pepys were members. Though Pepys could 
discern something very curious in the accounts Teviot 
presented, none of the great men said a word, and he, 
like a good civil servant, held his tongue. So Teviot had 
all he asked, even the permission to take over Salee 

a Dfc¥is,a*fM9. 

• Fuuhaw toGbmdon, October 31, 1662, BeathcoU M88. p. 89. 



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1663 8PANISH INTRIGUES WITH THE MOORS SO 

castle, if it were offered him, as was not unlikely, since it 
was in the hands of Guylan's hard-pressed rival. 1 

The energy which Teviot displayed at home was no 
more than was wanted. During his absence the danger 
that had been menacing Tangier had been making head 
fast. No sooner had his back been turned than it was 
known that Quylan had had an interview with a special 
envoy from the King of Spain between Tetuan and the 
Spanish possession of Ceuta. The news was quickly 
followed by a still more serious discovery. A short time 
previously a German engineer called Martin Beckman, 
or Boeckmann, had arrived at Tangier to offer his pro- 
fessional services to the British. 1 Employment was 
refused him, but he was apparently given to understand 
that he might make himself useful as a spy in Spain. 
In any case he proceeded to Cadiz and made overtures 
to the Duke of Medina-Celi, Governor of Andalusia, 
as an expert familiar with the defences of Tangier, and 
ready to assist in the recovery of the place to the Spanish 
crown. The King authorised the Duke to take the man 
into the royal service, but desired him not to commit 
himself to anything else until they had heard further 
from Guylan. Shortly after this Beckman gave warning 
to the English Consul at Cadiz that a design against 
Tangier was on foot, and, in a few weeks, so well did he 
prosper that he secured copies of a series of letters from 
the King to the Duke of Medina-Celi, in which the whole 
plan of campaign was laid down. So at least he alleged, 
and in England the documents were believed to be 
authentic. The scheme appears to have turned mainly 

1 Pepys's Diary, September 80, 1668; &JP. Colonial, Tangier, Bundle ii. 
October 20. 

* His name is variously spelt, bat afterwards, when he rose to high 
distinction in the British senrioe, he was usually known as Sir Martin 
Bookman. 



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40 FIRST OCCUPATION OF THK STRAITS 1664 

upon the use of the galleons of the Indian Guard. At 
the moment they came in, when no one would suspect 
them of further action, instead of careening they were at 
once to proceed to sea again, and in concert with the 
Cadiz galley squadron to make a swift descent on Tangier 
and seize it by a coup de main} 

The whole of these documents were handed to Teviot, 
so that before he left England he was fully aware of 
what was on foot. Before the end of the year his 
preparations were complete, and he sailed with Lawson 
in time to reach Tangier on January 14, 1664, a week 
before the expiration of the six months' truce. A further 
move was made at the same time by sending Sir Richard 
Fanshaw as Ambassador to Madrid with instructions to 
mediate between Spain and Portugal, and among other 
matters to request immediate permission for British ships 
to use the Spanish ports in the Balearic islands and the 
Two Sicilies, and especially Port Mahon in Minorca. 
To further enable him to force the Spanish hand he 
too was furnished with copies of Beckman's docu- 
ments. 1 

On Teviot's arrival he found that the Acting-Governor, 
anxious at the approaching termination of the truce and 
having no news of his chief's return, had procured its 
prolongation for two months on condition that nothing 
further should be done on the mole or the forts. To 
this Teviot politely told Guylan he could not agree, as 
his master had ordered him to proceed with the works. 
Hostilities consequently reopened, and at the end of 

1 The King of Spain to the Duke of Medina-Ccli, September 22 (o.s.) 
1S6S (Btatkcot* MSS. p. 180). Despatch of Colonel Fitsgerald, Acting- 
Governor of Tangier, October 34 (&P. Colonial, Tangier, ii.). Despatch of 
ike Cadis Consul, October 99, ibid. 

» Letters of 8w Richard Fanshaw, 1702. Instruction dated January 14, 
MSft,B.lo*a*f. 



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1664 TEVIOT DEFEATS THE MOOR8 41 

February Guylan attacked in force. After a few hours* 
defence Teviot ordered a sally, and with such judgment 
and energy was it pushed home that the Moors were 
completely defeated with the loss of a prominent general 
and his standard. They returned baffled, vowing Teviot 
was the devil himself. They had stories that he was 
invulnerable, that he never slept except leaning up 
against some of his new works, and that he had invented 
flying ships and guns that ran alone. 1 The impression 
was real and well justified. The extraordinary intuition 
he displayed for dealing with orientals marks him for a 
high place among our early proconsuls. His conduct 
after the victory further reveals his power. Some of the 
English dead had been found mutilated. Instead of 
retaliating he caused the bodies of the Moors that were 
in his hands to be washed and clothed in fine linen 
and laid on biers strewn with flowers. Then, preceded 
by a flag of truce, he and all his force in review order 
solemnly escorted them to his outermost lines and de- 
livered them to the Moors. The effect was profound, and 
the Moorish warriors with one accord bared their heads 
and ungirded their waistcloths, humbled almost to adora- 
tion. 

After the victory the works went on apace. The main 
trouble was lime, which the Spanish officials did their 
best to prevent his getting, going so far as to treat his 
men, who came to fetch it, not only as enemies but as 
rebels. Still Teviot was not disheartened. 'A gallant 
man,' he wrote, 'never wanted arms. 9 His only doubt 
was the rankling memory of Dunkirk, surrendered after 
all the energy he had spent on its fortifications. He was 
sure, he said, that in spite of every difficulty Tangier in 

' Britf Relation of th* Prtuni SiaU of Tangimrt, 1664. 



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43 FIRST OCCUPATION OF THE STRAITS 1664 

two yean 9 time, unless given up or sold, would be a very 
comfortable place and a pleasant too. 1 

Meanwhile Lawson with the fleet was exhibiting his 
characteristic activity. During the past summer the 
Algerines, in spite of the treaty, had been behaving as 
badly as ever and preying on British ships in the Straits. 
They had even captured Teviot's own ketch. To Algiers 
therefore Lawson again betook himself. By the end of 
March he had made them disgorge eighteen English 
prizes. ' But/ as he wrote, ' till it please God to make 
them feel some smart, no peace can be made with them 
but what is worse than war.' ' So he remained where he 
was, blockading the port and capturing its cruisers with 
his wonted success till the work was interrupted about the 
end of May by a melancholy summons. 

One of those sudden disasters had occurred which 
were destined to become so familiar to British arms on 
African soil. All through April, by a well-conceived 
series of reconnaissances and patrols, Teviot had been 
pushing his enemy further and further back while he 
completed the lines which he considered the nature of 
the ground demanded. His officers delighted to say, he 
fought with one hand while he built with the other, and 
that it was only half his business to beat the Moors. On 
May 3, the anniversary of the disaster in Peterborough's 
time, he was engaged in another such operation in force. 
He was acting with his usual boldness and with all the 
skill and care that his high experience could suggest, 
when in a wooded place he suddenly found himself and 
his staff cut off by the enemy and his troops surrounded 
by overwhelming numbers. In spite of the steadiness of 

• T*rk* to Con**] Wwtoombe at Cadi*, April 15, 1664, HtathcoU M8S. 
148;Itori*,6a. 

• I«wmi to F*n*h*w, Iferah 98, 1664, HeathcoU M8S. p. 148. 



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1664 SURPRISE AND DEATH OF TEVIOT 43 

the men, practically the whole force was annihilated. 
Some thirty-five officers and gentlemen volunteers and 
nearly four hundred rank and file were killed, and with' 
them Teviot himself. Not ten men, it was said, escaped 
to bring the tale, and they told how the Governor had 
seized a hill with all the men he could rally, and there 
had died fighting to the last and dealing death around 
him. So perished a gallant and accomplished Scottish 
soldier, the first of a long list of others like him who 
were to lead the stormy way that Great Britain had 
begun to tread. Years afterwards Pepys was assured on 
the spot that the death of Lord Teviot was the fate of 
the place, ' for he took all the ways to have made it 
great.' l 

Their victory won, the Moors flung themselves upon 
the British lines, but only to learn that if the Devil was 
dead his spirit lived. They were hurled back, and so 
great were Guylan's losses in the two actions that. for a 
while he was forced to leave the place in peace. Then a 
reaction set in. The garrison became demoralised and 
mutinous. The opportune arrival of two royal frigates 
availed to check the evil, but all was not safe till Lawson, 
who had flown to the rescue at the first summons, 
appeared in the bay with the bulk of his squadron. 

1 Smith, Life, Journal, and Ccrrupond*nc$ of Sammd Papfo (Tanpar 
Diary), i. 444. 



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CHAPTER XXI . 

TANGIER AND ITS ENEMIES 

Tragic as was its conclusion, the governorship of Lord 
Teviot had firmly established the British occupation of 
the Straits. It was none too soon. New danger was in 
the air, and Lawson's ready response to his summons 
was doubly welcome. ' Sir John Lawson,' wrote Fan- 
shaw on June 5, 1664, ' is now at Tangier worthily con- 
cerned for a place of that consequence after so great a. 
I06S as it lately sustained, and especially when the 
rumours are so hot of a war with Holland/ For the 
old quarrel was burning into a flame again, and on all 
sides the horizon looked dark for England, and especially 
for her Mediterranean power. Holland steadily refused 
redress for the outrages which English merchants had 
suffered, and De Ruyter with a fresh ' corsair ' squadron 
had been sent down to the Straits. The States had 
requested the British Government to co-operate with him 
against Algiers ; but, although they had a squadron ready 
under Sir Robert Holmes ostensibly for that purpose, 
they had refused, and Holmes had sailed to the south- 
ward. His real orders were to run down to Cape Verde 
and there exact reprisals upon the ships and factories of 
the Dutch East India Company. At the time this was 
of course a secret, but the worst was suspected, and 
De Buyter received orders to keep a careful watch on 
Lawson. Spain too was still hostile and known to be 



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1664 rr8 GROWING IMPORTANCE 46 

in communication with Guylan. France, far from 
friendly, had a powerful expedition on the point of 
sailing from Toulon, and no one knew its destination. 

The strategical value of Tangier had never been so 
apparent, and everything seemed to threaten it. ' Guy- 
lan/ continued Fanshaw in the despatch already quoted, 
'hath been at them again, but bravely repulsed. The 
truth is, I believe there is no nation that knows Tangier 
which doth not wish it in any hand rather than that in 
which it is.' Charles was equally impressed with its 
importance. Neither danger nor disaster could shake 
his determination to hold the vantage point he had won. 
A new Spanish ambassador was sent to London to pro- 
pose friendly terms upon which the place might be sur- 
rendered; but it was only to receive from the Sing's 
Jips an answer so sharp as to make further discussion of * 
the subject impossible. So soon as Teviot's disaster was 
known in England, Colonel Fitzgerald, an Irish officer 
who had formerly been Deputy-Governor, was sent out 
with reinforcements to take charge, and he actively pro- 
ceeded to complete Teviot's works. By the middle of 
July, Fanshaw could write home again, ' Now that all is 
exceedingly well at Tangier, even before the recruits' 
arrival, give me leave to say my thoughts : that, whether 
the King have peace with all the world or must have 
war with all the world, nothing like Tangier, with the 
mole speedily finished to perfection, in order to the 
quiet enjoyment of the one or vigorous prosecution of 
the other.' l 

The far-reaching ideas of which Tangier was the 
symbol showed no sign of abating. At this time was 
published a rose-coloured account of the place, and the 
apology the author makes for it in his preface is highly 

UtUrt, p. 166, to See. Bennei, July 19-29, 1664. 



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46 TANGIER AND ITS ENEMIES 1664 

significant. He justifies the costly works: 'Firstly, 
because here is set down the great passage to the wealth 
of Africa and America, where an acre of ground is a 
barony and a rood a duchy. Secondly, because this and 
the country round is like to be that renowned scene of 
action which will render us considerable in this last age 
of the world. The French intend to make themselves 
famous by seeking out a convenient footing in this 
country; no doubt we shall be so also for keeping 
ours/ 1 

Such enthusiasm was certainly not without justifica- 
tion at the moment. By this time the atmosphere in the 
Mediterranean was clearing. All through the summer 
Lawson and De Ruyter hod been watching one another, 
each suspecting the other of an intention to make some 
sudden attack. About August Lawson began to get the 
upper hand. Thanks, to Fanshaw's diplomacy and 
Charles's resolute attitude the Spaniards at least officially 
had recognised the status quo at Tangier, and were turn- 
ing their backs on the Dutch. Lawson was allowed 
liberty of Spanish ports for water and cleaning, while 
De Ruyter was everywhere refused pratique. Thus, as 
Lawson shifted between Cadiz and Malaga, Tangier and 
Algiers, keeping his fleet clean and well furnished, 
De Ruyter was at his wit's end to keep his eye on him, 
and every day his ships grew fouler. One day, early in 
September, the two admirals met off Malaga. Lawson 
had been informed by the Spaniards that De Ruyter had 
just received orders so pressing that the courier who 
carried them had travelled from Holland in seven days. 
With cordial civilities he did his best to find out what 
the orders were, and, failing, held away to cover Tangier. 
The fact was that news had come of Holmes's reprisals 

1 A Ducripfam of Tangimrg, 1664. 



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1664 EVE OF THE SECOND DUTCH WAR 47 

at Cape Verde. The mysterious orders which De Ruyter 
had received were that he was to follow him with 
all speed, and a few weeks later, after vainly trying to 
careen his ships at Cadiz, he disappeared out into the 
Atlantic. 1 

The French danger had also passed. The Toulon 
expedition, which had grown to sixty sail of war-ships, 
galleys, and transports, after ominously assembling at 
Port Mahon under the Due de Beaufort and Du Quesne, 
had sailed away up the sea, and were soon busy with 
Louis's African venture to the eastward of Algiers, and 
well away from the British sphere of action. Tangier 
was left in peace, with the result that by October the 
whole of the lines and outworks which Teviot had pro- 
jected were complete, and thus, as the war drew nearer 
and nearer, Colonel Fitzgerald felt he was able to take 
good care of himself and his charge.' In view of the 
now inevitable war with Hollaed, Lawson went home to 
take up a higher command, and Admiral Thomas Allin, 
who had been one of Rupert's captains in his pirate days 
and was then Commander-in-Chief in the Downs, came 
out to succeed him. Before he had been more than a 
month on the station he had completed Lawson's work 
by procuring from Algiers a renewal of the old treaty, 
and in reporting his success he was able to send news of 
an event beside which even Teviot's disaster must have 
seemed eclipsed.' 

Throughout the summer Beaufort with his formidable 
force had been busy making good his hold on the African 
coast. The place ultimately chosen was not Stora but 

1 Michel de Butter, p. 90S et seq. 

• Colonel Fitzgerald to Fanahaw, October 8-18, 1664, Heathcote M88. 
167. 

• Heathcote M88. Norember 18-98, 1664, p. 169. Fan$haw>e Letter* 
December 9 (u), p. 847. 



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48 TANGIER AND ITS ENEMIES 1664 

Gigeri, now called Jigelli, a little to the westward. 1 On 
July 22 the place had been captured with considerable 
skill, but at the cost of some four hundred killed, besides 
wounded. Still the news was hailed in France, especially 
by the mercantile community, with high satisfaction, and 
a convoy was despatched from Toulon under the Marquis 
de Martel with an abundance of stores and two troops of 
hone. The idea which Louis had in his mind was the 
establishment of a permanent naval base similar to that 
which the English were creating at Tangier. Colbert, 
however, was unwilling to commit himself definitely to 
Gigeri until it was clearly ascertained to be the most 
suitable spot. He called for a report from the naval 
officers. Du Quesne, though not entirely satisfied with 
the place, thought it might be made a useful harbour, 
and there was every prospect of its being held. About 
the middle of October, Beaufort, having seen the military 
well established, moved to the westward to make an 
attempt on Bougie, leaving Martel and his vessels in the 
road. No sooner was he gone than a sort of panic appears 
to have seized the troops, and, as some said, the officers as 
well. In constant skirmishes with the enemy they had 
been suffering serious loss. In spite of their efforts their 
assailants were still pressing closer, even erecting fresh 
works, till the cry was raised that the French lines were 
no longer tenable. From hour to hour, as the enemy's 
numbers increased, the panic grew till it became uncon- 
trollable. The troops openly said that, unless the place 
were evacuated, they would desert and turn Turk, and 
finally the officers decided to re-embark them in Martel 'b 
ships. Four days after Beaufort had left, it was done- in the 
dead of night and in haste. Sick and wounded, the whole 



1 la eoatempomy doeumanto the pleoe if called Gigeri, OigherU, 
r, Gigery, Jejine, end the like. 



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1064 RIVAL PROJECT OF THE FRENCH 4© 

of the stores and baggage, guns to the number of over a, 
hundred —all were abandoned : and so in a shameless flight 
ended Louis's first attempt to extend his power in the 
Mediterranean. In France the shock was severely felt. 
Everything was done to hush up the disgrace, but tlie 
loss had been too great for concealment, and the disap- 
pointment of the merchants too deep. And to fill the 
bitter cup there was always Tangier growing every month 
in importance to show what might have been achieved. 1 

Thus, in comparison with the French misfortunes, the 
English position on the eve of Charles's first struggle for 
the dominion of the sea was highly favourable — so favour- 
able indeed that Tangier was left to shift for itself. When, 
towards the end of November, Allin returned from Algiers 
with his squadron, he found orders awaiting him to seize 
the Dutch Smyrna convoy as it attempted to pass the ' 
Straits. It was in anticipation of some such stroke that 
De Buy ter had been left shadowing Lawson all the summer ; 
but now the coast was clear. War had not yet been 
declared, though it had practically begun. By this time 
it was known that when De Euyter left the Mediterranean 
he had sailed southward against the English factories in 
Guinea in revenge for what Holmes had done. Allin's 
orders therefore were but another step into the inevitable 
struggle that had to be fought out. Unfortunately, before 
the Smyrna convoy appeared, Allin met with a severe 
disaster. One evening about the middle of December, 
having sighted wtfat he believed to be a Dutch fleet in 
the last of the daylight, he gave chase through the Straits. 
It was a foul and rainy night, and so dark that he and 
four of his captains, in their eagerness, ran themselves 
ashore on the Spanish coast near Gibraltar. Two of the 
frigates were totally wrecked, and, though he managed to 

1 Jal, Du Quunt, I 81ft-96 ; Gafein, iii. 156-8. 
VOL. II. X 



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» TANGIER AND ITS ENEMIE8 1065 

get his flagship off again, and to save the other two 
frigates, they were all severely damaged. He was in this 
plight when another Dutch fleet of fourteen sail appeared, 
in which were three men-of-war. He had now but seven 
of his nine vessels left, but he attacked at once* crippled 
as he was. The three men-of-war escaped into Cadiz. 
Of the merchantmen he sank two and captured two, one 
of which proved a rich prize. Under the circumstances 
it was a creditable achievement, and, but for the unlucky 
mishap that preceded it, would probably have accomplished 
all that had been expected. 1 

In pursuance probably of the old policy of concentra- 
tion on the enemy's main fleet, Allin was now ordered 
home with a convoy, and the Straits were abandoned to 
the Dutch. Some anxiety was felt by men on the spot. 
De Euyter was still somewhere to the southward ; three 
Dutch men-of-war were in Cadiz, only waiting for Allin' 8 
disappearance to put to sea, and private vessels were also 
being equipped. 2 To give heart to the garrison Lord 
Belasyse came out as Governor — a man of little military 
reputation, but energetic and sanguine, and a great 
person at Court. His appointment at least put an end 
to a demoralising rumour. During the winter it had 
been persistently reported that Louis, having failed at 
Gigeri, had offered to purchase Tangier, and that Charles 
had agreed to sell. Quidnuncs could even name the 
sum.* 

But the tale could not survive the arrival of Lord 

■ Allin to Fanshaw, December 17, 1664, Heatheote M8S. p. 179, and 
AJ». Dam. cri t 111. Same to same, December 35, HeathcoU MS8. p. 173 
aad&P.2X>m.eTiLf.3S. 

* 8ame to Coventry, Gibraltar Bay, January 15, 1665, HeathcoU MS8. 
p. 174. He did not get away till the end of February, ibid. p. 179. 

• Fanshaw to Lord Holies, March 39, 1665, Heatheote MSS. 168. 
W. Hhmden to Fanshaw, April 10, ibid., where he says the rumour arose 
from an English frigate transporting French treasure. 



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1665 TANGIER DURING THE WAR 51 

Belasyse,and only served to mark the increasing importance 
of the place. ' I conceive/ wrote a merchant to Fanshaw, 
'it is the most important place in Christendom for his 
Majesty and the good of our nation ; and when the mole 
is built and magazines, it may maintain itself with little 
or no charge to the Crown. It was an obscure place and 
not known till delivered to his Majesty, and now the 
whole world sees how much the case is altered by the 
change of possessor.' Fanshaw himself was entirely of 
this opinion, and his only anxiety was lest Belasyse should 
not be left ships enough, as he said, ' to make our stake 
good in the Mediterranean against an upstart fleet which 
the Dutch were then scrambling together.' 

But no squadron was spared for Tangier, though letters 
of marque were sent out for private ships ; and during the 
summer, while the war was raging in the Narrow Seas, 
the upstart Dutch fleet blockaded the port. But it mat- 
tered little. It had been fully provisioned and the mole 
was so far advanced that a battery had been established 
upon it that kept the enemy at a distance. The blockade 
was consequently loose and easily run by the British 
frigates that from time to time appeared with convoys . 
or despatches. Merchantmen too were able to use it as 
a port of refuge in running the gauntlet through the 
Straits. In the autumn a fleet of twenty Levant merchant- 
men and victuallers for Tangier, under a weak convoy, 
arrived. The Dutch attacked, and though they defeated 
the war ships, all but four of the merchantmen got safely 
into Tangier and were able to pursue their voyage. 1 The 
effect was — according to a calculation made for the first 
year of the war — that the Dutch did not capture enough 
prizes to cover much more than half the cost of main- 

1 8 J*. Colonial, Tangier, ir. t . 10. 

■ a 



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63 TANGIER AND ITS ENEMIES 1665 

taining their squadron. 1 In vain the Spanish officials in 
Andalusia did their best to thwart the progress of the 
port; in vain they continued their intrigues with Guylan. 
The place throve in spite of every difficulty ; the mole 
pushed further and further to seaward ; and in the face of 
every enemy England was slowly locking her hold upon 
the Mediterranean. 

If to Spain and Holland the situation was unendur- 
able, still more so was it to France. It was impossible 
for Louis, seeing what his ambitions were, to sit quietly 
and see his fetters forged. The first battle in the war 
had resulted in a defeat for the Dutch. It seemed cer- 
tain that, if left alone, their sea power must be crushed, 
and this Louis could not permit. It would mean that 
England, well placed as she was, would rule undisputed 
upon the seas both within and without the Straits, and 
that hers, not his, would be the inheritance of Spain. 
After an ineffectual effort, therefore, to induce England to 
make peace, he resolved to force her i.ito it by a declara- 
tion of war. 

It was no fancied danger that disturbed him. Already 
at Brussels, in view of the certainty that sooner or later 
France must throw in her lot with the Dutch, the most 
far-sighted of Englishmen was at work. No. man so 
clearly foresaw the formidable expansion of France as Sir 
William Temple, and no one so justly apprehended the 
way to curb it. As minister resident at Brussels, he 
was deep in the subject with the Spanish Viceroy, and at 
his suggestion was urging upon Charles's Government an 
offensive and defensive alliance with Spain against the 
coming danger. It was always in Flanders, since the days 
of Alva, that had sprung and thriven the idea that the salva- 



1 Ooonl Weftoombe of Cadii to Fanshaw, December 81, 166*, HtathooU 
If 55. p.! 



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1665 SIR WILLIAM TEMPLETS IDEA 63 

tion of Spain lay in an understanding with England, and 
it was from there the idea was most likely to grow to 
fruition. But in the design which Temple was formu- 
lating there was a new factor that made its possibilities 
more formidable than ever. A main feature of the pro- 
posed alliance, suggested apparently by the Viceroy, was 
that Spain should permit England to establish a naval 
base in Sardinia. With a squadron of frigates acting 
from there, and the command of the Straits at Tangier, it 
seemed that the French trade in the Mediterranean, on 
which Louis so much depended for his resources, might 
be annihilated. Temple received the idea with enthusiasm, 
and for doing so has been ridiculed even by his admirers. 
' In ascribing to our naval power, 9 says his latest biogra- 
pher, ' an overwhelming influence upon the affairs of 
Europe, Temple was not justified either by past history 
or by the events of this particular war/ ! But he is 
certainly justified by future history and the wars to come. 
Nor is it clear that, if Spain and England had united for 
naval action in the Mediterranean, the result of the par- 
ticular war might not have been radically changed. The 
French Toulon fleet, as we shall see, could never have 
passed the Straits, and the diversion, which prevented a 
decisive English victory in the Narrow Seas, would never 
have been made. 

Of that at least tKere can be no doubt whatever. The 
French plan of campaign was founded on a concentration 
of their own fleet with that of the Dutch in the North 
Sea. Beaufort, who was in command at Toulon, was to 
come out of the Straits and effect a junction with the 
Atlantic squadron under Du Quesne; and, unless they 
were in time to pass the Channel before the English fleet 
got to sea, they were to endeavour to join hands with 

1 Courtesy, Memoirt of Sir W. TVmpfc, 1S8*, L 7B. 



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64 TANGIER AND ITS ENEMIES 1666 

the Batch main fleet north-about. To formulate the 
plan was to be at once confronted with the difficulty of 
getting Beaufort out of the Mediterranean. ' To ensure 
the security of M. de Beaufort's passage,' wrote Colbert, 
• I think the only way is to increase the number of his 
vessels by uniting with them a division of those which 
are at present on the west coast, and to strengthen his 
squadron with the largest number of fire-ships possible.' 
As a further precaution he desired that the ships detailed 
for this purpose from the Atlantic ports should go down 
as far as the Straits and effect the junction there ; and 
even so Colbert was doubtful whether the operation could 
be carried out successfully unless they were sure of a 
friendly reception in Cadiz. 1 

With this project in view war was declared in January 
1666, but no sooner was the step definitely taken 
than Sir Jeremy Smith, an old Commonwealth officer, 
was despatched with a strong squadron to the Straits. 
His mission was primarily convoy duty to protect the 
Levant trade ; but Colbert saw his whole combination 
struck at the root, and sent down urgent orders to 
Beaufort to get to sea immediately, and drive Smith from 
the Mediterranean before he could enter the Straits. But 
Beaufort was unable to move. In despair Colbert ordered 
the Toulon squadron of galleys to be fitted for sea with 
all speed, for, as he said, Smith would probably be rein- 
forced before Beaufort could get at him. To spur the 
galley commander to his highest efforts he told him he 
had the chance of striking the winning stroke of the war — 
the coup de partie — in the Mediterranean.' Colbert at 
any rate did not conceal from himself where the key of 

1 Jalf Du Qmnm, L S7S. 

• Lttfrm* CoUfrf, m. L 59 and 69, February 15-35 and March 6-10, 



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1606 SIR JEREMY SMITH'S MOVE «5 

the situation lay, and the anxiety which he displayed 
certainly does not belie the importance which Temple 
had attached to naval operations in the Mediterranean. 

By the middle of February Sir Jeremy Smith reached 
Cadiz, where he was allowed to water, and during March 
he was about the Straits and in touch with Tangier with 
fifteen or sixteen frigates. The effect was immediate. 
Beaufort's intended move was checked. In vain Colbert 
dwelt on the insignificance of the English force and urged 
his admiral to attack. So long as Smith held the station 
Beaufort would not or could not stir. Seamen were hard 
to get, and yet he kept adding to his squadron and fitting 
out fire-ship after fire-ship to the derision of the English. 1 
Besides his fire-ships and auxiliary vessels he had thirty 
men-of-war of his own of all rates, and eight of the 
1 upstart ' fleet, which the Dutch had scrambled together 
and which had retired before Smith into Toulon.' Even 
so he did not move till a squadron of twelve galleys was 
ready to accompany him to the Straits. Ne^er was the 
advantage of the Tangier station more emphatically 
declared, and yet at the critical moment it was thrown 
away. 

At home the naval action of the French was not the 
gravest anxiety. Louis was also engaged in a formidable 
diplomatic campaign to isolate England by a widespread 
coalition of all the powers that had reason to be jealous 
of her predominance on the sea. In London therefore 
the Government was rightly absorbed in the importance 
of crushing the Dutch sea power before the threatened 
coalition could take effect. The campaign of the previous 

1 Lett™ de Colbert, HI. i. 69 ; Jal, Du Quun*, i. 409 ; HeaihcoU MSS. 
248. 

* It is intonating to note that Beaufort's fleet contained a hospital shin. 
The other auxiliaries were tenders or 'Matelotes' to larger ships. Jai, 
Du Qutn*, i. 890 ; HeathcoU MSS. 961. 



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M TANGIER AND ITS ENEMIES 1666 

year had fully convinced them of the necessity of concen- 
trating at all hazards an overwhelming force in the North 
Sea. Its results had been far from satisfactory. The 
main fleet had been under the Duke of York, Prince 
Rupert, and Sandwich, with Sir John Lawson as senior 
vice-admiral. At the battle of Lowestoft they had done 
well enough. But in the death of Lawson, who was 
mortally wounded in the action, the fleet lost its most 
ardent spirit, and the fruits of the victory had not been 
gathered with sufficient activity. The two Princes betook 
themselves ashore to enjoy the sweets of the victory, and 
Sandwich had been left in sole command. In his 
inadequate or unwilling hands everything that the late 
success should have secured was lost. As usual the 
Dutch were plunged into demoralising political dissensions 
over their defeat, and could not agree on the appointment 
of commanders for the next year's campaign. De Buyter 
was the only man likely to secure confidence. Everything 
depended on his safe return, and he was still no one quite 
knew where. Having taken a full revenge for Holmes's 
reprisals on the West Coast of Africa, he had proceeded 
to the West Indies, and, after doing considerable damage 
both there and off Newfoundland, was feeling his way 
home along the coast of Norway. It was a hazardous 
end to his great cruise. Encumbered with prizes, and 
with his fleet barely seaworthy, he seemed a certain prey 
to an admiral in command of the North Sea. Yet 
Sandwich, with everything in his favour, failed to inter- 
cept him. By a miracle, which he devoutly attributed to 
the special intervention of Providence, he reached the 
Texel in safety, and just in time to receive the command 
of the main fleet, and to give new heart to the despondent 
Dutch with the story of his long and eventful cruise. 
Monk at the Admiralty was naturally furious. Sand- 



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1066 MONK GOES TO SEA AGAIN 67 

wich had further clouded his reputation with some irre- 
gularities about prize money which the stern old Croni- 
wellian made the most of. A change of command became 
inevitable. The Duke of York was persuaded not to 
endanger his life further. Sandwich, to ease his fall, was 
appointed Ambassador to Spain with instructions to 
complete the negotiations which Fanshaw had been 
hitherto conducting. Rupert was to remain, but not 
alone. As usual, when in a difficulty, it was to Monk 
the country looked to save the situation. During the 
terrible year that had passed the redoubtable old General 
had remained alone in London to fight the plague when 
every one else had run away to Oxford, and he had been 
conducting single-handed practically the whole adminis- 
tration of the country. With considerable nervousness 
the King was persuaded to make a still higher call upon 
his patriotism, and sent for him to see if he could be 
induced to go to sea again. The devoted old officer 
immediately consented with the sole proviso that his wife 
must not be told ; and when it was known that Cromwell's 
right-hand man, the hero of the old war, was girding on 
his sword again, victory was regarded as certain. 

It was now apparently that the fatal though perhaps 
necessary step was taken. Monk, as we know, had 
always been in favour of sacrificing the Straits to his 
inflexible belief in concentration on the enemy's main 
fleet. Had he been aware of the inefficient condition of 
the Toulon squadron his orthodoxy might have been 
relaxed. For a time it even looked as though his old 
strategy was to be modified. While his preparations for 
the coming campaign were pushed forward with all 
possible vigour, a small squadron was detached to carry 
Sandwich to Spain. It reached Corona in the middle 
of March, while Colbert was doing his best to drive 



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68 TANGIER AND ITS ENEMIES 1666 

Beaufort to sea. In the south, where Beaufort's weak- 
ness was better known, it was naturally believed that 
Sandwich's squadron had come to reinforce Smith and 
place him in a condition to hold the Straits. But as a 
matter of fact the orders it brought were the reverse of 
what was expected. Smith and his squadron were re- 
called. It had never apparently been intended that he 
should remain longer than was necessary to collect the 
homeward bound Levant trade. Smith, moreover, was 
an officer on whom Monk placed great reliance, and such 
men, as he never ceased to lament, were growing scarcer 
every day among the crowd of dandy captains whom 
the Court inflicted on him. So once more the Straits 
were abandoned at the most critical hour. Still, Monk 
can hardly be blamed. It may be that to risk a squadron 
at the Straits would have been the more brilliant and 
dazing strategy, but it is as certain as war can be that 
had either plan of campaign been drastically carried out 
all would have gone well. 

On April 19 Beaufort at last put to sea. in ten days' 
time he was at Alicante, where he was told that Smith 
had left Cadiz homeward bound on March 25. The 
information was not accurate. Perhaps Beaufort did not 
believe it. At any rate he moved cautiously down to 
Malaga, and there anchored for further intelligence and 
to allow the galley squadron which had lost touch to close 
up. On its arrival he ventured as far as Gibraltar, and 
finding there certain assurance that Smith had gone home 
a month before, he dismissed the galleys and proceeded to 
Cadiz. Considering that Beaufort's orders were to make 
for the Straits with all speed and defeat Smith before he 
could escape, his cautious advance tells a plain tale. He 
and his officers knew their fleet too well. In fact, it was 
no fleet at all, but a mere mass of ships. Many of them 



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1066 EFFECT OF SMITH'S RECALL 59 

were not even men-of-war, but merchantmen purchased 
and hastily equipped. All were still so short of men that 
Beaufort had had to send emissaries to Algiers to redeem 
captives at any price, and in Cadiz he pressed every 
Frenchman he could find in a foreign ship. So lament- 
able was his manoeuvring that when he turned into the 
bay some Genoese, who had availed themselves of his 
convoy, declared they were ashamed to see how the 
Frenchmen handled their sails, and that ' twenty English 
frigates would rout them all to pieces/ l This was doubt- 
less too much to say ; but it is probable that if Smith, 
reinforced with Sandwich's ships, had been permitted to * 
hold his ground, Beaufort would not have attempted to 
pass the Straits until Du Quesne appeared to help him 
with the Atlantic squadron. It is certain that if single- 
handed he had made the attempt in face of so compact 
and formidable a squadron with so strong a man as 
Jeremy Smith at its head, his fleet, even if victorious, 
would have ceased to be a factor in the campaign capable 
of disturbing the English strategy in the Narrow Seas. 
As it was, with no enemy to oppose him, Beaufort got no 
further than Lisbon. Louis was nervous lest a division 
of the English main fleet might be detached against him, 
and after passing the Straits he received orders to put into 
the Tagus and remain there till Du Quesne could join 
him.* 

A very serious aspect of the strategy which the 
English Admiralty adopted was the danger to which it 
exposed Tangier. Every one believed, in view of the 
nature of Beaufort's force, that Tangier was his zeal ob- 
jective. Fortunately it was in a very favourable condition 

1 Oontul Wettoombe to Fuuhaw, Umj 1S-2S, 1666, HvUhooU M88. 
•61. 

* M. Du Quun$ 9 L 899 n. and 410. 



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00 TANGIER AND IT8 ENEMIES 1066 

for defence. A new Moorish conqueror had arisen who 
was pressing Guylan hard, and in alarm he reopened nego- 
tiations with the English Governor, which resulted in a firm 
peace. This done, Belasyse went home in one of Smith's 
frigates, leaving a certain Colonel Norwood in command. 
So satisfied was this officer with the strength of the place 
that, as Beaufort's great fleet approached, he was in no 
way disturbed. Indeed, the prospect of an attack seemed 
to him too good to be true. ' We are looking out sharply/ 
he wrote to Fanshaw, * for Monsieur Beaufort with the 
French Armada to attack, as is given out in all ports. I 
am so charitable for that nation as to think their affairs 
are not managed by such weak counsels ; for if they force 
us to set our wits to theirs we shall, to human under- 
standing, use them no better than they were treated at 
Gigeri/ 1 

Norwood was right. The counsels of France were 
not so unsound. For all the thorn that Tangier was in 
Louis's side, he was not going to risk his fleet for it. In 
ordering Beaufort to Lisbon he had told him his first duty 
was to preserve his force, which, as he said, was necessary 
for an infinity of reasons, and, inactive as it was, it did its 
work. As Beaufort lay in the Tagus, forbidden to move, 
Monk and Rupert put to sea with a fleet of eighty sail, 
dynamically superior to anything the Dutch could bring 
against them. But no sooner had they reached the 
Downs than a message came from the King to say that 
the French fleet was approaching and that Rupert was 
to proceed to the Isle of Wight to meet it with one of the 
three squadrons. Thus was Monk's strategy entirely 
upset It depended for success on throwing the whole 
weight of the British main fleet on one division of the 
allies. He had chosen it deliberately in preference to the 

1 Bmthcots MSS. p. 150, Maj 9-19, 1666. 



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1666 THE COURT SPOILS MONK'S CAMPAIGN 61 

other possible plan of keeping the Toulon fleet within the 
Straits. Yet at the worst possible moment Stuart 
futility had forced upon him a plan that was neither one 
thing nor the other, and it immediately earned its reward. 
The wind that carried Rupert to the westward brought 
out De Buyter with eighty-five sail; Monk had but 
fifty-six ; but, catching De Buyter at a disadvantage, he 
made a brilliantly conceived attack, which, if Rupert had 
only been present in support, must have inflicted a serious, 
if not a fatal, blow to the Dutch. As it was, Monk could 
achieve nothing decisive. For two days he fought single* 
handed with all his old skill and confident impetuosity. 
On the third day Rupert, having found the alarm was 
false, managed to rejoin with part of his squadron ; but, 
though the fight continued till the fourth day, the English 
were too heavily overweighted throughout for their 
superior tactics and discipline to tell, and the result of 
the King's faulty strategy or, as it more probably was, 
the Duke of York's, was a victory for the Dutch. Two 
months later, on St. James's day, the balance was re- 
dressed off the mouth of the Thames by an action which 
gave the English complete command of the sea and kept 
Beaufort ingloriously in Brest. Still the effect he had 
had on the war was never recovered. Charles's finances 
# could not stand the strain of the prolonged struggle 
against the combined forces which threatened him, and 
peace negotiations were set on foot. They received the 
support of Louis, who had gained all he desired in seeing 
the two great sea powers cripple one another, and he was 
ready to begin his long-nursed attack on 8pain. In 
May 1667 a peace congress assembled at Breda. Under 
cover of it, when things seemed to be going against them, 
the Dutch suddenly appeared in the Thames and carried 
out their famous exploit against the ships laid up at 



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« TANGIER AND IT8 ENEMIES 1667 

Chatham. Peace immediately followed, but it was still 
as the expense of Holland, for it left England in full 
possession of the Dutch colonies in North America, and 
with the smart of a humiliation which she never forgot 
or forgave. 

Her position, too, within the Straits remained un- 
shaken. In vain Louis had clamoured again and again 
for twelve frigates which the Dutch had undertaken to 
send to join his galleys in the Mediterranean. In vain, 
too, had he urged them to combine with him in inter- 
cepting the fleet which in December 1666 was starting 
to supply Tangier. The Dutch were too much disgusted 
with the part he had played in the war to disturb their 
dispositions for an end which chiefly concerned French 
interests. 1 So Tangier remained unmolested, and had 
even been able to make itself felt offensively through 
privateers which Norwood induced the merchants to 
assist him in fitting out. Nor was it only by prizes that 
it was enriched. An increasing trade was also springing 
up with other Moorish ports, and, better still, as soon as 
Louis commenced his war with Spain by the invasion 
of the Spanish Netherlands, the French merchants, who 
could no longer reside in Andalusia, began to make the 
new port their headquarters, and a flourishing trade 
•prang up which seemed to promise that the dream of 
making Tangier the great emporium of the South might 
be realised before many years were passed. 1 

1 Jal, Dm Cut**, L 412, 460, 469, 470. 

• Horwood to Lcgge, June 16, 1667, Dartmouth MS 8. p. 16, 



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CHAPTER XXII 

TANGIER AS A NAVAL STATION 

With the close of the Dutch war the English hold on 
the Mediterranean had survived the first great effort which 
France made to break it. The coalition with the Northern 
powers which Louis had arranged to isolate England fell 
to pieces, and was succeeded by the famous Triple Alliance 
which Sir William Temple negotiated between England, 
Holland, and Sweden, and the French King abandoned 
his attempt to deprive England of her commanding posi- 
tion at sea by force. 

Four years' peace, the outcome of Temple's alliance, 
were in store for her, and during that time Tangier con- 
tinued to flourish and give promise of all that was hoped 
from it. The internal dissensions of the Moors kept it 
free from serious molestation from that quarter, and the 
works went on quietly with an increasing trade. In 1668 
it was thought safe to reduce the garrison to one regi- 
ment and half a troop, and in the following year it was 
given a civil municipal government, as though it were a 
permanent part of the empire. The same year Lord 
Middleton, the cavalier soldier of fortune, who had been 
Monk's chief opponent in his famous highland campaign, 
came out to replace Lord Belasyse, and quickly displayed 
his capacity for the post. He made the civil and military 
elements pull together, encouraged the growing trade, 
and further increased the strength of the defences. Above 
all, he devoted his attention to the completion of the 



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64 TANGIER A8 A NAVAL STATION 1669 

mole. As two of the three original contractors were 
dead, the Tangier Council took over the work, and it was 
thus placed directly under the Governor. In August 1668 
Sandwich specially reported from Madrid that 380 yards 
were finished, and at the end of 1669 Cholmley, the 
engineer, said it had been making continual good progress 
for three years. During the storms of that winter, how- 
ever, a serious breach was made. It was the first sym- 
ptom of trouble, and the noise of it, as Cholmley wrote, 
* filled all the gazettes of Europe. 1 1 But if those who 
viewed the growing port with apprehension saw hope in 
the trouble, they were doomed to disappointment. It 
was found that by building the stones in massive wooden 
chests and then sinking them in their place, as had been 
done at Leghorn and Genoa, the difficulty could be over- 
come, and as soon as the system was adopted the work 
went on again merrily. 

A noteworthy effect of the progress which the place 
was making is seen in the increasing importance which 
Louis was attaching to his Languedoc canal. The plans 
had been finally passed on January 1, 1665, and the 
works had been in progress over five years. The canal 
was to have a depth of twelve feet and a surface width of 
ten 'farises,' or about sixty-four feet, a capacity which 
Colbert hoped would be enough for the largest barks, 
and even for dismantled galleys. About the time when 
he had declared war against England he had pressed the 
engineer to revise the plans with the special view of 
making the canal passable for galleys. The engineer had 
apparently reported that it was not feasible, and the 
matter dropped, but not for long. 

It was in the year 1669, after the Triple Alliance had 
forced upon France the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, that 

1 D»ri% L 96. 



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1669 PROGRESS OF THE LANGUEDOC CANAL 65 

Colbert bad set himself seriously to reconstruct the French 
navy. Following Mazarin's lead, Louis had succeeded in 
getting the Admiralty into his own hands by vesting it in 
his baby son. His ambassador in London was ordered to 
inquire diligently into the English naval administration 
and their syBtem of naval warfare. On the analogy of his 
standing army regular marine companies were established 
to provide skilled crews for the royal ships ; and on all 
sides the work of reform was earnestly undertaken as a 
preliminary that was absolutely necessary to French expan- 
sion. Among other matters the idea of making the canal 
of real strategical value was revived more emphatically 
than ever. ' In spite/ wrote Colbert to his engineer, ' of 
the reasons iu your letter and report of three or four 
years ago, I persist in telling you that if we could make 
our maritime canal and the locks practicable for galleys 
there would be nothing so greatly advantageous for the 
King's service— seeing that if some day there is war in 
yonder seas and also in the Channel, the thirty galleys, 
which we could pass by the canal, to make war during 
June, July, August, and September might very likely 
decide all the actions.' He enclosed the dimensions of a 
galley, and told the engineer he was to examine the canal 
and the locks, and, if they were not capacious enough, to 
report how they could be enlarged. The harassed officer 
naturally made difficulties over the presumed elasticity of 
his works. Six weeks later Colbert wrote again some- 
what more reasonably. * You see/ said he, • there could 
be nothing so great and considerable for the sea power 
of the King as the easy passage of his galleys from the 
Mediterranean to the ocean ; but if it is impossible think 
no more about it/ In the spring of 1670, however, he 
was still harping on the idea, but apparently nothing 
could be done. Yet the correspondence remains to mark 

VOL. II. p 



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66 TANGIER AS A NAVAL STATION 1668 

the keen appreciation that Louis had of the weakness of 
his maritime position and of the mingled obsolete and 
advanced ideas with which he sought to remedy it. The 
idea that galleys could still redress the balance of sailing 
fleets marks an almost startling failure to grasp the new 
conditions of maritime warfare, while the project of secur- 
ing interior lines by means of a ship canal anticipated the 
very latest expedients of naval strategy. 1 

The anxiety which Tangier and the condition of 
affairs of which it was the outward manifestation were 
causing in France was in marked contrast to the calm 
which the place itself was enjoying. This was in a great 
measure due to the fact that for the time it had ceased to 
be for the Mediterranean powers the most serious centre 
of interest. It was one of those rare moments when the 
intestine quarrels of Christendom were hushed, and the 
attention of its kings was called away to the greater 
struggle between East and West. At Lisbon Sandwich 
had completed Fanshaw's work, and concluded a treaty 
which finally recognised the pew kingdom of Portugal 
and set free the British troops that had been engaged in 
defending it against Spain. At Aix-la-Chapelle, under 
the pressure of the Triple Alliance, a still more important 
peace had been signed, which ended the war between 
France and Spain ; but at the same time, by vastly in- 
creasing Louis's power, marked him for the great and 
disturbing factor he was to become. The advantage 
which England gained by being able to pose as the peace- 
maker of Europe was the recognition by Spain of all her 
conquests and colonies in the West Indies and America. 
But though the pacification was due mainly to the menace 
of the Triple Alliance and the overwhelming naval power 

1 Hittoir* * Bicquet ; Ltttru <U Coltxrt, UL L 110, and voL It. 
JomIS, Aagut*. 1660, March 27, 1670 (oj.) 



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1668 THE SIEGE OF CANDIA 07 

at its command, it was directly brought about by the 
mediation of the new Pope, Clement IX. To him 
the dissensions of the powers were as heartrending as 
ever they were to his crusading forerunners. His eye* 
were fixed upon Crete, around which the Candiote war 
had been continually raging ever since Blake so nearly 
plunged into it, and where the Venetians with ebbing 
strength were still heroically holding back the Moslem 
flood. For five and twenty years Candia, like another 
Troy, had been the centre of the epic strife, pressed by 
an interminable siege, to which the adventurous spirits of 
all lands gathered to shed their blood and flesh their 
swords with all the fierce spirit of Godfrey de Bouillon 
and Richard. Still year by year the advantage ever grew 
to the Turks. All that the Papal navy and the Knights 
of Malta could do to support the exhausted Venetians 
availed but little. France, preoccupied at first with her 
intestine troubles, and then with her hunger for the 
inheritance of Spain, could spare still less to assist. As 
for England, who might have turned the scale had Crom- 
well done more than dream, she was disarmed by the 
maritime and commercial privileges she had wrung from 
the Barbary states. Holland, too, no less than England, 
France, and the minor Italian states, was more concerned 
with the advantage of the Turkish trade than with the 
Mussulman peril, and so the maritime forces of Christen- 
dom could never be brought at one. 1 But now, at last, 
when Candia was in extremity, and the old terror took a 
more glaring shape, Clement was able to arouse something 
of the lost mediaeval spirit. It was in France, which in 

1 The English refused the Venetian request lor assistance lor fear • we 
should have all our stook in Turkey forfeited.' See Arlington to Temple, 
Jan. 8, 1669 {Arlington L$Uer$ 9 I p. 884). The Dutch, it appears, 
ready to help if we would. 

F 2 



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68 TANGIER AS A NAVAL STATION 

modern times had been the most backward of all the 
Mediterranean powers against the common enemy, that 
he found the readiest response. By the end of 1668 
Louis had decided to come to the rescue with an expedi- 
tion under the Due de Beaufort himself ; but, in order to 
avoid an open rupture with the Porte, it was to sail 
nominally under the Papal flag. 

A really powerful force was prepared. Besides ten 
fire-ships and small craft, it included sixteen ships of war, 
and as many transports, with a large number of troops. 
With this fleet Beaufort appeared before the beleaguered 
town early in June 1669. The landing was successfully ac- 
complished, and the Turks were being driven from point 
to point, when suddenly a deafening explosion hushed the 
sounds of battle. It came from a redoubt which the 
French seamen had just taken. There was an instant 
alarm that all the works were mined, and a panic ensued 
that bid fair to degenerate into a rout. To check it 
Beaufort immediately placed himself at the head of his 
best troops, flung himself on the advancing Turks, and 
was never seen again. It was a disaster that could 
not be retrieved. The French troops, instead of raising 
the siege, could barely hold their ground, and the mutual 
recriminations that ensued rapidly demoralised the Chris- 
tian army. Thirteen galleys of France, with three fresh 
French regiments, arrived a few weeks later, and further 
reinforcements were preparing at Toulon. Louis was 
putting forth a strength which marked more clearly than 
ever his determination to take the place which in the 
days of Lepanto had belonged to Spain. But all to no 
purpose. One tremendous effort to dislodge the Turks by 
a bombardment from the whole of the assembled ships 
only ended in fresh disaster. The French troops re- 
embarked with a loss of 1,800 killed and 1,500 wounded, 



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1660 THE CONSILIUM JEGYPTIACUM 69 

and at the end of August the Venetians capitulated. So 
ended the famous Candiote war in a fresh advance of the 
Mussulman power and another rebuff to Louis in his 
attempt to make himself felt in the Mediterranean. 

What reward he looked to, had success attended the 
great effort, we cannot tell. Following as it did upon his 
other attempts to spread his power to the South, we 
seem to see him seeking in the Eastern half of the sea a 
means of redressing the balance that was against him in 
the West. Had he perhaps anticipated the vast idea of 
the Consilium JEgyptiacum which Leibnitz was about to 
present to him ? Already the young German philosopher, 
eager to divert tho ambition of Louis from European 
conquest, was preparing his famous treatise, in which, 
with a wealth of historical and geographical learning, and 
a convincing grasp of the economical and political condi- 
tions of his project, he was trying to tempt Louis to 
conquer Egypt. Seated there, he argued, where the Bed 
Sea and Mediterranean met at the centre of the world, a 
Prince like Louis would be able to draw into his lap the 
wealth and power of the East which his Western rivals 
were fast absorbing, and would become the master not 
only of Europe but of Asia too. It is hardly possible the 
idea was not already in the air. It is certain, at any rate, 
that when the proposal of a then almost unknown scholar 
was placed before Louis in January 1672, he was suffi- 
ciently interested at once to send for the author to explain 
Wb design. Nothing further came of it. The influenoe of 
*Louvois, Louis's minister of war, was in the ascendant to 
hold him to military adventure in Europe, and probably 
his unhappy experience at Candia taught him to take a 
view of the difficulties too grave for the learning and 
enthusiasm of Leibnitz to explain away. 1 

1 (Etwr* d$ LmJbmU (ed. Foocher d« OtiiU), vol ?. 



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70 TANGIER AS A NAVAL STATION 

The Turks at least appreciated to the full the signi- 
ficance of their victory. In the Mussulman world it pro- 
duced a profound impression of returning strength, which 
was immediately displayed in renewed activity among 
the Barbary states. Fortunately England was once more 
in a position to curb them. Already, at the end of 1668, 
she had sufficiently recovered from the shock of the 
Dutch war to send a squadron into the Mediterranean. 
It was under Sir Thomas Allin, who, as Admiral of the 
White Squadron in 1666, had largely added to his repu- 
tation and had led the attack in the victorious ' St. James's ' 
action. After demonstrating before Algiers and Salee 
with some effect he had gone home. But so soon as his 
back was turned their piracies grew as bad as ever, and 
in the summer of 1669 he returned with a still stronger 
squadron. 1 About the middle of August he appeared before 
Algiers with an advanced division of eight sail to pre- 
sent the English demands. He had been met with the 
news of Beaufort's death, and the retreat of the French 
to Toulon. The capitulation of Gandia was already on 
foot and it was hardly likely that the Algerines would be 
inclined to submission. After some fruitless negotiation 
they flatly refused all satisfaction, and the first week in 
September Allin commenced hostilities. A day or two 
later he was joined by his second division, under Sir 
Edward Spragge, a cavalier officer, who, after serving in 
the Boyalist army during the civil war, is believed, like 
Allin, to have followed Rupert on the high seas. During 
the late war he had risen to vice-flag rank in the main 
fleet, and had highly distinguished himself in the darkest 
horns by his bold defence of the Thames when the Dutch 
were trying to force their way up towards London. His 

1 His journal lor this voyage is among the Dartmouth MS 8., and 
at itaraghen in Hi$L 1£SS. Com. XL v. 17-19. 



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1670-1 SPRAGGE AT BOUGIE 71 

advent brought AUin's force up to eighteen sail, besides 
fire-ships. It was the normal strength of the British 
Mediterranean squadron and the normal operations 
followed. A blockade was established, while with his 
detached cruisers Allin soon established a mastery over 
the Algerine navy. He continued the work with success 
till September 1670, when he was succeeded by Spragge. 
Under a revised plan of operations the new chief was set 
free from convoy duty and was able to devote his whole 
squadron to the Algerine cruisers. Furthermore, arrange- 
ments had been made to provide him with a base of 
supply at Port Mahon, and acting from there he soon 
outdid his predecessor. 1 Prizes came fast, till in May 
1671 the work culminated in a really important success. 
Having heard that a number of Algerine men-of-war 
were lying at Bougie, he proceeded thither with all the 
force he could collect. He immediately sent in a fire-ship, 
but it miscarried, and before he could prepare another the 
enemy, as usual, had time to protect themselves with a 
powerful boom. But Spragge would not own himself 
beaten. Undismayed, he tried again and quickly demon- 
strated what was possible to boats handled with skill and 
determination against these temporary defences. Under a 
heavy fire the boom was cut, his smallest frigate was sent 
in for a fire-ship, and so boldly was it pushed home that 
the entire Algerine squadron, consisting of seven vessels of 
from twenty-four to thirty guns, was completely destroyed. 
So exasperated were the corsairs that a Palace revolution 
followed at Algiers. The reigning Dey was put to death 
and his successor forced to make peace. 

1 Hut. M8S. Com* Varum* Collections, iL 140, 152, 166-7. II m 
not purely for strategic reasons that Port Mahon was chosen, bat also to 
keep captains out of commercial ports, where they were tempted to cany 
merchants' treasure and so neglected their oraising. Allin was said to be 
an arch-offender. 



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72 TANGIER A8 A NAVAL STATION 1671 

It was not only in Algiers that the lesson was felt. In 
France, too, it was a bitter pill. She had been attempt- 
ing to cany on a similar war against Tunis, but with 
little or no result, and the success of the English acutely 
emphasised the failure that seemed to dog every step she 
took upon the Mediterranean. The King, so Colbert 
wrote in referring to Spragge's exploit, was weary of 
hearing of English successes when his own men did 
nothing. 1 All the minister's efforts to give France a 
worthy position upon the sea seemed still to be of no 
avail Of his own views on the situation in the Mediter- 
ranean, and of his idea of ameliorating it, we are per- 
mitted a curious glimpse, which reveals him bent on 
supplanting England at Tangier. In September follow- 
ing Spragge's success, Ralph Montagu, the British Am- 
bassador to France, had an interview at Dunkirk with 
Estrades, to whom he was commissioned to deliver a 
letter from the English King. It was at the time when 
Charles was playing his extraordinary secret game* with 
Louis, by which through an offensive and defensive alliance 
with France he hoped to make himself despotic at home, 
and abroad to punish the Dutch and have a share in the 
dismemberment of the Spanish empire. Estrades had 
not been taken into Louis's confidence, and was naturally 
jealous. Moreover, he had reason to believe that he had 
also lost the goodwill of the English King, which he had 
formerly enjoyed so intimately. He therefore determined 
to assert himself and recover his position by warning 
Montagu of the dangers in which Louis meant to entangle 
his unwary ally. Among other things he cautioned him 
that Charles must 'never hearken to the parting with 
Tangier.' He knew— so he said— Colbert's heart was set 
on it, and that to his knowledge there were some about 
\L*ttrt* de Colbert, III. i. 890, n. 



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1671 COLBERT COVETS TANGIER 78 

the English Court who had engaged, when the time 
should serve, to persuade the King to part with it. So 
far from releasing the hold he had, on any pretence, 
Charles should insist, if ever he joined Louis in a war with 
Spain, on a promise that the French should seize Porto 
Longone in Elba, and hand it over to the English per- 
manently. Then, said he, with Elba in his hands as well 
as Tangier, Charles would be as much master of the 
Mediterranean as he was of the Ocean. 1 

The seed appears to have fallen on good ground. At 
all events, Charles began to evince a sudden anxiety that 
in the plot he was hatching with Louis the Mediterra- 
nean should not be left entirely to his fellow conspirator. 
Under the new treaty operations were ito begin with a 
joint declaration of war against the Dutch, and Charles in 
return for a French subsidy had undertaken to provide a 
fleet for co-operation with Louis's admirals in the Narrow 
Seas. Now, however, about a month after Estrades' 
curious confidences, when all was settled, Montagu was 
instructed to broach to Louis a proposal for a further 
subsidy to enable another British fleet to be fitted out for 
service in the Mediterranean. In pursuance of these 
orders Montagu did his best to persuade Louis that, in 
view of the fact that the Spaniards would most likely join 
the Dutch as soon as war was declared, there was no 
quarter in which the English fleet could be of so much 
assistance to him as within the Straits. Every argument, 
good and bad, that could be dragged into the service was ' 
used to win Louis's consent. But to see the English 
strong in the Mediterranean was no part of the French 
King's game, and he met the request with a profession of 
his absolute inability to furnish another livre.* 

1 B. Montagu to Arlington, Sept. 4, 1671, DuccUuch M88. L 600. 
■ Same to same, December Iff, 16, and 84, ibid. 007-9. 



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74 TANGIER A8 A NAVAL STATION 1672 

Such then was the position of affairs in relation to the 
Mediterranean, when, without making any further con- 
cession to his fellow conspirator and dupe, Louis early 

- — in 1672 succeeded in thrusting Charles into a new war 
with the Dutch. Hi-advised as it was, there can be little 
doubt it was at first popular, and a real expression of the 
instinct of the nation. The great and rising mercantile 
community no less than the Court was still absorbed in 
\ the passion for commercial and imperial expansion, which 
is the dominant note of the Restoration. In spite of 
every effort to live at peace with them the Dutch had been 
showing by their behaviour that there was no room for 
them and the English side by side in any part of the 
world. If British commerce was to grow every one felt it 
must be rooted in domination of the Dutch. 1 Blinded by 
this pie-occupation, and burning for vengeance upon the 
burners of Chatham, public opinion welcomed the war 
with something like enthusiasm. But from the first there 
were far-sighted eyes that saw more acutely. Beneath 
Louis's cunning display of common interest they dis- 
cerned a deep-laid plot to set by the ears the two powers 

— who stood most formidably in the way of French ambi- 
tions. As the struggle proceeded this view quickly gained 
adherents. The behaviour of the French fleet throughout 
the war again did everything that was possible to foster the 
belief in Louis's ulterior motives. The Comte d'Estrees, 
in command of the main fleet, attended actions as though 
they were manoeuvres he had been sent to study. How- 
ever loyally later French historians have sought to palliate 
the disgraceful part the French seamen were directed to 
play, it is certain that at the time it made a chivalrous 
people smart with shame. 1 They, seemed to see their 

1 Harts, English Public Opinion after the Restoration, cap. iii. 
» Jal ia bis Du Queen* sod Capt. Chevalier in Vol. i. of Histoire de la 
Uewme Fr+nj+iee (IMS), both defend the action of the French in this war 



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1672-3 THE THIRD DUTCH WAR 75 

fleet on every occasion hold ingloriously aloof while their 
ally sapped her strength and enhanced her glory upon the 
common enemy. 

It is only in this aspect that the war concerns us. 
Charles failed to shake Louis's refusal to assist him in 
fitting out a second fleet for the Straits, and consequently, 
during the two years the struggle lasted, it in no way 
affected the situation in the Mediterranean. Between 
them England and France were far too strong at sea for 
the Dutch to attempt anything serious to the southward. 
It is true that the refusal of the English proposal of a 
second fleet brought Colbert his nervous moments, when 
he was haunted by the spectre of De Ruyter detaching 
a squadron for a raid into the Mediterranean. At such 
times he would scold his officers who were destined to 
guard the Straits, and who would never get to sea, or, 
when they did, accomplished nothing. And so he would 
fall to mourning over the bad blood that prevailed among 
them, 'qui est/ as he sighed, 'l'esprit de l'ancienne 
marine.' l It wa6 after the battle of Solebay in 1672 
that he was most anxious, and there it was the action of 
the French fleet that had rendered a decisive victory 
impossible. The same prudent tactics were repeated the 
following year at the battle of the Texel, and so glaringly 
that the behaviour of the French was made a ground 
in the House of Commons for the refusing the supplies 
which the Government asked for the continuance of the 
war. ' The last fight,' said Sir John Monson, • was as 
if the English and Dutch had been gladiators for the 
French spectators.' His speech brought up the Secretary 
of State in reply, and it is worthy of note that he 

and the previous one, bat it cannot be said that they make oat an entirely 
convincing ease against the strictures of Voltaire and the older historian*. 
1 Lettre$ de Colbert, IH. i. 431, 438, 435, 496. 



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7« TANGIER AS A NAVAL STATION 1670-2 

particularly urged the danger of losing Tangier if a fleet 
were not provided for the coming year. 1 

The growing importance of the place had already led 
to measures for providing it with a mobile defence of its 
own, and they are worth noting as the last attempt to 
reintroduce galleys into the British fleet. In a narrow 
strait, subject to calms and light airs, they had obvious 
advantages, and Henry Shere, a young engineer who 
afterwards superseded Cholmley, and about 1670 visited 
Leghorn and Genoa to study their methods of harbour 
work, says he first suggested their employment. ' My 
lord, 9 he wrote from Italy to some one in authority at home 
about this time, ' I remember to have discoursed to your 
excellency about galleys for the port of Tangier, and now 
advise your excellency that here hath lately arrived a 
French gentleman, by name Duteil, who is employed to 
the state of Genoa and the Grand Duke [of Tuscany] 
with ample credentials from his Majesty and his Royal 
Highness [the Duke of York], in order to the building 
and getting to sea of four or five galleys, two of which 
are already on the stocks in the arsenals of the aforesaid 
states. ... I was glad of the news, very well assured 
that a couple of galleys being carefully employed would 
do the King good service in that part, but more than two 
would be burdensome and inconvenient.' He concludes 
by advising that an arsenal be immediately commenced at 
Tangier for their reception. 1 In August 1671 Cholmley 
had received orders to this effect, and sent home a plan of 
the port, showing how he proposed to berth the galleys 
and the modifications in the mole suggested for their 

1 ParL HuL 998 : ' Debate on refusing a supply, October 81, 1672.' 

* Shere to , Tangier Paper* R.O. 1670, bundle 18, undated, but 

be refers to his last letter, which was dated March 10, 1669-70. The mission 
of Sir John Baptist Doteil Is mentioned in the summer of 167S, Domestic 
G*J*Mlsr t JoljSft,p.8?4. 



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1672-4* ITS MOBILE DEFENCE 77 

protection. 1 During the war, however, the project seems 
to have hung fire. In the winter the work of making an 
inner harbour for them appears to have been commenced,' 
and earfy in 1672 there were several proposals made to 
the Government reviving the Elizabethan idea of sending 
prisoners convicted of small felonies to serve in the Tan- 
gier galleys. 1 

Two years elapsed, however, before the experiment 
could be tried, and then only one of the galleys, that from 
Leghorn, was ready. She was called the ' Margaret, 9 and 
the expense of arming her proved so great that, although 
the other was to be a present from Genoa to the King, her 
completion was left to stand over. The ' Margaret * was 
delivered at Tangier about the end of 1674, but during 
the two following seasons she appears to have done small, 
if any, service. Probably the type was too repugnant to 
the ideas of our seamen for her ever to have had much 
chance of proving a success. Bowers were a continual 
difficulty. The idea of condemning felons to the benches 
from home seems never to have been carried out, and 
efforts were made to man the oars with Barbary prisoners 
taken by the regular cruisers. The only result was that 
the galley fell further and further into discredit. In the 
summer of 1675 Dutcil, who had been commanding her, 
was superseded by an English frigate captain, but all to no 
purpose, and in the following spring the ' Margaret ' was 
discharged and returned to Leghorn. The Genoa galley 
was never. even armed, and so the time-honoured craft 
disappeared from the British Navy List. 4 Contempora- 

1 Gholmley to the Tangier Council, Aug. 14, 1671, Tangier Paper** 
bundle 14, where the original plan is preserved. 
# " See plan, date February 8, 1671-2, in Davit, p. 140, oompared with 
k Cholmley's original sketch in the Tangier Paper*. 

1 Domeetie Calendar, pauim; Drake and the Tudor Navy, i. 402. 
* Derrick, p. 89. Luke to Shere, September 16, 1674 (Add, M88. 19872). 
Tanner, Pepye Calendar 1674-6, paetinu 



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78 TANGIER AS A NAVAL 8TAT10N 1076 

aeously with their short and ineffective reappearance a 
new type of oared vessel, designed after a French model 
and much more to the seamen's taste, had been worked 
out, and two of thejse were now to take the place of the 
obsolete craft. 1 

* In the year 76/ says Pepys, 'Captain Wildshaw 
came from Toulon, and was telling his Majesty that there 
were building at Toulon several galley-frigates " to row 
with many oars," and thereupon, at the King's request, 
Sir Anthony Deane, the famous naval architect, wrote 
to procure particulars of them from an agent of his at 
Toulon. The answer being returned/ Pepys continues, 
4 A. D. 9 8 son drew the draft of the " James ' ' galley-frigate, and 
Mr. Pett the " Charles " upon the same principles, and from 
them came that improvement so useful to us against the 
Tacks. 9 * The new vessels ranged from 450 to 500 tons, 
drew only twelve feet of water, and proved a great success. 
Shere called attention to their defect ' in not having some 
force of guns between decks/ and Pepys begged him to 
continue his observations on their usefulness, as the King 
proposed to lay down two more. Shere, who had recom- 
mended the galleys, was perhaps prejudiced against the 
new type, but their excellence is everywhere praised, and 

1 In 1683 George Byng, afterwords Lord Torrington, was appointed lieu- 
tenant of a * half-galley ' (meexo-gaUra) attached to the Tangier garrison, hat 
Ibis was certainly one of the new type. Memoirs of Lord Torrington (Camden 
Sot. 1889), p. 6. 

• Naval Minutes, p. 269, quoted by J. B. Tanner in Ena. Hist. Rev. 
xiL 699 ft, 765. Wildshaw's suggestion mast really have been made at the 
end of 1675. They were both in hand in February 1676, which accounts 
for the galleys being discharged at this time. Pett's vessel was launched by 
the Duke of York on September 12 the same year. On November 8 both 
were pot into commission. Each was to have 80 ' watermen • in her com- 
plement to row, and each was to have a special * second boatswain ' for * the 
better exercising, instructing, and commanding the gangs of men appointed 
to the oars.* Tanner, Pepys Calendar, 2796, 8194, 8428, 8666, 8668-6, 



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1677 PROGRESS OF THE HARBOUR WORKS 79 

they became the prototype of a class of light vessel, using 
sweeps, that remained in the navy till recent times. 1 They 
were permanently attached to the Tangier station, and, 
together with the smaller oared craft, such as ketches, 
barca-longas, and the new class of sloop now first appearing 
in the fleet, provided all that was wanted of free movement 
for the policing of the Straits. 1 

The attention that was being bestowed on the defence 
of Tangier is not surprising ; for by this time it was 
beginning to have a real value as a port of refuge and a 
naval base. By the end of the year 1673 the mole was 
completed to a length of nearly 450 yards, and in 1675 
Shere estimated that, if he were allowed to take over the 
works and carry them on upon the principles he had 
studied in Italy, he could finish the whole undertaking 
in a little over four years, and for less than a hundred 
thousand pounds. 3 A man of high scientific attainments, 
he was a convinced enthusiast for the place, and was to 
spend his best work and mo6t strenuous years in making 
it what he knew it might be. It was about this time 
that he wrote a treatise on the tides, currents, and climate 
of the Mediterranean, and in the course of it his opinion 

1 Pepys to Shore, September 16, 1677 (Add. MSS. 19872), and A Die- 
course touching Tangier (dated October 1679), Harleian Misc. viii. S97. 

* The word * sloop ' had become by this time familiar in the navy, the 
older 'shallop* and pinnace disappearing. In 1677 an officer of the 
'Woolwich' in Narbrough's fleet speaks of the ' Boneta,' • Emsworth, ' and 
• Woolwich ' sloops (see log of the ' Woolwich ' and • Defiance/ 1072-6, HarL 
MSS. 1910, f. 23), also of the ' Chatham ' double sloop, and the • Sprig ' doable 
sloop, a fire-ship (ff. 24, and under May 4, 1678). The * Young Sprig' had 
been a sixth-rate, and in 1677 was made a fire-ship (Tanner, Eng. HisL 
Rev. xii. 55 n). No more double sloops appear to have been built They 
were probably superseded by the galley-frigates. On January 24, 1678, 
Narbrough writes of his intending to attack Algiers with his 'slops' and 
fire-ships, Add. MSS. 19872. 

• The survey of 1678 certifies 487 yards finished; besides 40 of founda- 
tion (Davis, p. 140). For Shore's estimate see Pepys to him, October 9, 1676 
(Add. MSS. 19872), in which Pepys points out an error in his figures. 



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W TANGIER A8 A NAVAL STATION 1074 

of the place forces itself out. ' And here/ he exclaims, 

in mentioning Tangier, ' were it not a fitter subject for 

a treatise than a digression, I might say my opinion 

touching this noble port of Tangier, which in a word is 

a jewel fit only to adorn the crown that wears it, whose 

value I can better conceive than write, and humbly refer 

to a more worthy pen or to a truer and more impartial 

relator. Time for a few years, in despite of all the 

obloquy cast upon it by the enemies of his Majesty's 

honour and dominion abroad, will suffice to polish it to 

much perfection of use and public service both for peace 

and war, as would be very hard for a stranger to believe, 

and scarce fit for a modest pen to write.' ! 

He certainly had some grounds for his enthusiasm, for, 
besides being able to give shelter to merchantmen during 
the war, it enabled war ships to use it as a station for 
watching the Straits. Had this not been so, the Dutch, 
who were in close alliance with Spain, and whose cruisers 
and convoys were using Cadiz as if it were a port of 
their own, would have had an insuperable advantage 
against our trade. The last action of the war well 
illustrates the situation. Peace was signed at West- 
minster on February 9, 1674. A week later Captain 
Passchier de Witte in the ' Shackerloo ' of 28 guns, who 
was cruising off the Straits mouth, retired into Cadiz. 
An hour or so later he was followed in by Captain 

1 A Discourse concerning the Mediterranean Sea and the Streights of 
Gibraltar, by Sir Henry Shere, p. 20. Ik was fink prinked in 1703, just 
before Booke took Gibraltar, and again just after in 1705. It was written, 
however, long before. On p. 30 fifhere says he has been in Tangier fou - 
jean. He left England for the place in May 1669. (See Diet. Nat. Biog. ' 
tub voce • Sheeres.') Internal evidence shows that It was written while he 
was at heme, and we know he was in England again in 1674 and 1670, just 
before he took over the work ak Tangier. Bee letter addressed to him ak 
Whitehall in September 1674, and Pepys to him in October 1675, Add. MSS. 
19873. He sailed for Tangier ak the end of May 1676. Tanner, Pepys 
CeJemdew, t904, 9912, 3996. 



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1674 ' SHA.CKERLOO • AND ' TIGER ' 81 

Harman from Tangier with the ' Tiger ' of 46 guns, who 
began to tell every one he had chased the Dutchman in. 
De Witte protested he had never even seen the English 
ship, but Harman continued to boast he had run from 
him. Admiral Cornells Evertsen was in the port at the 
time careening, and was at length so much infuriated 
with the English captain's behaviour that he told De 
Witte that for the honour of the flag it was his duty 
to fight him. The Quixotic challenge was given and 
accepted. With such disparity of force the result could 
hardly be doubtful. In two hours, after an heroic duel 
at close quarters, the ' Shackerloo ' was forced to strike 
with the loss of 50 killed and 70 wounded, including 
De Witte himself. Harman was also wounded, but the 
English loss was only 24 all told — an indication no less 
of the superior gunnery of the English than of the 
determined resistance of the Dutch. 1 

If Louis had hoped that the war would shake the 
English hold on the Straits he was disappointed. It had 
indeed rather the contrary effect. For it drove Medi- 
terranean merchants, and French ones in particular, to 
use Tangier more than ever, and thus served to give the 
place a prosperity it had never enjoyed before. « Tangier/ 
says a newsletter of the time, 'is likely to prove the 
richest port in those parts. During the war it has been 
the harbour for all European commodities and may long 
continue so.' * Still the inglorious policy which Louis 
had been pursuing at sea had left him the richer too, and 
in possession of a fleet with which he could seek com- 
pensation so soon as an occasion offered. He had not 

1 De Jonghe, Nederlandscte Ztewumh UL i. 861. 
• U Fleming M8S. 113, and Me Luke to Share, September 1674, Add. 
MS8. 19679, f . 9. 

vol* n. o 



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89 TANGIER AS A NAVAL STATION 1974 

long to wait. Within a few months after the peace was 
signed an opening presented itself, and by the end of 
the year France whs once more launched upon a course 
which threatened to change the whole condition of 
If editenanean power. 



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\ 



CHAPTER XXIII 

LOUIS XIV. AND SICILY 

The significance of the new movement lay in the fact 
that the European situation had by this time definitely 
assumed the aspect which we associate with the age of 
Louis XIV. The Triple Alliance, which Temple had 
negotiated, had failed to check the career of France, as 
it was doomed to fail, seeing that contemporaneously 
with it Charles was arranging his secret understanding 
with the French King behind his Ambassador's back. 
By the astounding treaty of Dover, which he had con- 
cluded under the influence of his idolised sister, Henrietta 
d'Orleans, he had practically placed his forei gn po licy in 
Louis's keeping. In return for aiding him to establish 
a Catholic despotism in England, Louis was to have a 
free hand and even assistance in his imperial and counter- . 
Reformation policy. So secret was the incredible pro- 
ject kept that for generations afterwards historians were 
baffled in seeking a key to Charles's bewildering policy. 
By the nation it was felt rather than understood — felt 
like some ghostly terror which could not be defined or 
grappled, but still was there, haunting its rest and 
scaring its resistance into insensate panic. The first 
manifestation of the great design, as we have seen, was 
Charles's joining Louis in the late war upon Holland, 
and the first uneasy movement of the nation compelled 
him to desert his Catholic ally. The in stinct of the people 
began to show them the war was a blow at Protestantism. 

^ -" o S 



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84 LOUIS XIV. AND SICILY 1074 

The old feeling rose paramount to all other considera- 
tions. The insult which the Dutch had put upon the 
country at Chatham was forgotten, the injuries in the 
East were atoned, and peace was the result. 

Abroad the danger was no less keenly felt. Every- 
where the unholy league was regarded as a new step 
towards the domination of France, and when Charles 
was forced to withdraw his support, Louis found him- 
self faced with a new Triple Alliance. The French peril 
had galvanised into life the old Hapsburg system, but 
with new relations. For the Hapsburgs the preserva- 
tion of Holland was now as vital as it had formerly been 
to France, and thus the new Triple Alliance was formed 
of Holland, Spain, and the Empire. With the domina- 
tion of Erance_ta king the place of the old threat of the 
domination of Spain, the array of the nations had 
changed, but the strategical factors were the same. The 
vital points lay still in the old centres— the military in 
the Tiow^Jountries, the naval in the Mediterranean. As 
the fiiBt alliance had been mainly naval, so the new one 
was mainly military. The Low Countries were therefore 
the more absorbing factor, but the Mediterranean could 
not be for a moment forgotten. Here lay the main 
sourctfL-Qf -French wealth, and it was here, according to 
the side upon which the balance of sea power fell, lay 
the link or the barrier between the two Hapsburg powers. 
Here too was the channel by which England could 
strike into the heart of the strife with an overpowering 
hand. Never had its meaning to the power of the island 
realm been more patent. As the sides stood ranged, the 
chances were fairly balanced. It is true France was 
single-handed. But Louvois had completed his reorgani- 
sation of the army ; Colbert had done no less for finance 
and the navy ; and the policy which Louis had pursued 



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1674 HIS FIRST MOVE 86 

in the two Dutch wars, while it had shattered the sea 
power of Holland, had left France with a fleet intact and 
yet trained to war. The fate of Europe seemed to hang 
on the part which England would play. The country 
was for joining the alliance, the Court for joining France, 
and Louis knew that, in the excited state of popular 
opinion, all he could hope for was neutrality. 

For him it had a double importance. On shore he 
could rely with confidence on the unprecedented army 
he now possessed. It was in the Mediterranean his 
chief anxiety lay, and England held its gate. Already 
he had ordered all his available vessels to concentrate 
from Brest and Toulon at the Straits, with the intention 
of barring the entry of the Dutch and, if possible, of 
crushing the Spanish sea power before she could unite 
with her new ally. The trouble was that he had no base 
from which his fleet could act against Cadis, the naval 
centre of the maritime alliance; and the first step he 
took, when England broke away from his toils, was to 
endeavour to remedy the evil by one of his most 
characteristic moves. With the alert appreciation of 
public opinion in England, which he was to use there- 
after with so much dexterity, he promptly withdrew his 
Catholic Ambassador and replaced him with a Huguenot 
nobleman, that the request he had to make might arouse 
as little suspicion as possible. It was the neutrality of 
England which the new Ambassador had to secure, and 
something more. His special instructions were to press 
for orders to the governors of all British ports that they 
were not only to admit French war ships, but to assist 
them with all they might require. 1 

From what followed it is clear enough which port it 
was that Louis had particularly in his mind. The focus 

1 Jal, Du Qu4tm % i. 180. 



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86 LOUIS XIV. AND SICILY 1674 

of his naval action lay in the concentration of his Toulon 
and Brest squadrons at the Straits. The united fleet was 
to be under the Due de Vivonne, who, as Captain-General 
of the Galleys of France, was then the highest naval 
officer in the service. For his flag-officers he was to have 
no less men than Valbelle and Du Quesne. The concen- 
tration was carried out with unusual precision in the 
early summer of 1674, and at the first trouble from bad 
weather the whole fleet came to anchor at Tangier. The 
advantage of Louis's action in London, where his Ambas- 
sador had obtained his request, was at once apparent. It 
was found that no Dutch squadron strong enough to 
force the Straits was expected for the present, and at 
Tangier, therefore, Vivonne could lie in security while he 
leisurely proceeded to work out a design for the destruc- 
tion of his enemy's shipping in Cadiz. 1 As it happened, 
nothing came of it. For it was while Vivonne was thus 
preparing to act from Tangier that an event occurred 
which pointed to a much more profitable employment for 
the French fleet. All thought of Cadiz was given up, 
and the maritime war swung back into the time-honoured 
grooves from which it seems almost impossible for a 
struggle for the command of the Mediterranean to 
escape. 

In Sicily, daring the absence of the Spanish Viceroy, 
Mess ina had suddenly risen upon her Governor, and, 
having driven him from the city, the insurgents had sent 
to Vivonne an entreaty that he would come to their aid. 
The stirring summons reached him at a moment when 
his officers were doing their best to frighten him out of 
his projected attack on Cadiz, and he readily seized the 
occasion to abandon so thorny an enterprise and to return 
to Toulon for orders. The importance of the event cer- 

1 Jal, Du Quuhs, 1 188. 



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1674 REVOLT OF MESSINA 87 

tainly justified his action. No more enticing opportunity 
could have occurred for redressing the defects of the 
French strategical position. Still in the memory of how 
France had burnt her fingers in the similar attempts of 
the Duke of Guise, and in view of the preoccupation 
of the southern French army with an invasion of Cata- 
lonia, Louis could not bring himself to take drastic action 
at once. Nevertheless, the situation was too full of en- 
ticing possibilities not to be kept open, and Valbelle was 
permitted to carry a small squadron with arms and stores 
for the relief of the besieged insurgents. No sooner was 
he arrived than they assaulted him with impassioned 
appeals for annexation to France. It was more than the 
admiral dare promise. He could only assure them 
vaguely of his master's protection. But, his mission 
accomplished, he hurried back to Toulon, convinced of 
the enormous importance of the opportunity, and deter- 
mined to persuade the Government to his views. 

The half-hearted intervention had already had a pro- 
nounced effect. In view of French operations in Cata- 
lonia, the bulk of the Spanish naval forces, including 
most of the Armada of the Ocean, was assembled within 
the Straits at Barcelona ; but, on hearing of Louis's move- 
ment, the whole force had sailed for Messina, and it was 
only by taking advantage of a moment when the weather 
compelled it to leave the port open that Valbelle had 
been able to break out of the beleaguered port. He had 
thus had to leave the insurgent city closely pressed by 
sea and land, and if, therefore, anything effective was to 
be done, it must be done quickly. The strategical advan- 
tage already gained was obvious enough to harden Louis's 
heart for a more serious attempt to gain possession of the 
island. As a preliminary step Valbelle was allowed to 
return in December with fresh relief, and he carried with 



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88 LOUIS XIV. AND SICILY 1«75 

hini a distinguished French general as Commander-in- 
Chief for the insurgents, and a number of officers to 
organise their forces. By dexterous manoeuvres he was 
again able to take advantage of unfavourable weather to 
run the blockade, and a fresh hold had been taken. 

Meanwhile Louis had gone so far as to create M. de 
Vivonne_yice*oy^6f Bicily, and had furnished him with a 
force which made the appointment something more than 
a threat. With Du Quesne as his second in command 
he arrived off Messiiia on February 1, 1675, and with the 
assistance of Yalbelle's squadron succeeded in a sharp 
action in forcing the blockade and compelling the Spanish 
fleet to retire to Naples for repairs. Messina, which had 
at that time over a hundred thousand inhabitants, and 
had been on the point of succumbing to starvation, was 
saved, and the central point of the Mediterranean was 
effectively ^aJBVenclTpossession. Nor was this all. So 
completely was the Spanish fleet reduced to impotence 
for the time that the French squadrons were able to pass 
between Toulon and Messina without hindrance, and in 
the course of the spring Vivonne, who had taken the 
command ashore, had received sufficient reinforcements 
to enable him to assume the offensive and begin the con- 
quest of the island by a move towards Palermo. 

It was a situation which the sea powers were not 
likely to regard with indifference. About midsummer the 
elaborate preparations which the Spanish admiral was 
making in Naples began to have a new significance when 
it was known that Spain, under the terms of the Triple 
Alliance, had applied to the Dutch for assistance, and that 
Be Buyter himself was under orders to proceed to Sicily 
with a squadron of twenty sail. About England Louis was 
scarcely less nervous. In the autumn of 1674 Sir John 
Narbrough,a flag-officer who had made a considerable 



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1676 LOUIS BUYS CHARLES'S NEUTRALITY 89 

reputation in the late war, had been appointed Com- 
mander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, and was now 
maintaining an effective blockade of Tripoli in ominous 
proximity to the storm centre. In view of the condition 
of affairs in England it was impossible to tell how far or 
how long the chastisement of the corsairs would remain 
Narbrough's real object. Charles, who was cynically 
oscillating between dependence on Louis and a frank 
national policy, might any day come to terms with his 
warlike Parliament and fix their devotion by throwing in 
bis lot with the allies ; and since England during the 
past century had established a sinister reputation of 
always commencing hostilities without a declaration of 
wjar, Louis might find the balance in the Mediterranean 
turned against him at any moment. By the middle of 
September De Ruyter was in Cadiz concerting operations 
with the Spaniards and preparing for an effective junction 
with their squadron in Naples so soon as it should be 
ready for sea. Vivonne had failed in his offensive move- 
ment ashore, and Du Quesne, who was in Toulon trying 
to get to sea with a fresh fleet for his relief, was in immi- 
nent danger of never being able to reach Messina. The 
.tension of the situation was acute ; nor was it relieved 
till Louis found himself comp elled to indu ce Chaste* to 
prorogue his aggressive Parliament with. the promise of a 
pension of half a million a year. 

At this cost Louis was able to reduce the balance to 
equality. But De Ruyter was already at Melazzo, where 
Vivonne's advance towards Palermo had been checked. 
Du Quesne was still in Toulon. The operations that 
ensued mark the definite establishment of Prance as a 
firat-rate naval power. The bulk of the Spanish ships 
with which De Ruyter was to co-operate were in Palermo, 
not yet ready for sea. In Messina was a French squadron 



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90 LOUIS XIV. AND SICILY 1076 

of eight of the line and several frigates, under orders to 
endeavour to join hands with Du Quesne as soon as he 
appeared. This squadron De Buyter immediately re- 
solved to attack and destroy in detail before the Toulon 
squadron came on the field. Having seen Melazzo safe, 
therefore, he weighed to enter the straits without waiting 
for his Spanish colleague. As luck would have it, how- 
ever, the wind went into the south-east, and he found it 
impossible to get in. For two days he stood off and on 
between the mouth of the Straits and the Lipari islands, 
waiting for a shift of weather. Seeing that De Buyter's 
object was to prevent a junction between the two French 
squadrons, these islands were the key of the situation ; 
for, lying as they did in the direct course from Toulon, 
they gave every opportunity for evasion to a squadron 
from that port seeking to get touch with Messina. On the 
third day he received intelligence that a French fleet had 
been sighted from Alicudi, the most westerly of the 
islands. The news pointed to an intention of Du Quesne 
to reach Messina by passing between Melazzo and Vul- 
cano, the southernmost of the islands, and De Buyter 
promptly occupied the channel. Here, on the fifth day, 
he was joined by the Spanish galleys that were lying at. 
Melazzo, but a stiff south-wester came on, and they had 
to go back. De Buyter held his ground. He was still 
hoping to get into the Straits, but towards evening he 
saw on the heights of Lipari the fiery signal that a fleet 
was in sight, and, as the wind still held at south-west, 
he resolved to deal with the new-comers first. Next 
day saw him among the islands, between Stromboli and 
Lipari, where he heard from fishermen that a fleet was 
in sight from Salina. Officers were quickly landed to 
climb the heights of that island, and towards evening they 
returned with the report that they had seen thirty sail 



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1675 DE ttUYTER AND DU QUESNE 91 

some six leagues to the north-west standing towards 
them. Steering northward all night, De Ruyter at break 
of day sighted the enemy some three leagues ahead and 
to leeward of him, standing west-north-west almost 
athwart his course. He immediately crowded all sail in 
general chase, and about noon, as the French continued 
to hug the wind in a determined effort to weather him, 
his ten leading ships were within range. But instead of 
holding on he suddenly hauled his wind, and, standing 
with the French out of gunshot, made the signal for line 
of battle. 

To the French it seemed he was declining an action. 
Conduct so contrary to the usual impetuosity of the old 
fire-eating admiral has been misunderstood by others 
besides the astonished French. The highest modern 
authority has endeavoured to account for De Buyter's 
action on the supposition chat, finding himself in inferior 
force, he did decline the action, but with the deliberate 
intention of giving the enemy the wind, so as to compel 
him to attack to leeward, and that he thus inaugurated 
the defensive tactics which the French so long used with 
success against the British admirals of the eighteenth 
century. 1 

In face, however, of De Buyter's own despatch, this 
view is not tenable. It is true his information led him to 
believe that Du Quesne's fleet was more numerous than 
his own, but it is clear he did not yet realise how much 
stronger it was. There was nothing to show that the 
bulk of the enemy were not store ships and transports, 
and his own galleys were now close at hand at Lipari. 
His movement was solely made in order to keep the wind 
and to allow his rearmost ships to get into battle order. 
8o far, however, had they fallen to leeward that it was 
1 Hfthan, Influence of 8§a Power on SUtury* 



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82 LOUIS XIV. AND SICILY 1676 

three o'clock before the line was formed. At seven it 
would be dark, and he saw that in those confined waters 
it was too late in the day to win a decisive victory. The 
action must be fought on the morrow, and, calling his 
captains aboard him, he exhorted them to fight to the 
death. Each officer grasped the old hero's hand and 
passed his word, and then all night long he hang upon 
the enemy with the galleys in company. The two fleets 
were sailing close-hauled on the same tack to the south- 
westward. Half-way between them De Ruyter had a galley 
to keep contact and signal him if the enemy attempted 
to elude him by a change of course. But as the night 
advanced the wind grew unsteady with ugly squalls. 
Later it increased to half a gale, and the contact scout 
with all the rest of the galleys bad to run for Lipari for 
shelter. Now was Du Quesne's chance, and sure enough 
through the roar of the gale De Ruyter soon heard 
his signal to tack. He immediately did the same and 
the French move was parried. No man ever worked 
harder or better to keep the advantage of the wind. 
Du Quesne, under a press of sail, was using all his art to 
outmanoeuvre his antagonist, but against the first master 
of his craft his efforts were useless. Chance at last gave 
him what he could not win. Towards dawn the wind 
again chopped round, and when day broke on December 27 
De Ruyter saw the French fleet about four leagues 
from him and well to windward. The fickle weather had 
lost him the game, and, worse still, daylight showed him 
that the French fleet was composed mainly of war ships 
bigger than his own. Then, and not till then, he knew 
he was in serious inferiority both in numbers and force. 
StOl the hard-bitten veteran would not give way, and, 
seeing the weather gage hopelessly gone, he bore up till 
he was in such a position that the enemy could not 



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1675 THE BATTLE OF STROMBOLt 03 

reach Messina without fighting him, and there awaited 
Da Quesne's attack. 1 

What followed is described by De Buyter in words 
that leave no doubt as to the intention of his tactics. 
• At daybreak on the 8th/ he wrote in his official despatch, 
' we saw them again edging past us, and, the wind being 
six points against us, they had the weather gage. So 
that, instead of our chasing them and their wishing to 
avoid an action, as we had supposed, they bore down on 
us about nine o'clock in the morning/ ' The action was 
fought somewhere between Filicudi and Stromboli. For 
three hours or more it raged, as was admitted on all sides, 
with unexampled fury. A calm put a stop to it, and by 
the help of his galleys De Buyter was able to withdraw 
his fleet from an enveloping movement which, in accor- 
dance with the latest tactical ideas, Du Quesne says he 
was about to make. 1 

Both sides claimed the victory. Neither sought to 
renew the action. The technical advantage was certainly 

1 See Brandt's Michel de Ruiter, and De Jonge's Geeehiedenis van hst 
Nederlandsche Zeewczen. Both authors used De Ruyter's despatch written 
on Jan. 9, 1676 (n.s.), the day after the action. Though Jal (Dm Quesne, 
ii. 203) gives part of this despatch, he omits the earlier and more interesting 
portion, and somewhat mistranslates other parts. Captain Mahan, not 
having access to these two excellent Dutch works, or to the later French 
ones, was unfortunately induced in his great work to rely too much 
on the French 'official • naval history of Lapeyrouse, which a brother naval 
historian, himself by no means an impeccable scholar, has called 'una 
malheureuse compilation, due a un ex-officier de marine, M. Bonfils la 
Bltaie ou Laperouse, sous le titre trompeur d'histoire de la marine ; ear ii n'j 
a pas trace d'histoire seneuse dans cet ouvrage dont le minister* de la 
marine, a defaut du publio, s'est fait 1'acqucreur, et dont il a empoisonne lea 
bibliotheques des ports et b&timents de l'etat, pour enseigner aux marina 
sans doute le contrepied du bon sens et de la verite ' (Ouerin, Hietmt* 
Maritime de la France, iii. 405). Of Guerin's work another French eritio 
writes: 'Cette ceuvre de seconde main est au milieu de nos bona lines 
d'histoires d'aujourd'hui ee qu'est le vulgaire oison dont parle Virgile an 
milieu des cygnes harmonieux.' See De la Bonders, L 27, note (6). 

•Jal,lt20». • Seaport, p. 968. 



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M LOUIS XIV. AND SICILY 1675-6 

with De Ruyter. With an inferior force he had held his 
ground, and prevented Du Quesne's getting through to 
Messina. On the following day he was joined by the 
Spanish admiral, and together they devoted themselves to 
trying to draw Du Quesne to the westward away from the 
Straits. He held, however, resolutely to Stromboli and 
refused to move till the Messina squadron slipped out and 
joined him. The allies were now in an inferiority of two 
to one, and, after again trying to induce Du Quesne to 
chase to the westward, De Ruyter decided to return to 
Melazzo. So long as he kept his fleet there intact within 
striking distance of Messina he knew Du Quesne dared 
not enter the straits for fear of exposing his rearguard 
to destruction. The move was a complete success. Du 
Quesne, even though he had succeeded in effecting the 
junction, was beaten. For all his superiority he had left 
the allied fleet in being, and was compelled to attempt the 
relief of Messina south-about. So hard pressed was the 
garrison, and so uncertain the wintry weather, that this 
in itself constituted a victory for the Dutch. The chances 
were that Du Quesne could not arrive in time to save 
Messina, and as soon as the French move was known 
De Ruyter retired into port to refit. The time for which 
his services had been engaged was expiring, and in 
pursuance of his original orders he prepared to go home, 
content that he had done for the Spaniards fully as much 
as their unreadiness deserved. 

With the small force at his command be had certainly 
added new laurels to his great reputation. Still, after all, 
the lasting advantage was with the French. Against all 
expectation, lucky shifts of wind enabled Du Quesne to 
reach Messina in time to save the situation. Nor was 
this all, or nearly all. Afte^years of blundering-and 
pusillanimous failure the FroncE^iavjLcasne^o^t of the 



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1676 BATTLE OF AUGUSTA 05 

action with an established reputation. Not only had 
Da Qaesne crossed swords with the most renowned sea- 
man of his time and suffered no defeat, but by the 
generous admission of their opponents the French had 
handled their fleet with consummate skill and in admi- 
rable order. 1 It was clear to all men that Louis's navy 
had begun to be something that it had never been before. 
Thanks to Colbert's efforts and the cheap experience it 
had won by pretending to co-operate first with the Dutch 
and then with the English in the late wars, it had reached 
a degree of discipline and tactical efficiency little if any- 
thing inferior to that of its masters ; and from the hard- 
fought battle off Stromboli dates the commencement of 
the time when France could feel real confidence in her 
naval forces. 

Nor did the remainder of the war belie the first ex- 
perience. Towards the end of February De Ruyter, 
having received at Leghorn despatches authorising him 
to continue the campaign, moved to Palermo, where he 
concerted with the Spaniards a combined attack on 
Messina by sea and land in hopes of destroying Du Quesne 
where he lay. The attempt took place at the end of 
March. De Ruyter succeeded in carrying the fleet into 
the Straits, but once before Messina he saw that the 
currents made an attack impossible. At the same time 
the Spanish troops were defeated in their assault, and the 
fleet went southward to Reggio, hoping to draw Du Quesne 
into the open.' The French did not refuse the challenge, 
and before long the two fleets met again off Augusta, 
a little town that lies between Syracuse and JEtna. The 
Spanish contingent, wholly inexperienced in the new 

1 See De Ruyter's despatch in Jal, ii. 90S, and of. Brandt and De Jonge, 
ubi supra, 

» Brandt, Michel de Ruiter, book xviii. 



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96 IX)UIS XIV. AND SICILY ld76 

tactics, proved themselves incapable of acting in unison 
with the smart manoeuvres of the Dutch. Another in- 
decisive action ensued, which was terminated by nightfall. 
Again the French more than held their own against the 
combined Dutch and Spanish fleet, and, to add to their 
sense of victory, the veteran De Buyter, who from the 
first had felt he was going to his doom, was mortally 
wounded. Verschoen, his vice-admiral, had been killed at 
Stromboli, and De Haen, the original rear-admiral, suc- 
ceeded to the command. He at once withdrew the allied 
fleet to Palermo. Here the exultant French a month later 
resolved to deal the allies a final blow. Vivonne himself 
took command, and De Haen, disgusted at the hopeless 
blundering and inefficiency of the Spanish captains with 
whom he was condemned to act, resolved to abide the 
attack at anchor. By skilful tactics, which added still 
further to their prestige, the French succeeded in concen- 
trating their attack on a portion of the enemy's line, and 
by a timely use of their fire-ships to inflict so crushing a 
blow as practically Jo remove the hostile fleet from the 
board. Twelve ships were completely destroyed, many 
more disabled, and De Haen, with two of his flag officers, 
was killed. 

Having thus within six months fought three successful 
actions against two of the great sea powers, the reputation 
of the French navy was firmly established, and their 
position. inJhe Med iterra nean secured. Du Quesne could 
safely retire to Toulon for stores and reinforcements, and 
in the middle of July was able to sail again with three 
thousand infantry to reinforce the French Viceroy. There 
was nothing to intercept him. In vain the Spaniards 
urged the Dutch to make one more effort. The admiral 
said he had instructions from home to go to Naples to 
await further orders, and Du Quesne and the rest of the 



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1676-7 SICILY 4 IN EXTREMIS' 97 

army that was following him passed unmolested. The 
fact was the Dutch were disgusted with the futility of 
their ally, and in August, when the second period for 
which they had promised to serve in the Mediterranean, 
was expired, the fleet was recalled. France was at last 
in command of the sea, at liberty to throw in what 
force she chose to complete the reduction of Sicily. As 
things stood it was but a question of time. With a real 
army at his back Vivonne began to reach out towards 
Syracuse, and by the autumn Taormina, the romantic 
spot from which the Greeks two thousand years before 
had begun their Sicilian dominion, was in his possession. 
Single-handed it was hopeless for Spain to expect that 
she could prolong the situation indefinitely. By pursuing 
those evasive tactics in which, since the days of Drake, 
she had always shown so high a skill, she was still able to 
support her hard-pressed officers. Yet, unless something 
intervened to relieve the tension, it was inevitable that 
France ^ould soon be in possession of the heart of the 
Mediterranean. 

But already the heat of her success, both here and else- 
where, was drawing out of the North the cloud that was 
destined at last to chill and wither the system of the Grand 
Monarque. His evil genius had arisen. Since the murder 
of De Witt the monarchical constitution had been restored 
to the Netherlands, and William of Orange, as Stadt- 
holder of the States, had become the focus of resistance 
to Louis. At present his prospects were dark enough. The 
land campaign in Flanders was going far from well ; and on 
that side the relations between the Dutch and the Spaniards 
were growing as bad and mistrustful as they were in the 
Mediterranean. In his trouble William turned to Charles, 
and while Vivonne was in the act of again setting out for 
a grand attack on Syracuse, Bentinck, the Prince's most 

vol. n. H 



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98 LOUIS XIV. AND SICILY 1677 

confidential follower, came over to feel the ground for a 
match between the houses of Stuart and Orange. The 
attack on Syracuse proved abortive. Bentinck's mission 
was in every way a success. Vivonne's whole campaign 
fell to pieces, and while Louis was chafing at his Viceroy's 
failure, William was at Newmarket approving the attrac- 
tions of Princess Mary, the eldest daughter of the Duke of 
York. At the same time, Sir John Narbrough, who had 
gone home after successfully completing his work at 
Tripoli, reappeared in the Mediterranean with a fresh 
fleet, and Louis began to take serious alarm, as well he 
might. 

During the last inglorious years the British navy, the 
one factor in the situation which, if thrown into the scale 
against him, Louis could not hope to resist, had well 
maintained its prestige, and above all in the Mediterra- 
nean, where most it was to be feared. It was Narbrough, 
moreover, who had most brilliantly kept the old "fire 
burning. The blockade of Tripoli, which he had esta- 
blished and maintained throughout the year 1675, had 
proved a complete success. A number of the corsairs' 
vessels were captured or destroyed by his cruisers and 
boats, and in January 1676 he had made a bold attempt 
on four vessels that lay in the harbour itself. The flotilla 
by which the attack was made was led by a young 
lieutenant named Cloudesley Shovell, afterwards the 
famous admiral, and without the loss of a man all four 
vessels were destroyed. Subsequently Narbrough landed 
a party and succeeded in burning a quantity of naval 
stares, but in spite of the lesson the Dey remained obdu- 
rate. He had still four powerful vessels at sea, but these 
Narbrough soon fell in with. Besides his own ship, the 
'Hampshire,' he had only one frigate with him, but he 
did not hesitate to engage. A bloody action ensued, in 



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1676 NAUBKOUGH'S SQUADRON W 

which, though he did not capture one of the enemy, he 
forced them to fly into Tripoli, cut to pieces, and with the 
loss of six hundred men. With his navy practically 
annihilated, the Dey at last came to reason. On March 5, 
1676, a treaty was signed, conceding to England the 
maritime privileges she demanded, and agreeing to an 
indemnity of eighty thousand dollars. So abject a sub- 
mission produced a revolution. The Dey was expelled 
from the city, and the new Government defied the 
admiral. Thereupon he once more stood in to threaten a 
bombardment, and the new Dey found himself compelled 
to ratify the objectionable treaty. Fresh from this suc- 
cess, Narbrough returned to Tangier, and his mere 
presence there was enough to coerce Salee into a treaty 
similar to that which he had exacted from Tripoli. 

Louis himself was able to cut a scarcely more dignified 
figure than the corsairs. His protests that the English 
were practically protecting Dutch commerce against his 
privateers instead of assisting him to destroy it only 
resulted in his having to agree to a commercial treaty, 
whereby he gave up his belligerent rights and exempted 
British vessels from molestation by his cruisers, whether 
they were carrying enemy's goods or not. 1 But even this 
humiliating concession brought him little rest from his 
main anxiety. Though the ostensible object of Nar- 
brough's return to the Mediterranean after his exploits 
at Tripoli was merely that some Algerine cruisers had 
captured one or two English merchantmen, the fleet he 
was to command was to consist of nearly thirty sail ; ' but 
what is most extraordinary/ as a newsman wrote, * is that 
the Duke of Monmouth goes to sea with this fleet in 
quality only of captain of the "Resolution," a ship of 

1 LiUm d* Colbert, UL I No. 440, Sept 7-47, 1676. Bank*, ir. 36. 

M * 



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100 LOUIS XIV. AND SICILY 1675 

between sixty and seventy guns.' ' Eventually the young 
Protestant hero did not sail, but the fact that he thought 
of doing so remains as evidence of the importance attached 
to the fleet in Court circles and the menace it contained 
for Louis. 

A further point is not without significance and of high 
interest as showing the germ of an idea on which the 
British Mediterranean power came ultimately to be largely 
based. In the spring of 1675 Pepys had written to Nar- 
brough instructing him to arrange a base to which rein- 
forcements might be sent for a more vigorous prosecution 
of the war with Tripoli. Since Leghorn was too distant 
and too ill-disposed and Messina blockaded, the King and 
the Lords, he was told, considered Malta, fittest for the 
purpose. Eephallonia had also been suggested, but the 
final decision was to be left to the admiral. Narbrough 
had no hesitation. He chose Malta, and seeing that he 
was operating against the nearest and most formidable 
enemy of the Knights, he had no difficulty in securing 
their permission. As soon as this was known at the 
Admiralty, the Tangier careening hulk and all the stores 
that were going out to Narbrough were ordered to Malta. 
In June 1675 Pepys, in submitting a memorandum of the 
Navy Estimates to Parliament, asked for a grant • for the 
providing of stores to be lodged at Malta for answering 
the wants of the fleet under Sir John Narbrough,' and a 
month later a frigate sailed from Spithead to convoy the 
Tangier hulk to the new base. 1 The arrangement pro- 
bably terminated with Narbrough 's successful conclusion 
of the war, but as he expended his indemnity on the spot 

1 La Fleming MSS. (HuL USS. Cam.), sii. vii. 189, UQ. 

* 8m ityjtf Calendar, 1676; Pepys to Narbrough, April 19, May 10, 
Jane 14; am to the Speaker, Jane 19, July 6; name to Bett, July 6 
(ordering the 'Earopa' balk from Tangier to Malta); and sanio to Ear- 
i September 8* 



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1675 PEPY8 ON INCREASING THE NAVY lOl 

in ransoming captives, amongst whom were several 
Knights of Malta, he was clearly in a position to prolong 
or renew his advantage as he pleased. 

Besides the indication of the intended field of Nar- 
brough's operations which these proceedings afforded, 
there lay in them a still higher menace. In view of the 
alarming growth of the French fleet, the House of Com- 
mons had passed a resolution to take into consideration 
the whole state of the navy, and called upon the Admi- 
ralty for a return. In presenting it, Pepys, to enforce his 
argument for an increase of strength, produced one of those 
comparative tables — now so familiar — which showed the 
French fleet actually superior to our own. ' Our neigh- 
bours 9 force,' said he, ' is now greater than ours, and they 
will still be building, so that we are as well to overtake 
them for the time past as to keep pace with them in the 
present building.' Not only had they passed us in num- 
bers, but also in the individual power of their ships. In 
strength, staunchness, and general sea endurance, their 
recent construction had gone beyond us. He therefore 
urged the immediate laying down of a number of the larger 
rates ; and recommended our ' building ships more bur- 
densome, stronger, and giving them more breadth. 9 This 
would 'make them carry their guns better — that is higher — 
our great ships failing therein, especially in bad weather ; * 
'enable them to carry more timber and thicker sides, 
less easily penetrated by shot ' ; give more stowage room, 
and fit them for the heavier guns that were coming into 
, favour. In the ehd the House voted a large grant for the 
^constractioiMjfJihirtyjiew-flhips, and though conditions 
were attached to it which Charles could not agree to, 
the programme was soon after taken in hand. 1 

It mattered little therefore that when, towards the 
1 Tanner, Engl Hist IUv. xli. 691 $t «g. 



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102 LOUIS XIV. AND SICILY 1077 

end of 1677, Narbrough reappeared in the Straits, the 
misconduct of the Algerines afforded an excuse for his 
presence. Behind him was a strenuous naval revival, 
directed to a declared end, and he carried in his hand a 
threat there was no concealing. His arrival was followed 
by a report that Cornells Evertsen was coming down to 
join him with eighteen sail, and Louis saw he must take 
rapid and decisive action. 1 Vivonne, since his late failures, 
had been showing as little heart as ability for his posi- 
tion, and it was now decided to allow him to return to 
his naval command at Toulon, and to replace him with 
one of the most accomplished soldiers in France. It was 
Marshal d'Aubusson, Due de la Feuillade, on whom Louis's 
choice fell, and in the last months of 1677 an expedition 
was prepared for him, strong enough to carry French arms 
from end to end of Sicily. At the same time Charles, 
having decided to offer his mediation, was pressing Louis 
to make a reasonable peace with Spain. But, so far from 
listening, the French King continued to extend his opera- 
tions in Flanders, f»nd on New Year's Day, 1678, Charles 
and the Prince of Orange signed a treaty to unite their 
forces in compelling France to end the war. Clearly there 
was no time to lose; Feuillade had already left Paris, 
and was riding night and day down to Toulon to take up 
his command. By January 14, 1678, he was clear away 
to sea, and by the end of the month carried bis fleet into 
the Straits of Messina. On February 3-he took the oath 
as Viceroy, and proceeded at once to strengthen the 
French advanced posts for immediate offensive action. 
For about a month his preparations continued, and when 
they were complete he invited the leading citizens to a 
banquet In their enthusiasm they brought with them 
the sacred banner of Sta. Maria della Lettera, which had 
been placed infa general's hands since, a century 

1 L$Um * Colbert, UL i. No. 470, November 7-17, 1677. 



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1678 EVACUATION OF MESSINA 10S 

before, it was given to Don John of Austria on the eve 
of Lepanto. For a power that was about to take the 
place which Spain bad then held the honour was appro- 
priate enough, and Fenillade accepted it complacently. 
After the ceremony he begged them to adjourn to the Senate 
House that he might publicly announce his niaster'sorders. 
To the surprise of the citizens they heard that these orders 
were for every French soldier to be immediately vrith- 
drawa.fromSiciiy. The King, so the Marshal said, re- 
quired them for a secret expedition, and he hoped to be 
back in two months with still larger forces. The Mes- 
sinians had no suspicion of the word of the general passed 
under their sacred banner, and Feuillade was allowed to 
proceed without interruption. 

So the unhappy insurgents were left to their fate. 
It was this that had been intended by Feuillade's appoint- 
ment. The decisive step which Louis had felt himself 
compelled to take was not the conquest of Sicily but its 
evacuation, and once more by a threat of action in the 
Mediterranean the Northern powers had laid a mastering 
hand upon the European situation. In France, so far 
from there being any hope of retaining a hold upon 
Sicily, the fear was that they would not even be per- 
mitted to abandon it. Narbrough was on the spot, and 
there was no telling what his orders were. ' We ought, 
I think,' wrote Du Quesne, ' to assume that, if the English 
declare themselves, it will be as they habitually do, by 
firing the shot at their own time, just as they did when 
they declared against the Dutch in 1672 by Holmes attack- 
ing the Smyrna convoy/ He might, as we know, have 
added many other instances, which gave to a British fleet 
ready for action in the Mediterranean its peculiar weight 
in the councils of Europe. The English, however, did not 
declare themselves. The threat was enough, and the 
French garrison returned direct to Toulon unmolested. r ^ ' 



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101 LOUTR XIV. AND SICILY 1678 

On his northern frontier Louis was not so easily 
checked. Though a pence congress was sitting at Nymwe- 
gen f to Englishmen it seemed that, if the Spanish Nether- 
lands were to be saved, war was inevitable. The Duke of 
Monmouth went over to the Low Countries with an English 
force ready to co-operate with William of Orange. In July 
an engagement actually occurred between the opposing 
forces at Mons; and at sea conflicts between French 
and English vessels from time to time intensified the 
situation. Preparations, moreover, were being made in 
the British ports for fitting out a fleet of ninety sail. 
It was the last year of Pepys's able administration, and 
the navy had never been more ready for war. Eighty- 
three vessels were actually in commission, the magazines 
were packed with reserve stores, the ships in harbour 
were in excellent condition, and thirty new ones of the 
first three rates were upon the stocks. 1 Here lay the 
greatest anxiety for France ; and throughout the summer, 
while the negotiations continued, Colbert had ever a 
nervous eye upon Narbrough's fleet, for fear of the 
spark which would set the seas in a blaze. In order to 
improve the French position at the Congress he was 
still bent on using the Toulon squadron either against 
Catalonia or the Dutch Smyrna convoy, but all Du 
Quesne's orders were strangled by the condition that at* 
all hazards he must keep out of- Narbrough's way. 2 
With his hands thus tied'Du Quesne could of course 
effect nothing to restore the balance in favour of the 
French arms. Louis was compelled to give way in every 
direction, and a general peace was concluded in Sep- 
tember. 



1 Bqpyi, Mmm rin* touching the Royal Navy. 

* L*tr*$d* Colbert, Ul. i. No. 494, May 8-18; 496, May 4-14; 496, 

Mayis-ts. 



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CHAPTER XXIV 

TANGIER AND THE POPISH PLOT 

Like the other treaties by which the powers had sought 
to curb the career of Louis, that of Nymwegen proved 
but a mere breathing place in his advance. Much as he 
had gained, it served only to whet his appetite and increase 
his confidence. With his army triumphant and unex- 
hausted, his wealth increasing, and a navy that had 
just given signs of maturity, he was not likely to rest 
content, and least of all in the Mediterranean, where the 
promise was highest and the failure most marked. The 
pressure that had forced peace upon him had been irre- 
sistible, but in peace he knew how to work for his ends 
as well as in war. To oust the English from Tangier was 
still one of those ends. 

How far his hand was in it we cannot tell, but it is 
certain that no sooner was the treaty of Nymwegen signed 
than a new and insidious form of attack upon the place 
began to make itself felt. There is no direct evidence 
that it was Louis's work ; but, seeing what the condition 
of affairs was, it is impossible to believe that it had not 
at least his countenance. Since he had lost his hold on 
Charles, he had allied himself with the Anglican opposi- 
tion. Indeed it was they who had forced him to make 
the peace, and it was still by secret influence in English 
political circles that he was trying to keep the British 
power out of his path. At the moment the situation was 
dominated by the notorious papist scare. The tenor, 



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106 TANGIER AND THE POPISH PLOT 1678 

which had been haunting the popular imagination ever 
since the treaty of Dover was signed, had burst out 
into ungovernable fury against all papists; and Tangier at 
this time had Lord Inchiquin, son of the old Irish Catholic 
leader, for Governor. Now it will be remembered that 
Estrades had warned Montagu that there were men 
about the King ready to suggest the abandonment of 
Tangier so soon as an occasion served. It was such an 
occasion now. The Moors had recently become actively 
hostile again, and it was clear that sooner or later, if the 
place was to be kept, the reduced garrison would have 
to be brought up to its original strength. This meant 
increased expense and something worse. Tangier had 
already won itself an evil name with Protestants. Lord 
Inchiquin was not its first Catholic Governor: its 
garrison had always been largely Catholic, and it was 
openly branded by many as a nursery for papist troops. 
What better opportunity then could there be for suggest- 
ing that, instead of raising fresh troops to preserve the 
place, the double danger should be avoided by its evacu- 
ation? 

Like most similar efforts to influence public opinion 
the origin of the movement is difficult to trace. Pepys 
believed on the highest authority that it was the Earl of 
Sunderland who first suggested the evacuation to the 
Sing. 1 He certainly had motive enough. His last 
diplomatic appointment had been to replace Montagu, 
who had been recalled in disgrace from the Embassy at 
Paris, and after the conclusion of the treaty at Nymwegen 

'- On Oct 2, 1683, Lord Dartmouth, who was privy to the whole design, 
told him at Tangier that 'it was first proposed by my Lord Sunderland 
about three years ago* ('Tangier Diary* in Smith's IAfe % Journals, and 
CmtttpomtUme$ of Sawmd Pepy*, £*g. FM.8. i. 880). This would plaoe 
the origin of the movement in the autumn of 1680, but it was certainly 
in tfca air a year earlier. 



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1679 RUMOURS OF ANOTHER SALE 107 

he had returned to London to begin his unscrupulous 
political career as in effect prime minister of the ' Chits * 
administration. An arch opportunist from the first, he 
was aptly described in a lampoon of the time as 

A Proteus, ever acting in disgnige, 
A finished statesman, intricately wise; 
A second Machiavel, who soared above 
The little types of gratitude and lore. 

Having posed all his youth as a strenuous Protestant, 
he was now seeking his inspiration from Mademoiselle de 
Kfroualle, Duchess of Portsmouth, or in other words from 
Barillon, the French Ambassador, and there is little 
reason to doubt the general correctness of Pepys's informa- 
tion. Indeed Sunderland himself afterwards admitted the 
idea was his own. 1 

The known facts of the case are these. After an 
existence of eighteen years, the Restoration Parliament 
had been dissolved. In the early spring of 1679 a general 
election had taken place, by no means so favourable to 
the Court a? had been expected, and so soon as the new 
Parliament met, it fell savagely upon Lord Danby, the 
Old Cavalier minister whom they regarded as responsible 
for all that was evil in the King's policy, both at home 
and abroad. In the midst of the proceedings for his 
impeachment a rumour arose that the King was in treaty 
with Louis for the sale of Jamaica and Tangier for a 
sum of money which would enable him to dispense with 
the aid of Parliament. Whether any such idea was in the 
air or not, it seems clear that Barillon knew nothing of 
it. The opposition, however, took the matter very 
seriously, and worked themselves into such a state of 
nervousness that on April 7 they ordered a bill to be 
brought in for annexing Tangier to the Crown of England- 

1 Pepyi to Lord Dartmouth, April 6, 1684, Smith, ii. 48. 



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108 TANGIER AND THE POPISH PLOT 1679 

Nobody in bis senses — so Montagu assured the Ambas- 
sador — believed the rumour to be possible. Moreover 
the Court party was able to point out to the House how 
unwise was the bill ; since if it were passed it would 
saddle Parliament with the burden of the garrison. But 
the country members were far too excited to listen. The 
bill was brought in, and committed to the most violent of 
the opposition to draft ; but even then they could not 
rest. The King might deal with Tangier, as he had 
dealt with Dunkirk, before the bill could pass, and so 
high was the feeling that, three days later, immediately 
after their refusal to accept the Lords' milder proposals 
about Danby, the Commons passed a resolution, nemine 
contradicenie : ' That this House is of opinion that those 
who shall advise his Majesty to part with Tangier to any 
foreign prince or state, and be instrumental therein, ought 
to be accounted enemies of the King and kingdom/ ' 

Though the meaning of these proceedings is clear 
enough, it is uncertain from what quarter came the note 
of alarm. Barillon affirmed that it was believed to have 
originated from Danby himself; but it is much more 
probable that Montagu was at the bottom of it. He 
had been deprived not only of his embassy, but also of 
his seat in the Council, and was bent on revenge. Danby, 
by warmly supporting the Orange match, had incurred 
Louis's enmity, and Montagu, in return for a substantial 
gratuity, had offered to bring about the obnoxious mini- 
sterns fall It was in this way the attack of the Commons 
had begun. Montagu's unscrupulous method of proceeding 
was to make the unpopular statesman appear responsible 
lor Charles's degrading bargains with the French King, 
which Danby had done his best to neutralise, and of 

1 Common* Journal*, ix. 5SS. Barillon to LouU, April 17 and S6 (n.s.), 
lfTO, U.O. BamkH TramcripU, 40. 



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1679 THE TANGIER BILL 109 

which Montagu himself had been the instrument With 
this end in view, nothing could tell more sharply against 
his victim than a hint that Tangier was in the unsavoury 
market. Such a suggestion, moreover, had a further 
advantage for Montagu. To take foreign pay in those 
days by no means meant that a man had lost his patriotism. 
Montagu could earn his money without betraying his 
country, and nothing could serve his purpose better, both 
for calming his conscience and turning suspicion of 
French influence from himself, than warning the opposi- 
tion of what he had heard from Estrades. Thus pro- 
tected he would be able to attack Danby with all the 
virulence he pleased ; and at this time he had been so 
successful in his game that the House had taken him 
under its special protection and impounded his papers to 
prevent the Court getting hold of them. It is extremely 
probable therefore that we may trace the action of the 
Commons to Montagu. In any case they were so far in 
earnest that the bill was read a first time some six weeks 
later, and had not the King suddenly prorogued Parlia- 
ment in order to save Danby from its animosity, the 
Tangier bill would certainly have become law. 1 

Thus it is most probable that it was by Louis's own 
pensioner that the movement against Tangier, if there 
was one, was checked. But Sunderland remained at the 
head of affairs, and the nervousness continued. A similar 
rumour recurred early the following year. This time it took 
the form that, if Parliament would not vote enough 
money for the fleet, the Dutch were ready to lend it on 
the security of Tangier. As the place had not been 
formally annexed, it was argued that it was in the King's 
power to deal with it, and that in the hands of the Prince of 

1 Common* JournaU, it. 635, M*y 90, 1670. A oopy of (Km bill it 
dared in Hi$t. MSS. Com, r. 890. 



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110 TANGIER AND THE POPISH PLOT 16*0 

Orange, who was to command the garrison, it would be 
as useful to England as if it were in English hands. It 
was a suggestion— so Barillon wrote to his master— of the 
Dutch party at Court, who were urging an alliance with 
Holland instead of with France; but he found comfort 
in the alarm it aroused, not only with the Parliamentary 
opposition but with the great mercantile community. 1 

The feeling that prevailed is further reflected in the 
activity of the pamphleteers. In the autumn was pub- 
lished The Present Danger of Tangier ; or an account of 
its being attempted by a great army of Moors by land and 
under apprehensions of the French at sea. It purports to 
be a letter written from Cadiz on board the ' Hopewell/ 
but is clearly a political tract. After referring to the 
popish plot and the religious troubles in Scotland, the 
anonymous author describes Tangier and the army of 
fifteen thousand Moors which he alleges is encamped 
against it. He fears that unless quickly succoured it will 
be lost, and if, he says, it should fall into some people's 
hands it would cause the loss cf all our Mediterranean 
trade. Besides the danger from the Moors, he affirms 
that the French have forty sail of galleys threatening it 
from Gibraltar, and throughout he is clearly writing to 
create a public feeling for strengthening the place 
instead of giving it up.* 

The manuscript of a similar tract, apparently of this 
tune, exists in the Pepys collection, which dwells particu- 
larly on the strategic importance of the place. ' Tangier/ 
it argues, ' being a most convenient station for our naval 
forces, which may give law to all that sail upon the 
Midland sea, when once our mole is finished, as also a 

• BtriQon to (Km King, Feb. IS and 30, 1680, R.O. Bucket 2V<m- 

41. 
'Dro* pp. 1*0-1. 



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1680 TANGIER PAMPHLETS HI 

safe port for vessels of trade/ The author sharply 
censures those who call it a useless expense, since already, 
he urges, it has forced the French King to make his 
Languedoc channel, make spacious harbours, and keep 
a large naval force on foot, to wit, thirty galleys at 
Marseilles with eight or nine thousand men always 
aboard them. In peace and war, he says, it has supplied 
merchantmen and ships of war with victuals and intelli- 
gence. So formidable a threat, moreover, was it to com- 
merce that it inclined foreign princes to peace, since about 
the Straits they could now discover almost no sail but what 
bore St. George's Cross. The ugly reputation which the 
garrison had acquired for insubordination and lewd living 
he was obliged to admit, but this, he contended, was no 
essential evil, due to the climate, but to be attributed rather 
to want of business and action. It was caused by idle 
hands ' enjoying their neighbours' troubles, and delighting 
in scandalous reports, especially 9 — so he adds— 'the 
women, whose tongues are not to be limited.' ' 

A still more important tract was issued the following 
year, 1680, which with considerable power and at length 
sets forth the advantages that had been already reaped 
from the occupation. To begin with, the author points 
out how at the very commencement it compelled the 
King of Spain to draw his forces from the Portuguese 
frontier down into Andalusia, and so at the most critical 
period of their struggle for independence it gave the 
Portuguese respite for a whole campaign. 'Tangier/ he 
proceeds, ' is so advantageously situated that it surveys the 
greatest thoroughfare of commerce in the world ... so 
that no ship or vessel can pass in or out of the Mediter- 
ranean unobserved from thence. . . . Here it was that a 

1 BoUand 1 * MmUUrransa* Pajxn, No. 15, in the PepyiUn Libra, 
Magdalene College, Cambridge. 



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113 TANGIER AND THE POPISH PLOT 1680 

squadron of the Dutch, on two several occasions during 
that war, lay in wait for our Newfoundland fleet, who had 
no recourse for safety but to Tangier, where they were 
protected and secured till the danger was over.' He then 
goes on to speak of how Allin and Narbrough had won 
all their greatest successes by being able to hold this 
station, and had thereby destroyed the pirates' power. 
Already it was a real port of refuge and naval base. 
' With what ease and expedition, 9 he says, ' did Sir John 
Xarbrough, the last year, careen and refit the ships under 
his command within the mole. I have often heard him 
say with great satisfaction that he would undertake to 
refit a squadron [there] in half the time and with half the 
charge that it could be done anywhere else out of 
England/ He then dwells upon its high strategical 
advantage in case of war with France or Spain, both for 
the protection of our commerce and the power of offence 
against theirs. In the case of the Dutch wars its 
value was particularly conspicuous. For in the first war, 
when it was in its infancy, 'the mole of little benefit, 
nor the ministers then not so much enlightened in its 
usefulness, ' the Hollanders did with a small squadron of 
ship6 scour the whole Mediterranean,' whereas in the 
last war they themselves were barely able to trade within 
the Straits at all. Finally, it had proved itself, if rightly 
managed, capable of being an absolute prevention to the 
Barbary corsairs. 

'If/ he proceeds, 'Tangier be a jewel of so many 
extraordinary virtues, it were a great deal of pity it should 
adorn any prince's crown but he who wears it/ So he 
speaks of an alarming rumour that the place was to be 
sold to the French, and urges the terrible danger to our 
position and prestige if it were not only lost to us, but 
gained by them. He warns men against complaining of 



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16 80 NEW DIFFICULTIES 113 

its expense, and reminds them how just the same was said 
of Dunkirk and how they have repented the sale. It is 
no more expense, he argues, than one first-rate ship in 
war. ' Yet/ he asks, ' did ever anybody complain that our 
ships were a burden ? ' 

In conclusion he dwells on the commercial importance 
to which its position seems to entitle it over and above 
its strategical advantages. He foresees it may become 
the great emporium of the American, East Indian, and 
Levant trade — the main centre of distribution for all 
Europe, if only it be kept a free port. *It is an easy 
matter therefore/ he concludes, ' for the Prince of Tangier 
to command our northern world, and to give laws to 
Europe and Africa. The situation of Borne, of Carthage, 
of Constantinople, of London, Paris, and other imperial 
cities is nothing near so advantageous for that purpose as 
Tangier if all things be considered/ ' 

It is clear therefore that by this time its true value 
was fully appreciated, and the attempt to bring it to the 
fate of Dunkirk failed. Still no help for its adequate 
maintenance was to be had from the House of Commons. 
A new Parliament met in October 1679 ; but the King, in 
face of the movement for the exclusion of his Catholic 
brother from the succession, dared not let it sit, and it was 
continually prorogued. Still, in spite of his penury, he 
contrived to send out reinforcements. In the course of the 
year 1680 the garrison was brought up to two battalions : 
and the help came none too soon. Towards the end of 
the previous year the pressure from the Moors began to 
increase to a dangerous degree. All work on the mole 
had to be stopped, and the money allotted for it hastily 

1 *A Discourse touching Tangier,' in a Utter to a person of quality, to 
which is added * The Interest of Tangier, 9 by another hand (Harleian 
MiscsUany, ed. 1810, rol. riii. 891 ft $eq.). The Discourse it dated Oct 90, 
1G79. 

VOL. II. I 



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114 TANGIER AND THE POPISH PLOT 1680 

spent on the fortifications. By the end of March 1680 
the Moors had sat down before the new works in force, 
and formed a regular siege. Sir Palmes Fairborne, who as 
deputy governor was commanding in Lord Inchiquin's 
absence, at once recognised that he had to confront a 
situation such as had never yet threatened the place. In 
the great school of arms which had formed round the siege 
of Candia there were numbers of Mussulman soldiers 
who had gradually acquired a high degree of skill in the 
European methods of siege work. When the capitulation 
put an end to their employment, it was natural for the more 
adventurous of them to seek further service with Muley 
Ishmael, the rising star that had supplanted Guylan in 
Morocco. At Tangier then it was no longer a question 
of untutored warfare and ill-directed assaults as in the 
earlier days, but of a formal siege with all the order of 
trench and mine that modern science could suggest. 

Fortunately, Fairborne was just the man that was 
wanted. He too had served his apprenticeship to arms in 
the Candiote school under the Venetian colours, and had 
been an officer in the Tangier regiment from its formation 
in 1661. No one knew the possibilities of the place better 
than he ; he was a soldier born and bred, with a high reputa- 
tion both for courage and conduct, and Tangier had never 
been so well ordered as during the years he had been acting 
governor. The chance had come to show his mettle, and 
at every turn the utmost skill of the Moors in devising 
approaches was promptly met and foiled with equal art. 
The fleet too was doing its best to support him. It was 
now under the command of Arthur Herbert, afterwards 
famous as Lord Torrington, an officer of quite the modern 
type. Having joined the service in 1663 at the age of six- 
teen, he had been on active service almost ever since. 
In both Dutch wars he commanded a ship, and had 



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1680 A FORMIDABLE SIEGE 115 

served in the Mediterranean in almost every squadron 
that had gone there. He had had a ship under Allin, 
Spragge, and Narbrough. In Narbrough's last and most 
important fleet he held the rank of Vice-Admiral, and 
when in May 1679 Narbrough went home he remained in 
command of the station. A year later he received his 
commission as Admiral and Commander-in-Chief. Sur- 
rounded by a devoted band of captains, and thoroughly 
familiar with his work, he was able to render material 
assistance to the Governor. Tangier was in his eyes, as 
in Narbrough's, an invaluable naval station. He regarded 
it as his headquarters, and in the modem fashion had a 
house in the town. 1 Fairborne could not have wished for 
a better colleague or one who had the preservation of the 
place more earnestly at heart. But none knew better than 
he that all modern experience showed how the defence of 
fortified places must ultimately be beaten by a regular 
attack. Under the conditions that existed, and against 
the great odds to which it was exposed, the place could 
not hold out indefinitely. Bit by bit the Moors were 
eating their way in. By the first week in April they had 
isolated two of the outer forts. For more than a month 
both of them held out; but, on May 12, one had to 
surrender while the other was cleverly evacuated, and 
Fairborne was able to secure a truce of four months. 

But he was too good a soldier not to see his fate before 
him, unless Charles was ready to put forth a strength to 
which he was probably unequal. To Pepys, the secretary 
of the Tangier Council, he wrote a private letter in which 
he laid bare his thoughts, and clearly sounded the last 

1 Smith, i. 401. Pepys censures him (or this, and generally give* him a 
bad eharaoter. Bat Pepys was so devoted an adherent of his patrons 
that we can attach no more importanee to his dislike of Herbert than weean 
to his dislike of Monk. Admiration for Lord Dartmouth was at the bottom 
of the one, for Lord Sandwich of the other. 

it 



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116 TANGIER AND THE POPISH PLOT 1680 

note. ' I only desire/ he wrote in sending home a report 
of the situation, 'that you possess yourself with the 
opinion that it will be impossible ever to maintain this 
garrison by any other ways but by open war, unless the 
enemy would condescend in time of peace to [our] fortify- 
ing the town, which, so far as I can learn, they absolutely 
refuse, but upon consideration of powder are willing [for 
us] to carry on the work for the mole ; by which you 
may conclude that the enemy do only defer their attempt 
against the town till the mole be made more convenient 
for them. Therefore it will be more for the King and 
kingdom's service (I say, if his Majesty cannot maintain 
it with such a force that we may be able to beat them in 
the field) to blow up both town and mole. This I have 
endeavoured to digest amongst my friends as most proper, 
and what I foresee must be the end.' l 

But Charles could not so easily bring himself to lose 
the most glittering jewel he had added to the British 
crown. It was all that remained of the brilliant hope 
and high purpose with which he had begun his reign. 
Struggling as he was with the influences that were dragging 
him down, he still clung to it with a last effort of his 
better self. With Tangier would go his last claim to be 
considered a great power in Europe. Nor was he without 
support. In the ministry was Sir William Temple to 
counteract Sunderland's influence, and in him he had at 
his elbow an adviser who had perhaps the clearest view 
of any man of his time how the prestige of the country 
could best be preserved. 

The newsletters of the time clearly reflect the anxiety 
that prevailed. • All fear/ says one of them on June 12, 
•that Tangierswill fall,' and again on July 31, 'There 

• BodfUm MS8. {But. MS8. Cam.), p. 176, May 24, 1680. 



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1680 ENTHUSIASM FOR ITS RELIEF 117 

are hopes we can still hold Tangiers. 9 1 The Govern- 
ment had, in fact, determined to make a serious effort 
to save it. The Court — so Barillon kept informing Louis 
—was wholly absorbed in the affair. The merchants re- 
garded the preservation of the place as essential to the 
safety of the Levant trade, and, in spite of the danger of 
letting seasoned troops leave the country at so critical a 
political juncture, something had to be done. True, as 
he says, there were courtiers who began to whisper that 
Tangier was of no use and had better be abandoned* ' I 
believe/ wrote the Ambassador, ' if they did not fear what 
would happen when Parliament met, they would make 
up their minds to abandon Tangier after destroying the 
works that are in progress on the mole. 9 s For the time, 
at any rate, public opinion and Charles's remnants of 
ambition were too strong for 6uch counsels to be listened 
to. Thirteen companies of infantry, including five of the 
Coldstream Guards, were to be ready to go out in June, 
and more were to follow, and Spain was persuaded to 
provide two hundred horse. To complete the testimony 
of energy, Lord Ossory, the Duke of Ormonde's idolised 
son and the Bayard of the English Court, was induced to 
accept the governorship. The most brilliant of the golden 
youth eagerly volunteered to accompany him. At sea, on 
land, and in diplomacy he had won equal distinction, and, 
if Tangier could be saved, every one knew he was the man 
to do it. Adored by the seamen no less than the soldiers, 
and the darling of society as well, he gave to the King's 
resolution a distinction which left nothing to be desired. 
But a cloud had settled over Charles's star that not even 
his brilliance could dispel. Ossory himself received the 

1 U Fleming Jfc'&.pp. 108, 170. 

' Barillon to the King, July 81, 1080 (n*.) Also his despatches from 
May V to Augunt 34, U.O. Banket Trantcripts, 41. 



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118 TANGIER AND TUB l*0PI8H PLOT 1680 

appointment as his doom, and saw open before him the 
grave of his reputation. As he told Evelyn, he was being 
thrown away, not only on a hazardous venture, but on 
one that in most men's minds was an impossibility. Yet 
he prepared himself to obey, sinking every day into a 
gloomier foreboding, till, before he could sail, death came 
mercifully to his release. With him died the newly 
kindled enthusiasm. No one was appointed to succeed 
him. The King wearily abandoned his effort. The Cold- 
streams and the other old troops were countermanded, 
and it was decided to send a small relief of fresh levies, 
and leave the rest to Parliament when it met. 1 

Meanwhile the truce at Tangier was fast ebbing away. 
As no new governor had been appointed, the command 
remained in the capable hands of Sir Palmes Fairborne. 
The truce expired on September 15, and the Moors im- 
mediately reopened hostilities; but Fairborne, having 
received some reinforcements and being backed by 
Herbert's fleet, had everything in order. He at once 
assumed the offensive, and, having now a sufficiency of 
cavalry, was able to do so with success. During the 
following months, by a series of skilfully designed opera- 
tions boldly carried out, he succeeded in reoccupying all 
the positions he had been forced to abandon by the terms 
of the truce, and firmly built out a position from which 
he meant to strike the Moors a final blow in the field. 
During all these operations he superintended the work in 
person, exposing himself on horseback in complete con- 
tempt of the enemy, till on October 24, in directing a 
far advanced work that practically completed his scheme, 
he was seriously wounded. The Moors seized the oc- 
casion for a strenuous effort to recover the ground they 
had lost, and during the following days redoubled their 
1 BtrilloQ to Ix»U, Aug. 34, 1680 (n.s.), R.O. Banket Transcripts, 41 



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1680 A VICTORIOUS SORTIE 119 

efforts in the trenches with alarming insistence. But 
Fairborne equally saw his hour had come, and determined 
on a sally of the whole garrison in force. On the 27ih all 
was ready. Herbert organised an important diversion 
with his boats to threaten the enemy's flank on the 
opposite side of the bay, besides taking command of a 
battalion of seamen in the main attack of the troops* 
Fairborne, whose wound had taken a dangerous turn, was 
unable to sit his horse ; but, though he was compelled to 
resign his place to Colonel Sackville, his second in com- 
mand, he had himself carried to a chair on his veranda, 
whence he could survey the whole field of operations. 

The movement began with a feint by the Spanish 
horse to the westward against the enemy's left, supported 
by the workmen engaged on the mole, who had been 
furnished with drums and colours to give them the 
appearance of infantry. At the same time the boats of 
the fleet developed their demonstration to the eastward 
against the enemy's right, and succeeded in holding a large 
force of Moors in that direction throughout the day. 
The real attack was made from the centre with five 
battalions of infantry, the naval brigade, and the three 
troops of British horse. With splendid dash the men flung 
themselves on the advanced trenches of the Moors, where 
a stubborn fight at push of pike took place, till one by 
one they were carried and the Moors pressed back to 
their original lines. But Sackville was not yet content : 
he had only just begun. There was no pause except for 
filling up the trenches to make a passage for the horse. 
This done, the advance was renewed, and all the horse, 
including the Spanish who had now joined the main 
attack, passed over. The resistance of the Moors was 
fiercer than ever, especially from their cavalry, who charged 
again and again to protect the beaten infantry. But all 



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190 TANGIER AND THE POPISH PLOT 1680 

• 
was of no avail. As the Moors were dislodged from the 

trenches, Sackville's cavalry kept dashing into them and 
cutting them to pieces until a complete rout declared 
itself. The British infantry and seamen rushed the 
enemy's camp, killing the Moors, who all refused quarter, 
among the tents, while the cavalry pursued them with 
great execution a mile or more into the open country. 
The victory was complete; Fairborne's methods had 
proved irresistible, and it was the crown of his life. All 
day long, as he had watched the resistless advance, he 
had been slowly sinking ; and when the exultant troops 
were returning with shouts of triumph to their quarters, 
he passed away. So died a fine soldier and a worthy 
pioneer of British Mediterranean power. He had passed 
all his best years, as he said in his last words, ' doing my 
endeavour for the advancing of my King and master's 
interest, to withstand the Moors' attempts and gain my* 
self reputation.' He was honoured, as he richly deserved, 
with a monument in Westminster Abbey,. and Dryden 
wrote the epitaph. It refers to his early service at 
Candia and tells how — 

His 700th and age, his life and death, combine, 

Ai in some great and regular design, 

All of a piece thonghout and all divine. 

Still nearer heaven his virtue shone more bright, 

Like rising flames expanding in their height ; 

The martyr's glory crowned the soldier's fight. 

He had saved Tangier, and not only that. For so 
hard were the Moors hit that they made advances for a 
cessation of arms, and Sackville was able to exact from 
them, on his own terms, a truce for six months. The 
position was still further secured by the arrival of the 
new reliefs. They took the form of Colonel Percy Kirke 
with his newly raised Second Tangier Regiment, destined 
to be famous as the ' King's Own,' and notorious in 



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1680-1 COLONEL KIRKE 131 

Monmouth's rebellion as 'Kirke's Lambs/ Still Sack- 
ville did not conceal the fact that the inherent defects of 
the situation, on which Fairborne had insisted, were still 
unchanged. He reported home that things could not 
continue as they were. A much wider line of defence 
must be secured in order to take in the positions which 
commanded the place if it was to be rendered perma- 
nently tenable, and * unless/ said he, ' the King can send 
ten thousand foot and eight hundred or a thousand horse, 
it is impossible ever to possess that ground, which must 
be had before these fortifications can be made according 
to the draft sent his Majesty/ l The estimate for com* 
pleting the necessary works was 800,000Z. a year for ten 
years, an outlay which he feared was too large for his 
Majesty's undertaking. 

Meanwhile the only hope of securing the place was to 
convert the truce into a lasting peace. For this purpose 
Sir James Leslie had come out as ambassador. It was 
characteristic, however, of Charles's administration that 
when he sailed his presents had not been forthcoming, and 
he dared not go to Fez without them. The Emperor con- 
sequently began to take an ugly tone. From a potentate 
whose favourite pastime was believed to be the invention 
and trial of new tortures, and whose frenzies of self-impor- 
tance were as ungovernable as his cruelty, anything might' 
be expected, and it was necessary to keep him quiet at all 
costs. It was Colonel Kirke who stepped into the breach 
and boldly undertook a mission to the Moorish capital 
The effect was remarkable. There was something in the 
Colonel's fierce and reckless personality which hit the 
tyrant's fancy. He treated Kirke with marked affection, 

1 A sketch of the proposed works by Bookman, who bj this time had 
been received into the British serriee, is among a number of water-oohmr 
sketches of Tanner, all from his hand, in Add. U 88. 8SSM. 



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123 TANGIER AND THE POPISH PLOT 1680 

consented for his sake to receive the dilatory ambassador, 
and finally vowed that so long as Eirke remained in 
Tangier there should never be a gun fired at the place, 
but that it should be furnished with provisions and enjoy 
the benefits of a hearty peace. Thus all difficulties were 
removed and Leslie was able to conclude a peace for four 
years on the sole condition that no new fortifications 
should be erected. 

The retention of the English hold on the Mediter- 
ranean now depended on whether the King could come to 
terms with his new Parliament. In no other way could 
he hope to get the funds necessary for Tangier. Louis, 
fully alive to the situation, was again straining every re- 
source to prevent an accommodation, and so far French 
influence had been successful. For a whole year after 
the general election successive prorogations had pre- 
vented any business being done; but at last, in October 
1680, about a month before Sackville's victory, Parlia- 
ment had been allowed to meet, and in his opening 
speech the King had particularly requested the Commons 
to help him in preserving Tangier. But the scare of 
the popish plot had not yet burnt itself out, and the 
new Parliament at once showed itself absorbed with the 
exclusion of the Duke of York. When the news of the 
battle arrived Charles ventured to send them a mes- 
sage reminding them of his desire. The message was 
duly considered, but it resulted only in a resolution to 
present the King with an address on the dangerous state 
of the kingdom. In this address they recalled to the 
King that Tangier had had several popish governors, that 
one of them then lay in the Tower for complicity with the 
popish plot, and that the garrison had always consisted 
largely of popish troops. They therefore ventured to 
hope that if they voted a supply for the place they would 



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1680 ITS KNELL IS SOUNDED 123 

receive assurance that they should not thereby augment 
the strength of their popish adversaries. The address 
was repeated a month later, and Charles replied by beg- 
ging them to state what assurance they required, trusting 
that they would consider the present state of the kingdom 
in such a way as to enable him to preserve Tangier. Then 
came the final blow. The Commons could not be turned 
from the one question on which it seemed to them that the 
future of the country hung. They bluntly announced the 
condition of their assistance must be the passing of the 
Exclusion Bill and the dismissal of every minister who 
opposed it. 1 

So the knell of Tangier was sounded. Three days 
later Parliament was dissolved, and after a despairing 
effort in March to hold another at Oxford, which was 
dissolved after a week's session, Charles's attempts at 
constitutional government came finally to an end. 

1 Commons Journals, uu, November 15, 17, 39, December SO, 1680, Mid 
January 4, 7, 1681. 



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CHAPTER XXV 

THE EVACUATION OF TANGIEB 

Louis had won an incalculable victory. At last he had 

succeeded in sowing irremediable dissension between 

Charles and his Parliament. He had neutralised the 

only factor in the European situation that was beyond 

his strength, and the master of the seas was once more 

forced into the position of his pensioner, with no hope of 

escape. Charles, it is true, had finally triumphed in his 

ill-starred attempt to dominate the constitution, but it 

was at the cost of his position in Europe — the position 

which had been the one lofty sentiment of his life. On 

every side Louis was ready to pursue his career. In the 

Mediterranean he had never been better placed. The 

Ijanguedoc canal was finished, and in the summer of 1681 

it was opened with high festivity, while at Toulon Vauban 

had been at work doubling the capabilities and strength 

of the port and arsenal, and Du Quesne, ranging the 

Mediterranean with a formidable squadron, was at last 

asserting a real mastery over the Barbary corsairs. It 

was a moment of all others when Tangier should have 

reached the position that had so long been sought for it, 

and which, at the expense of so much blood and treasure, 

it had nearly attained. 

For a couple of years longer it lay undisturbed under 
the governorship of Eirke, who succeeded Sackville. 
His relations with Fez, though salted with constant 



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1081-2 KIRKETS GOVERNORSHIP 19S 

bickerings, remained most cordial ; the place continued 
to be regularly supplied ; squadrons acting from it 
under Herbert and Cloudesley Shovell cruised against 
the corsairs with every success, and nothing beyond the 
iniquities of the garrison under Kirke's loose notions 
of good manners sullied its appearance of prosperity. 
While Kirke was allowing the place to become a sink of 
immorality and corruption, the Emperor continued to 
assure him of his admiration for the ' whiteness and clean- 
ness of his heart/ and to tow 'he was the best of all 
Christians that ever were.' Still Kirke mistrusted him 
for many reasons. When the fleet went home to refit, 
the Emperor openly renounced the maritime clauses of 
the peace, the 'Sea treaty' as it was called, and the 
depredations of his ships went on as before. Kirke felt 
the peace could not last, and, while taking every pre- ^ 
caution against surprise, never ceased to demand rein- 
forcements and supplies. His importunity and his 
anxiety no doubt did something to hasten the end, but 
Charles continued to hold on. At the end of 1682, 
Herbert came out again with a powerful squadron to 
enforce the * Sea treaty,' and with him he brought large 
quantities of stores and drafts of troops. The Moors 
then changed their note and were all obsequiousness, so 
little did it seem to require to keep Tangier safe. 

Yet that little was more than Charles could spare in 
the crowd of difficulties that he had made for himself. 
The navy, moreover, had been going rapidly downhill. 
When the papist scare had sent the Duke of York abroad 
and Pepys to the Tower as a suspect, the office of Lord 
High Admiral had been put in commission. The men 
chosen for the duty, if we may believe half that PepyB 
says, were very ill chosen, and the old evils and abuse* 
rapidly declared themselves. The King was robbed 



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126 THE EVACUATION OF TANGIER 1688 

right and left, and everything about the service except 
the budget was neglected. 1 Financial difficulties began 
to press the Court more and more severely, and, in 
the confusion and dishonesty that prevailed, Ttagier 
naturally presented itself as a ready means of economy. 
Thus, early in 1683, Charles had to face the inevitable 
end of his autocratic policy, and Tangier was doomed. 

In February, in answer to Kirke's continued demands 
for reinforcements, Sir Leoline Jenkins, Secretary of State, 
wrote to him complaining that Tangier was already cost- 
ing more than all the home garrisons put together. The 
letter was followed by the arrival early in March of 
Admiral Sir John Berry with orders for Kirke to banish all 
the Jews. Kirke had already reported that through them 
the Moors had established a regular system of intelligence 
by which nothing in the garrison could be kept secret. 
This order was the first indication of what was coming.' 
Up to that time there appears to have been little sus- 
picion in Tangier of the fate that overhung it. Kirke, 
with his hands strengthened by the men and stores which 
Herbert had brought out, was more busy than ever 
strengthening the fortifications and preparing for any out- 
burst from his truculent admirer. Absolute secrecy was 
still maintained and no further sign was given. Though 
rumours began to disturb the garrison, they were little 
regarded. The secrecy indeed with which the resolution 
of the Government was shrouded was so profound that 

1 Pepys, Memoires touching the Royal Navy. 

• Kirke to Jenkins, February 22, 1663, Tangier Papers, bundle 39. See 
alto * The first proposals for Tangier,' Dartmouth MSS. p. 84. The paper 
is u nda t ed, bat it mentions Berry's mission, and thus fixes the time about 
which the evacuation was decided on. Berry reached Tangier on the 
Thursday before March 8, 1688, ibid. p. 80. The • First Proposals ' must 
i have been drawn up before he sailed, or early in February— 
, the time, that is, of Jenkins's complaint to Kirke. This is con- 
Iky what Dartmouth told Pepys. Bet post, pp. 127, 181-8. 



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1668 SUNDERLAND'S PART 127 

its immediate cause is nowhere on record. Still, what it 
was is scarcely doubtful. 

Sunderland^ opportunism and the wiles of the French 
Ambassador had led him into supporting the Exclusion 
Bill, with the result that in February 1681 he had been 
struck off the Privy Council. He lost little time, how- 
ever, in trimming his sails, and by Louise de Kiroualle's 
influence was reconciled to the Duke of York in August 
the next year, and at his request readmitted to the Council. 
But Barillon and the French mistress still pressed him 
forward, and with so much success that in January 1683 
he re-entered the Government as Secretary of State for 
the North. It was just at this time the momentous 
Tangier question was reopened. Pepys indeed was ex- 
pressly told by the man who had the best means of 
knowing the truth, 'that it was taken up again upon 
my Lord Sunderland's coming in again. 9 The King, 
he said, was himself the first mover of it, but clearly 
he thought that it was Sunderland's idea. There is 
indeed but too much reason to suspect that Sunderland 
went even further than urging the evacuation. There 
is evidence that about this time he made some kind 
of overtures to Barillon with a view to selling the place 
to France. Barillon apparently could not believe the 
offer was seriously made, and, suspecting some snare, 
refused to take the matter up, but the suggestion remains 
as one more stigma on Sunderland's name. 1 

The motive of Charles's advisers is clear enough. 

They were in the midst of their attack on the municipal 

1 Barillon to Louis, Aug. 15, 1688: -Je oraindrais do parlor tor oottt 
affaire a cause do oe qui s'est passe il y a six mois. . . • Milord Sunderland 
m v a deje dit : " Vons Toyes que l'offre qn'on vons a fails ostail effective si 
qu'il n'a tonn qu'au Boi voire maisire d'avoir Tanger." ' R.O. Batch* 
Trmtuenpti, 44. Ii does not appear, from any despatch of BariUon's in 
ths early pari of the year, thai he communicated this offer to Levis at the 
time. 



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128 THE EVACUATION OF TANGIER 1683 

corporations, and had just determined to clinch the King's 
constitutional triumph by an attack on the charter of 
London itself. To this end they desired not only to cut 
down every avoidable expense, but to get into the 
kingdom all the troops that could possibly be collected. 
The original draft scheme for the evacuation is much 
more concerned with the disposal of the garrison when & 
returned than with how to get it safely out. Barillon 
traced the whole scheme to the Duke of York, Rochester, 
and Sunderland, the nefarious triumvirate in whose hands 
Charles was now but a puppet. The Marquis of Halifax, 
Barillon's and James's chief opponent, did his best — so the 
Ambassador says — to stop it, supported by all who still clung 
to a hope of parliamentary government being restored. 1 

But all was of no avail. The discovery of the Bye 
House plot had put a fresh weapon into the hands of the 
King's evil counsellors, and they had their way. It was 
this surrender that marks Charles's final lapse into mili- 
tary despotism, and with the determination to evacuate 
Tangier he cut the last tie that bound him to the ideas of 
the Great Rebellion. It was that pregnant upheaval that 
had carried England to Mediterranean power, and it was 
its ebb that sucked her back. 

In such haste was the Government to get the troops 
home that it was originally intended that all the ships 
available should assemble at Tangier in May. Some one, 
however, must have pointed out that it was an operation 
which could not be conducted in a hurry. At any rate 
the execution of the scheme was delayed for more elabo- 
rate preparations, and it was not till July 2 that the final 
instructions were signed. As a preliminary step to their 
execution, Herbert was recalled, and the project was kept 
an absolute secret, known to no one outside the King's 
i to Looift, Aug. 15, MSS, R.O. Ba$ch*t TrantcripU, 44. 



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1683 DARTMOUTH AND PEPY8 129 

immediate circle, except to Pepys's informant, George 
Legge, recently made Lord Dartmouth. It was to him 
the obnoxious commission was to be entrusted. He had 
served with distinction throughout the Dutch wars as a 
naval officer, and had since risen through various offices to 
that of Master-General of the Ordnance and Master of the 
Horse to the Duke of York. It is in this appointment 
we see the hand that really loosed the British hold on 
the Mediterranean. Dartmouth was the most devoted 
partisan that James had, and 6ince the defeat of the 
Exclusion Bill had settled his position as heir to the 
throne, the inevitable effect had been that it was he, not 
Charles, who was king. James's real reign began with 
the dissolution of his brother's last Parliament, and 
Dartmouth was one of the men he chiefly looked to for 
the repression of any attempt at resistance to his rule. 

The story of the melancholy business, which this fine 
officer thus had thrust upon him, has fortunately been 
enlivened by Samuel Pepys. The manner in which he 
became connected with it is eloquent of the extreme 
secrecy in which the whole affair was wrapped. Every- 
thing had been done personally by the King and his 
brother. Neither the Admiralty nor the Tangier Council 
had- been permitted to have a finger in the preparations; 
but on Saturday, July 28, Pepys, who since his release 
from the Tower had been closely attached to the Duke 
of York, received sudden orders to repair within forty* 
eight hours to Portsmouth, where the fleet was assembled. 
Not a word of explanation was given him, nor was it 
apparently till the following Friday, when Lord Dart- 
mouth joined, that he was informed he was to go out 
on his staff. Still the secret oi the expedition was 
withheld from him. Some hesitation seems to have 
pr evailed at Court, Dartmouth had not yet been handed 

vol. n. K 



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130 THE EVACUATION OF TANGIER 

his commission, and no sooner had he reached Portsmouth 
than he received an intimation from Sunderland that he 
tou not to sail till farther orders, which would probably 
reach him not later than Monday. But on that day, 
instead of sailing orders came a summons to Windsor 
4 to speak with the King once more/ What the trouble 
was no one could tell. All they knew was that the prepara- 
tions for sailing were to proceed, and Sunderland assured 
the General there was nothing serious. ' I will only tell 
you now/ he wrote, ' that the occasion of these directions 
can be of no prejudice, and may be of advantage to your 
journey and the business you go about/ 

It is Barillon who lets us into the secret. The fact 
was he had just and only just learnt what was in the 
wind, and he immediately hurried off a special messenger 
to Louis to ask how he was to act. He had further dis- 
covered that the Portuguese ambassador had also fathomed 
tbe secret, and was making the most strenuous efforts to 
be allowed an option of purchase. Arlington had be- 
trayed the project, and wha*. Barillon was so anxious to 
learn from Versailles was whether his master would prefer 
to see the place destroyed or in Portuguese hands. In 
view of his behaviour over Sunderland's offer six months 
previously, he did not think well to move in the matter 
directly, but clearly he had hopes that a purchase by 
the Portuguese might be made a step towards a French 
occupation. It was to consider this proposal of the 
Portuguese envoy that Dartmouth was summoned to 
Windsor. But every one was against it — James and 
his confederates because they believed the necessary 
negotiations would delay too long the return of the 
troops— Halifax because he feared it covered an eventual 
cession of the place to France. In vain the Portuguese 
envoy went so far as to call on Barillon and beg for 



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PEPtfS LEARNS THE SECRET 131 

his support. The opposition was too well* united, and 
all he could exact was that if a properly accredited 
plenipotentiary met Dartmouth at Tangier with fall 
authority to accept the British terms, the thing might be 
arranged. Two hundred thousand crowns was believed 
to be Charles's price, though probably it was never 
seriously thought the suggestion would come to a head. 1 
At any rate the Portuguese move was not allowed to 
cause any further delay. In two days Dartmouth was 
back again and every one embarked the same day. Still 
they could not sail, for the weather kept obstinately 
adverse. Every one, as they lay idle at St. Helen's, did 
his best to penetrate the mystery ; but, though Pepys was 
named in Dartmouth's commission as his sole councillor 
in the fleet, he was still no wiser than the rest. He had 
even written to his friends, he tells us, in perfect good 
faith to assure them that the rumours about the evacua- 
tion of Tangier had no foundation. He pardonably ima- 
gined that, if there had been any truth in them, he of 
all people would have been told. It was not till August 13, 
as they still lay windbound under the Isle of Wight, that 
Lord Dartmouth took him into his cabin and told him 
in the strictest confidence that the object of the expedi- 
tion was the disarmament and destruction of Tangier. 
To Pepys it was a severe shock. It did not receive his 
approval, and since he had been so long Tangier secretary 
he was not a little nettled at not having been consulted. 
' I shall, 9 he wrote, ' by the grace of God give the same, 
and perhaps more, obedience both passive and active to 
it than I might have done had my mean advice been 
preconsulted in it.' ' 

1 Bullion to Iiouis, Aug. 6-15, 0-10, and 13-28, R.O. Jkuehst Tran^ 
icripU, 44 ; Smith, Tangier Diary, 826 it Mg., Dartmouth US 8. pp. 87-6. 
* Pepys to Houbloo, St. Helen's, Aug. 16, 1683, 8mith, L 883. 

e2 



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U2 THE EVACUATION OF TANGIER . 1683 

In this praiseworthy spirit he continued to act. 
Dartmouth handed him a note of the reasons for the 
step which had been agreed on in the Cabinet, directing 
him to embody them in a minute. They were lame 
enough, but Pepys was equal to the task, adding fresh 
considerations which his pliable and well-informed brain 
was able to suggest. His work was of peculiar delicacy 
and importance. The fact was that every one concerned 
was highly nervous about what they had got to do. Tan- 
gier was the symbol of the new-born spirit of imperialism 
that pervaded the country. There was no doubt its 
abandonment would be unpopular, and unless it could be 
clearly justified there was the danger that Dartmouth 
and his staff would be made the scapegoats, and that 
Tangier would be used against them as Dunkirk had 
been used against Clarendon. Pepys with his way to 
make in the world was as anxious as any one. The hard 
part of it was that there were no definite instructions to 
ease the responsibility. In theory they were going out to 
report on the place and to act accordingly; and there 
was talk among the staff that the King meant to break 
the news to his people by saying that the experts had 
pressed him to do it against his will. Pepys therefore 
bluntly asked his chief how things stood. 'Before we 
parted/ he said, ' I asked my lord whether the King was 
indeed satisfied in this business ; for,' he added characteris- 
tically, ' we should be able to give our advice accordingly 
in reference to what he might expect from it, whether 
the success was good or bad. He answered in plain 
words • . • that the King was the fondest man in the world 
of it, and had declared to Lord Dartmouth at his coming 
away that it was the greatest service any subject could do 
him. On my lord's adding that he had understood 
persons at Court did nevertheless labour to render 



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1688 NERVOUSNESS OF DARTMOUTH 138 

this ill to the King, to do him hurt ... I took occasion 
to say something of my being, sorry for it ; but he was 
not the first that had been so used in obeying the King's 
commands and labouring to serve him. He answered, it 
did not trouble him (though by his looks and manner of 
speech I saw sufficiently it did), for the King would do 
him right in it and did at this time discourse publicly of 
the folly of keeping Tangier any longer.' l 

Haying thus ascertained the official view, Pepys saw 
his way clear before him and promptly crystallised his 
opinion. ' Lord ! v he exclaimed, as on September 14 they 
anchored in Tangier road, ' how could anybody ever think a 
place fit to be kept at this charge, that, overlooked by so 
many hills, can never be secured against an enemy ? ' On 
this note he continued to harp to his great comfort, and 
indeed it was the real crux of the situation. Not only was 
it the one valid excuse for the evacuation, but also a grave 
cause of anxiety as to whether the operation could be 
carried through without disaster. So far had the lines 
advanced, and so near to completion and well-built was 
the mole, that it was clear the work of demolition would 
take much longer and therefore be much more hazardous 
than was expected Dartmouth began to doubt whether, 
with the force and stores at his command, it was even 
possible. He became seriously depressed and was barely 
prevented by Pepys and others from officially informing 
the Moors what was intended, and negotiating their 
forbearance. He had hoped the whole affair would be 
over in three weeks, but it was three weeks before it 
could be really begun. 

A very necessary preliminary was to secure from the 
captains of the fleet a declaration that the place was unfit 
for a naval station. This difficult duty was entrusted 

1 Tangiir Diary, p. 880. 



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184 THE EVACUATION OF TANGIER 1683 

to Sir John Berry, Dartmouth's vice-admiral, a 'tar- 
paulin ' officer who had worked his way up from the fore- 
castle by sheer merit and hard fighting. In Charles's 
first war he won an action in the West Indies against 
the French and Dutch, and at the battle of Solebay had 
earned his spurs by rescuing the Duke of York when 
be was nearly overpowered by superior force. He had 
also served with distinction under Allin and others in the 
Mediterranean. He was assisted by Sir William Booth, 
the most successful of Herbert's captains against the 
corsairs. But even these men found the task extremely 
difficult. ' Sir William Booth/ wrote Pepys on October 14, 
* gave me an account of the ado he had had with some of 
Herbert's young fellows to get signed the paper my lord 
desires about the mole and harbour of Tangier.' 

It was no wonder. The mole was now 475 yards long 
with a mean breadth of nearly thirty-seven yards, and a 
height above low water mark of eighteen feet, and for the 
past four years Herbert and his captains htvd been making 
it the base of their successful operations against the corsairs. 
Yet they were expected to say that, owing to the nearness of 
4 the Great Ocean/ it was impossible to render the harbour 
secure except at a ruinous cost, that even if it could ever 
be completed it would quickly silt up, and that it was * alto- 
gether unuseful to his Majesty for receiving, careening, or 
preserving his Majesty's ships.' With such a document 
to be signed it was certainly to Herbert's credit that it 
had been thought expedient to recall him. His stubborn 
independence and strong convictions were difficulties not 
to be faced at such a crisis. He had, however, left be* 
hind him several junior captains, who were devoted to 
him and his ideas. These men Dartmouth had express 
authority to command to his flag, provided he did not 
thereby interrupt the operations for which they had been 



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1688 OPPOSITION FROM THE NAVY 135 

detailed. Dartmouth did call them to his flag, and— so 
Pepys tells us— went out of his way to gain their good- 
will. Nevertheless, as it seems, they resented the super- 
session of their old chief, and it was among these men 
— * Herbert's creatures,' as Pepys calls them in loyal indig- 
nation — that the ringleaders of the opposition were found. 

The most obstinate were Cloudesley Shovell, who had 
been flying his first flag as commodore of the little cruiser 
squadron that Herbert had left behind, Francis Wheler, — - 
and Matthew Aylmer — all of them men destined to rank 
among the founders of British Mediterranean power. 
But Pepys had no patience with them and the ideas their 
experience had given them. 'Though they have been 
prevailed with by Booth,' he says, ' to sign this, yet they 
did declare to Booth their satisfaction in the harbour 
when they signed it, and will be ready to do the like when 
they come into England. This is your men of honour 
and gentlemen ! at least the two latter.' ' Shovell was . — 
only a ' tarpaulin,' and presumably not expected by Pepys 
to forswear himself to oblige his chief. Aylmer was a 
young Irish officer of the ' courtier ' type, who had only 
entered the service four years before, under the wing of 
the Duke of Buckingham. He rose to be Commander-in- 
Chief in the Mediterranean, and afterwards, as governor 
of Greenwich Hospital, was the founder of the Naval 
School. Wheler also was to hold the same high 
command, and to be lost with his flagship and all hands 
in a gale off Gibraltar. Among other of 'Herbert's 
young fellows ' was George Booke, destined by a strange — 
turn of fortune to be the means of giving back to his 
country what Pepys was helping to throw away. For it ; 
was when he was flying the Mediterranean flag that 
Gibraltar rose like a phoenix from the ashes of Tangier. 

1 Tangier Diary, pp. 803, 89S, 411, 488. Dartmouth M88. 89. 



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136 THE EVACUATION OF TANGIER 1688 

Still he was by nature a courtier and politician, and, 
whether from conviction or not, he seems to have made 
no bones about doing what was wanted. 1 

Against Pepys's ingenuity the indignation of the 
stalwart Mediterranean men was of no more avail than 
Booke's compliance. A series of cunningly framed ques- 
tions were put to them, from which they found it impos- 
sible to escape. Both Booke and Shovell had careened their 
ships under shelter of the mole, but they had to confess 
it was done with some difficulty from the swell. Then 
they all had to face the ugly fact that on a recent occasion 
Herbert, having to refit his squadron, had carried the 
repairing hulk, which had been established at Tangier, 
and all the necessary stores over to Gibraltar, as being 
a better place for the work. 1 Entangled in admissions 
which they knew did not express their real judgment, it is 
no wonder they remained stubbornly in their old opinion. 
Whether or not the harbour could ever be made fit to 
receive the higher rates, they knew it was already a prac- 
ticable station for the class of vessel that was best adapted 
for keeping a firm hand on the Barbary pirates, and for . 
obtaining intelligence in time of war, no less than for 
harbouring the smaller merchantmen which were inca- 
pable of protecting themselves. Still there was no escape 
from Pepys's skill, and in ten days, about the middle of 
October, all the signatures were affixed. At the same 
time a similar declaration was obtained, apparently with- 
out difficulty, from the officers of the garrison as to the 
military defects of the place, which were real enough, 
and the work of demolition could proceed. 

Of a Portuguese plenipotentiary nothing had been 

1 Dims, p. SSI. He wai then thirty-three and had commanded a ship 

both Xarbrongh and Herbert 
■ Sea the Captains' Beport, Tangier Papen, bundle 40, Oct. 18, 1688, 
7and8. 



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1668 THE DEMOLITION BEGINS 137 

heard. The ambassador in London did not for a moment 
relax his efforts, and on Louis's instructions Barillon kept 
urging the Duke of York to agree. He went to see the 
Prince several times, as though on his own initiative, and 
pressed upon him the loss of prestige which the destruc- 
tion of the fortress would entail, and the disgrace of so 
complete a reversal of policy. James would only reply 
that it was no disgrace for the King to reverse the policy 
of ministers that had given him bad advice, and it was 
better for the royal interest to have a strong body of 
troops at home than a weak naval station abroad. Any 
chance, moreover, which there might have been of the 
matter being carried through with sufficient promptitude 
was ended by the death of the Portuguese King, and 
Dartmouth had no alternative but to act on his obnoxious 
orders. 1 

It was a laborious undertaking and its difficulty gave 
the lie to the declaration that had been wrung from the 
seamen. Shere, the engineer who had succeeded Cholm- 
ley, calculated that without the foundations the mole 
then contained nearly three million cubic feet of concrete 
and masonry, weighing near 170,000 tons, all of which 
must be destroyed, and that it would take a thousand 
men over two hundred days to do it. Lord Dartmouth 
wrote home that the part which Shere had built was as 
hard as the rocks. It appeared almost indestructible, 
though, as the General said, ' he was showing his great 
abilities in the destruction of his own building/ As no 
ordinary military methods would touch it, he was blasting 
it to pieces with drills and small charges in the modern 
way, which to Pepys at least was new. Yet, in spite of all 
Shere's skill and zeal, like a man butchering his own child 
as they sympathetically said, it was soon clear that his 

Barillon to Louis, Aug. 80-Sept. 9, R.O. Ba$che?$ ZVmucrtpts, 44. 



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188 THE EVACUATION OF TANGIER 1088 

estimate of the time the demolition would take must 
prove correct. Month after month went by with con- 
tinuous and infinite labour of the whole force at Dart- 
mouth's command. Storms constantly hampered their 
efforts, and at the end of the year it was still far from 
done. 1 

As the work, upon which so much blood and treasure 
and so much high purpose and devotion had been spent, 
stubbornly yielded to Shere's ingenuity, lamentations came 
in from all sides. Typical of these is a letter written to 
Pepys by an Englishman in Cadiz before the work had 
actually begun. ' I heartily congratulate/ he says, ' your 
safe arrival at Tangier, but if you come about what we 
are persuaded here you do, I had rather you and all that 
come about the design had tarried at home. I am sure 
in no age, nor by any people, was ever Tangier thought 
useless and contemptible ta not worth keeping, till this 
we live in, and that by our own countrymen. If we go 
as high as history affords us records, we shall find Tangier 
always esteemed . . . When the English had got Tangier, 
they, as well as all the world, believed they had a con- 
siderable and important place, as well for their conveni- 
ence in all respects as for its capacity for prejudicing 
their enemies. . . . The French covet, the Spaniard and 
Hollander dread it, one as to trade, the other from 
neighbourhood and the prejudice they may receive from 
it. Then of the safeguard and convenience to trade in 
case of war with Spain, none that knows anything is 
ignorant. After all must a place, qualified by so many 
advantageous and unequalled benefits, be parted with on 
the score of its being chargeable, and we the only people 

1 la the Tangier Paper$ (R.O. Colonial), bundle 40, is an interesting 
flea showing how the mole was destroyed by blasting and crosscuts, end 
1 to fool the anchorage. 



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1683-4 DESTRUCTION OF THE MOLE 139 

that ever thought so ? Where is the honour and reputa- 
tion of the nation? . . . . The parting with it in any 
manner will render us very inconsiderable and necessitous 
to all the world : for what will they think of us, esteem 
or dread us, if we cannot maintain a place so much to 
our convenience to preserve ? . . . You are, as much as 
any man, sensible of what advantage Tangier is to us here, 
and to the nation in general. If anything is designed 
against it, pray use your endeavours to prevent it. 9 1 

Such protests were useless. At home the political 
struggle was uppermost in men's minds and everything 
had to be subservient to it. A week after the seamen's 
declaration was signed, Shere's first charge was fired. A 
week later again the Mayor and Corporation were em* 
barked. Thereby the tie which bound Tangier to the 
Imperial Crown of Britain was severed, and, curiously 
enough, it was to George Rooke was assigned the duty of 
carrying them home. By the first week in November the 
last of the inhabitants were shipped away, and the work of 
demolition could go on without impediment. All through 
the winter it continued as well as the storms would 
permit, and with one eye always anxiously on the Moors. 
By the end of January the navy captains were able to 
^report that the mole was ruined and destroyed, the harbour 
filled with stone and rubbish, and ' made unfit to receive, 
harbour, or protect from the weather, ships or vessels of 
any pirate, robber, or any enemies of the Christian faith 
or any other/ The delays and difficulties had been pro- 
digious, owing to the complete miscalculations of the 
Cabinet, and, as Pepys tartly says, to their misguided 
determination to keep the secret from the proper officers 
of the navy and army, whereby it had been impossible to 
provide the expedition with the necessary stores. * Hence 
1 Charles BiuteU to Pepy*, Cadis, October 7, 16S8, Smith, L 886. 



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140 THE EVACUATION OF TANGIER 1884 

I say/ he growls, ' how necessary that Ministers of State 
be men of general knowledge, and, among us, especially 
in sea matters. 9 His strictures were certainly not with- 
out excuse. The force was continually on tho brink of 
starvation, and there were times when the forbearance of 
the Moors alone rendered food procurable. 

To these and his other anxieties Lord Dartmouth had 
to add the depressing conviction that he was abandoning 
the Mediterranean to Louis. While he was breaking his 
heart over the destruction of the English foothold, France 
had attained a dominating position within the Straits. 
Du Quesne, by means of the newly devised bomb-ketches, 
or galliots as they were then called, had bombarded Algiers 
with a success no one had yet attained, and Toulon „was 
more formidable than ever. 'Lord Dartmouth, 9 wrote 
Pepys, ' is mighty full of it, that the King of France 
designs by his late and present dealings with Algiers to 
make himself master of the Mediterranean, making the 
Turks his friends, and thereby enemies to us and others.' ! 

The mole destroyed and the harbour choked, there yet 
remained the more dangerous task of dismantling the 
fortifications on the land side and the withdrawal of the 
garrison. It took another month to accomplish, but it 
was done with consummate skill and thoroughness. Not 
a fort or redoubt was left standing, and yet the troops were 
embarked without the Moors attempting to interfere. On 
March 5, 1684, the fleet weighed, and Tangier ceased to 
be a British possession. 

With it passed away the last claim of Charles's reign 
to distinction. For more than twenty years it had re- 
mained as a symbol of the higher aspirations which 
redeemed the cynical levity of his character, and through 

1 Smith, iL 41, March 29, 1684. Of. Dartmouth memorandum on this, 
r 10, 1688, Dartmouth MS 8. p. 103. 



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1684 ITS EPITAPH 141 

fair weather and foul he had clung to it as though to raise 
a real monument to his better self. A6 it was, he could 
only write upon its remains the epitaph of his hopes. f By 
the King's direction/ says Burchett in concluding his 
account of the destruction, ' there were buried among the 
ruins a considerable number of crown pieces of his 
Majesty's coin, which haply, many centuries hence, when 
other memory of it shall be lost, may declare to succeed- 
ing ages that that place was once a member of the British 
Empire.' 

So with a smile, half humorous, half cynical, Charles 
dismissed his failure. What more pathetic glimpse could 
we have of all it meant to him? With the occupa- 
tion he had inaugurated an imperial tradition that bade 
men look beyond the limits of their narrow lives. With 
its abandonment he marked his inability to understand 
those conditions of sympathy between government and 
people on which alone a lasting policy of empire can be 
based. With his final fall into despotism his dream faded 
from him. Could he but have brought himself to grasp 
the depth of that national sentiment on which what we 
now call ' Little Englandism ' is based, his aspirations of 
empire would have received the support they deserved. 
The resources for which he pleaded so pathetically would 
have been granted in abundance, and Tangier would never 
have been abandoned. England, in retaining her hold 
upon the Mediterranean, would have kept the dominating 
position in Europe which Cromwell had made for her, 
and which Charles believed he could enhance. 

His hope was no mere indolent fancy. He was a 
true sea-king, and intuitively understood, perhaps better 
than any of his councillors, all that the commerce of the 
Straits meant for the expression of his sea power. - He 
has knowledge of many things/ wrote Burnet, ' chiefly 



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142 TIIE EVACUATION OF TANGIER 1«84 

in all naval affairs. Even in the architecture of ships he 
judges as critically as any of the trade can do, and knows 
the smallest things belonging to it.' Pepys, than whom 
there was no better judge, could write of him in his most 
private memoranda, as a king ' who best understands the 
business of the sea of any Prince the world ever had,' and 
assures us that 'his Majesty possessed a transcendent 
mastery of all maritime knowledge.' ! In the times of his 
deepest desperation at the intractability of his Parliament, 
it was always for his fleet and for Tangier that he pleaded 
most humbly. Never, except in Cromwell's best years, 
had the navy been so well administered as during his reign, 
never had the fleet been so intrinsically powerful, and 
never before had a regular naval station been established 
beyond the Narrow Seas. If Charles failed it was because 
he came to believe the fallacy that a strong imperial 
government can only rest on despotism. Abroad it may 
be so. For men of British race it is untrue. The ruins of 
the Tangier mole and Charles's buried coins bear witness 
of the truth, and there they still rest as Dartmouth left 
them to remind the world of the English King who tried 
to build an empire on the sands. 

1 Foxouft, Supplement to Burnet 1 $ Hi*tory % p. 48, and Tanner, Eng. 



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CHAPTER XXVI 

THE NAVAL STRATEGY OF WILLIAM HI- 

It is a curious fact, the significance of which it would be 
] as wrong to ignore as to exaggerate, that the period during 
: which England abandoned tfate Mediterranean coincides 
; exactly- with the zenith of Lo uis XTV.'s power. Within 
six months from the lowering of the British flag at 
Tangier, the truce of Batisbon was signed, which cop- 
firmed to France her hold upon the Empire, and is 
usually taken as marking the culmination of Ixrais's 
triumphs. Within a year of the reappearance of a British 
fleet within the Straits, Namur capitulated, and Louis 
was facing the first of that series of reverses which 
brought his empire about his ears. 

In dealing with European history from one aspect, 
nothing is easier than to lose our sense of proportion, to 
exaggerate the importance of our particular point of view. 
1 We have now traced, step by step for nearly a century, the 
remarkable phenomena that accompanied the interference 
of the two Northern sea powers in the Mediterranean. 
We have seen how constantly that interference or its 
removal seemed to shift the whole action of the stage. 
We have now to witness the last act of our drama, when 
those two powers were joined in one, and after in- 
effectual efforts to baffle the ambitions of France they at 
last threw the mass of their strength into the Mediter- 
ranean and immediately saw the gigantic system of the 
enemy begin to totter. Many were the forces at work, and 



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144 NAVAL STRATEGY OF WILLIAM III. 1686-9 

in watching the one that turned the scale we must never 
for a moment forget it was part of a whole. Still it 
would be hard to say that any other part was so powerful, 
and for that very reason we must be on our guard not to 
place it too high. With this warning we may safely set 
, out to trace the last phase of the epic to that resounding 
catastrophe which finally fixed the position of England as 
a great power in Europe. 

For a time it seemed that the evacuation of Tangier 

bad definitely arrested the development of British navaT 

power. Charles II. did not survive the loss of his most 

cherished possession a year, and the accession of his 

brother made England internationally more than ever a 

dependency of France. In Germany the Emperor formed 

the famous League of Augsburg to curb Louis's further 

aggression. But with the British power neutralised it 

could barely restrain his advance, and still less break his 

hold. It was not till the accession of William restored 

. England to the European system that anything could 

be done. By us that far-reaching event has come to be 

regarded as a purely domestic revolution. To William 

himself and to all the rest of Europe it was a stroke of 

international politics that brought the wealth and the 

fleets of the two great Protestant powers into line against 

France, and it is in this aspect that it concerns us here. 

England was immediately plunged into the war of the 
League of Augsburg, and Louis found himself confronted 
withnhnost the whole of Europe. Although the British 
sea power was the real life of the new coalition, it was not 
for some time that it was able to assert itself. During 
the first years of the war we can discern no trace of the 
farther development in naval strategy which we have 
been following from early Stuart times. Louis's splen- 
did organisation enabled him to take the initiative, and 



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168&-K HIS APPRENTICESHIP 144 

i 
William's fleet was kept busy in trying to obtain the 
command of the Narrow Seas in order to secure the 
English coasts from invasion and to recover Ireland from 
James and his French allies. The break in our naval | 
history had been so complete that it seemed to go back a 
century, and as it were recapitulate itself. It is mote 
than doubtful whether William perceived the true direc- 
tion in which our naval policy had been gradually 
drawn, until the recapitulation brought him by ex- ! 
perience to the point where Charles II. had been forced 

to break it off. We seem at first to go back to the i 

i 

almost mediaeval strategy of the wars of Henry Yin. 
No attempt was made to strike a real blow at France in 4 
the main seat of her power. Action towards the Mediter- 
ranean was quite subsidiary. It was confined to ill-con-; 
ceived attempts to prevent squadrons from Toulon passing 
to Brest, and to protect the Levant trade. Both were 
unsuccessful. De Tourville's victory off Beachy Head' 
marks the one failure ; his swoop upon the great Smyrna 
convoy the ether. Even after Bussell's victory off La* 
Hogue had given William the command, it was only 
used in the old way. The fleet was mainly employed in 
attacks on the French Channel ports, and in raids upon 
the coasts, which had no higher object than that of 
crippling the action of privateers and confusing the 
strategy of the French armies by diversions. 

For William as for Henry VIII. the war was at first * 
\ I a military war, and the fleet was kept subsidiary to the 

, military operations. So soon as he had secured the corn- 

it , mand of the Narrow Seas, and had recovered Ireland, he 

; [ naturally flung himself into the old cockpit in the Low . 

; Countries, which to a soldier seemed clearly the key of 
| the situation, and it was not till the fifth year of the war' 
that a radical change in Louis's strategy opened William's 
! vol, n. L 



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146 NAVAL STRATEGY OP WILLIAM III. 1608 

eyes to his real power. Then there was something 
Napoleonic in the rapidity and completeness with which 
he grasped the new idea and changed his front. It has 
been the accepted view that it was his tastes and limita- 
tions that had made the war mainly military, that he was 
a man who could only see war with a soldier's eye, and 
was incapable of viewing the great contest as a whole, 
in which the sea must play its inevitable part. It is 
difficult, however, to see how this censure can survive a 
study of the conditions under which he resumed the 
broken thread of English action in the Mediterranean. 

When, in the autumn of 1693, William returned from 
his defeat at Landen to meet his British Parliament, it 
was to find the air heavy with the disaster that had 
overtaken the Smyrna fleet. During the spring the 
whole North Sea, Baltic, and British trade, that was 
bound for the Mediterranean and the southward, had 
assembled in the Channel, waiting to get safely past 
Brest. British, Dutch, German, and other vessels 
numbered nearly four hundred sail, and the protection 
of this huge convoy was assigned to the main fleet, 
then commanded jointly by the Tory admirals, Eilligrew, 
Delaval, and Shovell, who had ousted Russell after La 
Hogue. Their orders were to escort it to a safe distance 
beyond Brest, and then detach Sir George Booke, who 
had just received his knighthood, with the British and 
Dutch Mediterranean divisions to take it on. Having 
gpne some fifty leagues beyond the point of danger, the 
fjlmir^lg considered their duty done, and parted company 
with Booke and the convoy. Unfortunately, they had 
not taken sufficient care to ascertain whether Tourville 
was still in Brest. The port was so well screened by 
cruisers, as they afterwards explained, that it could only 
be reconnoitred by a squadron. Why they did not use 



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1603 LOSS OF THE SMYRNA FLEET 147 

a squadron was never explained. The result was that 
when Rooke reached Gape St. Vincent on his way to 
his rendezvous at Cadiz, his scout vessels discovered 
that there was an enemy's force of unknown strength 
in Lagos Bay, on the south coast of Portugal. He 
himself was for holding back till he found out what it 
was; but Van der Goes, his Dutch colleague, protested 
that if they stopped for every little squadron they got in 
contact with they would never finish the voyage. Besides, 
the wind was fair and they could certainly run through 
anything that was likely to be in front of them. Rooke 
gave way, and the whole fleet stood into the bay. 

Some French vessels that were seen at anchor at once 
cut their cables and ran, setting fire to the store ships that 
were too slow to escape. This, and some false informa- 
tion given by two French naval officers who were taken 
prisoners, confirmed the impression that what was in 
front of them was merely a small squadron hurrying from 
Brest into the Mediterranean. As a matter of fact it was 
Tourville himself, with the whole Brest fleet of seventy 
of the line. Though the prisoners asserted that the 
hurried retreat which deceived Rooke was due to the 
belief that his force was the British main fleet, Tour- 
ville was and is still believed to have cunningly devised 
the whole scene in order to draw Rooke into his meshes. 
In any case it had the desired effect. Next day, as 
Jkhe allies held on for Cadiz, they found themselves in the 
presence of the whole French fleet. Rooke— so he says- 
was for fighting and sacrificing his squadron for the 
convoy. Van der Goes was against it, advising flight; 
and in face of the Dutch admiral's protests Rooke did not 
feel justified in persisting in his desperate course. Seeing 
how completely they had been entrapped the flight was 
managed with considerable success. Tourville, being 



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148 NAVAL STRATEGY OF WILLIAM III. 1093 

far to leeward, had launched his light division in general 

chase to take hold of the allies' rear till he could get up. 

Hooke and his colleague, however, by a bold show of 

fight, frightened the officer in command of the chasing 

squadron into forming line of battle, and the result was 

that three-fourthsof the convoy and the whole of Booke's 

division escaped. The loss fell principally on the Germans 

and Dutch, not more than five-and-twenty English vessels 

being taken, and some of the richest of those only because 

they took a line of their own and were caught afterwards 

in Gibraltar and other Spanish ports. Still, the loss was 

bad enough, and the shock which the sense of insecurity 

produced in London was very severe. On no point was 

the Exchange more sensitive than on the ' Smyrna fleet,' 

' as it was called, from what was then the chief Levant 

port ; and to think that the costly navy, for which they 

had to sacrifice so much, could not protect it pointed to a 

piece of incompetence that was not easy to forgive. - 

Nor had William anything to show against the 

•French success. Although, during his defeat at Landen, 

he had inflicted such loss on his enemy and so skilfully 

retrieved his position afterwards that they gained little or 

nothing by the victory, yet everywhere else the campaign 

had added to the lustre of Louis's arms and diminished 

? the hopes of the allies. On the German side the quarrels 

of the members of the League and the successes of the 

* Turks had enabled him to more than hold his own. On 

the Italian frontier, where the Duke of Savoy, in the 

f pay of England and Holland, was on guard between the 

Gulf of Genoa and the Alps, the French Marshal Catinat 

had won a decisive victory, and laid open the way into 

Piedmont, while over against him the Due de Noailles had 

forced his way into Catalonia and seized the fortress port 

of Bosas in the Gulf of Lions. Thus not only was Louis 



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1093 SPAIN AND SAVOY 140 

in a fair way to secure in the next campaign the focal 
point on which the cohesion of the Hapsburg system had 
always depended, bat he had also a base through which 
the invasion of Spain could be nourished from Toulon and 
Marseilles. Louis, who was beginning to feel severely the 
exhaustion of his titanic struggle, immediately recognised 
the value of what he had gained for relieving the un- 
endurable strain. By vigorously pushing his advantages he 4 
saw he might force Savoy and Spain out of the alliance, 
and, with his rear thus secured, he would be able to 
throw the whole weight of his power against William and 
the Empire. So fickle was Savoy, and so faint the 
Spaniard, that success was certain if only he could* 
control his own portion of the Mediterranean, and so 
once more the struggle for European dominion swung 
back to the old centre. 

After Tourville's brilliant exploit on the Smyrna 
convoy with the Brest squadron, he had passed on into 
the Mediterranean, and towards the end of the summer 
of 1693 he and D'Estr&s were in Toulon with a fleet ' 
such as had never been seen before within the Straits. 
It consisted of ninety-three sail of the line and sixty of the * 
lower rates, representing nearly the whole naval force 
of France which had survived Russell's victory at La 
Hogue. 1 It was no wonder that William saw the need 
of changing his strategy. With such a force to overawe * 
them it was impossible that the weaker Mediterranean 
powers could remain staunch to the Grand Alliance. It 
is true that Tourville with some sixty sail passed out 
again to Brest and Bochefort, but this was mainly to 
relieve the pressure in the Toulon arsenal, and was not 
necessarily an indication of a change in Louis's Medi- 

1 Chevalier, Hist, do la marim franfaUd juuu'au traiti d$ paiw d$ 
176*, p. 198. 



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150 NAVAL STRATEGY OF WILLIAM III. 1604 

teiranean policy. There was every possibility that 
Tourville, who was busy refitting as many of the Brest 
squadron as the failing French finances would allow, 
would repeat his move as soon as he was ready for sea, 
and the first object of British strategy therefore was to 
prevent his getting back into the Mediterranean. 

It was clear to every one that the campaign of 1694 „ 
was^ likely to be themost critical of the war, and for the 
allies the horizon could scarcely look blacker. Fortunately 
it was one of those occasions when at home the national 
spirit manifested itself at its best. The bungling and 
disasters of the past year, instead of shaking the country, 
had hred a sullen determination to see the thing through 
and stand by the man it could trust. It was the Tory 
ministers, not William, on whom displeasure fell. They 
were dismissed together with the Tory admirals. Bussell 
was restored to the post of Commander-in-Chief, and 
William reopened negotiations with the Duke of Shrews- 
bury and the Whigs. So, though men might scold and 
grumble, when the King came to ask his Parliament for 
help, they poured treasure into his lap, and a fleet of 
nearly three hundred sail was able to be commissioned 
during the year. 1 

The 'main fleet in the Channel and for service in 
the Mediterranean/ as it was expressed, was originally 
settled at ninety-two sail, besides fire-ships, bomb-vessels, 
auxiliaries, and small craft. 1 This fleet included the usual 

1 See the returns made to the House of Lords the following winter (Hotus 
of Lords MSS. new series, i. 461, 467, 472 ct seq.). The abstract shows 
348 navy ships, of which 181 were rated ships, and the rest tenders and 
auxiliaries. There were also 23 hired ships, of which 17 were fourth and 
fifth rates, and the rest hospital and store-ships. Besides these there were 
24 vessels building. The main fleet absorbed 08, Wheler's Mediterranean 
sqnadron 28, cruisers and convoy ships on specified stations 98, besides 14 
en the northern coasts. The rest were for the most part in the West Indies 
or fitting in the dockyards. 

* H*rUwnl£8S.im, f.82«f ate;., where the whole estimates and details 



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1694 DISTRIBUTION OF THE FLEET 151 

Mediterranean squadron, but it must not be inferred that 
the estimates indicate any distinct departure from the old 
lines of Mediterranean action. If such a departure already 
existed in William's mind, he seems to have kept it to 
himself, at least during the winter months^ when he was 
, wearily endeavouring to form his new administration, and 
to remove Shrewsbury's scruples about taking office. 
The ships intended for service in the Mediterranean were 
merely a cruising squadron, though stronger than usual, 
detached in the old manner from the main fleet for convoy 
duty and commerce protection. It consisted of some twenty 
sail of third to sixth rates, besides fire-ships and auxiliaries, 
under Sir Francis Wheler, and in the last days of 1693 
he repaired to his station in company with a smaller 
Dutch squadron under Vice-Admiral Gerard Callenburgh. 1 
His instructions were to convoy the Levant trade as far 
as Cadiz, to remain there a month to cover the home- 
coming of the Spanish treasure fleet if it had not already 
arrived, and then, after detaching a small squadron to 
take back the homeward-bound trade, to proceed with his 
convoy into the Mediterranean. On his return he was to 
arrange a junction with the admiral of the Spanish 
Armada of the Ocean, and co-operate with him for the 
guard of the Straits and the defence of the Spanish coasts. 9 

of the various squadrons an set oat The extra vessels over and above the 
1 rated' ships included fire-ships, bomb-vessels or galiots, maehine vessels 
(i.e. explosion vessels), five hospital ships, besides brigantines (oared despatch 
boats), and yachts. 

1 Burehett {Transactions at Sea, tM$-M7, P- 901) gives the squadron 
as 16 third rates, 7 fourths, 1 sixth, 6 fire-ships, 3 bomb-vessels, a hospital 
ship, and a store-ship, or 84 in all. The HarUian MS. gives it as it actually 
sailed, as 8 third rates, 6 fourths, 1 fifth, 4 sixths, and 6 fire-ships, or 15 
in all. 

* See * Considerations touching the employment of the King's and Dutch 
ships in the Mediterranean and at Cadis, • Home Office, Admiralty, v. 81-77, 
wrongly assigned to 1683. Wheler's instructions are ibid. L 888, 
November 80, 1688, and Burehett, p. 801. 



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153 NAVAL STRATEGY OF WILLIAM III. 1694 

80 far, then, there is no indication of any radical 
change of strategy. The combined squadron at the 
Straits was clearly little more than a development of the 
Cromwellian idea of commerce protection with a powerful 
cruising squadron, such as Blake had wielded in the old 
days. No doubt it was intended to prevent small detach- 
ments of French ships slipping out of the Atlantic ports 
and passing into the Mediterranean. But the main fleet 
was still bound to the Narrow Seas, and the chief design 
for frustrating a concentration at Toulon was to be 
the surprise and capture of Brest before Tourville could 
8afl. Some idea there probably was that Russell should 
subsequently employ part of his fleet in acting with 
Wheler against the expected operations of the French in 
Catalonia, but the development of the design cannot be 
traced till events forced it to the front. Up till the end 
of March there is no indication of it in the Admiralty 
oiden. 

The tendency was even in the opposite direction. On 
arriving at Cadiz Wheler 1 reported that he was very 
doubtful as to how far he could even protect the trade with 
the force at his command. The Mediterranean was said 
to be swarming with French cruisers and privateers. 
The fleet at Toulon was being fitted out with diligence, 
while the Spaniards had not even begun work on theirs, 
and could not possibly be ready for sea for three or four 
months. 1 The intelligence he sent home was no doubt 
confirmed through other channels and his orders were 
immediately modified. He was now directed not to enter 
the Straits at all, but to return to Cadiz and secure his 
ships there till the Spaniards were ready for sea or till he 
received reinforcements from home. If he hears for cer- 
tain that the Toulon fleet has come out and is bound for 

I Cjfb* Admiralty y. 866, January 19 and 99, 1694. 



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1004 RUSSELL AND WHELER 153 

the north, he is to return forthwith and rejoin the niain 
fleet. Bat even this discretion was not long allowed him. 
In a few days the news of the French activity became so 
serious that he was ordered to return immediately. 1 

. For the moment, „ at _ an jl rate, the idea, pfjirastis. 
action in the Mediterranean was given up.. Following 
Wheler's recall Russell on the last day of March received 
instructions from the Admiralty to take command of 
ninety-three specified ships, of which forty-six were of 
the first three rates, nineteen fire-ships, seven bomb- 
vessels, four hospital ships, and four brigantines or des- 
patch-boats, and with these and such others as might 
from time to time be sent to him, he is directed to ' pro- 
ceed with the Dutch fleet to the westwards and do his 
best to harass the enemy without expecting further orders, 
and to protect the trade passing in and out of the 
Channel.' ' Not a word yet of the Mediterranean— at 
least publicly. 

A few days, however, before these orders were issued 
and while Russell's fleet was still far from ready for sea, 
a very serious piece of news came to increase the critical 
aspect of the situation. Wheler's statement of the diffi- 
culty of his position in no way indicated that he shrank 
from carrying out his orders, and before his recall could 
reach him he had already sailed for the Mediterranean 
with his convoy, determined to fight his way through the 
French cruising squadrons. As ill-luck would have it, 
however, he met off the mouth of the Straits a storm of 
exceptional fury, and mistaking Gibraltar Bay for the 
fairway he was cast away and lost with his flagship and 
a number of his squadron and convoy. His vice-admiral, 
Hopsonn, had been already detached with the homeward- 

1 Home Office, Admiralty, ▼. 878 and 882. 

• Houuo/LordiMSS. (Hut. MS8. Cam.). toL i. (da) p. 468. 



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154 NAVAL STRATEGY OF WILLIAM III. 1694 

bound trade, thus farther weakening the fleet, and 
CaUenburgh, the Dutch admiral, by virtue of his rank, 
succeeded to the chief command of the combined force. 
Bear-admiral Nevell, the remaining English flag-officer, 
was still for going on ; but CaUenburgh, in view of the 
expected junction of the Toulon and Brest squadrons, 
declared it would be madness, and Nevell was thus 
forced to return to Cadiz to refit, with no hope of being 
able to protect the trade in his charge, and still less of 
effectually opposing the passage of the Brest or Rochefort 
ships through the Straits. 1 At the same time it was known 
in London that D'Estr6es and Tourville had left Paris 
for their commands at Toulon and Brest, and that 
Marshal de Noailles was about to take the field in Cata- 
lonia. Thus, so far from there being any prospect of 
interfering with the French initiative, there was every 
likelihood of the Straits squadron being attacked and 
destroyed in Cadiz. 

It waaclear therefore that something drastic had now_ 
to be done -to save the situation in the Mediterranean; _„ 
and yet so behindhand were the naval preparations at 
home that it was not till the end of April that Russell 
had been able to go down to Portsmouth to hoist his flag. 
On him had rested the bulk of the work during the winter, 
and for his reward he was named, on the eve of his depar- 
ture, First Lord of the Admiralty. His place at home 
was filled by Rooke, who, so far from being involved in 
the disgrace of the other Tory admirals, was given a seat 
on the Admiralty Commission and retained William's 
confidence as a naval expert throughout the rest of his 

1 8m Nettll's despatch dated Cadis, May 6, 1604 (Home Office, 
Aimvutty, **.). •** another from Gibraltar, March 11 (ibid. vii. 9). De 
Jonge confirms his statement that it was CaUenburgh, as Commander-in- 
Chief, who d«nded to retire into Cadis, citing his despetoh to the States 
, dated March 90, Ned$rk u uUch* Z-w$aen, it. i. 619. 



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1094 RUSSELL'S INSTRUCTIONS 156 

reign. The instructions which Russell received at Ken- 
sington, on taking his leave, disclose the first definite 
conception of the new strategy. They were of the most 
confidential character, under the King's sign manual, and 
• they reveal the exact stage which the project of a Medi- 
I terranean campaign had reached in William's mind: 
( ' It being not yet known/ they run, ' in what manner the 
/ French will dispose of their fleet this summer, Admiral 
1 Russell is directed, (1) in case the French fleet is at Brest 
f or Belle Isle, to attempt to burn or destroy it ; (2) in case 
' he hears it is at sea, to search for it, but not to go beyond 
the latitude of Finisterre ; and (3) in case he has trust- 
worthy information that it or part of it has gone to the 
Mediterranean or south of Finisterre, to follow and attack 
it. The Admiral is not to wait for further orders, but is 
to report from time to time to a Secretary of State and 
to the Admiralty. 9 1 

The whole responsibility for the momentous step 
that was in contemplation was thus thrown on Russell's 
shoulders, and as things stood the orders filled him with 
misgiving. Before he reached Portsmouth, intelligence 
had come in that on April 12 Tourville had received 
orders to repair overland to Toulon ' to order affairs there/ 
and that, though the first and second rates at Brest were 
laid up for the summer, a squadron of the smaller ships 
of the line was about to sail for the Mediterranean under 
Chateau-Renault.' The French were again screening the 
port so well with their cruisers and privateers that cer- 

1 The resolution tu laid before the Committee ol the Council on 
April 10, 1604 (see See. Trenchard's notes, Home Office, Admiralty, 
▼ii. 18), and agreed to on April 19 (ibid, t 88). The final orders wen 
dated • Kensington, April 34, 1694.' See Home of Lord* MSS. (Hisf. 
U88. Cam.) vol. i. (n*) p. 469, where will be found the whole ol the 
fleet orders at this time, as they were famished to the Lords in response to 
their call for papers in January 1696. 

• BeeeWed April 87, Home Office Admiralty, ifL 19. 



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156 NAVAL STRATEGY OF WILLIAM III. 1694 

tain intelligence was hard to come by. About the same 
time, however, a captain who had been scouting came in 
to report that with great difficulty he had succeeded in 
looking into Brest and had seen a French fleet standing 
to the southward. 1 Such information, combined with 
Tonrville's departure for Provence, could only indicate 
that the main action of the French navy was to be 
developed from Toulon, and it was there with his old 
adversary that Russell's heart was. 

Still he was bound by his orders to make sure of Brest 
before moving, and this was no small difficulty. At Spit- 
head he found nothing ready for attacking a fortified 
port. Troops, bomb-vessels, and stores had not yet arrived, 
and half the fleet was not paid, and could not be moved 
till it was. Still, with thirty-five Dutch and English vessels 
that were available, he put to sea the first week in May to 
look into Brest ; but it is clear he wished to leave it alone 
altogether. 1 By this time his friend the Duke of Shrews- 
bury had accepted office, and, though no more than Secre- 
tary of State, was in effect Prime Minister. To him Russell 
began to pour or t his woes in a correspondence which has 
left us a picture of the whole episode so vivid and intimate 
that we still feel the feverish pulse of the time beating 
as it were under our touch. ' I am afraid/ he wrote 
from the ' Britannia * at St. Helen's, as soon as he had 
hoisted his flag, ' these two designs, Brest and the Straits, 
will hinder one another and may make neither effectual. . . . 
I have no very good prospect of success on Brest — that is 
if the ships are gone from Brest Water/ ' This under 

1 Captain Wright's despatch, flow* Office, Admiralty, vii. 81. 
* Ha took 19 English and 16 Dutch ships with him, leaving behind 80 
English and 7 Dutch unpaid. See list sent up by Sir C. 8hovell, May 4, 
l€N,flMfM»irS&lS9e,i.S8. 

3 Sea Gose's Co rresp o nd ence of Charles Talbot, Duke of Shrewsbury, 
p. ltt, when will be found all the more secret papers relating to Russell's 
Others are in BuecUnch H88* vol. it 



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1094 SHREWSBURY'S VIEWS 157 

his instructions was the main point he had to decide, and 
next day he weighed and stood away for Brest. 

In Shrewsbury's answer the note of vagueness and 
indecision is still clear. ' I have long apprehended/ he 
wrote on May 5, ' that these two designs will interrupt 
and spoil one another. I am not enough instructed in 
what can or cannot be done at Brest to give judgment 
upon that matter ; but I doubt if, after the resolutions 
have been taken for the Mediterranean and the instruc- 
tions you have received thereupon, any great prejudice 
should happen to that service by delay, people would be 
apt to impute the faults to you, unless you have positive 
orders to warrant you in it. If you should go before 
Brest and find that squadron not yet gone to the Mediter- 
ranean, I suppose you will think it advisable to spend a 
little time if anything could be attempted upon them . . . 
but I cannot tell even in that case whether you might 
not think it reasonable to make some detachment which, 
joined with Neville's ships, might be in a condition to 
keep the Toulon squadron from giving any assistance to 
the besieging a Spanish seaport town, which the French 
in Catalonia seem to aim at. But that which I think 
most likely to be the case is that the Brest squadron will 
be gone for the Straits before you come thither, and then 
in my poor opinion all possible haste should be made to 
follow them/ 

These vague counsels, which rather indicated than 
solved the difficulties, can only have served to increase the 
nervousness which Russell felt in having practically to 
decide the direction which the war was to take for the 
year. It was not long, however, before he saw his way 
plainly pointed out. The first week in May the King had 
left London, as usual, to conduct the military operations 
in Flanders; and the first news that greeted him was 



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168 NAVAL STRATEGY OF WILLIAM III. 16M 

r that the rumour of the Brest squadron having sailed, and 
Bailed for the Straits, was true. 1 Whatever his hesitation 
before, he now came to an immediate decision. JFhe old 
tradition could bind him no longer, and, taking the whole 
responsibility on his own shoulders, he sat down to pen 
an order which should be treasured as one of the leading 
documents of British naval history. ' There can be no 
longer any doubt/ he wrote to Shrewsbury on May 14, 
* that the squadron which left Brest cm the 7th (n.s.) of 
this month has sailed for the Mediterranean after joining 
the ships from Rochefort, so that Admiral Russell has no 
time to lose in following them ; and although it is not 
your department I am well assured you will use your 
endeavours to hasten his departure, and persuade him to 
leave to the squadron which remains in these parts the 
execution of the attempt on Brest.' 

Political and financial difficulties had kept the King 
so late in England that he found himself deprived of the 
initiative in Flanders, and his main hope for the year was 
now centred on what the fleot could achieve in the Medi- 
terranean. On that he boldly resolved to stake his all, and 
so with the high resolution that marks the great captains 
from the small, he penned his memorable order. Russell 
needed no persuasion to obey. The King's decision reached 
him when at the end of May he returned fuming from 
his reconnaissance to pick up the remainder of his fleet at 
St Helen's. He had found Brest practically defenceless 
and was raging that the chance was lost for want of the 
troops and bomb-vessels that should have been with him. 
• The delay/ he wrote in his breezy way, ' must lie where 
it ought, on that driveller, the General of the Ordnance/ 
Possibly he was right, for Henry Sidney's tenure of the 

1 OL fba lafonnatfeii of Daniel Palot, received some time in May, saying 
tint be 1m4 eeen Chafteaa-BenaiiU nil for Barcelona with 23 of the line, 
tarl'eocntodeara/andtteailinall. Home Office, Admiralty, y. m. 



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ie©4 A CRITICAL SITUATION 160 

office, though it procured him the earldom of Romney, 
is only remembered by the brilliant display of fireworks 
with which he greeted William's triumphant return from 
Namur the following year. Russell no longer believed in 
the practicability of surprising the place, and was only too 
glad to leave the attempt to a subordinate. Moreover, 
the news from Catalonia made him keener than ever to 
be away. De Noailles had already laid siege to Palamos 
below Rosas, and if it fell there would be nothing between 
,<the victorious French army and Barcelona. Not know* 
ing that Noailles was even more hampered for want of 
money than himself, his abiding fear was that he would 
be too late, and he fell to excusing himself and scolding 
the Treasury in the most modern fashion. 'I will not 
say where it stuck, 9 he wrote, ' but it is not hard to guess, 
and pranks of this kind will some time or other, besides 
disappointing the services designed, put you to greater 
hazard if not looked into ; for as the navy of England is 
the most certain security to the country, so it is a service 
neglected till every petty thing is provided for.' The King 
was no less impatient and anxious than Russell. ' I am 
under great uneasiness,' he wrote to Shrewsbury on May 22, 
1 lest our squadron should arrive too late in the Mediter- 
ranean. If you could expedite this business by writing to 
Admiral Russell or by despatching the ships that remain, 
it would be of the utmost importance. 9 And again, three 
weeks later, ' God grant that Russell may soon arrive in 
the Mediterranean, as from that alone we expect success 
in this campaign. May God confer on us this favour I ' 

But Russell had needed no urging. He was already 
gone. So important, however, was the Brest design still 
considered that in the mouth of the Channel he had 
detached nearly half his own fleet and a number of the 
Dutch against it under Lord Berkeley, with Shovell as his 



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100 NAVAL STRATEGY OF WILLIAM III. lew 

vice-admiral, and General Tollemache in command of 
the troops. 1 Little as Russell thought of the enterprise, 
such a force, in s pite of the betrayal of the design by 
Marlborough and others, should have achieved something 
better than the costly repulse that awaited it. Russell at 
least had done all he could for its success, and, free of the 
task he mistrusted, he held away southward with all 
speed the weather would permit. Without calling at any 
Spanish port, he sent in to Cadiz to summon Callenburgh 
and Nevell to his flag ; but so baffling and stormy was 
the weather that it was not till July 1 that he reached 
his rendezvous off the mouth of the Straits. Without 
counting an almost worthless Spanish contingent that at 
last had been patched up for sea, he had now a fleet of 
sixty-three of the line, and a full proportion of minor 
rates and auxiliaries ; but the long delays at starting and 
the tedious voyage had permitted things to reach so 
critical a stage that it was very doubtful whether he was 
not already too late. s 

1 BusseU's nunc, to Berkeley, May 29, Horn* Office, Admiralty, v. 460, 
and tee Houee of horde MS8. (n.s.) vol. i. p. 485. The division, which 
included SO of the line and 10 fire-ships, numbered 40 sail, and with the Dutch 
division of 19 ships and 4 bomb-vessels, 68. Russell was left with 32 of 
the first low rates and 58 British ships in all, of which 9 were fire-ships. 
Fire-ships at this time, it mast be remembered, were not merely old vessels 
intended to be burnt in action when occasion arose. They were primarily 
second-class cruisers, as we should now say, and were armed, manned, and 
commanded like any other navy ship of their rate. Their dual function 
was indeed curiously like that of * Destroyers ' in a modern fleet. 

■ De Jongs (op. ctt p. 521), from the Dutch official documents, gives the 
fleet at 75 of the line (50 to 100 guns). Of these, 41 were British, 24 
Dutch, and 10 Spanish. The Dutch included four 90-gun three-deckers, 
and the British four first and second rates (90 to 100 guns). There were 
19 fire-ships, In the Memoir* of Byng, who was BueseU's first or flag- 
captain, the force is given as 64 of line, English and Dutch, and 41 
Spanish of all rates. Memoir* relating to the Lord Torrington (Camden 
Society, 1889, cd. Prof. Laughton), p. 67. This work is a principal 
anthority lor the campaign, ' the business of the fleet,' as it says, * passing 
the first captain of the admiral, and he being esteemed as his 



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CHAPTER XXVII 

THE MAIN FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

A few days after Russell had left London to hoist his 

flag, Tourville had received orders to move out of Toulon 

and take up a position in Hy&res Roads. In his eyes the 

move was strategically unsound, but after pointing oat to 

Louis the disadvantages of the position, in case he should 

be attacked, he obeyed. The order was followed by 

a request from Noailles that he would join him at 

Rosas, which was to be the base of his operations 

against Palamos and Barcelona. Thither he accordingly 

moved about the middle of May, and Noailles at once 

took the field. Advancing to the banks of the Ter, where a 

miserable Spanish army was in position to bar his road 

to the southward, he completely defeated it on May 17. 

The very day of the victory, Ch&teau-R£nault with the 

Brest and Rochefort squadrons joined Tourville's flag. 

Palamos was forthwith invested by sea and land, and 

taken by storm before the end of the month. Gerona, the 

district capital, situated at the point where the great 

inland road to Barcelona crossed the Ter, was then 

attacked and reduced in less than a week with barely a 

show of resistance. There was now practically nothing 

between the victorious marshal and his objective except 

the insignificant fortress of Hostalrich, and Tourville's 

fleet had already moved down to blockade Barcelona 

pending the advance of the army. 1 

1 Memoirs of the Due de Noailles, L 860 4 $$$. (PetUot, voL hot); 
Stanhope, 8pain under Charles II. 

VOL. II. If 



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UB THE MAIN FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1694 

Such was the news that greeted the impatient British 
admiral. Barcelona was still safe, but in the direst 
danger. The French fleet, as it was reported to him, 
consisted of seventy sail, and was echeloned from Barce- 
lona as far south as the Ebro, as though feeling to get 
contact with him. There was still time, therefore, and 
lie was in high hope of a fight — a second La Hogue to 
retrieve the situation. ' I will not lose one moment's time 
to get at them, 9 he wrote to Shrewsbury, ' that if they 
design to stay for us, as I suppose they will, if they 
be the number reported, we may soon come to a deciding 
blow; that when all are killed that are to be killed, the 
rest may return home before cold weather and Michael- 
mas storms come in, which I apprehend for these three- 
deck ships/ l This fear, in view of what followed, must 
be noted. Added to the overwhelming sense of responsi- 
bility that was oppressing him, it was almost more than 
he could bear ; nor must he be blamed for it, seeing that 
for the first time since Drake persuaded Howard to 
attempt to destroy the Spanish Armada in Coruna in 
1588, the fortunes of the country were being staked on a 
bold offensive beyond the limits of the British Seas. 
4 Surely/ he wrote privately to Shrewsbury, ' a 6hort time 
with a fair wind will put it to the trial, and then I may 
hope to be coming home again. It is a very pretty thing 
to be an admiral ; but really I think to have three king- 
doms at one's disposal after one year's fatigue at sea is 
not a reward to a man that can live ashore and has no 
ambition to be great/ 

To increase his trouble the fair wind would not come. 
For a whole week he had to lie under Cape Espartel with 
a succession of fogs and easterly winds. 9 But a westerly 

1 He also wrote in almost identical terms to Secretary Trenehard, July 1, 
HX>. Admiralty, y. 60S, and cf. BuccUuch MSS., II. i. 74. 
I to Trenehard, Cartagena, July 18, ibid. t. 668, 



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1604 RUSSELL ENTERS THE STRAITS 163 

breeze came to release him at last, and then, with a fall 
sense of the gravity of the step that was being taken,. he 
carried the fleet through the Straits, and the die was cast 
that committed British naval policy to its final shape. 
It is for his not too decisive victory at La Hogue that. 

; Russell is chiefly remembered in British naval annals. 
Yet were it not for the often spurious importance which 

' actions give to naval movements, he would rather be 
remembered as the man who first led the British main * 
fleet into the Mediterranean. 

The reason he was denied the battle which he expected, 
and which would have given his great movement immor- 
tality, is no less significant than the movement itself. 
For the French immediately met the new strategy by a 
parry which inaugurated the defensive line that thenceforth 
they were destined to take in the Mediterranean almost 
without interruption. It was Tourville himself who, when 
Louis's fleet began to be overweighted by that of William, 
had first adopted the characteristic naval policy of the 
French. By his famous J^canapaign au Uzrge^.he had 
shown how, by keeping a powerful fleet in being, the 
English could be compelled to keep their ships also 
together in fleets and thus leave the seas more open to 
the action of cruisers and privateers. From that policy 
he had been forced by higher orders into the disastrous 
day of La Hogue. His defeat was rightly rewarded by 
a repentant king with the baton of a Marshal of France, 
and his ideas now ruled supreme. In these ideas his 
faith remained unshaken. Louis was naturally still 
anxious to see his costly fleet supporting his military • 
movements, but after the lesson of La Hogue he could 
no longer be persuaded to ride roughshod over Tourville's 
judgment. As De Noailles, therefore, was receiving the 
capitulation of Gerona, and was about to pursue his 

MS 



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164 THE MAIN FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1694 

triumphant march to Barcelona, a letter was pat into his 

band from Louis, warning him that a British squadron 

of forty-five sail was starting for the Mediterranean. He 

was authorised, therefore, to take Gerona, an operation 

on which the Marshal had insisted as a vital preliminary 

to Barcelona, if he had not already done so, but on no 

account was he to venture farther till the naval situation 

was more certain. The fact was that Louis, mindful of 

Tourville's teaching and of his original protest against 

leaving Toulon, had authorised him to avoid an action 

with Bussell. Tourville did not wait for a second word. 

Though Bussell was still far away he immediately 

abandoned the blockade of Barcelona, and, regardless of 

his colleague ashore, he hurried his fleet back to Toulon. 

There was plenty of time, but he would risk nothing. 

The main point in his eyes that overrode all others was to 

preserve the fleet, and as he explained to Louis, in defence 

of his sudden abandonment of De Noailles, he wished to 

reach Toulon in time to get all his ships into its inmost 

basins, out of the reach of Russell's bomb-vessels before 

the British fleet appeared. He was convinced that when 

the waning of the summer should force Bussell to begin 

his homeward voyage, there would still be time to 

complete the Catalonian campaign ; and so it was that, 

when Bussell entered the Straits, Tourville was har^ at 

work with booms and batteries fortifying his fleet in 

Toulon. 1 

Barcelona was saved, at least for the time, and De 
Koaflles*8 campaign, for which Louis had sacrificed 
operations everywhere else, was brought to a standstill. 
6101, thanks to Tourville's embarrassing caution, the 

1 The Enoch dcspetchee relating to these movements will be found in 
to Delarbre'e Tourville et la marine d$ mm ta*j» and the 
i Dm d$ Noatftof ubi supra. 



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lew THE KING SEES THE WAY 165 

situation was difficult enough for Russell. A continu- 
ance of baffling weather prevented his reaching Barcelona 
before the end of July. It was already time to think 
of returning, and Russell was at a loss how to proceed. 
' I wish/ he wrote to Shrewsbury from Barcelona on 
August 3, ' I was able to give any hopes of success in 
these seas as you desire, but the French will not let me 
see them and I dare not venture to attack them at 
Toulon. By what I can inform myself the place is too 
strong, and a mortification or repulse would be of very 
ill consequence. With probable hopes of success I would 
venture a great deal, but the time of year obliges me not 
to spend much time. ... I long to be rid of this trouble- 
some affair. I have neither head, body, nor temper to 
undergo all I do. Pray God bless you and send you all 
you wish and desire, and that I may have the good 
fortune to see you at Christinas.' 

However distracting were the thoughts of the harassed 
admiral, there was fortunately one man who saw his way. 
with heroic clearness. . William was no man to do 
things by halves, and, though his admirals might falter, 
lie himself was far from the end of his resolution. The 
failure at Brest and the impossibility of doing anything 
effective in Flanders determined him to cling at all 
hazards to the advantage and prestige he had gained in 
the Mediterranean, and towards the end of July the 
Council was startled by receiving from him a proposal 
that Russell should remain out all the winter. It was 
clear that if he was to winter in England he must return 
at once. The Mediterranean move would then sink to 
a mere demonstration. The moment Russell's back was 
turned, Tourville would put out again, and Barcelona 
must fall. As Shrewsbury, who was inclined to approve 
the idea, put the case in his answer to the King : ' The 



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166 THE MAIN FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1694 

reputation your arms have gained by being master of 
that sea will vanish with the loss of that town in the 
autumn. 9 It was at Cadiz, he argued, the fleet should 
winter, and thereby secure what we now call 'interior 
lines.' ' There/ Shrewsbury continued, ' they would be 
ready to act as you should command the next year, and 
be in such a place as they would certainly watch the 
motions of the French, [so] that in case they should send 
a squadron into the ocean to be stronger here, a squadron 
of like strength should be immediately despatched from 
Cadiz to reinforce us also.' 

The difficulty, as William knew, would be to persuade 

the Council and Russell to adopt the suggestion loyally. 

< To the Council the move would naturally appear as a 

1 sacrifice of the immediate interests of England to the 

* Dutch King's far-reaching views of continental policy ; 

; while as for the admiral it was clear his heart was no 

• ( longer in his work and that he was ripe to avail himself 

I of any technical excuse to get home again as soon as 

possible. As it happened, this idea bad already been put 

before him. It was obvious at the first glance to every 

one in the fleet, that Spain was in no condition to resist 

Louis's attack single-handed, and that, unless the fleet 

remained to command the sea, Barcelona would be taken, 

and its fall would probably be followed by the reduction 

of the Balearic islands. To prevent the French thus 

obtaining a firm hold in the western Mediterranean, ' a 

noble lord v in the fleet, whom we would gladly be able 

to identify, proposed to Russell that he should winter 

. within the Straits. Naples, Messina, and Port Mahon 

wene suggested, but Russell rejected them all. Naples 

was not well enough defended, Messina was too small, 

while at Port Mahon, the only possible station for so 

large a fleet, no provisions were to be had. But his 



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1604 A DISTURBING PROPOSAL 167 

strongest objection was a strategical one, that 'should 
such a strength be absent from England and Holland all 
the winter, the French might make themselves too strong 
for us in the Channel.' l 

That Cadiz met all these objections he perhaps did 
not care to see ; but it is only fair to say that there was 
certainly much excuse for his view. Tourville at least 
shared it, and it was on the supposition that Bussell could 
not stay that his strategy was based. Within a very 
few days of the subject being broached in the English 
Council it was known, like everything else, to Louis. 
Marlb orough had betrayed the Brest design, and 
somebody took care to betray the new one. Tourville 
Vas warned, but he replied that in his opinion the 
English could not possibly intend to winter in the 
Mediterranean, though it must be said there is a ring of 
apprehension in his letter that belies his expressed con* 
fidence, and tells how the possibility had come upon him 
with a disturbing shock. 1 

From the Council, on whom William naturally wished 
to throw the heavy responsibility, he could get no definite 
opinion at all. In days when a serious error of judgment 
meant in all probability a trial for high treason — and 
few of them' were quite clear of the taint— responsibility 
was a serious matter. First they summoned liooke and 
his fellow Commissioners of the Admiralty to ask them 

1 Burchett, Transactions at Sea, 16S8-1697, p. 243, published originally 
in 1703, and subsequently incorporated as Book iv. in the Naval History, 
1720. In July 1694 he was named Joint Secretary to the Admiralty, and 
thus becomes a first-hand authority from this time onward. He was 
originally a servant of Pepys, and subsequently attached himself to 
Bussell (Diet. Nat. Biog. tub voce). See also Owyn to Harley, July 7, 1694, 
Welbeek M8S. ui. 561. 'I hear this poet Sootherne is giving up the 
Secretaryship of the Admiralty, and that Bridgman and Admiral BuseelTs 
Birket (tic) are to be joint secretary* in his room.' The spelling m 
interesting as giving the contemporary pronunciation of Burchett's i 

' Delarbre, Tourville, Tourville to Louis, August 8 (n.s.), 1094. 



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168 TOE MAIN FLEET IX THE MEDITERRANEAN 1694 

whether they thought it possible to overhaul and revictual 
the fleet so far from home. But from the Admiralty they 
got no relief. The Commissioners promptly replied they 
could be ready to send out everything that was required 
for revictualling and careening the whole fleet in two 
months, and that there would be no difficulty about the 
operation provided Russell had full liberty of the Spanish 
ports ; but they suggested that the Council should ask for 
the removal of the present Governor of Cadiz, who was 
suspected of French sympathies. 1 The ministers were thus 
forced to consider and give an opinion on the revolutionary 
proposal which William had laid upon them, and the 
report we have of their curious proceedings shows how , 
heavily a movement which for us is a commonplace 
weighed on the spirits of the statesmen of that time. 

Dauby, now Marquis of Carmarthen and President of 
the Council, said it was too nice a point and refused to 
give an opinion either way ; Lord Normanby was one day 
' most clear and violent for the fleet's remaining ' and the 
next as positive against it. Dorset and the Lord Steward 
stayed away. Shrewsbury and the rest, so far as they 
had not been cunning enough to conceal their opinions, 
were on the whole favourable, but insisted on the extreme 
danger of the fleet's having to depend oh stores sent out 
across the Bay. of Biscay in midwinter. If Russell could 
remain out till the next summer, Shrewsbury said he 
believed that the fleet in Toulon might be destroyed, and, 
even if that were impossible, the mere threat of retaining 
the command of the Mediterranean would probably incline 
the French to a reasonable peace during the winter. On 
one point only were they all agreed, and that was, ' that 
the decision ought to be left to Mr. Russell/ To make 



of 11m Committee of Council, H.O. Admiralty, vii. July 81, 



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1094 THE KING GIVES THE ORDER 1«0 

sure do responsibility should in any case rest on them- 
selves they begged that, whatever orders the King decided 
to give to Russell, he would send them under his own hand 
direct by way of Genoa. 1 

At such pusillanimous trifling, which was all the more 
marked from the candid way in which his own States 
General had supported his idea, the King was seriously 
annoyed ; but still he did not shrink. ' I do not know/ be 
wrote on August 2, in answer to Shrewsbury's report, ' if 
I rightly comprehend, but it appears that the Committee 
ate of opinion that Admiral Russell should winter at Cadiz, 
but dare not declare that opinion, through fear of being 
responsible for the event. I do wish that they had spoken 
more clearly on this occasion, and indeed they ought to 
have done, so as to prevent my being exposed to the 
supposition of acting solely from my own opinion. Bat 
as there is no time to deliberate, I am reduced to the 
necessity of coming to some determination, and I have 
accordingly resolved to order Admiral Russell to winter 
with his whole squadron at Cadiz. May God grant that 
this may succeed for the good of the kingdom and for the 
welfare of our allies/ 

Even then the nervous ministers could not harden their 
hearts to send the admiral a positive order to remain, but, 
in concert with the Queen, framed one, which gave him 
considerable latitude to return if he thought proper. 1 It 
was more than the King could endure. He knew, as he 
told Shrewsbury, 'that wherever there is an unwilling- 
ness to do anything, reasons against it are easily found to 
prove that impossible which is not so in effect. 9 He made 
sure Russell would exercise the discretion allowed him by 



76. 



Minutes of the Committee of Council, Aug. 8, H.O. Admiralty, *iL 
Trenchard to Russell, Aug. 4, H.O. Admiralty, v. 754. • Yesterday/ 1m 
*, I received a copy of the orders he (the King) had sent. 9 



says, I received a copy of the orders he (the King) 1 

■ Privy Council Minutes, Aug. 0, DuceUueh MSS. II. L 111. 



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170 THE MAIN FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1004 

returning, and he was more than ever anxious for hiin to 

remain. He therefore sent him a peremptory order to 

stay, and even then could not be at rest. He poured out 

his heart to Heinsius, the famous Grand Pensionary of 

the Netherlands, to whose clear head and devotion both 

he and Marlborough owed so much of their success, telling 

him how anxious he was lest his order should not reach 

the fleet in time to stop it, since he was convinced that 

its wintering at Cadiz would prove the winning stroke of 

the game. 1 To Shrewsbury he wrote in the same strain 

of anxiety. 'I am under great alarms,' he said, 'lest 

Admiral Russell should not receive my order to continue 

in the Mediterranean, and the more I consider that affair 

the more important it appears to me. I know, from the 

best authority, there is nothing France so much dreads.' 

And finally, as a last precaution, he ordered a ship to be 

sent to meet Russell with orders that, even if he were 

already on his way home, he was to turn back. 

So the momentous step was taken to adorn William's 
memory with one of its finest ornaments. It was he and 
be alone whose act it was, and his should be the undying 
credit. For the honour of his ungenerous ministers it 
must be said that, when he had once assumed the respon- 
sibility, they did all they could to support him. ' The 
letters,' wrote Shrewsbury to Russell, so soon as the first 
fiat had gone forth, ' which will come to you with this 
packet are of the greatest moment to yourself and England 
of any that perhaps ever came to your hand.' He urged 
him with friendly advice to remain at Cadiz, since, as he 
said, *it will be very glorious to interrupt all the King of 
France designs this autumn in the Mediterranean, and 
ride the next summer master of both seas as you have 
done this. 9 He feared, so unprecedented was the order, 
1 Ife *Ǥ* JfcfcrluiMbrA* Zwwuen, it. L 537, note, August 10-29. 



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1094 RUSSELL'S DISMAY 171 

tbat Russell's unruly temper would tempt him to disobey, 
and he warned him that, though his Majesty had gone 
beyond any advice the council had given, yet in his 
high determination the feeling of the country was with 
him. Presently he fell to coaxing. ' Though by your 
letter of the 3rd/ he wrote on August 26, ' I find you are 
not in a very good humour, I doubt the orders you have 
received since will put you in a worse. The doctrine you 
used to preach to me that public good ought to be con- 
sidered before private ease will now come to your share 
to practise in a more tedious and troublesome manner 
than you could foresee. . . . Dear Mr. Russell, let a man 
who truly loves and values you prevail on you to practise 
submission and patience/ 

Russell was wise enough to take his friend's good 
advice, but he consoled himself with an exaggerated pose 
of martyrdom, natural enough when men were accus- 
tomed to leave the seat of war each year to enjoy the 
winter season in London, but almost ludicrous when we 
remember the long vigils of Nelson and Collingwood or 
the service that men blithely endure to-day. ' Really/ he 
replied to his friend, ' I am so surprised at receiving the 
King's positive commands to winter with the fleet at 
Cadiz that I do not know whether serving six months, as 
I have done, a-shipboard and six months to be at Cadiz, 
and six months more a-shipboard, it be not better to put 
an end to a troublesome life as I have made it' He ex- 
pressed himself wholly opposed to the King's strategy and 
was certain that, if the French chose to send a squadron 
round to Brest, his fleet would be in no condition to 
oppose them. He was in despair, but resigned. 'I con- 
cluded what would be the event/ he laments, ' well know- 
ing the King's passionate desire to have ships in these 
seas, without considering how reasonable it may prove 



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172 THE MAIN FLEET IX THE MEDITERRANEAN 1694 

to the other services. He fancies the defects of a ship 
are as easily repaired as mending a bridle or stirrup 
leather/ 

It must not be supposed, however, that in spite of his 
lamentations Russell did not loyally carry out his orders. 
When they reached him he was already on his way home. 
Seeing the hopeless condition of the Spanish army and 
the limited time at his disposal, he had found it impossible 
to assist the Spanish commander-in-chief in any of his 
proposals for the recovery of the ground which De 
Xoailles had won, and towards the end of August he 
found the state of his stores made it imperative that 
he should move down to repass the Straits. Neither of 
the orders which William had sent overland through 
Genoa had reached him. Both had been intercepted by 
French cruisers between Genoa and Marseilles, and so sure 
was Tourville that Russell could not dare to remain 
out all the winter that he believed the orders were 
meant to be intercepted as a ruse of William's to deceive 
him. 1 So Russell had sailed with the pleasant prospect 
of a winter season in London, and he had reached as far as 
Malaga, ready to pass out of the Straits, before he was dis- 
illusioned. There the vessel sent to intercept him met the 
fleet, and he received under ' the sign manual and royal 
signet ' William's peremptory commands. 2 

The effect upon him we have already seen in his letter 
to Shrewsbury. To the Secretary of the Council he 
expressed himself no less pathetically. To do him justice 
his first complaint was that he had not been told in time, 
bo that he might have stayed longer off Catalonia aild 
effected something against the French. In his mortifica- 
tion he then suggested he should be relieved. The strain 

1 DelsrM, TomvilU, Appendix, Sept 6-16. 

* The order ih dated Aug. 7, Torrmgton Memoirs, p. 70. 



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1694 RUSSELL OBEYS 173 

was too great for him. ' Could I have imagined/ he wrote, 
4 this expedition would have been detained here so long, 
I would much rather have chosen to live on bread and 
water. . . . The business of the conducting part is so 
terrible . . . that I am at present under a doubt with myself 
whether it is not better to die. 9 Still he did not flinch from 
the task laid upon him. He immediately called a council 
of war. Callenburgh was for carrying on to Cadiz there and 
then ; but Russell says he thought the idea * so preposter- 
ous a proceeding ' that he persuaded him to go back at least 
as high as Alicante. He himself was for going to Minorca, 
but the Dutch officers would not go without the stores they 
were expecting. So it was settled, Russell declaring he 
did not mean to go to Cadiz till October, unless he was 
sure the French had disarmed their fleet. 1 

The intention of his movement back to the Balearic 
islands was to foil an expected attempt by Tourville 
to slip past him out of the Straits, and to this end he 
forthwith detached Novell with a squadron of ten sail to 
cruise between Formentara and the African coast, and at 
the same time sent away intelligence vessels to Minorca, 
Oran, and Tetuan to make sure the French should not 
escape his cruising squadron undetected. Before, how- 
ever, he himself could do anything with the main body of 
the fleet he was struck down by dysentery and had to go 
ashore at Alicante. He had just strength left, he says, to 
sign an order to his vice-admiral, Aylmer, to take command 
of the fleet and do whatever the council of war decided.* 
It was resolved to join Nevell at once with the bulk of the 
fleet and to fight or pursue any French ships they found 
at sea. In this posture the fleet was kept till Russell was 

1 Russell to Trenchard, Malaga, September 5, Home Office, Admiralty. 
▼• 934. 

• Buasell to Trenchard, Alicante, September 91, ibid. 1056. 



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174 THE MAIN FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1694 

recovered. By that time his intelligence and the ad- 
vanced season made it fairly certain that the French 
were fixed at Toulon for the winter, and accordingly in 
the first week in October, as he had intended, he carried 
the whole fleet round to Cadiz. 1 

Even then Russell was not left in peace. Louis, 
habituated to unhalting success, was exasperated with 
the failure of his campaign, and directly it was known 
thai the allied fleet had left the Mediterranean he 
began pressing the Due de Noailles and Tourville with 
desperate orders to renew the attempt at Barcelona. 
Unpaid and inactive, Noailles v s army had become hope- 
lessly demoralised by plunder, and he protested that, 
even if they were fit to march, unless the fleet could 
support them, the move would only be sending them 
to destruction. Tourville no less energetically repre- 
sented the unwisdom of exposing the fleet in any such 
hazardous attempt. Still the effect of Louis's pressure 
this continual alarms from Barcelona that Noailles was 
moving and Tourville at sea. In spite of the excite- 
ment of the Spanish officials, Bussell refused to believe 
the rumours, but nevertheless held the bulk of the fleet 
in constant readiness to re-enter the Straits. It is said 
that Tourville actually sailed from Toulon in October 
with a large body of troops for Barcelona, but was 
promptly recalled again on news that Bussell was coming 



1 Borchett, who was Russell's secretary, says Aylmer was ordered ooi for 
a week, and returned to Alicante, September 10, which would imply that 
BttsseU left the sea open during all the rest of September. Burchett's date 
h owever is dearly a misreading. Bussell did not acknowledge William's 
orders at Malaga tfll September 7-17, and did not announce his illnets at 
Alicante and Ayhner's sailing till the 91st. Burohett also had dysen* 
tery and went ashore with his chief. Byng says Novell was detached on 
September 10 and that Aylmer started for his cruise on the 18th, was 
joined by HotcH on the SSnd, and returned on the 28rd, Torrington Mtmoirg, 
f»9sV 



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1604 EFFECTS OF THE MOVE 175 

back. 1 After that there was no sign of movement. 
Keeping a squadron of cruisers always in the Straits and 
the bulk of his fleet in continual readiness for sea, Bus- 
sell set to work to refit piecemeal for the next year's 
campaign, and winter settled down to seal William's 
triumphant move. 

The effect had been extraordinary. While William 
had been able to score his first success in Flanders by the 
capture of Huy, the French had made no progress in 
Italy, and the Duke of Savoy had held firm to the Allies. 
Noailles's army never recovered the demoralisation of its 
inactivity. Degenerating more and more in their efforts 
to support themselves by marauding, they fell into 
excesses which brought upon them all the terrors of a 
guerilla war, and the exasperated Catalans, of whom Louis 
had hoped to make loyal subjects, were driven to fierce 
and successful retaliation. At Toulon things were little 
better. Its resources were not equal to refitting the 
whole fleet, and the only hope of breaking William's hold 
on the Mediterranean was to commission the first and 
second rates that had been laid up in Brest, and man 
them from Tourville's spent ships Large numbers of 
seamen were 6ent for the purpose overland to Brest. 
On the way they deserted in hundreds ; they could never 
be gathered again, and Louis's fleet never recovered the 
blow. And all this was directly the result of an enemy 
dominating the Mediterranean and keeping a fleet inter- 
posed between the two seats of the French maritime 
jpower. 

The effect on Louis's prestige was even more severe. 
His career of conquest was checked, the panic in Spain 

Mtnunr$ of De NoailUs, p. 895. Kuetell believed it was a design to 
draw him from Cadiz and permit Tourville to eeoape. Ooxe, S hnw bm j 
Correspondence, 200. 



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176 THE MAIN FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1604 

allayed, and the wisest diplomatists in Europe began to 
be sensible of a new development in international politics 
in what the Venetian Ambassador at Madrid called ' the 
unprecedented and grand resolve to place and maintain 
the fleet at the Straits.' 1 In England it was thoroughly 
appreciated. 'The resolution,' wrote Shrewsbury to 
Bussell, ' of the fleet's wintering at Cadiz was not only 
met with general applause in Christendom and extremely 
disappointed the French designs, but it is approved here by 
almost all sorts of people, as the only step that has been 
made by us this war that looks like a vigour and a mind 
to put an end to it. ... I cannot think but that you are 
at this time in much the considerablest station of any 
subject in Europe.' * After a full inquiry into the 
conduct of the war at sea, the House of Lords voted their 
thanks to Bussell, and a resolution was also carried 
approving the King's strategy and begging him to increase 
his fleet so as to enable him to keep a force superior to 
that of the enemy permanently in the Mediterranean. 1 

Everything was expected from the coming campaign. 
Booke and his brother Commissioners were as good as 
their word, and sent out all the stores, artificers, and 
officials that were necessary to turn Cadiz into a British 
navy yard. The whole ' terrible business of the conduct- 
ingpart 9 was taken off the admiral's hands and he had 
leisure to* think. The result was a clear warning 
to the Government that the expected success depended 

1 *L' insolita e grande risolusione di raettere o fermar la flota alio 
Stretto serve a raddolcire gli animi,' Ac. ReUuioiii Venete, Spagna, ii. 

m. 

* This, no doubt, was partly in answer to Russell's request for a 
commission as general, ' for admiral in Spain,' he complained, ' is squire 
tn England, so insignificant a name Sb it in these parts. It is not a new 
thing. Lord Sandwich, Black Dean, and several others had it,' Coxe, 209. 
The —— » s— s^i WM granted him, ibid. 224. 

• LordM Journal* xv. 511. 



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1695 WINTERING AT CADIZ 177 

entirely on his being able to bring the French to action 
and defeating them. If Tourville refused to put to sea, 
the situation of the past year would recur. At the end of 
July he would have to turn homeward and leave the Medi- 
terranean open to the operations of the Toulon squadron. 
He therefore urged that the Channel division of the main 
fleet should be given sealed orders to be opened towards 
the end of summer, directing it to proceed to Cadiz. At 
the same time his own fleet would slip away, and, before 
the French could know what was going on, the fresh 
force would have changed places with the stale one. In 
this way the situation might be held for a second winter, 
and, unless it was so held, there was no certain hope of 
success. In reply he was told the King generally 
approved his plan, though, as his own division of the main 
fleet was so much larger than that he had left behind, it 
would be impossible to replace the whole of it, and some of 
the ships would have to remain. In any case it was the 
King's flattering desire that he himself should continue in 
command, Russell excused himself on the ground of his 
health, and then set to work to show his zeal. 

By April, though he had kept squadrons out even far 
up the Straits all the winter, the whole fleet was ready 
for sea. Some eighteen sail he had sent home by the 
King's orders. In their place he had asked for some 
bomb-vessels as well as three regiments of foot, and one 
of the new marines to fill up his complements and furnish 
a landing force. These had now arrived, and on May 2 
he put to sea with forty-five of the line, Dutch and 
English. The meaning of the new additions to his force 
was that he meant to break the deadlock by striking a 
direct blow against Toulon or Marseilles. By that device 
he hoped to drive Tourville out of his astute strategy 

virr him *° fight **• ° rder *° keep "■ *** 



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178 THE MAIX FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1006 

troops for the operation his first object was to fetch a 
Spanish force, which had assembled at Finale, near Genoa, 
to secure Catalonia against the remnants of De Noailles's 
army. 

Accordingly, after showing himself at Barcelona and 
communicating with the Spanish Viceroy, he passed on 
to the eastward. The trouble was that the practicability 
of Russell's design depended wholly on the possibility of 
inducing the Duke of Savoy to co-operate. British in- 
terests at Turin, his capital, were in the hands of the 
famous Massue de Buvigny, Deputy-General of the 
Huguenots, one of the many valuable subjects whom 
the revocation of the edict of Nantes had given to 
William. His mother was a Russell, and he was now 
a British subject and Earl of Galway for his services 
as a general of horse in Ireland. In Savoy he com- 
manded the subsidised contingent and was also Envoy 
Extraordinary. To him Russell now addressed a letter 
to inquire if there was any hope of inducing the artful 
prince to co-operate with him in his grand design. 
Having looked into Toulon and found all quiet, he was 
content to despatch Nevell with a small squadron to 
deliver his letters and fetch the troops from Finale, 
giving him a rendezvous at Hyeres. In the interval 
he despatched Admiral Mitchell with the chief military 
officers and Sir Martin Beckman, of Tangier fame 
and now one of the leading British engineers, to make 
a close reconnaissance of the Toulon defences. 1 Then 
his plans were suddenly upset. A gale sprang up, which 
blew for three days and nights, and drove him clean off 
the coast ; and by the time he was able to get back to 
cover the passage of the Finale transports past Toulon he 

• Ib Torringtv* Memoir*, p. 78, it if Mud they were gent *to view 
.* Burchett says Toulon. 



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1095 THE 8ECOND CAMPAIGN 170 

had to ran to Sardinia for water and to protect the home- 
ward-bound Smyrna fleet. 

Before he was again ready for action, Casale, the 
immediate objective of the operations of the Duke of 
Savoy and his Imperial allies, had fallen. With scarcely 
a show of resistance it had suddenly capitulated — so 
suddenly indeed that Galway suspected all was not 
right. The astute Duke was clever enough, however, to 
allay all suspicion, and no one could yet tell what was in 
the wind. As a matter of fact Louis had recognised that 
William's move in the Mediterranean had beaten him, 
and the sacrifice of Casale was the first step in a new 
opening to detach Savoy from the League and remove 
Italy from the board. Ignorant of all this subtilty, Kussell 
only saw in the allies' success fresh hope of carrying 
off his great combined move against Toulon, and so finally 
crushing the French sea power in the Mediterranean. 
Having seen the Smyrna convoy safe for Alicante, he 
proceeded with his fleet to Barcelona. It was here, 
about the middle of July, that he heard the news of 
Savoy's success, and he was about to sail for the coast of 
Provence in high expectation when letters reached him 
from home that again raised his ugly temper to bpiling 
point. 

William had once more taken a high hand with the 
navy. Disregarding Russell's plan, or knowing perhaps 
that it was now impracticable, he had bluntly decided 
that he must remain in the Mediterranean till the 
autumn. For the King it was the only way in which . 
Tourville's defensive strategy could be met. All he did 
to meet the seamen's objections, was to say that if a 
few of the ships were unfit to keep the sea so late, they 
might be sent home, and Booke must replace them. In 
vain the ministers protested, and, fortified with Rooke's 



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180 TOE MAIN FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1696 

opinion, urged that by that time the condition of the 
ships would be such as to render them unfit to face 
equinoctial weather. ' Not one but every seaman/ Shrews- 
bury wrote to the King, ' that any of us have discoursed 
with, do not only say the hazard is very great, but almost 
certain ; that ships of the first or second rate have not till 
very lately been ventured to those seas, and if they are to 
return in the winter, Sir George Booke's expression to me 
was, " It is a thousand to one several of them miscarry." ' 
The King would not listen. Having failed to penetrate 
the French lines in Flanders, he had just made his bold 
move on Namur, and had sat down before the place in 
form. The risk he was taking must have made those 
which he was forcing on Russell seem light, and the orders 
went forward as he had resolved. 

On receipt of them Russell delivered his temper once 
more in a letter to his friend at Court. After representing 
the madness of his orders he fell to abusing the Dutch 
squadron, which was never up to strength and always 
short of victuals, and roundly accused the King of being 
under the thumb of the Admiralty of Amsterdam. He 
begged sarcastically to be informed at least what force 
<p-as coming in September and who was to command it. 
4 For at present, 9 he said, ' I know nothing but that after 
that month I may be drowned in coming home.' The 
end he hinted would probably be another order that he 
himself was to stay out, and if it came he plainly said he 
should disobey it. This letter he had the recklessness to 
send through France, regardless in his temper of the 
possibility of its being intercepted. As a matter of fact 
it reached the Sing's camp in Flanders, and William 
opened it, but there is no trace of his ever having visited 
the indiscretion, if it was no worse, on his testy servant's 
head. 



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1095 DESIGN ON TOULON 181 

Again, having vented his spleen, Russell obeyed, and 
still further reduced his force by sending home his most 
defective ships as convoy for the Smyrna fleet. The only 
consolation for the angry admiral was that there was still 
hope of solving the situation by a stroke against Toulon 
or Marseilles in concert with the troops of Savoy, if only 
he could induce the Viceroy of Catalonia to lend him his 
squadron of twelve galleys. 1 On this exploit his heart 
was still set ; but to add to his irritation the Viceroy met 
his application for the galleys by an application that he 
would first assist him in recovering Palamos. Seeing 
what his instructions were, and how badly he wanted the 
galleys, he could scarcely refuse. But, as the Spaniards 
had no material for a siege, he thought himself justified 
in stipulating that his troops should be landed for a week 
only, and not so long if danger threatened from Toulon in 
the meantime. Early in August therefore the troops 
were landed at Palamos, and a vessel sent to watch Toulon. 
Combined operations were opened immediately, and were 
meeting with unexpected success, when Russell's advice 
boat returned with two prisoners who asserted that at 
Toulon sixty sail of the line were lying in the road ready 
for sea. At the same time five fresh Dutch ships joined 
from Cadiz. Russell insisted on immediately re-embark- 
ing his troops, and, advising the Spaniards to return to 
their previous position, he sailed off in search of the 
French. He was in high hope that he had gained his end. 
He thought that the news of his having sent home his 
. unseaworthy ships must have induced the French to 
.come out and fight; but the intelligence was false. At 
Toulon, it is true, he found indications that the ships were 
being prepared for sea, but, after hanging as close in to 
the port as the weather would let him, he made certain 

1 Torrington Memoir; p. 74. 



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182 THE MAIN FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1695 

they had no more intention of fighting him than before. 
As for his darling project of an attack upon the place in 
force, he had now to learn there was no hope of help 
from Savoy, and for his own force it was far too strong. 
In any case September on that coast was no place for 
such a fleet as his, and he once more retired to his original 
station at Alicante. 

Ho had heard that Sir George Rooke was coming oat 
with some fresh ships to relieve him, and it had been his 
intention to stay where he was till the end of the month 
in pursuance of the King's desire, or at least till he heard 
Booke was at Cadiz. But Callenburgh considered that so 
long a delay at Alicante was incompatible with his own 
orders to return before the Dutch ports became icebound ; 
whereupon Russell resolved to go home at once with all 
the first and second rates in accordance with William's 
instructions, leaving his rear-admiral, Sir David Mitchell, 
in command of the rest with orders to establish himself 
at Cadiz, and from there do all he could to protect the 
trade and embarrass the French. 

So ended the two campaigns— the type of so many 
that were to succeed them. How often were their maih 
features to recur ! The French fleet helpless in Toulon 
— not blockaded, but refusing to stir; the fitful opera- 
tions on the Spanish coast hampering in greater or less 
degree the military operations of the French army ; the 
fruitless efforts to achieve something on the coast of 
Provence by the help of preoccupied or faint-hearted 
allies. Nor was this the whole. As always, beneath the 
apparent failures and disappointments there was still, 
unseen and almost unnoticed, the silent pressure of the 
chafing fleet that was felt to the farthest borders of the 
war, even to the far-off Meuse, withering the lilies on the 
walla of Namur. 



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L0UI8'8 OOUNTERSTROKE 183 



In truth, Russell's fleet had been eating into the roots | 
of France, ancfc William showed no sign of loosing his hold. .. 
Sir George Rooke reached Cadiz after a tempestuous 
voyage of five weeks in the middle of October, and with 
Mitchell's and the Dutch squadron could show a force of 
thirty ships of the line, besides bomb-vessels and others. 
It was of course insufficient to deal with the Toulon 
fleet, but reinforcements were being brought forward in 
England which were to join his flag during the winter for 
an early campaign in the spring. Louis saw himself 
threatened with a continuance of the exhausting situa- 
tion. At all costs the tension must be broken, and he set 
to work to effect it in his grand manner with one of those ^ 
broad strokes that are the fascination of his epoch. A 
century later the greatest of his successors found himself 
forced by the same pressure to attempt the invasion of 
England. In this Napoleon was but repeating Louis's \ 
expedient. In mid-winter, while the bulk of the British 
fleet was in harbour, a force was rapidly concentrated at 
Calais, where James joined it, prepared to throw himself 
across while the seas were clear, and put himself at the 
head of all that was Jacobite and reactionary in his lost 
kingdom. The design promised all success. It happened 
however that a continuance of westerly winds had prevented 
the sailing of the last division of the Mediterranean fleet 
It was at once ordered to the Downs with every available 
ship that could be got out of harbour. Russell in person 
went down to comniancir^nd Rooke was recalled. The 
situation in the Narrow Seas was saved, but that in the 
Mediterranean was lost. James returned to his hopeless 
exile, and the Toulon fleet put to sea. Every effort was 
made to prevent its getting into Brest, and although after 
many delays Rooke early in May was able to get off 
Ushant with a sufficient fleet, he was just too late. 



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184 THE MAIN FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1096 

Chiteau-Benault was safe in Brest, and William's 
Mediterranean venture came to an end. 

The finan cial crisis through which England was 
passing made it impossible to renew the strategy which 
had promised so well. Still its effects continued. The 
dislocation of French finance and of the naval administra- 
tion which had been caused by William's two years' 
command of the Mediterranean left its mark. Though 
the fleet was concentrated at Brest, it was in no condition 
to effect anything, nor for the rest of the war did French 
action rise above commerce destruction and colonial raids. 
Every one except Spain, whose impotence had been the 
cause of all the trouble, was anxious for peace. The 
absurd pretensions of the Court of Madrid were the main 
obstacle to its conclusion, and, even had William been 
able, he was certainly unwilling to support her unreason- 
able attitude by again sending his fleet to the Straits. 

In any case the necessity of withdrawing the fleet 
had been followed by events which made peace inevitable, 
and at the same time marked with fresh emphasis what 
the command of the Mediterranean meant in European 
affairs. If it be thought that too much weight has been 
adjudged to William's great move, the rebound which 
came immediately the pressure was removed should 
certainly justify what has been claimed. It was in Italy 
the most convincing effect is seen. 'The measure, 9 
wrote the despairing Galway to Shrewsbury, ' which the 
Sing finds it necessary to adopt of recalling his fleet is a 
misfortune to our affairs in general, as the French are 
thus relieved from the greatest embarrassment which 
they have hitherto experienced.' And again, ' My lord, 
permit me to represent to you that the most important 
affair is to think of the fleet which the King would have 
in the Mediterranean/ And yet again, when the danger in 



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1696-7 EFFECTS OF THE FLEET'S RECALL 185 

the Channel was over : * I am glad, my lord, that you are 
well convinced of the necessity of having a fleet in the 
Mediterranean, and I am thence induced to hope that the 
King will send one. The enemy have laid up the squadron 
which sailed from Toulon to Brest with the exception of 
twelve ships. So no more than twenty-five or thirty of 
these ships are left in the ocean in three squadrons. 
Why then do we keep in your seas a fleet of eighty sail 
and not send a squadron of twenty-five or thirty into the 
Mediterranean ? If it should please his Majesty to order 
on hoard only two battalions, he will divert a force of 
the enemy equal to twenty thousand men, and change in 
his favour the aspect of affairs in all this country and all 
Italy/ 

No clearer exposition of the true lines of British 
strategy could be desired ; but it was not to be. The 
Duke of Savoy, while he had the effrontery to beg for the 
return of the fleet, was making separate terms for himself. 
The surrender of Casale proved to be the firstfruits of an 
accommodation, by which Savoy deserted the alliance and 
Louis secured from Spain and the Empire the neutralisa- 
tion of Italy. In view of the military impotence of the 
Spanish King at home, this pusillanimous arrangement 
was no less than a complete abandonment of the position 
in the Mediterranean. It was in forcing that position that 
William had come to see his only hope of bringing the 
war to a successful issue. It is small wonder then that 
his patience broke down. With such allies it was 
impossible to work, and when Louis adroitly seized the 
moment to offer honourable terms of peace, William 
insisted on their consideration. A congress, after inter* 
minable delay, assembled at Ryswick, near the Hague, 
but it was only to be the scene of every kind of obstruction 
that the pride and folly of the Hapsburgs could suggest, 



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**6 TOE MAIN FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1607 



id the pedantic diplomacy of the time invent. Still 
obstruction availed the malcontents nothing. William 
^nrith his fleets was master of the situation, and, driven to 
exasperation, he resolved to take the matter into his own 
Iiands. 

A little wayside diplomacy between Lord Portland 
and Marshal Boufllers behind the back of the Congress 
quickly settled a give-and-take line for a firm peace. 
It amounted roughly to the status quo ante bcllum, with 
the substantial addition that Louis recognised his arch- 
enemy as King of England. The malcontents, who had 
set the example of private arrangements with the common 
enemy, were naturally furious at seeing the tables turned. 
Spain, who had the least right to complain, was the 
loudest in her vituperation ; but the mere threat that, if 
the war continued, no fleet from the North would again 
appear in the Mediterranean forced her to acquiesce. 
Deprived of the protection at sea which William had 
refused to continue, Barcelona had already fallen. At the 
same time came news that on the Spanish Main Cartagena 
had been sacked by a French squadron under Pointis, 
and Spain, for all her overweening pretensions, could be 
under no hallucination as to what a continuance of the 
war would mean for her without the goodwill of the 
sea powers. She had no choice but to lower her note, 
and on September 20, 1697, peace was signed at Ryswick 
on the lines which William had arranged with Louis. 



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CHAPTER XXVIII 

THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 

Though the Congress of Ryswick gave peace to Europe, 
it was far from staying the struggle for the Mediter- 
ranean. It simply transferred the contest from the sea to 
the cabinets. The nightmare of the Spanish succession 
still hung over Europe. The childless King of Spain, in 
ever failing health, still lingered on, and any day the 
news of his death might blow into flame the embers 
which the peace had merely covered over. Every power, 
oppressed almost to exhaustion with financial embarrass- 
ment and the dislocation of trade, was pining for rest, and 
none more than France. The only possible escape from 
the intolerable situation was to arrange it diplomatically 
while the King of Spain yet lived. No sooner therefore 
was the peace signed than Louis set to work, and the 
result was the famous negotiations for the ' Partition 
Treaties/ which form perhaps the most extraordinary 
chapter in diplomatic history. 

With the failure of the male line of the Spanish 
Hapsburgs, three claimants could show a title on the 
distaff side — the Dauphin, the eldest son of the Emperor, 
and the Electoral Prince, son of the Elector of Bavaria. 
The real struggle lay of course between France and 
Austria, who alone could hope to assert their claim to the 
undivided succession ; but both Bourbon and Hapsburg 
had to face the fact that Europe would not sit down 



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1SB THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 1698 

quietly while either house added the vast dominions of 
Spain to the possessions that already made each so 
formidable. Before either could hope to enjoy its 
prospective rights in peace, Europe must be satisfied, 
and since the late war Europe for this purpose meant 
William. To him therefore Louis had deferentially 
to apply, and to beg him to say how it would please him 
to arrange the balance of European power. 

The crux of the whole question, as it had always 
been in the rivalry between France and the Empire, was 
the command of the Mediterranean. The possession 
of the Spanish crown meant also of course the possession 
of the Spanish Indies, but it is impossible to read the 
correspondence of the time without seeing that this was 
the minor consideration. The real and recognised value 
of the Peninsula was that, as the powers were then 
ordered, it would give to its possessor the dominant 
place in the Mediterranean, and the Mediterranean, as 
William had so clearly demonstrated, was the keyboard of 
Europe. 1 

Accordingly, since William's recent demonstration of 
his power and determination to play upon it, the first. 
necessity was to come to terms with him if the vacant 
succession was not to prove a bed of thorns. And at 
every turn of the negotiations we see that it was the 
freedom of the Mediterranean that was uppermost in 
William's mind. With Cadiz in French hands the 
Straits were in their hands, and his power ofdividing_ 
the two seats of their maritime power was gone. Cadiz 
in the late war had acquired a new strategical coefficient 
that had never been quite clearly recognised before. 
Its former importance was mainly that it was the seat 

LitUn of William III. and Louis XIV. and of thsir 



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1096 PARTITION NEGOTIATIONS 189 

of the American trade of Spain and of her Oceanic sea 
power. But since William had had the use of it, he 
had demonstrated its higher value to be that it com- 
manded the Straits. As no first-class n aval p ort th en 
_existedLin_ the Straits themselves, it stood in fact for_ 
_what Gibraltar stands for to-day. Unless therefore 
William had the liberty of it, or of an equivalent, it 
would be impossible for him in a future struggle to 
repeat the masterly stroke which had brought home to 
Louis the length of his arm. In the negotiations all 
this was of course expressed in terms of trade— it was 
for the freedom of his Mediterranean trade that William 
evinced his main anxiety — but behind it, and scarcely 
disguised, was the higher strategy of war. 

Louis's overtures began by pointing out the extreme 
danger of reviving the domination of Charles V. if 
the Spanish dominions and the Empire were to become 
reunited in the Austrian Hapsburgs. To avoid such 
an accumulation of territory round one throne, he was 
prepared, if William supported the Bourbon claim, to 
settle the Spanish crown on the Dauphin's second son, 
and so secure its separation from that of France. As a 
further security for the trade of the maritime powers, he 
would be prepared to cede to William Ceuta and Oran, 
the remaining Spanish possessions on the 'African coast, 
for the benefit of England and Holland. To this 
William would not listen. He protested he had nothing to 
fear from Austria upon the sea, however great her empire, 
but that so large an addition to the French sea power as 
was proposed was a danger not to be borne. If Louis 
wished to negotiate with a view to sharing the vast 
inheritance, it must be on the basis of a partition between 
. the three claimants, which would make none of them 
predominant. By way of a counter proposal therefore 



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190 THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 1698 

lie introduced the Prince of Bavaria, the third claimant, 

and proposed, after various interchanges of views, that 

to him should go Spain and the Indies, while Louis's 

grandson contented himself with Naples and the Italian 

islands, and while Milan, Sardinia, and the Netherlands 

went to the Archduke Charles, the second son of the 

Emperor; or, in the alternative, if Louis had set his 

heart on Spain and the Indies, then Italy and the 

Netherlands must be divided between the Electoral 

Prince and the Archduke ; but in this case— if, that is, 

Spain and the Indies went to a French prince — then 

England must insist on a guarantee for the freedom of 

the Mediterranean, not only by the cession of Ceuta and 

Oran, but also of one or two really serviceable ports 

^within the Straits. 

Louis was now more than ever disturbed. In the 
arrangement which William had proposed he had said 
nothing about Sicily, and at Paris it was feared 
that he would demand the island France had coveted 
so long, and if not the whole, at least its naval centre, 
Messina. But the fact was that both Louis and 
William were secretly oppressed with their own internal 
difficulties, and were overrating each other's strength. 
William had really little hope of bringing Louis to any 
reasonable terms, or of inducing his war-weary subjects 
to permit him a display of force. He had no faith in 
negotiations that were not carried on sword in hand, and, 
in face of the growing anti-military spirit in England, 
all he could do to whet his diplomacy was to increase 
the usual Mediterranean squadron and beg the Dutch 
to do the same. The effect of the expedient was neces- 
sarily to enhance the importance of the Mediterra- 
nean demands and increase still further Louis's anxiety. 
Eventually William declared that the place he had in 



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1098 ' WILLIAM DEMANDS MINORCA 191 

his mind within the Straits was Minorca. Portland, 
his ambassador in Paris, also mentioned Gibraltar, but 
in spite of his urgent advice William would not insist on 
it, thereby again displaying his remarkable strategical in- 
sight. For there is no doubt that, so long as England held 
Minorca, the extra advantage of Gibraltar was certainly not 
worth the cost and bad blood its occupation must entail 
Louis, misunderstanding his opponent's apparent modera- 
tion, now took a higher tone, and declared nothing would 
induce him to cede a port within the Straits, since such 
a concession would give the mastery to the maritime 
power. William, in his quiet way, immediately hardened 
down. His irreducible minimum was the power of 
keeping a fleet permanently in the Mediterranean, and 
without Minorca or some other Spanish port it was 
impossible for his fleet to winter there. 

In every word he wrote we see his firm grasp of 
the controlling factors in European politics which he 
had discovered, and his far-sighted appreciation of what 
the late war had taught. Louis, as wise as he, resisted 
with all his diplomatic force, but he resisted in vain. 
In vain he suggested that, if William were bent on a 
port within the Straits, he might in apportioning 
Southern Italy reserve one for himself out of the Arch- 
duke's share. William would not recede an inch from 
the position he had taken up. He told Portland that he 
absolutely refused to treat at all for Louis's possession of 
Spain, except on the basis of the cession of Port Mahon. 
Then, when a renewal of the war began to look inevitable, 
Louis gave way. Bather than give William a footing 
in the Mediterranean he decided to abandon to the 
Electoral Prince his claim to Spain and the Indies, and 
to content himself with the alternative arrangement, which 
would give him the control of Italy. One effort he made 



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192 THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 1098 

to improve the exchange, by proposing that Milan 
should go to Savoy instead of to the Emperor. This 
idea was of course that the pliant Prince should give 
Savoy to France in exchange for Milan, and then Louis 
would control almost the whole coast of the Medi- 
terranean from Sicily to the Pyrenees. William treated 
the suggestion almost as an impertinence. So incensed 
-was he with the Duke of Savoy for the treacherous 
desertion which had robbed Russell's great move of 
complete success, that he would not permit his name to 
he mentioned, and Louis had to content himself with 
the original proposal. 

Still it was much that he gained — all indeed or 
nearly all that France had been striving for since 
Mazarin's day. For besides Naples and Sicily he was to 
have Orbitello and the other Spanish ports on the Tuscan 
coasts, Elba and the adjacent islands over which so much 
blood had been shed, and the port and marquisate of 
Finale, while in return for concessions elsewhere he was 
also to have Guipuscoa with its famous ports of Passages 
and St. Sebastian. The latter concession of course in no 
way affected the situation within the Straits, except 
for the increase it gave to French naval resources. No 
division could well have been fairer. France gained at 
least half the Spanish sea power with a substantial 
strengthening of her position both within and without 
the Struts, while at the same time she gained nothing by 
which, as she had hoped, the Western Mediterranean 
would be constituted a French lake. William had re- 
solutely kept the gate open, and held France back from 
the Spanish sphere. 

The main interest of it all is as a step in the gradual 

solidification of the naval policy which William inau- 

: guxated. .Its effect was not seen till the war was 



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1700 THE KIXG OF SPAIN'S WILL 1M 

renewed. The treaty itself never came into operation. 
When all had been settled it was not the King of Spain 
that died, but the young Electoral Prince. The succession 
thus lay entirely between France and Austria, and 
William's well-framed edifice fell to the ground. Every- 
thing had to begin again from the foundations. A whole 
year's negotiations followed before the second partition 
treaty was signed ; but throughout all their shifting phases 
Louis never once made any proposal which could give 
William a loophole for claiming a port in the Mediter- 
ranean. Further than this the negotiations and the 
final terms of the treaty do not concern us. They were 
indeed a mere pretence that covered the determined 
efforts of France and Austria to secure the whole succes- 
sion by intrigue at the Court of Madrid. It was Louis 
who won the unsavoury game. When at last, in 
November 1700, the King of Spain died, it was found he 
had bequeathed the whole of his empire to the second 
son of the Dauphin, Philip Duke of Anjou. 

With this fatal catastrophe the bloodstained century 
came to an end. So terrible was the prospect to all 
Europe, and so weary was the world of war, that the 
inevitable struggle did not at once break out. Every one 
shrank from striking the first blow and was absorbed in 
securing the strategical points with which he was most 
concerned. The main causes of anxiety were, firstly, the 
4 Barrier Fortresses ' along Louis's northern frontier, which 
since the peace of Byswick had been garrisoned by 
Dutch troops so as to secure the Spanish Netherlands as a 
real ' buffer state ' between France and Holland ; secondly, 
the Duchy of Milan, which gave to its possessor the 
command of North Italy ; and finally the entrance to the 
Mediterranean. The naval importance of the ports in 
the first two areas was a tradition in European politics. 

vol. 11. 



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1M THE SPANISH SUCCESSION' 1700 

That of the third was new, and the unprecedented weight 
attached to it reveals the impression which William's 
strategy had made. 

No sooner had Louis declared his intention of accept- 
ing the fatal will than he begged the Junta of Regency 
to take steps to secure and strengthen their ports, 
especially Cadiz, Port Mahon, and Gibraltar, and officers 
were immediately despatched for that purpose. The 
resident agents of the Protestant powers at once spread 
the alarm. 'What will become of the Protestant re- 
ligion/ wrote a correspondent of the Elector of Hanover, 
* and what will become of the commerce of the English 
and Dutch ... if he [the King of France] has Gibraltar 
fortified and keeps a strong garrison there with a good 
squadron of galleys and ships of war ? If once he is in 
possession of this port, it will not be difficult to seize 
Tangier, on which to all appearance he has had his eye 
for a long time past. Then, monseigneur, the Straits 
will be indeed closed, and what effort and cost will not 
England and Holland be put to to open it 1 . . Would to 
God there were in Spain five or six of the most discreet 
and enlightened members of the House of Commons ! ' l 

His lament was well justified. Ever since the peace 
of Byswick Parliament had been doing its best to thwart 
William's far-sighted efforts to fortify the country against 
the coming danger. As the means he had taken to that 
end became known, the hostility of the nation increased. 
The partition treaty had been received with something 

1 Bucdeveh MSS. i. 867. The document is undated, but Assigned in a 
note to * 1701 or after.* It was certainly not after, but perhaps before. 
The Junta of Begency to which it refers was in power only from November 1, 
1700, to February IS, 1701. It is also stated to have been written ' some 
weeks 9 alter it was known in Spain that Louis had accepted the will, which 
would give its date about the latter part of December 1700, or at latest the 
ear|y part of January 1701* 



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1700 HOSTILITY OF PARLIAMENT 195 

like an outburst of indignation. The King of Spain was 
not yet dead when it became known, and public utterance 
took the high moral line that it was little short of highway 
robbery thus to divide the possessions of an ally. Beneath 
this cry William believed that he could detect its real 
grounds. He put it down to the ever increasing sensitive- 
ness of the country about its Mediterranean trade. He was 
probably not far from right in believing that the opposi- 
tion to his work arose from the fact that France was to 
have Naples and Sicily, so that, as the Levant merchants 
said, they would have thenceforth to go to the French 
Court for license to trade. He had therefore set to work 
to remove the difficulty by arranging an exchange where- 
by Louis should take Savoy and its North Italian terri- 
tories, and the Duke of Savoy Naples and Sicily. 1 Louis 
appeared to favour the idea, but, before anything was done, 
Parliament met in the worst of tempers. At the very 
hour when the King of Spain lay dying, they had been 
busy forcing William to disband his army, and had left 
him powerless to face Louis with effect in the late 
negotiations. The failure of those negotiations, which was 
mainly due to their own want of sense, they visited on the 
King's head, and he in disgust had come to contem- 
plate retiring to Holland and leaving them forever. But 
suddenly a strong revulsion of feeling set in. Early in 
Feburary 1701 Louis by a sudden move surprised the 
Dutch garrisons in the Barrier Fortresses and was in 
practical occupation of the Spanish Netherlands. Parlia- 
ment was in the act of reassembling. It met with the 
sound of the occupation in its ears. It was a sound 
which, in its traditional jealousy for the North Sea ports, 
Parliament could not fail to understand. At the same 
time, to leave no room for doubt, a new French project far 
1 GrimUot, vol. ii. 

9* 



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196 THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 1701 

keeping England busy with a Stuart invasion was 
disclosed, and the country's foolish mistrust of its 
sovereign was laid bare. The Commons promptly passed 
a vote of confidence in the King, and in a burst of 
repentance he was given carte blanch* to negotiate a new 
Grand Alliance. 

William was at once himself again. He asked and 
obtained an increase in the fleet, and made overtures for 
the restoration of the Barrier Fortresses. The French 
refused to treat, and Kooke, who through all the shifts of 
party politics still remained William's most trusted naval 
officer, was named Commander-in-Chief. Fire-breathing 
petitions came up from the country, and by June Parlia- 
ment was unanimous for war in support of Holland and 
the Empire. Negotiations began at the Hague for a re- 
newal of the Grand Alliance, and in July William, whose 
strength was fast failing, went over to Loo to watch them 
and to rest, after leaving all prepared for an outbreak 
of war. Indeed peace barely existed. Ten thousand 
British troops were already in Holland under Marlborough's 
command. An Imperial army under Prince Eugene of 
Savoy, fresh from his triumphant campaign against the 
Turks, had entered Northern Italy to forestall the French, 
and a French army under the veteran Marshal Catinat 
was in motion to turn them out. In Brest Ch&teau- 
B£nanlt had ready for sea a squadron which was supposed 
to be under orders to take possession of the Plate fleet ; 
and, as William passed over to Holland, Booke received his 
final instructions. 1 

A powerful Anglo-Dutch fleet was gathering at Spit- 
head, and with this Booke was to make a demonstration 

1 Rook* 9 * Journal (Navy Records SdcUty), p. 130. The exact nature 
of thee* {attractions is not known, bat their tenor may be gathered from 
•'* marks about them, ibid. pp. 133-128, 135, 180, 183, 185. 



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1701 ANXIETY FOR GIBRALTAR 107 

before Cadiz with the intention apparently of emphasising 
William's arguments in his characteristic manner, and . 
even of preventing the occupation of the harbour by a I 
French squadron. It was a threat at once to the Spanish 
American trade and to the French position in the Medi- 
terranean — a spring straight at the key of the naval 
situation. On the Straits William's eyes were fixed as 
keenly as they had been throughout the late negotiations ; 
and with good reason. Louis's designs there grew more 
patent every day. Within two months of the first warn- 
ing a kinsman of Pepys's had visited the place by his 
direction and had found there two French officers already 
at work planning an extension of the harbour and new 
fortifications. ' I was well satisfied,' he wrote, ' with the 
sight at Gibraltar, and should have taken a step to Ceuta 
but for the haste I was in for my getting back in time 
to Madrid. . . . The Straits are much narrower than I 
thought, and with the addition of some forts and carrying 
the moles out further at Gibraltar, which two French 
engineers are now actually designing, I fear the enemy 
will have a secure harbour there for a squadron of ships 
sufficient to exclude us the Straits.' l 

Throughout the year Count Schonenberg, William's 
envoy at Madrid, kept sending home similar reports — how 
Louis had persuaded the Spaniards to denude the for- 
tresses towards the French frontier in order to strengthen 
those of Andalusia, how the forces of Catalonia had been 
sent to Gibraltar, how Kenaud, one of the leading French 
engineers, had come to superintend the remodelling of tho 
defences of the Straits ports. But, unlike Pepys's corre- 
spondent, he knew the Spaniards too well not to laugh at 
it all, and was sure that in the end nothing would be 

1 J. Jackson to Pepys from Cadis, March 36, 1701, HodgHn USS. 
184. 



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198 THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 1701 

done. In his last letters, written at the close of the year, 
lie was able to report that Cadiz was still in no state to 
resist an attack, that Gibraltar was practically without 
fortifications or defences, and that Kenaud was angrily 
complaining he had been sent on a fool's errand ' to build 
castles in Spain.' ! With such information as this 
streaming home there can be little doubt of the intention 
of the proposed demonstration. But Rooke, whose lack 
of imagination must ever deny him a front place among 
naval commanders, did not like the idea. Thoroughly 
orthodox, his mind could only dwell on the risk involved. 
lake all English admirals of the time he was nervous 
about taking a first-class fleet to the southward so late in 
the year. The difficulty of getting it 6afely back into the 
Channel in the late autumn oppressed him, and Van 
Almonde the Dutch admiral agreed. All through July, 
while the negotiations for the Grand Alliance were going 
on at the Hague and the fleet was getting ready for sea, 
they continued to protest against the orders which British 
commerce approved and which William regarded as an 
essential backing to his diplomacy. 

The negotiations themselves were conducted by 
Marlborough, to whom William had become reconciled 
since the Queen's death. As the King's increasing in- 
firmities warned him that his own end was approaching, 
he looked for some one on whom his cloak might fall — 
some one who could worthily grasp and handle foreign 
politics with his own wide imagination. It was on 
Marlborough his choice had sagaciously settled, and he 
bad taken the ambitious general with him to the Hague 
as plenipotentiary, that he might in good time become 
familiar with the intricate ropes. The pupil proved 



1 See 8dMMntaig's despatches, April to November, 1701, 8.P. Foreign, 
71 



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1701 MAKLBOROUGH AND ROOKE 190 

worthy of his great master, and henceforward, if we look \ 
for the hand that held the helm of British naval policy \- 
steady for the Mediterranean, we find almost always that 
it is Marlborough v 8. It was so from the first. The main 
idea for the moment was to endeavour to save the 
situation on the basis of the last partition treaty. For 
the Emperor William demanded Milan and the Nether- 
lands, and for himself guarantees in the Mediterranean 
and the West Indies. On this Marlborough tells us he 
insisted — even against the jealousy and faint-heartedness 
of the Dutch — as the sole condition on which a peaceful 
settlement by a new partition treaty would be accepted 
in England. 1 A week after he had made this declaration 
the negotiations were broken off and Booke received 
orders for immediate action. 

The admiral's protests had had their effect. Instead 
of carrying the whole fleet down to the Straits he was now 
ordered to blockade Brest, or if he found Ch&teau-B6nault 
had put to sea he was, as he himself had suggested, to 
cruise off the mouth of the Channel and cover the trade. 
At the same time he was to detach a squadron of thirty- 
five of the lesser ships of the line, uuder Benbow and Sir 
John Munden, to the Azores to forestall the French in 
intercepting the Plate fleet and to ' take care of it for those 
who were entitled to it.' With these orders, so Eliza- 
bethan in flavour, Booke put to sea, and, having detached 
Benbow, he proceeded to Brest. He found Ch&teau- 
B£nault had gone. A few days later, news came that the 
Plate fleet had been stopped at the Indies. Benbow 
was recalled, and Booke in council of war decided it was 
f» time to bring the main fleet into Spithead. 

The outbreak of war was thus averted. There was 

1 Marlborough to Godolphin, July 22, 1701, in Coxa's Lift </ Jlaii- 
borough, chap. is. 



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200 THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 1701-2 

still hope. Marlborough had succeeded in negotiating an 
alliance with the Emperor and the Trotestant powers, 
which might yet bring France to reason, when an event 
happened which Louis recklessly used to make all further 
negotiation impossible. As Marlborough's treaty was 
being signed, James II. died, and Louis, in defiance of 
the treaty cf Byswick and of the tenderest susceptibilities 
of English public opinion, recognised his son as King of 
England. The insult was unpardonable, the provocation 
glaring. In the height of the war fever a general election 
was held, and a new Parliament met, pledged and even 
on fire to back William against his old enemy to the 
utmost limit of their resources. Forty thousand troops 
and as many seamen were immediately voted, and the 
war had come at last. 

From the point of view of the higher naval strategy 
no war has more illuminating instruction for our own 
time than that of the Spanish succession.* In many 
respects the conditions and objects of naval power closely 
resembled those which exist to-day. It was a war to 
prevent the dangerous preponderance of an ambitious and 
powerful military state ; it was also a war for the freedom 
of commerce ; and the one element against which no con- 
tinental power had an equal card to play was the British 
navy. During the late peace the strain of Louis's army 
had been too great to allow him thoroughly to re- 
establish his navy, while on the other hand the jealousy 
of a standing army, which in England had destroyed 
William's military resources, had not extended to the 
navy. Its power and efficiency had been well maintained. , J . 
Ships had been kept in good condition and the peace r 
footing settled at fifteen thousand men. Every one recog- 
nised it as the most trenchant weapon in the armoury of 
the alliance, but no two strategists agreed on how it could 



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1702 UIVAL STRATEGICAL SCHEMES 201 

be best employed. The Emperor hoped to see it at 
Naples, and in the spring made a formal proposal to that 
end ; bat he was informed politely that it was too late in 
the year for the great ships to go so far, as there was as 
yet no intermediate port available for wintering. Next 
year moreover he would probably be better able to co- 
operate, and in the meanwhile it should be disposed with 
a particular regard to his interests. 1 Prince Eugene, who 
was actively engaged with Marshal Catinat in Lombardy, i 
more modestly desired that at least a portion of it should | 
be sent into the Adriatic to protect his communications j 
with Trieste, which were being threatened from Toulon, j 
On the other hand, the Dutch and North German Princes 
who had joined the alliance, ignoring the lessons of the 
late war, would have had it operating on the north coast 
of France with a view to relieving by diversions the 
pressure on their own frontiers. 

Booke's imagination could reach no higher. In 
January 1702 he presented to the King his plan of 
campaign. A main fleet of fifty English and thirty Dutch 
of the line was to be formed. Its objective he does not 
mention, but it was certainly not for the Straits. For 
4 the southward ' he proposed a secondary fleet of thirty 
English and twenty Dutch 'to go abroad with eight 
thousand English and Dutch soldiers to attempt some- 
thing on Spain or Portugal.' The remainder of the 
available ships, being thirty sail of the line with frigates 
and smaller craft, were 'to remain at home for the 
security of the Channel.' ' This appears to be little more 
than the vague defensive strategy of the Elizabethan 
Government which Drake had tried so hard to break 

1 • The answer to Count Wratislaw's proposal,' April 19, 170*, AO. 
Admiralty, 10. 

* Rooke's Journal, p. 144, January 10, 1702. Sot also ibid. p. S5S, 
where the plan appears in detail, but under date by error Jan ua ry 10, 1708. 



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202 THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 1702 

/ 
down.' William's genius had left it far behind. His 

extraordinary capacity for seeing the vast theatre as a 
whole fixed his eyes on Cadiz. His unerring judgment, 
no less than his experience during the late war, showed 
it to him as the first strategical point to make, and there 
in its spacious roadstead, and amidst its well-defended 
dockyards, he saw the true position for his naval base. 
All its manifold significance was clear to him. Its 
possession would give him the command of the Straits 
and the West Indian trade ; it would enable him to cut 
in two the naval position of France, and at the same time 
would open a door for military and political action at the 
point most distant from Louis's base, and draw into his 
own system the life-blood of Spain. 

Booke's instructions leave little doubt as to which of 
these considerations was uppermost in William's mind. 
The true object of the expedition to Cadiz, with which 
the war opened, has been generally missed. It has been 
assumed that it meant no more than the similar expeditions 
that had preceded it in Elizabethan and Stuart times — 
that it was in fact, like them, aimed primarily at % the 
American trade and colonies, and intended secondarily 
as a diversion. Its main object, however, was certainly 
the command of the Straits— a first step to the develop- 
ment of a true Mediterranean policy. This is clear from 
the instructions which Kooke received when war was 
actually declared. It was not, unfortunately, by the 
King's hand that they were delivered. William was dead, 
and Anne reigned in his stead. Still all had been settled 
beforehand. The only difference was that the change 
of the crown and a consequent change in the Admiralty 
led to delays that were irreparable. War was declared 
through the fleet on May 4. A fortnight later Prince 
George of Denmark, the Queen's consort, was made Lord 



/ 



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1702 CADIZ OR GIBRALTAR 203 

High Admiral and Booke Vice-Admiral of England, and 
it was not till June 7 that he received his official instruc- 
tions. With the military force that was to accompany 
him he was first to endeavour to surprise and capture 
Cadiz. ' But in case it shall appear/ they continue, ' upon 
your arrival at Cadiz, that there is such a considerable 
garrison of disciplined troops in the town and such a 
squadron of ships in the bay or harbour as may render 
the attempt impracticable, you are then to proceed to 
Gibraltar, or take on your way home Vigo, Ponta Vedra, 
Coruiia, or any other place belonging to Spain or France 
as shall be judged proper by a council of war/ He was 
further authorised to assist the military commander in 
holding any captured place that was tenable, and leave 
there a sufficient squadron. The main idea became still 
clearer in the additional secret instructions which were 
to be communicated to no one but the Duke of Ormonde 
who was in command of the troops, and not even to him, 
as they say, ' till after the success of your undertaking 
at Cadiz or Gibraltar is known/ Then, and not till then, 
he was to detach a squadron and two thousand troops to * 
the West Indies. 1 

These instructions must be carefully noted. It is 
apparently from having missed thcin that the highest 
authorities have been led to an entire misconception of 
William's strategy. _It is almost universally said that his 
main Object was the capture of the Spanish American 
colonies ; that it was with this object he meant to begin 
by attacking Cadiz, the headquarters of the Armada 
of the Ocean ; and that it was only by accident that the 
main action of the fleet was eventually in the Mediter- 
ranean. In the third year of the war, as a consequence 
of the adhesion of Portugal to the alliance, the Arch- 
1 Home Office, Admiralty, xiiL S. 



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204 TI1E SPANISH SUCCESSION 1702 

dake Charles resolved to land at Lisbon, and thence, 
with the support of the Portuguese and the maritime 
powers, to enforce his claim by an invasion of Spain. But 
for this, so it is generally asserted, the allied fleets would 
have been primarily occupied with the West Indies. 
Booke's orders, following in the direct line of William's 
previous naval action and his recent diplomacy, show 
clearly that this was not the intention. They show that, 
from the first, action against the West Indies was to be 
secondary, and that the main action of the fleet was 
to be directed to the dislocation of the enemy's sea power 
at its origin by seizing the command of the Straits and 
controlling the Mediterranean. That William could con- 
ceive a plan of action so advanced, and Marlborough 
develop it as he did, entitle them both to rank as high 
among naval strategists as they do in their own special art. 
That Booke was authorised, if neither Cadiz nor 
Gibraltar could be had, to attempt one of the more 
northerly ports in no way detracts from the clearness 
of the conception. The meaning of this was that Louis, 
in his eagerness to secure his position in the Spanish seas, 
had succeeded in making a treaty with Portugal by which 
the ships of the allies were to be excluded from its ports. 
Lisbon could not be used as an advanced British base as 
it had been formerly, 'and it was therefore necessary, as 
a step to further action in the Mediterranean, to secure 
another port as near to the Straits as might be. Booke's 
alternative orders, therefore, only confirm the determina- 
tion to make the Spanish seas the centre of British naval 
action. 

If any doubt were left, it would be removed by the 
instructions of the next two years, which, as we shall see, 
are based on the fixed idea of the main fleet acting within 
the Struts, before ever the Archduke was landed in 



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1703 MARLBOKOUGII AND TOULON 205 

Lisbon. Even then the intention of the British Govern- 
ment was to use the main fleet to secure for the allies 
the invaluable lines of Mediterranean communication, to 
support the war in Italy, to establish there a base for an 
invasion of south-eastern France, and so to cut Louis 
off from the sea from which he drew the bulk of his 
extraneous resources. From the first it was recognised 
that Toulon was ' the key of the situation/ and, at least 
in Marlborough's mind, every movement of the fleet was 
but a step to this goal. From his place in the House of 
Lords years afterwards, when the conduct of the war in 
Spain was under inquiry, he put the matter beyond doubt. 
4 My Lords/ said he, ' I had the honour of the Queen's 
command to treat with the Duke of Savoy about an 
attempt upon Toulon, which her Majesty from the 
beginning of this war had looked on as one of the most 
effectual means to finish it. Spain did not enter into the 
design. The war there was to be managed on its own 
bottom.' In other words, the invasion of Spain was, from 
the naval and military point of view, a mere diversion 
which political exigencies rendered desirable. It was the 
command of the Mediterranean that was the real object,' 
and Toulon the ultimate objective ; and so far from the 
presence of the Archduke in Spain determining the action 
of the fleet, the truth is from first to last it did nothing 
but hamper and spoil it. 



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CHAPTER XXIX 

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1702 

Otctcg to various causes of delay, not the least of which 

was the ill-advised destruction of William's standing 

army, it was past midsummer before the expedition was 

ready to sail. But, vexing as was the difficulty of 

procuring troops in time, there came from it a priceless 

boon. For it was at this time the famous corps of 

Royal Marines was permanently established with the 

view of providing the fleet with a landing force that 

should be always available. Experience had shown how 

limited was the potentiality of a fleet that had no such 

extension of its arm. We have seen how Cromwell's 

design on Gibraltar had to be abandoned for want of 

such a force, and the events of the coming war were to 

prove its value up to the hilt and lay the foundations of 

a regimental reputation unsurpassed in the history of 

warfare. Attempts to solve the problem may be traced 

back through the • Maritime Regiments ' of Restoration 

times to the • Sea Regiments ' in the Elizabethan 

fleets. The idea took more definite shape when at 

the end of 1689 William III. had raised his First 

and 8econd Regiments of Marines. But even these 

were intended quite as much to supply the dearth of 

seamen as to create a landing force. Burchett assures 

us that one of the principal motives in raising them was 

that they should be a nursery for seamen, and so soon 



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1089 ORIGIN OF THE MARINES 207 

as a marine could qualify as a foremast hand he was 
passed to the ship's books and his place in the regiment 
filled up with a recruit. 1 Burchett really understates 
the case. From the numerous orders issued for the 
regulation of the new force, and the controversy to which 
it gave rise in the press, it is clear that it was based on 
the marine regiments of Colbert. The main idea, as in 
France, was to provide a standing force of trained and 
disciplined men who would be at hand as a jracleus for 
mobilisation at any moment while seamen were being 
collected, and who would give a better tone to the crews. 

To this end two three-battalion regiments, each three 
thousand strong, were to be raised. Half were always 
to serve with the fleet and half ashore alternately. While 
ashore they were to be trained as soldiers and employed 
in the dockyards as riggers and labourers, so as to be 
available for equipping and transporting ships at any 
sudden call. Afloat they were to be trained not only in 
musketry, but as seamen and gunners. It is evident 
that no mere landing force was intended, but rather an 
anticipation of our present system of continuous service 
which was not established till the eve of the Crimean 
War. 

Well meant as the scheme was, we can see it was too 
military in conception to be an entire success. It is true 
it had saved the situation when Russell was at Cadiz and 
the men had done well ; but the organisation was faulty 
and led to much abuse. In spite of several prohibitions, 
numbers of sea-officers obtained commissions concur- 
rently with their ordinary ones, and for this and other 
reasons the force fell into confusion and dwindled. At the 
end of the war an attempt was made to reorganise it in 
four regiments, but the suspicious antipathy to a standing 
1 Naval History, book t. chap. U. 



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208 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1702 1702 

army was growing irresistible, and the defenders of the 

force were not able to show a good enough record to 

overcome it. The new regiments were actually raised, 

but the hostility only increased, and in 1699 they were 

swept away in the short-sighted policy that deprived 

William of his army. 1 

William's attempt, it will be seen, was really aimed 

at providing the navy with a backbone of men trained as 

the bluejacket is to-day, rather than at creating a true 

marine force as it was afterwards understood. But 

whether or not such an achievement was possible in 

those days, the difficulty of getting troops at a pinch 

for Booke's fleet abundantly emphasised the importance 

of a standing military force to act with the navy. No 

less than six regiments were raised, but they were put on 

a different footing from their predecessors. There was 

no longer any idea of their being a nursery for seamen, 

and the men were not allowed to pass into the working 

crews of the ship. They were to be and remain a purely 

military force paid out of the navy vote, and under the 

command of the Admiralty. We may well believe that 

one of the principal motives this time was to elude the 

rooted objection to a standing army, which Parliament 

had lately so unhappily displayed, by making the new 

regiments part of their beloved navy. But, however 

this may be, the Marines rapidly, as we shall see, asserted 

their own intrinsic value apart from any constitutional or 

political consideration. As Burchett wrote, when they 

1 Major Edge, History of tlte Royal Marine Forces. The author rejects 
the idea that WiDiam'a marine regiments were raised as a nursery for sea- 
men, baring, in spite of his exhaustive research, missed Burchett's direct 
statement on the point. The official and pamphlet evidence that he has 
collected gives abundant proof that Burchett was not mistaken. For 
further evidence of the political antipathy to the Marines, see •A Seaman's 
Opinion of a Standing Army in England,* January 1699, in the Collection 
cfSimU Trncfc, temp, William III., u\ 684. 



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1702 OBSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE OF ROOKE 209 

had been well proved, ' experience hath shown that these 
regiments have been very useful, but more especially 
upon fitting out squadrons of ships for any immediate 
expedition ; for as they are constantly quartered, when 
not at sea, as near the principal ports as possible, namely, 
Plymouth, Portsmouth, and Chatham, so were they 
with great facility put on board such ships as had most 
occasion for them, for they were under the immediate 
direction of the Admiralty.' It was not too much to say ; 
for to their readiness and to the rapidity and length of 
stroke which they gave the fleet were due the two 
achievements which established England in the Medi- 
terranean. 

Had they been in existence at the beginning of the 

war there might have been a different tale to tell. Much 

obstruction and delay must at any rate have been got 

rid of, which spoiled the British initiative. Most of it 

came from Rooke himself. As the season advanced, his 

old anxieties recurred, and he began to fight shy of 

taking the fleet so far as Cadiz. 'I must repeat my 

opinion/ he wrote to Prince George on June l f « that no 

service can balance the hazard of bringing our great 

ships home in the winter ; ' and he added that, as it was, 

1 the expedition was pretty much to pieces to execute 

this great design/ It is clear from his letters at this 

time that he wished nothing better than that it should 

remain ' in pieces ' till it was too late to sail for the 

Straits. 1 The whole plan of campaign was opposed to 

the views he had expressed. It was Marlborough's, not 

his, and already he was finding himself displaced in the 

naval councils of the nation by Marlborough's brother, 

George Churchill, who was installed at the Admiralty 

w the Prince Consort's right-hand man. From the first 

1 H.O. Admiralty, xi. 

VOL. II. p 



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210 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1702 Jvxr 

therefore he 6et himself in sullen opposition to the 
official scheme. ' Booke,' says Burnet, ' spoke so coldly 
of the design he went upon before he sailed, that those 
-who conversed with him were apt to infer that he 
intended to do the enemy as little harm as possible.' 
The worthy Bishop had always an ill word for Booke, and 
his caustic comment must be received with discretion. 
Still, there is no doubt Booke was not quite loyal to his 
orders, and that he did everything he could to get his 
own plan of campaign substituted for that which Marl- 
borough had received from William. 

As it happened, an alternative presented itself. 
Earlier in the year Sir John Munden had been sent out 
to prevent a French squadron from Bochelle reaching 
Corona, where the outgoing flota was awaiting its 
escort to Mexico. He had failed, and the two fleets had 
got together into Coruna. Kooke's council of war 
therefore decided that their best course was first to 
direct the force against that place, and endeavour, by 
combined land and sea operations, to destroy the fleets 
where they lay. If, on their arrival, they found them 
gone, they would then consider Cadiz. This plan, 
which, as being directed against an important fleet of 
the enemy, was sound enough, received the sanction of 
the Government ; but at the same time Booke was told 
that his former instructions were to stand, and that as 
for his anxiety about his great ships he was to run the 
risk of getting them home in the storm months rather 
than give up Cadiz, or, if that could not be done, he could 
leave them behind in any port he took, and stores should 
be sent out to refit them. 1 

1 Hedges to Booke, Jane 17, 1702, and • Further Instructions,' July 13 
{BatUm-Finch Papert, Add. II SS. 210501), where most of the orders and 
> relating to this campaign are collected. 



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July CLOUDESLEY SHOVELL ON NUMBERS 211 

An advanced squadron of twenty-two of the line, or 
nearly half the fleet, was sent forward under Sir Stafford 
Fairborne, son of the famous Governor of Tangier, to 
blockade Corona till the main fleet arrived. This was 
Rooke'8 first step towards getting his own way ; and as 
Marlborough was absent, fighting in the Low Countries, 
the admiral's plausible views were difficult to resist. His 
next move, as July came and the expedition was still at its 
moorings, was to induce Van Almonde, the Dutch admiral, 
to write to his Government impressing upon them the 
risk of carrying out the original programme. 1 He was 
further backed by Shoyell, to whom was committed the 
task of blockading Brest and guarding the Channel in the 
absence of the main fleet. He complained that thirty 
ships of the line was a force inadequate for the purpose. 
The words of his protest are worth recordings c The mis-, 
fortune and vice of our country/ he wrote to the Earl of 
Nottingham 'is to believe ourselves better than other 
men, which I take to be the reason that generally we send 
too small a force to execute our designs ; but experience 
has taught me that, when men are equally inured and 
disciplined, in war/Tas, without a miracle, numbers that 
gain "the victory. For both in fleets, squadrons, and 
single ships of nearly equal force, by the time one is beaten 
and ready to retreat, the other is also beaten and glad his 
enemy has left him. To fight, beat, and chase an enemy 
of the same strength I have sometimes seen, but have 
rarely seen at sea any victory worth the boasting, when 
the strength has been near equal. 99 It was sound 
sense enough, and especially for the ears of a minister ; but 
fortunately it was a doctrine which British admirals have 

1 Rookc's Journal, July 13, 1703. 

* Home Office, Admiralty, iL, July 19,1702. H« repeats thett riewi <* 
July 38, ibid. 



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212 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1702 July 

been wont to honour more in the breach than the 
observance. 

These protests and complaints were also supported by 
Iiord Pembroke in his last words as Lord High Admiral 
before he resigned in favour of the Prince Consort. 1 For- 
tunately Churchill's growing influence over the easy- 
going Prince was strong and firm enough not to let Booke 
off altogether. Though he was released from the neces- 
sity of attempting Gibraltar, he was held to Cadiz with 
{he more northerly ports as alternatives if the place 
were found impracticable. So far from relenting, the 
Government had new reasons for holding him to their 
plan. 

Owing to the demonstration which William III. had 
made with Benbow's and Munden's squadrons before the 
war broke out, it was two years since a Plate fleet had 
come home, and so great was the consequent financial 
stress in Spain that early in the year ChAteau-Renault 
with twenty-three of the Brest squadron had gone out 
to the West Indies to fetch it. 9 On July 14 news was 
received from Benbow, who was in the West Indies, 
that Ch&teau-B6nault with his priceless charge was about 
to sail for Europe. Both in England and France it was 
expected he would make for a French port, and from this 
moment the British Government became preoccupied with 
the determination to prevent the vast treasure falling 
into Louis's hands. It was decided that Shovell with 
an increased force should take up a station from which 
he could cover Brest, Bochefort, and Port Louis, and the 

1 See hii protest against the Mediterranean policj, H.O. Admiralty, xi. 
and xvL, May 20, 1702. 

■ Dnre, Armada Espahola, vol. vi. eap. ii. and Appendix, Dieaetre en 
fioa. For Shorell's and Byng's movements see Memoirs of Torrington, 
p. 90s* a*. 8ee also Booke'e Journal and Life of Copt. Stephen Martin 
(Jfevy Beeorde Sec), and Onerin, iv. 119 et eeq. 



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July THE PLATE FLEET 213 

immediate importance of Rooke's fleet was that he should 
close Cadiz and the adjacent ports, and so head Ch&teau- 
Rinault into Shovell's arms. 

It was this consideration, so far as we can judge, 
rather than Booke's opposition that modified the original 
plan of campaign. His objections were met one after 
another with determined astuteness. As he continued to 
grumble about the safety of his three-deckers, Shovell was 
told to proceed westward immediately, and if he could 
come up with Booke before he sailed he was to relieve 
him of his largest ships and give him in exchange an 
equivalent number of third rates. In this way the ground 
was cut from under Booke, and at the same time Shovell's 
request for an increase of force would be met. But it was 
a solution of the situation that was little to Booke's 
mind, and, finding himself outmanoeuvred, he got away 
to sea before Shovell could reach him. It was all the 
Government required, and they contented themselves 
by sending orders after him, that, so soon as he had 
carried out his instructions, he could return home, 
leaving Shovell reinforced with ten or twelve of his best 
ships to intercept Ch&teau-B&iault if he had not already 
arrived. 1 

With these orders Booke cleared the Channel on 
July 25, leaving Shovell, as we have seen, to lament his 
inadequate force. Booke's fleet, including the Dutch con- 
tingent and Fairborne's squadron that was ahead of him, 
numbered fifty of the line, some ten frigates, about twenty 
bombs and fire-ships, and no less than seven hospital ships. 
Besides these there were fifty transports, and the whole 
fleet, with ordnance and store ships, amounted to nearly two 

1 Hatton-Finch Paper$, Add. MSS. 89591, when are collected all the 
orders Ac. relating to the intercepting of the Plate fleet See alio Rooks'* 
Journal, July 94, p. 170, and H.O. Admiralty, xili. 89, July 90. 



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214 TJIE CAMPAIGN OF 1702 August 

hundred sail. 1 Off Finisterre he ascertained that Coruna 
was empty. The birds had flown before Fairhorne's 
squadron could arrive to shut them in, and, after spending 
some time in finding him, Booke held on for Cadiz. His 
information assured him that it was strongly garrisoned— 
too strongly at least to be taken by a coup de main. But 
instead of leaving it alone, as their instructions directed, 
Ormonde and the Council of War decided to land 
and occupy the neighbouring port towns, and so reduce 
it by degrees. A landing was accordingly effected at Rota, 
on the opposite side of the bay, -but not till August 15, 
three days after they had appeared before the place. 

Had the whole force been under one capable and re- 
solute hand, there was still no reason why Cadiz should not 
have been taken and held. But with the divided and 
inefficient counsels that disturbed the expedition success 
was impossible. Ormonde had neither the experience nor 
the character to hold it together. His second in command, 
Belasyse, was no better. Booke, who disapproved the 
whole affair and was unwell, had taken to his bed as soon 
as he had cleared the Channel, and was concerned for 
nothing but getting his fleet safely home again.* Not 
only did soldier pull against sailor, but there was no agree- 
ment either in the army or the fleet, nor between the 
Dutch and the English. To make matters worse, the 
most capable man in the force was the representative of 
the Emperor, Prince George of Hesse Darmstadt, whose 
mission was political. As Governor of Catalonia during 
the late war he had endeared himself to the people and 
. the heart and soul of their resistance to the French 



• Journal, 160, S48. It is interesting to note that, before sailing, Book* 
I to No tting h a m again st his small force of frigates being further 
• far/ he said, • we have fower cruisers than any fleet of this eon- 
ever had.* S.O. Admiralty, xi., June 16, 1702. 

* See p. 315, note. 



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August THE CADIZ FIASCO 215 

after Russell had been compelled to abandon them. 
Under Bourbon influence he had been removed, and at 
the outbreak of the new war he had been sent forward to 
Lisbon to endeavour to persuade Portugal to desert the 
French and accede to the Grand Alliance. From that 
port, before he had achieved any success, he had joined 
the fleet, and was now bent on preventing any action 
which might alienate the Spaniards from the Hapsburg 
cause. 

This, unhappily, it was out of his power to prevent. 
Aimless and undisciplined operations about Port St. Mary 
and the neighbouring suburbs of Cadiz ensued, in which 
the army demoralised itself by plunder and drink and 
destroyed all hope of Spanish co-operation. Though 
Fairborne, full of his father's spirit, was always ready 
with some vigorous design for supporting Ormonde's pro- 
posals, he could not overcome the dead weight of Booke's 
inertia, and the army could never get adequate support 
from the fleet. Whether from pique or because he was 
really ill, the admiral was still in bed, and indeed he 
remained there almost continually throughout the ope- 
rations before Cadiz. Vice- Admiral Hopsonn, his second 
in command, who had to write his despatches for him, 
said he had gout in the hand and a touch of fever, and 
was ' extremely ill/ • In three weeks' time things bad 
come to such a pass that it was resolved to burn the 
Spanish magazines which they had captured and re-embark 
the troops. Hopsonn began to despair of taking the 
place. It was too late for the fleet to attend a regular 
siege. ' A vigorous and severe bombardment/ he said, was, 
the only chance. The soldiers were of the same opinion, 

1 Hopsonn's despatch, August 20, Add. MSS. 29691. This is eon- 
firmed by a despatch of Van Almonde's to the States General, De * 
iv. ii. 218. 



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210 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1702 August 

and this method it was resolved to try. But here the 
Prince of Hesse stepped in. A bombardment of the first 
port in Spain was not calculated to increase the popularity 
of the HapsburgB with the Spaniards, and Booke found a 
technical excuse for abandoning the project. 

There was then no thought but of home. In vain the 
Prince of Hesse urged them to winter in some Spanish 
port, and told them the Hapsburg cause was lost if they 
retired without effecting anything. He suggested the ports 
named in Booke's commission, but Booke got an opinion 
from his pilots against them all. He suggested a port 
within the Straits near Alicante, whence he promised ho 
could raise the whole of Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia 
against the Bourbons. Rooke's last instructions forbade 
him going south of Cadiz. The Prince told him plainly 
that he knew he had not been in earnest from the first, 
and all along had only been seeking an excuse to return. 
Booke was unmoved, and a few days later his Council 
of War decided to go home in spite of the protests of 
Ormonde and the Dutch general. 

So lame a conclusion was the last thing the home 
Government expected. The country was rejoicing over 
Marlborough's successes in the Low Countries and Eugene's 
hard-won victory in Italy. The capture of Cadiz — the 
easiest of the three main operations of the campaign — 
was regarded as a foregone conclusion. A week after the 
troops had landed the good news from Flanders was sent 
out to Booke, and with it fresh orders for his further move- 
ments. It is these orders that leave no doubt as to the 
lines on which the war had been designed. In the despatch 
which brought them the Government makes a last effort 
to get the stubborn admiral to understand the true object 
of their eagerness to get hold of Cadiz. Their chief in- 
centive was not political, but naval. As in the last War, 



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August ROOKE'S NEW ORDERS 217 

Cadiz was to be made a base from which to control the 
Mediterranean and the military operations upon its 
shores. He was informed that a small French squadron 
under Forbin was harassing Prince Eugene's communi- 
cation and interrupting the passage of his supplies in the 
Gulf of Venice. It was believed that the Comte de 
Toulouse, who was in command at Toulon, intended to 
join him for more serious operations, and Booke was told 
that, so soon as Cadiz was in the hands of the allies, he 
was to detach a squadron of eighteen or twenty sail to 
the Adriatic to parry the French move. Toulouse, the 
Government had ascertained, had about ten ships and 
six galleys, and Forbin three frigates and two fire-ships. 

But this was not all, or nearly all. Marlborough, 
regarding the fall of Cadiz as a practical certainty, was 
already at work preparing his further blow at the heart 
of the French Mediterranean power, and in the new 
orders is the first indication of what was in the wind. 
Cadiz was but a stepping-stone to Toulon, and Booke, 
without any explanation, was quietly informed that he 
need not run the risk of bringing home his great ships 
before winter. The Queen intended in the next year 
to have a much larger fleet in the Mediterranean, and 
that he was therefore to refit as many ships as possible 
in the Cadiz yards in readiness for the next campaign. 1 

In all this we may trace with certainty Marlborough's 
hand. Sir David Mitchell, Russell's old flag captain and 
his second in command in the Mediterranean, who was 
now on the Lord Admiral's Council and represented in 
politics all that was antagonistic to Booke, was over in 
Holland negotiating with the States for further naval 
co-operation, and Marlborough, in the midst of his arduous 

1 H.O. Admiralty, ziii. 58, Augtut 91, 1703, and Add. U83. 39*92, 
tame date. 



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218 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1702 Saw 

campaign, was guiding his hand. 1 Marlborough's unfailing 
readiness to assist his great rival, Eugene, is one of the 
brightest features in his character ; but in this case it was 
not to be. Unless Cadiz fell, the expedition to the Adriatic 
was impossible. About a month later, after Hopsonn's 
despatch had been received with its unsatisfactory account 
of the admiral's health and the state of the operations, 
the Government resigned themselves to their disappoint- 
ment and wrote patiently to both Booke and Ormonde, 
bidding them, as they were not likely to succeed at Cadiz, 
to try something else. 2 

The truth is that at this time they were more than 
ever absorbed in their anxiety to intercept Chateau-Renault. 
The old hankering after the treasure fleet in fact was 
beginning to distort their strategical aims as seriously as 
it had done those of the Elizabethans. All August intelli- 
gence of the French admiral's movements had been coming 
in, and it was immediately sent off to both Booke and 
Shovell. Shovel!, after his complaint, had been rein- 
forced, and for the moment Cadiz was not the first con- 
sideration. The last intelligence received by the home 
Government assured them that Chateau-Renault was after 
all going to try to get into Cadiz and not Brest. The 
main consideration therefore was to keep Booke on the 
Spanish coast. The information was hurried off to him, 
and at the same time Shovell was given authority to 
stretch down as far as Finisterre to bar the way to Coruna. 
Soon after writing their indulgent despatch, however, 
it would seem that something occurred to brace the 
Government back to their original high intention, and that 
at the same time they received some intimation that the 

1 Marlborough to Mitchell, August 14, 1702, Dnpotclta, J. 18. The 
letter refers mainly to a West' Indian expedition, bat that was not 
Kitchen's main business. See Marlborough to Nottingham, ibid. p. 8. 

• EJO. Admiralty, ziii. and Add. M8S. 20591, September 10, 1702. 



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Sept. ROOKE TAKEN TO TASK 219 

real cause of the failure at Cadiz, as they had too much 
reason to expect, was Rooke's obstinate refusal to give to 
Ormonde the support that he had the right to demand. 
At all events their note changed, and a week later they 
sent him still more unwelcome orders, which were indeed 
not far removed from a reprimand. He was told that 
the Government regarded the occupation of Cadiz as a 
matter of the highest importance. Instead of coming 
home, therefore, he was to continue to support the 
operations of the troops and to remain out till further 
orders, or until the land officers agreed that further 
operations were useless. When the great ships could no 
longer keep the sea he was to send them into Lisbon and 
winter them there. 1 

Here then we have a firm determination of the 
Government, in spite of their preoccupation, to hold Rooke 
to the original plan of campaign, or in other words to the 
Mediterranean. They were beginning to lose hope of 
the Plate fleet. Since it had been so long in appearing 
they feared it must be already somewhere safe in harbour. 
Moreover, the effect of the fleet's being off Cadiz so long 
without any sign of opposition from France was that the 
attitude of Portugal was becoming more favourable and 
the prospects of the Mediterranean looked more rosy. 
But already, as the sharp despatch was being penned, 
Rooke was in the act of abandoning his position ; nor, 
when the proposal to winter in Lisbon reached him direct 
from Methuen, the British Ambassador to Portugal, 
did it have any effect. For some time past it was known 
in the fleet that its presence had caused the Portuguese 

1 Add. MSS. 39591 {Hatton-FincJi Papers), September 14 and 84. Alio 
H.O. Admiralty, xiii. At this point there is unfortunately a gap in this 
Entry Book, bnt the Haiton- Finch Paper* to some extent continue the series 
of despatches. 



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220 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1702 . Skpt. 

King to back out of his engagement to France, though 
as yet he hesitated to throw in his lot with the allies. 
Methuen believed that it only required a squadron to 
winter in the Tagus and other Portuguese ports to make 
him take the plunge, and a despatch hinting this reached 
Booke on September 21 as the fleet rendezvoused off 
Lagos on the south co^st of Portugal for the homeward 
voyage. 

Methuen had arranged to communicate with Booke 
through the British consul at Faro, and as the fleet 
passed it a Dutch cruiser was sent in to bring off de- 
spatches. In view of what afterwards occurred this 
becomes highly important. On receipt of Methuen's 
suggestion a council of war was summoned, but it decided 
that his proposal was too vague to act on, and that there 
was no time to wait for a more definite explanation. The 
decision, it would seem, was taken by a bare majority, for 
Ormonde, Hesse, and the Dutch generally continued to 
support the idea so warmly that a fresh council was called. 
It was only to endorse Booke's determination. Whatever 
chance of Portuguese support, it was argued, there may 
have been when Methuen wrote, the whole situation was 
changed by the failure at Cadiz, and Portugal could no 
longer be trusted. In accordance, therefore, with the 
original instructions, six of the line and a dozen transports 
with three thousand men were detached to the West 
Indies, and Booke was soon speeding northward, ignorant 
that before him lay an exploit which was to retrieve his 
reputation and finally place Portugal at the disposition 
of the allies. 

What had happened was this. Having evaded Benbow 
in the West Indies, Ch&teau-B6nault and his priceless 
charge had reached the Azores in safety. There he had 
received information of the British movements to inter- 



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Skit. THE PLATE FLEET IN VIGO Ml 

cept him, and had done his best to persuade his Spanish 
colleagues to seek safety in Brest or some other French 
port. To so insidious a proposal they absolutely refused 
to listen, and the only thing for Ch&teau-R£nault to do 
was to try a dash through the enemy's cruisers. St 
Vincent and Finisterre were the points of danger. There 
the English had been wont to lie on such occasions ever 
since the days of Elizabeth. Vigo lay midway between 
them. To Vigo therefore it was decided to go, and there 
on September 11 Ch&teau-B£nault arrived, having cleverly 
slipped in unobserved between Rooke and Shovell. 

For this Rooke both then and since has always been 
severely blamed. He is accused of wholly neglecting the 
treasure fleet and of taking no steps to get intelligence 
of it, and by no one more acrimoniously than by Methuen 
himself. But, however badly Rooke behaved during 
the campaign, this charge is one that cannot be upheld. 
As we have seen, he duly sent into Faro and received 
Methuen's labt despatch. Although the Plate fleet had 
been in Vigo five days when he wrote it, it contained no 
mention of it, except a rumour that Chateau-Renault was 
expected — a rumour which Methuen himself clearly did not 
believe. 1 Rooke also, before passing St. Vincent, sent three 
cruisers with the home transports into Lagos to water, and 
later on three more into Lisbon to bring Methuen back to 
England. It is true these detachments were apparently to 
make their own way home, but it is clear that, if Methuen 
had any news, he had abundant opportunity of sending it. 

Meanwhile, on the 18th, the ambassador had heard 
of Chateau-Renault's arrival at Vigo and was sending 
messenger after messenger to the coast. The first one 
reached the British consul at Faro late on the night of 
the 22nd. The fleet had just passed westward out of 

1 RooWi Journal, pp. 317, 231. 



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THE CAMPAIGN OF 1702 Swrr. 

sight, and while the council of war were deciding to 
continue the homeward voyage the consul in person was 
pursuing Kooke in a hired boat. In spite of his efforts 
he failed to find the fleet and had to return dis- 
comfited. It so happened, however, that Methuen's 
messenger, a certain Don Josef Cisneros, who was also 
carrying despatches from the Imperial ambassador to the 
Prince of Hesse, was on his own account pursuing the 
fleet by land along the coast. At Lagos he found the 
horse transports still watering, and fell in with some of 
the officers of the ' Pembroke,' one of the escorting frigates. 
By the help of their chaplain they quickly ascertained his 
news and carried him on board to their commander, Captain 
Hardy. The glorious news was promptly communicated 
to the commodore, Captain Wishart, and be at once took 
the responsibility of sending off the * Pembroke ' to catch 
the fleet. 1 It was a hard chase. The weather proved 
very bad — so bad indeed was it that the cruisers which 
put into the Tagus with Rooke's letters, showing he 
had not received the news, could not put to sea again, 
in spite of Methuen's urgent orders, and he despaired of 
catching the fleet before it left the coast. Unknown to 
him, however, there was yet another chance. The news 
had already reached London, and orders were being sent 
off far and wide in eight duplicates, directing Booke and 
Shovell to concert measures for the destruction of Ch Ateau- 
Benaolt wherever they found him, either at sea or in 
Vigo.* All was over before they came to hand. But 
■ with all these strings in play it is clear that it was by no 
mere chance, as it is always said, that Ch&teau-B£nault 

1 HaUou-Finch Papers {Mclhuen Correspatukncc), Add. M88. 39590, cap. 
1. 133, 137, 151, and Methuen's despatch of October 5. For the chaplain's 
stay see Z*f tarri, ii. 753, u. ,. 

* Add. USS. 39591, October 4 and 17; Admiralty, Secretary's Out- 
LcUtn, 39, October 5, 17, 30. 



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Oct. HESITATION TO ATTACK 223 

was caught. The Admiralty, Methuen, Shovell, and 
Rooke between them had taken steps which made his 
escape practically impossible. 

Still Rooke had already reached as high as the 
extreme north of Portugal, close to Shovell's new station, 
before Hardy overtook him, and even then so fool was 
the weather that it was twelve hours before he could 
communicate his news to the admiral. At the time 
Rooke had his few remaining cruisers spread before him 
in a way that very probably would have got him the 
intelligence independently. So soon as he heard Hardy's 
report he called them in and formed a chain to connect 
him with Vigo and signal him a confirmation of Hardy's 
intelligence. The whole fleet then stood in after them, 
and the following day, when the weather had abated, he 
called a council of flag-officers. The question of attacking 
Chateau-Renault where he lay appears to have met with 
considerable opposition. The danger of risking a great 
fleet so late in the season on that wild coast was insisted on, 
and some, it would seem, were in favour of still continuing 
their homeward voyage, since they regarded the treasure 
fleet as now beyond their reach. Eventually, however, 
the more vigorous men prevailed, and, without consulting 
the military officers, it was decided to attack forthwith. 1 

As they approached Vigo they fell in with Captain 
George Byng, who had lately reinforced Shovell with a 
small division. From him they heard that the Channel 

1 This view of what occurred is mainly on Dutch authority. Their 
tradition is that the decision to attack was due to the resolute attitude of 
Van Almonde in opposition to Rooke 'as well as most of the English and 
Dutch flag-oflicers.' 8ee De Jonge, iv. ii. 221 and note. In Torringtom?* 
Memoirs is also mentioned a report that Books was not in favour of attack* 
ing. Burnet says • Books turned his course towards Vigo very unwillingly, 
as was said.' But neither of these authorities can be trusted in any state- 
ment derogatory to Booke. It may however be true, for be still thought 
himself too ill to leave his cabin. 



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224 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1702 Oct. 

squadron had reached its new station and was cruising not 
far to the westward, and Rooke resolved to call Shovell to 
his aid. In vain Byng begged to be allowed to stay and 
share the feast. To his intense disgust Rooke would not 
listen, and he had to carry the summons to his admiral. 
Still there was no thought of waiting till Shovell joined. 
The doomed fleet was found in the inmost recesses of the 
gulf, protected by a powerful boom and fort, and the 
vessels well arranged for a concentrated fire. The risk 
of attacking in waters so confined was enough to have 
staggered the stoutest hearts, but they did not flinch. 
To Vice- Admiral Hopsonn was committed the honour of 
leading the assault, while Rooke again took to his bed, 
and there Byng found him when he returned in the 
height of the action. 

As the ships advanced they were forced to anchor pre- 
maturely for want of a breeze. The troops were never- 
theless landed, and luckily before they could reach the 
batteries a fair wind sprang up. Hopsonn promptly cut his 
cable and, with a press of 6ail, charged the boom. Under 
hi6 great impetus it broke, but, before his supporting ships 
could follow, the breeze died away, and Hopsonn was left 
alone anchored within the boom between two French ships 
of the line. For awhile his situation was in the highest 
degree critical, but he fought on desperately till the breeze 
returned, and one by one his consorts, Dutch and English, 
hacked or forced their way through. At the same moment 
the troops carried the batteries ; and then, as Captain 
Stephen Martin says, ' for some time there was nothing 
to be heard or seen but cannonading, burning, men and 
guns flying in the air, and altogether the most lively 
scene of horror and confusion that can be imagined/ 
All the afternoon the work of destruction raged, and when 
the son went down Chateau-Renault's fleet had ceased to 



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Oct. ROOKE ABANDONS VIGO 225 

exist. Rooke, by the prompt daring of his officers, had 
gained one of the most complete victories in British naval 
aunals. The French flagship and six others were burnt, 
four were captured afloat, and the rest driven ashore, and 
the galleons were similarly dealt with. Most of the 
treasure had been sent up country, but a good deal was 
saved, besides valuable merchandise. 

Four days after the action Shovell came in, thirsting 
but forestalled. To him Rooke handed over the command 
with orders to float all he could, burn the rest, and so bring 
the fleet home. In vain, at the eleventh hour, Ormonde 
and Hesse returned to the charge and begged him to leave 
behind an adequate squadron so that they might establish 
themselves where they were for the winter, and so support 
Methuen in his efforts to bring Portugal to a decision. 
By sending home the victuallers and surplus stores, 
Rooke had made any such project impossible, and nothing 
would induce him to move from the attitude he had 
taken up. There was therefore nothing to be done but 
re-embark the troops. Captain Hardy for his reward was 
hurried off with despatches, and the next day Rooke with 
an easy conscience weighed for Spithead with sixteen 
sail, including the six great ships, to whose safety in his 
eyes all strategy had to subserve. 

So he had his way at last. By forcing the campaign 
into the shape he had desired from the first he had been 
able, in accordance with his original memorandum, to 
4 attempt something on the coast of Spain 9 and come 
home before winter. He had seen the Government's 
project for seizing the control of the Straits covered with 
disaster, while his own miraculously had secured a victory 
beside which the successes of even Marlborough and 
Eugene looked pale. 

It must not be supposed, however, that he came off 

vol. n. Q 



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826 THE CAMPAIGN OF 170*2 Dkc. 

scot-free. On Ormonde's complaint a searching and 
hostile inquiry into the admiral's conduct was held in the 
House of Lords. He came out of it very badly, but his 
influence in the House of Commons was too great for 
him to fear a serious condemnation. With calm effrontery 
he defended himself by contemptuously denouncing the 
plan of campaign he had been called upon to execute 
against his better judgment; and the bungling way in 
which the expedition had been prepared for him made it 
impossible for the ministers to meet his defence without 
exposing themselves. So Ormonde was quieted with the 
Lord-Lieutenancy of Ireland, and Booke whitewashed 
with a seat in the Privy Council. Between the new 
strategists and the old it was a drawn battle, and it re- 
mained to be seen whether Marlborough would yet have 
his way. 



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CHAPTEB XXX 

MARLBOROUGH AND THE NAVY 

It was not till the end of November that Marlborough 
was able to get back to London. In his last days at the 
Hague he had been urging the home Government, at the 
request of the Dutch, to send a squadron to secure the 
Portuguese and offer to co-operate with them in capturing 
Vigo or any other place they preferred. The news of 
Rooke's exploit was enough to modify the pressing 
necessity for such a move, and about a week after Marl- 
borough came home the 'Secret Committee, 9 as it was 
called, which was the Supreme Council of War or Com- 
mittee of Imperial Defence, had adopted a plan of action 
after his own heart. 

The decision was taken early in December at a meet- 
ing at which both he and Rooke were present. It will 
be remembered that in the previous year the Emperor had 
been given to understand that in this campaign the fleet 
would co-operate with him in capturing Naples, the object 
on which his heart and policy were mainly set. Accord- 
ingly it was now arranged that by the beginning of 
February a squadron of thirty sail, to which the Dutch 
were to be asked to add twelve or fifteen more, was to 
be ready to sail for the Mediterranean, and the Emperor 
was to be informed that it could be at Naples by May 
and remain there till the middle of July. The advan- 
tages of this plan were obvious. While it would divert 
French attention from Toulon, it would afford an oppor- 

Q2 



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223 MARLBOROUGH AND THE NAVY 1703 

trinity for attacking it at the most favourable season of 
the year, and in the meanwhile the Emperor would be 
kept in a good temper, and the pressure upon Eugene in 
the North of Italy relieved. It was only by the most 
brilliant generalship and dogged determination that he 
had been able to hold his own against the superior forces 
of the French, and owing to the vacillating attitude of 
Savoy his prospects were far from bright for the coming 
campaign. Booke, it would appear, was not to conduct 
a move which was so contrary to his ideas. In fact he 
was probably regarded as too unwell to go to sea at all : 
for it is noted in the margin of the minutes ' Sir G. 
Booke will take care of the Admiralty.' 1 

Why this project was not carried out we do not 
exactly know, but it may well have been that, owing to 
the late return of Booke's and Shovell's squadron, it was 
found impossible to get sufficient vessels ready in time. 
The more probable reason however is that the Emperor 
found he would be unable to detach a force to co-operate 
with the fleet, and this from the first had been a condition 
of the British offer of assistance. Such co-operation was 
now out of the question. Owing to the serious condition 
of affairs in Hungary the Emperor had even found it 
necessary to summon Eugene to command the operations 
against the insurgents and to abandon altogether the idea 
of a vigorous offensive in Italy.* 

However this may be, early in the new year, 1703, the 
idea of a Mediterranean squadron was considerably modi- 
fied. At the end of January the ' Secret Committee ' 
decided the general lines of the campaign. Marlborough 
was again present, together with Booke and the rest of 

1 Secretary Clarke's rough minutes of the • Secret Committee/ HaUon- 
JSucfr P«j*r», Add. M88. 89591, December 8, 1703. 
• Test Anetb Prim Bitgen von 8avoym, L 119 tt uq. 



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1703 IDEA OF A MAIN FLEET 220 

the Lord Admiral's council and the Dutch admiral, Van 
Almonde. The main fleet wa3 to consist of ninety-six 
of the line, English and Dutch. They were to be ready 
for sea by April 20 and victualled for six months. In- 
case a squadron should be thought necessary for the 
Mediterranean — so the minute runs — it was to be detached 
from the main fleet and its strength fixed according to 
the distribution of the French navy. 1 We thus see' 
already established the most modern view of British naval 
distribution, which had been in practical operation ever 
since William had set his mark upon it. The root idea' j 
was the concentration of the bulk of the navy in one 
main fleet, organised so that it could act as one unit or 
in two divisions, as events demanded, either in the home 
waters or the Mediterranean, or in both simultaneously. 
There is clearly no idea of. two. fleets — one for the 
Channel and one for the Mediterranean — but from the 
first it is the conception to which our naval strategy 
has recurred after two centuries of experience — the con- 
ception of two divisions of one homogeneous force that, 
without noise or friction, can develop united action at 
any point where danger or opportunity calls for special 
pressure. To a modern student nothing can be more 
interesting or instructive than the way the idea of the 
great soldiers of that time was worked out by the seamen 
who so imperfectly grasped their meaning. 

In spite of the hypothetical resolution of the Com- 
mittee it is clear that Marlborough clung to his idea that' 
a strong Mediterranean squadron was necessary. By 
March it had been fixed at twenty-four of the line, 
English and Dutch ; and just before Marlborough returned 
to Holland, Booke, who was better, was approached 
as to taking the command. He replied, in words that • 

1 Add. MSS. 20591, January 36, 170*. 



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290 MARLBOROUGH AND THE NAVY 1708 

clearly betray the limits of his understanding, that he was 
drilling to obey the Queen's wishes, but felt it was a com- 
mand ' too small for his character.' If it were the same 
to her Majesty he would rather continue with the main 
fleet than be separated * with so small a detachment 
on a remote service.' l On receipt of this answer the 
Secret Committee ordered a squadron to be made ready 
immediately for Shovell's command. It was to consist 
of twenty of the line, besides a Dutch contingent, with 
a full proportion of hospital ships, cruisers, bombs, and 
fire-ships. It was to carry a year's stores besides two 
months' victuals in store ships, and further supplies of 
wine and oil were to be prepared at Leghorn or 
Genoa. 1 

The chief and indeed the only interest that attaches 
to Shovell's force is the object for which it was designed. 
Though frequently modified in harmony with the changing 
aspects of the great struggle, Shovell's instructions display 
throug hout a high a ppreciation of the vaLue.of . a Mediter- 
ranean squadron as a diplomatic and strategical asset. 
As originally designed they appear to aim mainly at a 
diplomatic demonstration. Shovell was to renew the 
trea ties with the .Barbary states, and if possible induce 
them to declare war on France. He was also to appear 
at Leghorn jind force the Grand Duke of Tuscany, who 
was openly leaning to the French, to pursue a more 
strict neutrality. Venice was to be treated in the same 
way, and while in the Adriatic he was to clear out the 
French and secure the Imperial communications with 
Trieste. Nor was this all. For the second time Malta, 
appears within the range of British action. Shovell was 
to go there, but. with what object is not clear. He himself 

■ Add. MS8. 29501, March 8, 1708, f. 193. 
* Ibid, March 10, 1703, C. 195. 



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1703 SHOVELL'S INSTRUCTIONS 231 

asked for more precise directions on the point, but, before 
his orders were finally drafted, Malta for some reason was 
left out of them. 1 

Subsequently his instructions were cast in a more 
strategic mould. Although the withdrawal of Eugene 
and some of his best troops to Hungary rendered serious 
operations in Italy impossible, a diversion by the 
maritime powers to relieve the pressure on the Imperial 
troops that had to hold the position was still highly 
desirable. By no other means could they hope to resist 
the French advance. Under his new orders therefore 
Shovell was to take down the trade, and after seeing it 
safe on its way to the Levant he was to proceed, in 
accordance with the original idea, to Naples and Sicily, 
and co-operate with such Imperial troops as he should 
find there, and assist them with his marines. He had 
also authority to attack Cadiz, Toulon, or any other place 
in France or Spain, and to destroy any French maga- 
zines* he might hear of about Genoa, and to protect 
the Imperialist communications in the Adriatic if the 
French were disturbing them, as indeed they were, very 
seriously. 1 All this reads as something of a counsel of 
perfection, and indeed it may only have been intended 
mainly to satisfy Marlborough's demands, or to keep 
the Emperor in a good humour. The instructions, at 
any rate, were accompanied by a covering letter, in 
which Shovell was told that, after seeing the trade safe 
into the Eastern Mediterranean, he might proceed as far 
as Leghorn. Having done his business there, he was to • 
cruise as he thought best,. or in accordance with orders 

1 Hattoii-Finch Papers, Add. MSS. 29591, f. 199; Particular* pro- 
posed by Shovell, March 17, ibid.; Minute of Lord Admiral's Cooaeil for 
altering Shovell's instructions, H.O. Admiralty, xilL 71, April 9S. 

• H.O. Admiralty, xiii. S3, May 7. 



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M2 MARLBOROUGII AND THE NAVY 1703 

he might receive, until September, when he was to come 
home with the returning trade. 1 

Thus, when Marlborough's back was turned and he 
was absorbed with his military duties in Flanders, the 
Mediterranean squadron seems to sink to the old and 

. narrow conception of a force primarily destined for 
commerce protection. Booke had so far got his way 
that he had been given command of the main fleet for 
the defence of the Channel. As for offensive operations, 
his orders were as old-fashioned as he could wish. Vast 
as was the force at his command, all he was expected to 
do was to enter the Bay of Biscay and annoy the coasts 
and trade of the enemy ; and all the relief that the m&in 
fleet would afford to the position of the allies in the 
Mediterranean was by the demonstration possibly divert- 
ing some of the French army of Italy to the coasts of 
Guienne. Still, even with this easy task before him, he. 
would not get to sea. Week after week he lingered at 
Spithead to the exasperation of the Government. At 
last* towards the end of April, on an alarm apparently 
that a French squadron was passing from Toulon to 
Brest, he received peremptory orders to sail. Still for a 
week he clung to his moorings, protesting he was too 
ill to move. Losing all patience, the Government sent 
off Churchill to relieve him. It had the desired effect. 
Before Churchill could reach Spithead Booke was away. 
The incident did little to improve his reputation. 
'Booke's health/ says Burnet in his most caustic vein, 
' returned happily for him, or he thought fit to lay aside 

. 4 that pretence and went to sea. 9 There can be no doubt 
that Booke was one of those men whose popular reputa- 
tion will sometimes remain proof against the most glaring 
exhibition of incapacity and lack of understanding. 

Admiralty, Secretary's Ou(.T*Uers t 80, May 8. 



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1703 SIIOVKLI/S SAILING DELAYED 238 

l Under his guidance the main fleet was absolutely 
; wasted. All it achieved in harassing the French coasts 
i and confining the Brest and other Atlantic squadrons 
( could have been done with half the force, and the rest 
I would have been free for action where its operations 
\ would have thrown the whole of Louis's strategy into 
I confusion. 

That the Mediterranean squadron was not detached ' 
from the first fleet that was ready, as Marlborough wished, 
is to be the more lamented because the interminable delays 
of the Dutch in furnishing their contingent prevented 
Shovell's sailing till it was far too late for him to accom- 
plish anything of value. Indeed, in justice to the British 
strategy, it must be said that the failure of the Dutch 
to fulfil their engagements was the main cause of the 
trouble. It was a source of irritation and difficulty that 
was to increase with every fresh campaign, and already it 
was accentuating the growing ill-feeling between the 
British and Dutch flag-officers. 'Everybody/ wrote 
Marlborough, 'is so much out of humour at the great 
disappointment we have long laboured under for want of 
their Mediterranean squadron/ ' 

Owing mainly to the time that had been wasted in 
getting Rooke to sea, it was not till the middle of May 
that Shoveirs squadron was far enough advanced for him 
to hoist his flag. By that time an entire change in the 
situation was believed to be at hand, which for the 
moment shifted the main naval interest to a point outside 
the Straits. Godolphin, the Prime Minister, was the 
man most closely in Marlborough's confidence. He had 
married the general's daughter and was indeed his other 
self in England ; and what was actually uppermost in their 
minds may be gathered from a private letter written by 

1 To Stanhope, Despatch**, i. 1S8, and of. Do Jong* it. ii. S5&. 



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»4 MARLBOROUGH AND THE NAVY 1703 

the minister shortly afterwards to Fairborne, Shovell's 
lice-admiral. He was asked for his opinion — not as to the 
best means of relieving the Imperialist position — but how 
best to protect trade, countenance Portugal, and at the 
same time secure the British coasts. He replied with a 
solid directness which shows that, if our seamen could 
not quite appreciate the diplomatic and political tangle 
with which the strategical problem was confused, they 
at least had not forgotten the time-honoured methods of 
catting the knot. Louis, with his whole combination 
6haken by the defection of Portugal, and exposed to a dis- 
astrous blow in the Mediterranean, was endeavouring to get 
the Comte de Toulouse to sea from Toulon. All intelli- 
gence, Fairborne said, pointed to a concentration of the 
various French squadrons in Cadiz. His advice therefore 
was that Shovell should be reinforced from forty sail to 
sixty, with orders to bring the French fleet to action, 
even if he had to follow it into the jaws of Toulon. 1 It 
was sound and seamanlike advice, showing a lively 
appreciation of the elasticity of action, which the homo- 
geneous organisation of a single main fleet afforded, and 
could it have been brought to effect the whole difficulties 
of the position would have been solved. 

But, as it happened, before the arrival of the long- 
expected Dutch contingent allowed Shovell to sail, yet 
another new element in the situation had arisen. In the 
previous year the Protestants of the Cevennes mountains 
had risen in revolt, and, owing to Louis's preoccupation 
beyond his frontiers, the insurrection had reached alarming 
proportions. The revolted district lay in the hill country 
some forty miles north of Cette, the new port at which 
the Langnedoc canal reached the sea, and stretched east- 
wards towards the frontier of Savoy. As Savoy was 
• Godolpki* Comspondtnc*, Add. MSS. 28055, May 80, 1708. 



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1708 THE CEVENNOIS AND SAVOY 285 

beginning to show a more marked inclination to throw 
in her lot with the allies, the insurrection assumed a 
very serious strategical aspect. It was clear that, by co- 
operation from Savoy on the one side and from the sea 
on the other, the Cevennes might be developed into a 
barrier which would cut the French communications with 
Toulon and Italy, and seriously encumber those with 
Spain. It was mainly with a view of aggravating this 
situation that Rooke had been sent into the Bay of 
Biscay, but it was a situation that lent itself still better 
for well-directed naval action in the Mediterranean. It 
is no wonder therefore that when, about the time Shovell 
was hoisting his flag, a Cevennois agent appeared at the 
Hague and asked for assistance, the idea was warmly 
taken up. 1 Co-operation upon the coast of Languedoc was 
speedily arranged, and it was decided to reinforce Shovell 
with five of the line from the main fleet, provided the 
Dutch would agree to increase their contingent in pro- 
portion. Fresh instructions were sent him, directing that 
he was to make it his first business to get touch with the 
Cevennois in the Gulf of Narbonne, and furnish them 
with arms and munitions, and that above all he was to 
get away to the Mediterranean with all possible speed in 
order to convince the Duke of Savoy of the length of the 
sea powers' arm, and push him to a decision. 2 

Everything, it is clear to see, was still pointing to 
Toulon as the ultimate objective. It was at this time that 
Marlborough was endeavouring to negotiate a joint attack 
upon the place with the Duke of Savoy, and nothing could 
so well induce him to take the plunge as the support of 
the Cevennois revolt and the appearance of an. allied 

1 Stanhope to Hedges, May 18-20, 5.P. Spain, 75. 
* Admiralty, Secretary's Out-Letters, 80, June 9; H.O. Admiralty, xiiL 
June 16 ; Life of Leake, p. 65 ; De Jonge, it. ii. 350. 



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236 MARLBOROUGH AND THE NAVY 1703 

squadron on his coasts. Owing however to Rooke's failure 
at Cadiz the main link in the necessary chain was still 
missing ; but now arose a fresh chance of supplying it, 
which produced yet another change in Shovell's orders. In 
the last days of June, while he was still lying at Spithead, 
definite news arrived in London that Portugal had for- 
mally joined the Grand Alliance, and it was further known 
that the Toulon squadron was preparing to come through 
the Straits and deal her a blow while she yet lay unpro- 
tected. To the Tagus therefore the centre of gravity 
had for the moment definitely shifted. Seeing what 
Marlborough's views were of drastic action in the Medi- 
terranean, to support Portugal on the terms of the new 
treaty of alliance was in his eyes a matter of vital im- 
portance. So clear to him was the necessity that he 
immediately offered to sacrifice his whole campaign in 
the Netherlands and remain upon the defensive, if troops 
could not otherwise be procured for Lisbon. It was in 
anticipation of this new situation that Godolphin had 
asked Fairborne's advice, and consequently, on the eve 
of sailing, Shovell was told, as Fairborne had suggested, 
that he was to be reinforced with eight of the line and 
that his whole proceedings were to be subordinated to 
the primary object of preventing the Toulon squadron 
passing the Straits and bringing it to action if it did. 1 

On July 1 Shovell at last put to sea. He would not 
wait for his reinforcements. They were to follow him to 
the Tagus under Admiral John Leake, a typical seaman 
officer, who was destined to hold a place of singular dis- 
tinction among the founders of the British Mediterranean 
power. Having established his reputation at the relief 



to Nottingham, June 14, Despatch**, I 117. Shovell's 
Mil KO. Admiralty, zlli Jane 29; and cf. Torrington Memoir*, 



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1703 WHAT SHOVELL ACHIEVED 237 

of Londonderry by forcing the boom, he had been in 
active and successful employment ever since, and had just 
been promoted Vice- Admiral of the Blue. He was a man 
who could be trusted not to lose time. Shovell must have 
known as well as any one that he was already too late 
to execute a tithe of his complicated programme, which 
was still uncancelled. To follow his movements is 
needless. The only result of importance that he achieved 
was to deter the Toulon squadron from putting to sea. . 
Louis, unable to believe that so small a part of the main 
fleet was to be attached to Shovell, gave up the game 
and ordered the Toulon squadron to be dismantled. The 
Portuguese were thus convinced of the capacity of the 
sea powers to protect them, and so far all was well. 

The rest was a failure. Bound as he was to return in 
September, Shovell could barely reach Leghorn before it 
was time to turn homewards. What time he had was spent 
in trying to overawe the Grand Duke of Tuscany. Two 
vessels were also despatched to Narbonne, but the precon- 
certed signals were not answered, and they failed to get 
touch with the ill-fated Cevennois. A squadron too was 
detached under Byng, Shovell's rear-admiral, to visit 
the Barbary states ; but, though they were civil enough, 
they would not commit themselves to a declaration oi 
war. It was all that could be hoped for, seeing how 
Shovell's hands were tied. It is true that, some two 
months after, he sailed, orders were sent him to leave 
behind him a squadron to clear out the Adriatic, where 
the French had been playing havoc with the Imperialist 
supplies ; but even if they had reached him his fleet was 
too sickly for him to have been able to obey. 1 The whole 
design was hopeless from the first. Indeed we are told 
that when off Lisbon Shovell showed his orders to his 

1 H.O. Admiralty, xiii. 95, September 0. 



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238 MARLBOROUGH AND THE NAVY 1703 

colleague, Van Almonde, the Dutch admiral could hardly 
believe he had no others. 1 To complete the disappoint- 
ments of the campaign his home-coming was marked with 
one of the most terrible disasters in our naval annals. As 
he lay in the Downs with his disease-stricken fleet, a 
storm of unprecedented fury fell upon it. Nine ships of 
the line were lost, besides four other vessels, with fifteen 
hundred hands, and half the rest that were saved were 
little better than wrecks. 

In so appalling a visitation of Heaven his failure was 
condoned. Indeed, long before he could return with his 
fleet storm-torn and decimated by sickness, all interest 
in his movements had been lost. The Government was 
absorbed in developing its action from the new base it 
had acquired in Portugal. Savoy had joined the alliance, 
and already Marlborough, in concert with Eugene, was 
shaping that stupendous campaign which was to raise 
him to the highest rank of the great captains and for good 
and all to establish England as a Mediterranean power. 

One day, as Shovell lay before Leghorn truculently 
showing the distracted Grand Duke how he stood between 
the devil and the deep sea, far away inland men were 
startled with the roar of his guns thundering over the 
marshes. He had been informed by the Imperial am- 
bassador that the Austrian Archduke had been proclaimed 
Charles ILL, and in the heart of the Mediterranean, 
for all the world to hear, the maritime powers were 
saluting the Hapsburg King of Spain. Had Shovell been 

* Towwmgton Memoir*, 119. Other authorities for the voyage are 
Leake** Life and that of Gapt Stephen Martin (Navy Records Society). 
Tan Almonde** view of it i* in De Jong©, it. ii. 249 et $eq. For the 
Karbonao episode see Cfaarnoek, Biog. NavcUis, tub voce Robert Aires or 
Ajres, who was in oommand. BhoreU's despatch from the Downs to 
Nottingham, giving an aoconnt of his whole action, is in Add. M88. «9«91 f 
tfU»Ko*smbern. 



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/ 



1708-4 THE WAR TRANSFORMED 230 

bombarding the port hi^ grins could not have spoken with 
a louder voice. _It had been an essential point, in the 
treaty under which Portugal entered the Grand Alliance, 
that the Archduke Charles should be landed at Lisbon, 
and thence, with an allied army and the fleet of England 
, and Holland at his back, undertake in force the conquest 
of his new kingdom. The struggle was transformed. 
During the year 1703 France had shown heraelf more than 
capable of holding her own against the great coalition, 
but now all was changed. She was confronted with 
another land war, as far as possible removed from her 
base, added to those in the Netherlands, Italy, and Ger- 
many. For the allies, widely as the four seats of war 
were divided, all were held together and nourished by an. 
overwhelming sea power, while at the same time, by the 
adherence of Savoy to her enemies, France found her 
own connecting link exposed to a blow from the sea 
which she had no means to parry. 

It was on this basis that the memorable campaign 
v , of 1704 was designed— the grandest probably that up to 
y. J that time had ever been conceived. Marlborough's heroic 

resolve was suddenly to shift his whole force from the 
Netherlands to the Danube, and so tear Bavaria from the 
arms of France and fling Louis back from the Imperial 
frontier. The project was still a secret even from the allies. 
The objectives of the fleet were scarcely less well hidden. 
In midwinter Rooke had started to carry the new King 
to Lisbon, and though he was once driven back by storms 
he eventually reached the Tagus by the end of February. 
It was a duty, though his force was but Blender, that he 
found not ' too small for his character/ Transports with 
the promised troops accompanied or followed him, as the 
men could be got together, and in due season the bulk 
of the main fleet was to gather to his flag. 



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240 MARLBOROUGH AND THE NAVY 1704 

How far he knew this is uncertain. The whole plan 
of campaign was certainly not communicated to the 
Admiralty, and for a while at least it seems to have been 
kept even from Rooke. There exists a rough memorandum 
of about this time in Godolphin's hand, in which he notes 
for consideration how much of the Queen's intentions may • 
be communicated to the Lord Admiral's Council with 
a view to their issuing the admiral's orders, and how 
much must be conveyed to Rooke in secret by a Secretary 
of State. 1 It jyas not till March that the design began 
to take shape. Marlborough had been over to Holland 
to arrange the preliminaries of his great move, and while 
there he had written to the Duke of Savoy to assure him 
that at his (the Duke's) request the Queen had decided to 
send a powerful fleet into the Mediterranean in the spring 
to support and facilitate his designs. The greater part of 
the ships, be said, were already at Lisbon, and he himself 
was going to make an important diversion which would 
effectually prevent the French increasing their force in 
Italy, or even, he added, against the Emperor. 9 

In the middle of March, about a fortnight after 
Marlborough's return from the Hague, we have the first 
secret draft of Rooke's final orders. He had already been 
informed that, besides operating on the coast of Spain in 
concert with the Portuguese, he might, if he saw his way, 
do the same on the coast of Provence with the assistance 
of Savoy. But now his instructions were made more 
definite. The French, in order to recover the position 
which they had lost by the adhesion of Savoy to the 
allies, were threatening Nice and Villafranca, the two 
Savoyard ports by which the Duke commanded the 
coastwise route from France into Italy and was in direct 

1 BMm-Fmck Paper*, Add MSS. 29591, 1 958. 
* UMomugh Itapafcto, ii. 281, February 10, 1704. 



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1704 MARLBOROUGH'S MASTERPIECE 241 

touch with the maritime powers. Rooke was therefore to 
he informed that he was to hold himself in readiness to 
proceed to their relief at all hazards, and the moment he 
heard from Savoy that either place was in danger, he was 
to sail without waiting for his reinforcements to reach him. 1 
This draft is marked as haying been read to Godolphin 
and Marlborough as though up to this time the secret 
was confined to them. Ten days later his instructions 
were drawn up and signed. Generally they were an exact 
repetition of those which Shovell had received the pre- 
vious year, but with this difference, that Rooke's first 
duty was to relieve Nice in case it were besieged, and 
that, for fear of being too late, if a summons for help 
reached him, he was, if he possibly could, to enter the 
Mediterranean at once. To leave no doubt as to what 
the Government were aiming at, the formal instructions 
were accompanied by an ' explanation.' The Queen, he 
was told, desired above all things to havp # -a fleet in the 
Mediterranean so as to be within striking distance of 
Nice at any moment. As for the rest of the campaign, 
she would leave it to the fleet council of war ; but Rooke 
was to do his best to persuade his flag-officers that nowhere 
could they be so useful as in the Mediterranean. So long 
as they held that station Louis would be prevented from 
supporting or supplying his army in Italy by sea, while 
at the same time they would keep open the only line of 
communication which thi <-viperor had with his troops 
in Piedmont. As for assisting the Austrian party in 
Spain, which up to this time Rooke regarded as his main 
object, he could do it better by acting on the Mediterranean 
coast, and especially in Catalonia, than by any operations 
outside the Straits, 1 

1 H.O. Admiralty, zvi. 39 and ibid. xiii. Ifaieh 14, 1704. 
* Ibid. liti. March 24, J|04. 

VOL. II. ^ B 

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242 MARLBOROUGH AND THE NAVY 1704 

, So. far went Booke's open instructions, which every 
one concerned was to know, and never before perhaps _ 

_was th e h igher strategji..of_ the Mediterranean more 

luminously formulated. In its breadth and firmness we 
feel the touch of Marlborough, the hand not only of the 
great general, but of the great war minister, who sees in 
their true proportions the' scope.. and end of naval action. 
To the sailor the aim of naval strategy must always seem 
to be the command of the sea. To the soldier and the 
states man it js.only the means to afrentb — Forthem the 
end must always be the furtherance or the hindrance 
of military operations ashore, or the protection or 
destruction of sea-borne commerce ; for by these means 
alone can governments and populations be crushed into 
submission. Of the two methods that of military pressure 
must always come first, where resources allow, just as 
an assault, where practicable, is always preferable to the 
more lengthy blockade. If, therefore, it- be possible to 
give sudden emphasis to vital military operations by 
momentarily and without undue risk abandoning the 
sailor's preoccupation — by ceasing for a moment to aim 
solely at the command of the sea — a bigoted adherence to 
it may become pedantry and ruin the higher strategy of 
the campaign. 

On these fundamental principles of warfare Rooke's 
instructions were framed, and framed in the best possible 
way. The portion of the far-reaching design which 
Marlborough wished Booke to carry out was not forced 
upon the fleet. It was merely placed lucidly before the 
flag-officers that they might clearly perceive their place 
in the great whole so far as it could be safely disclosed. 
It was left to their judgment and loyalty to say how far 
the limitations of their art enabled them to carry into 
effect what the Government looked to them to perform. 



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1704 ROOKIES SECRET ORDERS 345 

Moreover, although the military exigencies of the situation 
were pressed upon them, their own immediate concern 
was not forgotten. From the spies and agents of the 
admirable intelligence system, which was then in existence, 
was flowing a constant stream of reports of French naval 
activity both in Toulon and the western ports. The secret 
of their intentions had not been penetrated. The reports 
variously pointed to a concentration either in the Medi- 
terranean or in the Atlantic, or possibly to separate 
squadrons acting in each arena. 1 To meet this uncertain 
situation the last clause of Booke's instructions informed 
him that he was to prevent a junction of the Toulon and 
4 West France ' squadrons, and that, if the Toulon squadron 
got out of the Straits, it was to be his first duty to follow 
it and bring it to action. This in fact was a naval 
condition to which every military necessity must subserve. 
The brilliance and lucidity of the whole design come 
out still more clearly when we consider what were Booke's 
secret instructions and how admirably the open ones were 
constructed to prepare the way for their execution. As 
the campaign existed in the minds of Eugene and Marl- 
borough, it was to rest upon a secret and sudden concen- 
tration against what may be called the right flank of the 
French at the Danube. At their opposite flank was to be 
a minor attack or diversion in the form of an invasion of 
Spain by Portugal and the Hapsburg King. Though this 
movement was to receive the support of the fleet, it was 
not Booke's main object. The memorable and unexpected 
fruit of his campaign has long ago obscured what that 
object was. It was in truth nothing less than the fruition 
of Marlborough's long-pondered design. It was. upon 
*"~ Toulon — the French centre as we may regard it— thai 
T the weight of his force was to be thrown— There, by a 
[ l Admiralty Stcrttary, In-LsUm, toL 8W0. 

IS 

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244 MARLBOROUGH AND THE NAVY 1704 

sadden and secret blow in concert of the Duke of Savoy's 
army, he w as to seize and destroy the seat of the French 
Mediterranean power. Not a soul was to be informed ; 
but, so long as the Duke of Savoy held to the project, 
Booke was to regard the operation as taking precedence 
of everything else, excepting only the relief of Nice and 
the shadowing of the Toulon fleet if it got out of the 
Straits. The operations on the Spanish Mediterranean 
coast were to extend no further than was desirable for 
masking the real objective. So soon as the blow at 
Toulon had been struck he was to set about reaping the 
fruit of the victory by proceeding direct to Palermo. 
There, by using private signals with which he was 
furnished, he was to get into communication with the 
Austrian party and endeavour with their co-operation to 
induce the city to declare for the Hapsbiirg King. The 
same was to be done at Messina, and from these points 
he might endeavour to reduce the whole of Sicily, and 
subsequently, with tho same end in view, proceed to 
Naples. 1 

Such in its entirety was the g/and design of this 
memorable year. We have only to bear in mind the 
leading idea of the main attack upon the Danube to see 
how each part assists and amplifies the rest. The 
ambitious programme assigned to liooke was of course 
scarcely practicable, and it depended too much upon the 
unstable factor of Savoy. Still it must not be dismissed 
as a dream. We should take it rather as an indication 
of the incalculable power of strategical disturbance that 
lies open to a Mediterranean fleet. By judicious handling 
of his force and a clear grasp of the situation it was in 
Booke's power to contain at least four French armies, 
and to prevent support being sent from any of the points 

• BX>. Admiralty, xiii. Maroh 89, 1704, and ibid. zvi. 128 et teq. 



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1704 THE CAMPAIGN OPKNS 245 

that lay within the length of his arm, to the vital battle- 
ground in Central Europe. 

It was, as we have seen, in the last days of March that 
Rooke' s orders were settled, and before a week was out 
Marlborough was at Harwich waiting for a wind to carry 
him across to Holland that he might set in motion the 
vast machinery which he and Eugene had adjusted. Rooke 
was already at work. Early in March Leake arrived in the 
Tagus from England with a combined English and Dutch 
squadron. Rooke had put to sea at once, and in ac- 
cordance with his first instructions had spread his fleet in 
cruising formation between Capes St. Vincent and Espartel 
with the threefold object of covering the English Levant 
trade in its passage through the Straits, intercepting 
some enemy's ships expected from Buenos Ayres, and pre- 
venting men-of-war slipping out from Toulon to join the 
squadrons in the West France ports. 1 Though the Buenos 
Ayres vessels were missed in dirty weather, two ships of 
the line were taken, and towards the end of April Rooke 
had returned to Lisbon. There he found his new 
orders awaiting him, and communicated them, so far as 
they were not secret, to his council of war. In concert 
with his Dutch colleague a decision was quickly arrived 
at. It was agreed to proceed immediately into the Medi- 
terranean and pass as high as Barcelona with the double 
object of supporting the Hapsburg party in Catalonia, 
and being at hand to relieve Nice and Villafranca if 
they should call for assistance. Ro oke's real object was 
of course to get unsuspected within striking distance 
of Toujfoi^Jrat of this he said not a word, nor of Sicily 
and /Naples, although Charles was very anxious that a 
demonstration should be made there as well as off Bar- 
celona. With the Dutch contingent Rooke had some 

1 Torrington Afaiiotr*, 127. 



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246 MARLBOROUGH AND THE NAVY 1701 

forty sail, and with them he entered the Straits in the 
first days of May, and watered by force in Altea Bay. 1 

In Toulon, according to the intelligence which the 

Government had, a fleet of about thirty of the line was 

being brought forward for the Comte de Toulouse — a force 

-which would probably be about equal to that of Rooke, at 

least on paper — and it was believed to be the intention of the 

French to pass it out of the Straits and endeavour to 

form a concentration at Cadiz with the Atlantic divisions 

from Brest, Port Louis, and Bochefort — together scarcely 

inferior to the Toulon squadron. This Atlantic or ' West 

France ' squadron was to be dealt with by the Channel 

squadron under Shovell, with Fairborne and Byng for his 

flag-officers. Shovell had also the charge of the mass of 

trade proceeding southwards, and of the stores for Rooke 

and the transports for Lisbon. About the middle of 

April, on an alarm that the Brest squadron was coming 

out, he received sudden orders to hoist his flag and get to 

sea. If he found the news was true and that the French 

-were in superior force, he was to retreat with all his 

convoy into the Thames ; otherwise he was to proceed off 

Brest, and if the squadron was still there he was to send 

on the trade and transports under convoy and devote his 

fleet to preventing a concentration of the three 'West 

France ' divisions. If however he found the Brest division 

had sailed and had reason to believe its destination was 

the Straits, he was to detach in chase a force that would 

make Rooke superior ; and if it were necessary to detach 

the greater part of his fleet, he himself was to go in 

command and place himself under Booke's flag.* 

Here then again we have the British naval strategy 

1 Lift cf Sit John Leake, p. 77 ; TorringUm MemoWi, p. 127 ; Capt. 
* Torrington Memoir*, 122. 



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1704 MOVEMENTS OF 8HOVELL 247 

resting firmly on the fundamental idea which William III. 
had inaugurated, that the Channel and Mediterranean 
squadron must be regarded as one main fleet, to be used 
wholly or in part either within or without the Straits as 
the distribution of the enemy's force demanded. Marl- 
borough, who alone of Englishmen appears to have grasped 
the true potentialities of the Mediterranean, had at last 
' got his way, and at the outset he was employing that very 
policy which we regard as among the latest and highest 
developments of modern naval thought. 

With these well-conceived instructions Shovell put to 
sea, and by the middle of May, with his whole charge, was 
off the Lizard, his first rendezvous. Here he received 
intelligence from the Admiralty that Toulouse himself 
had suddenly arrived at Brest and taken the squadron to 
sea a fortnight since, and as the news was confirmed by his 
own scouts he resolved to carry on and feel for Toulouse 
in the Soundings. Finding no trace of him there he 
concluded he must have gone for the Straits. According 
to his orders he therefore gave chase in person with the . 
bulk of his force. 

Nothing, it will be observed, was said in Shovell's 
instructions of the secret object of Rooke's fleet. The 
fact was that the situation had changed in a way that 
necessarily modified the original design. When Hill, who 
was charged with the negotiations with Savoy, reached 
Turin at the beginning of April, he found the Duke had 
grown ominously cool about the projected attempt on 
Toulon. The Dutch, who were stubbornly bent on keep- 
ing their fleet to protect their commerce, had informed 
the Duke that they were averse to engaging it in so 
desperate an adventure, and he demanded a definite 
assurance that Booke would come, and come soon. Hill 
said all he could and promised the Duke two hundred 



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248 MAKLBOROUGH AND THE NAVY 1704 

thousand crowns so soon as Toulon was in flames. But 
all was in vain. It soon became known that the French 
had abandoned their designs on Nice and Villafranca, and 
that the troops raised for the purpose were being sent to 
reinforce the army of Italy. The result was that the Duke 
found it impossible to spare enough troops to act with 
the fleet, and Hill had to send word to Booke that there 
was no hope of Savoy's co-operating with him in Provence 

This unwelcome news arrived home as Shovell was 
passing down Channel collecting his fleet, and it was at 
once sent on to Booke. He was further informed that 
the Imperialist forces in Italy were so few and bad that 
it was useless to attempt to co-operate with such material. 
He was therefore to fall back in order to concert operations 
with the Archduke Charles and the King of Portugal on 
the coast of Spain, and above all to intercept Toulouse if 
he got away from Brest and attempted to enter the Straits. 
At the same time he was informed of Shovell's orders 
and told to look out for him. 1 

Marlborough, who thus saw one half of his grand 
design wiped clean' away, received the news with his 
usual cheery good humour. He had already reached 
Ladenburg in the heart of Germany with his cavalry. In 
ten days he hoped to be on the Danube, and the meaning 
of his heroic move was apparent to all concerned. In his 
answer be contented himself with approving the step that 
had been taken and with warning the Government, which 
was nervous about an attack on the English coast, of what 
Toulouse's intention most probably was. 'There is no 
doubt, 9 he wrote, ' of his being gone from Brest, but I am 
apt to think his orders are to sail directly to Cadiz, so that 
I am glad care is taken to reinforce Sir George Booke, 

1 HOl's dsspatehes, April 11-1S, 8.P. Foreign, Savoy >W>\ Booke*sin- 
, May 9 V H.O. Admiral!* xiii. 14S. 



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1704 HOOKE'S FEINT ON BARCELONA 949 

and that he has fresh orders to co-operate with the 
Portugal troops on the coast of Spain ; for I fear, with- 
out the assistance of our naval force, we shall not be 
able to make any great progress at present on that 
side.' ! 

Meanwhile, as the great symphony developed, Booke, 
in accordance with his secret orders, had moved on to 
make his feint J at Barcelona. He was still ignorant of ' 
the altered conditions when he anchored in the Say, and 
no one but himself knew what his real intention was. 
Hesse, who was with the fleet, was as ignorant as the rest, 
and as eager as ever to decide the campaign with his 
beloved Catalans. He had been assured that he bad 
only to appear before the place for his friends to rise and 
declare for Charles III. So sure was he of his power that 
on the way he had persuaded Kooke to make something 
more than a demonstration, and permit him to land the 
marines and bring the smouldering insurrection to a bead. 
This was accordingly done. Barcelona was summoned in * 
the name ot the Hapsburg King, but for answer Hesse 
got nothing but defiance. There is no reason to believe 
that his information was false, but he had not calculated 
on the personality of the governor, Don Francisco de 
Velasco. This man, by the ascendency of his character 
and adroit tact, was able to keep under the disaffected 
element and to inspire his adherents with bis own de- 
termination. He pointed out the smallness of the force 
that had landed, and that the Archduke bad not had the 
courage to come in person. The result was that not a 
man moved. A bombardment was tried, but that only 
made matters worse and turned lukewarmness to exaspera- 
tion. It was clear the experiment had been miscalculated, 
and Booke, after letting Hesse try his hand for a fortnight, 

1 To Sir Charles Hedges, June 4, Itopafote, L M& 



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2TO MARLBOROUGH AND THE NAVY 1704 

would wait no longer and insisted on re-embarking his 
men for hjp main design. 1 

For the failure therefore at Barcelona Rooke was in 

no way to blame. For him the whole affair was only a 

feint, though, seeing what the information was, he certainly 

exercised a wise discretion in permitting Hesse to torn 

the feint into a coup de main if he could. He was equally 

'wise in refusing to allow him to continue the operation 

for any length of time. He was still secretly bent on 

Toulon, nor did he give a hint of his intention beyond 

detaching Bear-Admiral Witks with a small division to 

look into the port. The rendezvous he gave was the 

Hyferes islands, and his council of war believed they were 

going as far as Nice and Villafranca, to see them safe 

and then to return and attack Barcelona in force. His 

real object was of course to get into communication with 

Hill in order to concert operations with the Savoyard army. 

Whether he did so or not is uncertain, nor can we tell 

whether or not he had by this time received his amended 

orders. All we know is that at Hy&res he heard from 

Methuen, the Ambassador at Lisbon, that the Brest fleet 

had passed the Tagus on its way to Toulon. The council 

of war immediately determined that this fleet must now be 

their sole objective, and, without waiting a day, Rooke sent 

woid to Hill that he was turning back to meet Toulouse.' 



War of Succession, L 97 ; Duro, Armada BspaMa, vi. 51 ; 
\ Jlemoirt, 127 ; Life of Leake, IB. 
* Jawrmml of Roche** Voyage, 1704, Brit Mat. 810, m. 38, pp. 179 et eeq. 



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CHAPTEK XXXI 

GIBRALTAR AND MALAGA 

With the change of front which had been forced upon 
Eooke and the British Government a practically new 
naval campaign commences. Owing to the inability of 
Savoy or the Imperialists in Italy to provide the necessary 
military element, the elaborate design which Marlborough 
had formed for breaking into the centre of Louis's wide- 
spread position had to go by the board. Without the 
co-operation of an adequate military force Booke could 
do nothing. It was only on the extreme opposite flank 
to that upon which Marlborough was closing that this 
condition existed. True, the army of the allies in the 
Peninsula was weak and unsatisfactory enough ; still, as 
they stood, it was the only point where naval and military 
co-operation could be brought into play, and it was there- 
fore only in this quarter of the vast field of hostilities that 
Booke could hope to make the enemy feel the smart of 
his command of the sea. 

For the moment, however, that command was 
threatened. By the escape of the Brest squadron Booke 
was in danger of finding himself in inferior force at the 
vital point, and his sole and immediate object became the 
defeat of that squadron in order to prevent its junction 
with that of Toulon. It was now a purely naval ques- 
tion, with which Booke was quite at home, and, rightly 
disregarding all political and military distractions, he 



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252 GIBRALTAR AND MALAGA 1704 

spread his cruisers to get touch with Toulouse. With 
his council of war he had settled the exact course they 
were to pursue. If the enemy was sighted before they 
reached the Straits they were to do their utmost to deal 
him a blow ; if not, they were to hurry on to Cadiz and 
seek an occasion of bringing him to action there. If he 
refused they were to proceed to Lisbon, to meet Shovell 
and replenish with stores. They knew that Toulouse's 
intention was to join hands with the squadron which he 
expected to come out of Toulon to meet him, and they 
believed that, whether the combined French fleet entered 
the Straits or attempted anything on the Portuguese 
coast, they would be in a position to give a good account 
of it. 1 

It was not long before their action was decided for 
them. On the second day after the council the scouts 
signalled the enemy in sight, and on the morrow the two 
fleets were in contact. The French, to the number of 
about fifty, with thirty-one of the line, were to windward, 
and as they formed line of battle Kooke went about to 
the northward to cut them off from Touloir. Though 
the French were slightly superior, they refused an engage- 
ment and held on for their destination, and being clean 
they soon began to show their heels to Rooke's foul fleet. 
All that day, however, he struggled on. The next the 
weather fell almost calm, and it became clear that nothing 
could prevent the French admiral making Toulon if he 
chose, and that Booke's only chance of bringing him 
to action was in the mouth of the port where the allies 
would be exposed to an overwhelming attack from both 
the French squadrons. It was therefore resolved to 

1 De Jong*, iv. li. 293, quoting the Dutch • Minute* of the Joint 
of War hold on board H.M.8. "Royal Catherine," off the Hyeret 
Hay it, 1704(0*)' 



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1704 JUNCTION OF ROOKK AND SHOVELL 253 

abandon the chase and make the best of their way to 
join Shovell in the Tagus preparatory to farther action. 1 

The French had fairly won the first round of the 
game. Bat Shovell was speeding southwards, and a 
few days later he pat into the Tagus for water and 
provisions so as to be ready to get to sea the moment 
he received a summons from Booke. Here, however, 
he heard what had happened. Toulouse had entered 
the Straits, and, fearing Booke might be overpowered, he 
very properly decided to go in search of him without 
waiting for orders. Thus it was that on June 16, just as 
Marlborough was joining hands with the Margrave of 
Baden, Booke and Shovell met off Gape St. Mary, and 
at both extremities of the French position the situation 
was ripe for the catastrophe. 

Had the admirals been left to themselves they would 
have been in no doubt what to do. They were all in favour 
of holding to the resolution taken off Hy&res and entering 
the Straits in search of the now united French fleet. - 
But there were political considerations which complicated 
the problem. Their last orders were to co-operate with 
the Kings of Spain and Portugal in supporting the land 
war in the Peninsula, and it became necessary to send 
into Lisbon to know what was required of them. At the 
same time Toulouse's fleet in Toulon remained their chief 
consideration, and while awaiting an answer they resolved 
to get into the best position they could for dealing with 
it if it moved. To this end, as Marlborough was in the 
act of defeating the Bavarians at Schellenberg and secur- 
ing his passage of the Danube, they decided to enter the 
Straits and water by force at Malaga. There they would . 
be well placed, both for engaging Toulouse if he attempted 

1 De Jonge, iv. ii. 394, from the Journal* and Despatches of the 
Dutch admirals, and Life of Leake, p. 80, 



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SS4 GIBRALTAR AND MALAGA 1704 

to reach Cadiz, or to go to the rescue of Nice or any other 
port of the allies if he intended a stroke in that quarter. 

Nothing could have been better under the circum- 
stances. The two kings appear to have had no objection 
to the movement, and had contented themselves with 
requesting that on its way to the Straits the fleet would 
attempt something on the coast of Andalusia. Cadiz was 
the place particularly indicated in the admirals' instruc- 
tions, and this they knew was what the two kings would 
most like to see undertaken. They had therefore expressed 
their willingness to attack the place if sufficient troops 
could be provided to act with them. Now Shovell had 
already ascertained at Lisbon that it was extremely un- 
likely that such troops would be forthcoming, and they 
had therefore every reason to believe that the answer 
from Lisbon would set them free to proceed up the 
Straits and devote themselves to bringing Toulouse to 
action. 1 

For a week baffling easterly gales prevented their 
entering the Mediterranean. A further delay was caused 
by false intelligence that a French squadron had taken 
advantage of the weather to slip through and had got 
into Cadiz. Nor was it till July 7 that they reached 
- M alaga and seized the watering places. When the whole 
fleet was watered, Booke put to sea, and, while waiting 
for his answer from Lisbon, occupied the entrance of 
the Straits in readiness for Toulouse if he appeared. In 
a week the answer came and the memorable council of 
war of July 17 was called to consider it. 

The proposal of the two kings, as the admirals 
expected, was for an attack on Cadiz, but as no troops 
could be promised it was promptly rejected. Then it 
was that in considering how best to pursue their own 

1 Tonrington Memoir$ f pp. 128, 199. 



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1704 TI1E MOMENTOUS DECISION 256 

object, and at the same time to satisfy their instructions 
and the expectations of the two kings, the momentous 
word was spoken. Dim in the distance glimmered the 
Bock of Gibraltar. For a century past it had shone 
enticingly in English eyes ; for half a century it had been 
an admitted end of their endeavour. Cromwell had 
stretched out his hand to it. Under Charles II. English 
careening hulks ha4 been stationed there in preference to 
Tangier. William III. had marked it for his own, and 
had never ceased in peace or war to work for its posses- 
sion ; and since his death every admiral that had sailed 
for the Straits had been instructed to capture it if he 
could. 

From whom the suggestion came we know not, but 
it matters little ; for by this time the idea had b ecom e a 
]i ! commonplace both in the cabinet and the service. It is 
* generally attributed to Prince George of Hesse-Darm- 
stadt, who was with the fleet still in hope of effecting 
something in Catalonia. Sir John Leake, the vice- 
admiral of Booke's squadron, says that he himself had 
proposed it to the Prince some time before ' as the most 
advantageous conquest that could be made for the benefit 
of the trade as well as the fleet during a war with France 
and Spain/ but that it could not be undertaken till the 
two kings had agreed not to attempt Cadiz. 1 We know, 
at any rate, that a memorandum from Hesse was laid 
before the council of war, as soon as the decision of the 
kings was known. If it did not contain the formal pro- 
posal, it was certainly Hesse's sanction that was the 
decisive factor. It is the custom of historians to credit 
England's possession of the gate of the Mediterranean to 
Booke's fearlessness of responsibility. But as a matter 
of fact so long as he had the sanction of King Charles's 

1 Leake's Life, p. 88. 



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256 GIBRALTAR AND MALAGA 1704 

representative, he was incurring no responsibility at all. 
No one knew better than he, as William's most trusted 
naval councillor, how long Gibraltar had been the secret 
and the open aim of successive English governments. He. 
knew the weakness of the place, and his own strength 
was overwhelming. By the Queen's instructions he had 
full authority to undertake the operation ; he had been 
requested by the two kings to attempt some place on the 
Andalusian coast; and he actually had in his pocket a 
proclamation by Charles III. to his city of Gibraltar, 
telling them the British admiral was going to call with 
his fleet to receive their submission. 1 All that he required 
was to satisfy his last caution from home about acting 
only by consent of the two kings, and this consent had 
been given by Hesse's action. If he had not seized so 
favourable a chance of retrieving his waning reputation 
and of saving another barren campaign, it would have 
been sheer madness. Still, he must not be denied the 
credit of having overcome some opposition. Byng, who 
was Shovell's vice-admiral, has left it on record that the 
proposal ' was lightly thought of by many at the council.' 
He himself was one of them. But to his and his friends' 
objections Booke had sharply replied that not only should 
the place be attempted, but that Byng himself, the leader 
of the opposition, should conduct the attack. 1 

80 much and no more was the height of Booke's 
decision; nor as a feat of arms was his exploit more 
lofty. Benowned as that exploit became at the time for 
political reasons at home, and afterwards for its lasting 
effects on history, the truth is there was nothing in it 
heroic either in the resolution of the admiral or in the. 

1 Lopes am Ayala, But. of Gibraltar (trans. James Bell), p. 186, where 
the proclamation is set oat 
* Torrmgto* Mem oir *, p. 197. 



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AlfUw and Xocact <M*p 4fftht City and Bay of 
GIBRALTAR in Spain laksn, hy S^QILoomj: 
VuirAJamrml *f JSnglancl ?ft* zf. gf July *7*+ .By 3CM. 




Umt ******* fhmjm.iUijwmtittm+f*' ***** CL*>fmaUj&Kmm ~U 



fi/£sfi*+*mUd iUlwi* &,*£&£* 



GIBRALTAR 

From *A Discourse concerning tmb Mkditekjmnkak Ska,* 
rt Sir Hknkv Shrrb, 1705 



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1704 CONDITION OF GIBRALTAR 257 



difficulty of ite execution. Gibraltar at this time 

little more than it had been throughout the middle ages,_ 

'a third-rate seaport town with works designed to secure 
it against the Barbary pirates. Charles V. had con- 
structed the wall which included the Bock in the de- 
fended area, and Philip II. had added a bastion or two. 
Philip IV., it is true, had done something more. Till 
his time it had had nothing but a galley harbour under 
the Old Mole. By constructing to the south of the town 
what was called the New Mole, he had provided it with. 
a shelter for ships. Under him it had consequently 
increased substantially in population and prosperity, and 
during his war with Charles I. he had partially modernised 
the fortifications. But this only meant that the mediaeval 
battlements had been replaced by parapets, and the towers 
cut down to the level of the curtains and filled in solidly 
with the rubbish. 1 Indeed it may be doubted whether 
some of these improvements, by extending the lines to be 
guarded, were not at the moment a source of weakness 
rather than strength, seeing how slender was the garrison. 
There was not even a citadel : for the old Moorish castle 
had been dismantled and nothing had yet replaced it; 
while of the modern works recently designed by the 
French engineers not one had been carried out The 
regular force that held it at the time had been reduced 
to under a hundred men, and with all the local militia 
which the governor could collect he could not raise a 
garrison of five hundred. Against Kooke's force, with ite_ 

^ five and forty of the line, its frigates, fire-ships, and bomb- 

_ vessels, its two thousand marines and its overwhel ming . 

. weight of metal, such a place Was but a nutshell. 

1 Lopes de Ayala, op. ciL, andXuis Bravo's offioial report made la 1627. 
Add. MSS. 16152. This manuscript contain* large plans and sketches in 
water-colour of the condition of the fortress as it then existed. 

vol. n. s 



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258 GIBRALTAR AND MALAGA 1704 

The contemptible condition of the fortress was well 
known in the fleet, and this indeed may have been the 
reason why the attempt was thought of so lightly by 
Byng and his friends ; but Booke had always the grand 
manner, and he approached it with all the pomp and cir- 
cumstance of a great operation. In Tangier Bay, hard 
by the ruined mole under which he had helped to bury 
the hopes of the older Mediterranean school, the ela- 
borate preparations for the attack were made. In four 
days they were complete, and on July 21 the fleet stood 
oyer to Gibraltar Bay. Byng and the Dutch rear- 
admiral Yanderdussen led the way with the battering 
squadron of seventeen of the line and three bomb-vessels, 
and the following day came to anchor about a mile from 
the town. Booke followed with the rest of the fleet and 
the marines of Byng's squadron, and brought-to further 
in the bay towards Point Mala. Here in the mouth of 
the little river Guadarran the British marines, eighteen 
hundred strong, were landed under Hesse without oppo- 
sition, and at once marched to the north front of the 
town, where they took up a position across the isthmus 
from sea to sea, so as entirely to cut off Gibraltar from 
the mainland. It was here, as was called to mind, that 
Cromwell had intended to cut his canal, and the invest- 
ment was complete. It had been arranged however that 
Byng was not to open fire until the garrison had been 
summoned by Hesse, and, accordingly, from the position 
he had seized, the Prince sent in a trumpet together 
with King Charles's proclamation. 

No answer was received that night, and next morning 
Byng signalled for the line of battle. While it was form- 
ing the governor's reply arrived. It was a sturdy 
defiance and a chivalrous declaration that he meant to 
hold the place for the King to whom he had sworn 



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1704 BOMBARDMENT OF GIBRALTAR 269 

allegiance. On hearing the result Booke reinforced the 
battering squadron with five more of the line, bringing it 
up to twenty-two. Byng disposed his force in a line 
stretching from the old mole to the new one. He him* 
self, with a division of ten sail, occupied the centre oppo- 
site the town and south bastion. Northward of him was 
the Dutch division of six sail before the old mole, while 
to the southward, facing the new mole and its defences, 
was an English division of six under Captain Jasper 
Hickes of the ' Yarmouth.' Outward of the line were the 
three bomb- vessels. As there was no wind, every one had 
to warp into position. The work proceeded all night, and 
by daybreak they were so close in that Byng had only a 
foot or two under his keel. As the first light of day 
revealed what had happened, the shore batteries opened. 
Byng promptly replied, and with so furious and well- 
sustained a fire that in a few minutes nothing could 
be seen but a stream of panic-stricken inhabitants hurry- 
ing out of the town towards the southernmost point of 
the Bock. It was the women and children flying for 
safety to Our Lady of Europa. There all that terrible 
Sunday morning, in the sanctuary of the old Mediter- 
ranean power, they cowered and prayed beneath the 
trophies of the great galley admirals while the roar of 
Byng's guns sounded in their ears the knell of the dead 
past. 

Towards one o'clock the thunder of the bombardment 
sank into silence. It had lasted nearly six hours, and 
Byng had ordered a cessation to see what the effect had 
been. But for the fugitives a new terror quickly suc- 
ceeded the first. Captain Whitaker of the ' Dorsetshire 9 
had been sent down the line to convey the orders to cease 
fire, and by the time he reached the ' Lennox,' which lay 
nearest to the new mole, both he and her captain, William 

• 8 



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280 GIBRALTAR AND MALAGA 1704 

Jumper, could see that most of the guns in the works that 
defended it were dismounted and the garrison had ap- 
parently fled. Whitaker promptly hurried back to Byng 
with the opinion that the forts and mole might be seized. 
It was no part of the design, but Byng did not hesitate. 
Signalling for all the boats of his own line, he sent 
Whitaker off to Booke to ask for the rest. Without 
waiting for a reply, however, he despatched Captain 
Hickes with his own flotilla, under orders to land to the 
southward of the mole head, and endeavour to take pos- 
session. 

Shortly afterwards Whitaker came back with word that 
Booke had consented to the attack and that he himself was 
to command it. But, before he could get up to the'mole, 
Hickes and Jumper were already well on their way, and the 
distracted suppliants of Our Lady of Europa, seeing the 
new danger, were streaming in terror towards the town. A 
gun or two headed them back, and under a misapprehension 
that it was a signal to re-open fire, the bombardment broke 
out again. Under cover of it Hickes and Jumper landed 
their men. Resistance there \Vas none. During all this 
time Hesse and his marines had been vigorously assaulting 
the north front. It was consequently impossible to spare 
reinforcements for the garrison of the new mole, and, 
fearing to be cut off, they had retired into the town. Still 
the loss was severe. As the seamen recklessly rushed into 
the abandoned works with their matches burning in their 
hands, they exploded a magazine, killing or wounding 
about a hundred men, besides sinking a number of the 
boats. 1 Every one believed it was a mine that had been 
sprung, and for a moment there was a panic. But 
Whitaker's flotilla came up immediately, and with re* 
newed spirit the whole landing force pressed northward 

1 Poeockt's Journal in Torrington Memoirs, App. p. 198. 



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1704 GIBRALTAR CAPITULATES 981 

along the sea wall. At a bastion half way between the 
new mole and the great or south bastion at the southern- 
most point of the town, they were compelled to halt, for 
there Charles V.'s wall barred their way. Here, therefore, 
and in the other works that he had taken, Whitaker 
was content to secure himself, while, by arrangement 
between Hesse and Bpoke, a fresh summons was sent in 
simultaneously from both forces. 

It demanded the surrender of the fortress in half an 
hour on pain of the last severities of war. All that loyalty 
could demand had been done ; the women and children 
with Our Lady of Europa were at the sailors' mercy ; 
and the governor decided to capitulate. On the morrow 
the articles were signed; the women and children were 
reverently escorted into the care of their own people in 
the town, and the defenders were allowed to march out 
with all the honours of war. So at last, after so many 
years of longing, the gate of the Mediterranean was in 
British hands, the sanctuary of Europa had been stripped 
bare by Rooke's seamen, and the lamps of the Dorias and 
the Colonnas were resting in the ship-chests of Jumper 
and his friends. 1 

Gibraltar was taken, and, to add to the rejoicing, a 

1 The fullest accounts of the exploit will be found in the Torrington 
Memoirs, pp. 138-145 ; in Chaplain Pooocke's Journal (ibid. pp. 190 5); 
and in the despatch of the governor, Don Diego de Salinas, to the Marques 
de Villadrias (Duro, vi. 03, Appendix). The other official Spanish docu- 
ments are printed by Ayala (op. cit. Appendices xi.-xiv.). There is an old 
story that the flag of Charles III. was hoisted by some one when the place 
was taken, and that Rooke ordered it to be struck and the British flag to be 
hoisted in its place. I can find no confirmation of this improbable tale. 
Modern Spanish authorities reject it (Duro, vi. 58, n.). Rooke had orders to 
act strictly as Charles's agent, and the garrison was certainly summoned in 
Charles's name. The origin of the story may lie in the fact that the sailors 
planted the British flag on the works they took before the final summons 
and capitulation. It may well be that, when all was settled, Rooke ordered 
it to be removed, and so the perverted legend might have arisen (Tom*? ton 
Afemotrs, 14$ ; see also po$t, p. 964, noU). 



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283 GIBRALTAR AND MALAGA 1704 

frigate came in at the moment of victory with news of 
Marlborough's success at Schellenberg and his capture 
of Donauwdrth. It also brought letters from home, and 
from Methuen at Lisbon which were less welcome. To 
take Gibraltar was one thing, to keep it another. 
Toulouse's fleet was still unbeaten, and Wilks, with a 
squadron of observation, was cruising off Malaga on the 
look-out for it. The letters just to hand, however, gave 
Booke to understand that Toulouse was in so great an 
inferiority to himself that there was little likelihood of his 
venturing out of Toulon. 1 He was therefore urged once 
more to attempt either Cadiz or Barcelona. Barcelona 
was quickly rejected by the council of war on the old plea 
that it was too late in the year to proceed so far up the 
Straits ; but as for Cadiz, they felt bound to declare they 
were ready to co-operate until the middle of September, 
but no longer, and that only if an adequate force and siege- 
train were provided by the two kings as well as a garrison 
for Gibraltar. Such an answer was practically a refusal 
to do anything but maintain the conquest they had made. 
In this they were rightly absorbed, and to secure it they 
resolved to remain in the Straits till an answer came from 
Lisbon, and in the meanwhile to water the fleet by 
squadrons on the Barbary coast. It would seem that 
the admirals themselves were by no means easy about 
Toulouse, in spite of the sanguine views of the home 
Government. The reckless bombardment had made a 
serious hole in their magazines ; they were obliged to send 
Vanderdussen with five sail to Plymouth to fetch some 
Dutch transports with reinforcements for Portugal ; an- 
other squadron had been detached to the Azores to bring 
in the Brazil convoy, and they may well have doubted 

1 HX>. Admiralty, xiii. July 4, 1704 (o.«.). It wm reoeWed with Methuen'f 
of Hhm »•* and *84h (ils.) on July 94, Torrington Memo**, 146. 



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1704 TOULOUSE TO THE RESCUE 263 

whether they were really so superior as to deter Toulouse 
•from hazarding an action. 

As a matter of fact the information which the English 
Government had sent was incorrect. Instead of having 
only forty of the line at his disposal, as they believed, 
Toulouse, in spite of every difficulty that was put in his 
way, had succeeded in getting fifty-one ready for sea, besides 
a score of galleys. On the other hand, Rooke, instead of 
having sixty as they thought at home, had now only forty- 
one English and twelve Dutch of the line. He had 
nothing to set against the galleys, which were still 
regarded as formidable in giving mobility to a fleet in 
calms or light airs and against crippled ships at the end of 
an action. He was therefore really in inferior force, and 
so far from Toulouse being afraid to come out, he had 
actually put to sea a week before Rooke appeared at 
Gibraltar. His destination was Barcelona, which the 
French Court had been made to believe was Booke's real 
objective, and there he expected to find the allied fleet, 
or at least to learn its position. Of what was happening in 
the Straits he was entirely ignorant, nor was it til! he made 
Barcelona that he heard the stunning news that Gibraltar 
had fallen. He could be at no loss what to do, for await- 
ing him were orders from Madrid that without a moment's 
delay he was to proceed to the Straits. The sudden loss > 
of the bulwark of the Spanish monarch/, he was-told, 
had filled the Court with dismay. Already an army was 
on its march to the rescue, and between them they were 
to retake the renowned fortress, cost what it might. 1 We 
may well imagine the alarm that prevailed. In the minds 
of Spaniacdsj&ibraltar was associated with the evil days, 
when it was the well-head from which Moorish conquest 
had flowed over the Peninsula. Its second fall was 
1 De Jong©, it. ii. 806, 



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261 GIBRALTAR AND MALAGA 1704 

ominous of a new heretic dominion, and, sped by the 
prayers and terror of the faithful, the deliverer hurried 
again to sea. 

Marlborough^ great symphony had reached its fullest 
swell. Feverish as was the excitement in Spain, the worst 
was not yet known. Far away on the banks of the Danube 
a still more resounding blow had been struck. As Toulouse 
sped southward in search of Rooke, Marlborough and 
Eugene w$re crushing the most splendid of Louis's armies, 
and in Blenheim village the white flag was flying over the 
flower of his troops. 

Meanwhile fi ooke, h aving secured his conquest as best 
be could, had passed over toJTetuan.. Gibraltar had been left 
to the care of Hesse and the British marines, and, screened 
by a squadron of scouts, the admiral was anxiously watering 
in hourly expectation of disturbance from Toulon. 1 Owing 
to the swell that prevailed the operation took nearly 
a week to perform. It was not till August 8 that he 
weighed to return to Gibraltar, and even then a dozen 
nnwatered ships had to be left behind. That night, with 
light easterly airs, he held across the Straits, still in 
ignorance of Toulouse's movement ; but at break of day 
one of the scouts to windward was seen making the signal 
for an enemy's fleet. Byng, who was the first to see it, 
immediately hurried aboard the flagship to impart the un- 
expected news. Sir James Wishart, Booke's first captain, 
was for retiring at once into Gibraltar Bay to cover the 
threatened fortress. Byng, however, vigorously protested 
against so wrong-headed a proceeding. To say nothing of 
the folly of receiving the French at anchor, the move- 
ment would enable Toulouse to cut off the squadron that 

1 De Jonge points out that, m the Dutch admirals mado no objection 
to the fortress being occupied by a garrison that was entirely British, there 
oaa hardly have been any dispute about the flag (op. dt. it. ii. 806). 



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N \ 



1704 TOULOUSE DISAPPEARS 285 

was still watering at Tetuan. Unable to decide, Booke 
made the signal for the line of battle, and, while it was 
being formed, summoned the council of war. It proved 
as eager as Byng for a bold offensive. Most of the flag- 
officers were unable to believe that Toulouse meant to 
fight, the more so as there was still no sign of his coming 
down. To confirm their views the scouts presently re- 
ported that he was making off in the direction of Malaga. 
The decision therefore was to endeavour to get half the 
marines back on board the fleet, and then, so long as the 
wind held where it was, to lie in the open water to the east 
of Gibraltar to await the French and cover the place 
against any attempt Toulouse might make to recover it. 
If, on the other hand, the wind came westerly, they were 
to follow the French as far as Malaga, but no further. 
For if they were not found there it would be pretty certain 
they had retired as usual to Toulon, whither it was too 
late in the season to follow, them. 

All that day, therefore, and the following night they 
held on in battle order to the northward, Shovell and 
Leake in the van, Booke and Byng in the centre, and the 
Dutch in the rear. Meanwhile Hesse had handsomely 
met Booke's request for the marines, and next morning 
the fire-ships and sloops from Gibraltar appeared with a 
thousand of them instead of only half. As soon as they 
were distributed, Booke went about to the southward to 
pick up the twelve ships that had been left on the Barbary 
coast. The sound of the French signal guns, which all 
through the night had been growing more distant, had 
ceased altogether, and though the wind was fair for their 
coming down, not a sign of them could be seen. Towards 
evening Booke made up his mind that Toulouse must be 
trying to get away from him, and, taking in the signal 
for the line of battle, he ordered a chase to windward* 



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266 GIBRALTAR AND MALAGA 1704 

The wind held fresh from the eastward, and for two days 
he heat against it in long boards across the mouth of the 
Straits under a press of sail, and still not a sign of the 
enemy could be seen beyond one small vessel which the 
frigates chased ashore. During the next night it would 
seem that Wishart's anxiety for Gibraltar increased, and 
a fear arose that Toulouse by the help of his galleys might 
have slipped past inshore, and if so he would have 
the half-repaired fortress and all the fleet auxiliaries at 
his mercy. At daybreak therefore on August 12 a fresh 
council was called, at which it was agreed that, as it was 
clearly hopeless to close with Toulouse if he meant to get 
away, it was best to bear up for the Straits, lie there for 

"\two days more, and then if the French did not appear to 
/'devote their whole force to putting Gibraltar in a con- 

' dition to defend itself. So, in no hope of a fight, the 
council broke up. But scarcely were the flag-officers 
aboard their ships again and the new course set, when 
the whole French fleet was sighted off Cape Malaga to 
the north-west of them and to leeward, speeding before 
the wind towards Gibraltar. 

Then the truth flashed upon them. To abandon his 
mission was far from Toulouse's mind. The meaning of 
his retrograde movement was merely that, having located 
Booke, he wanted to pick up his galleys and water at 
Malaga before bringing him to action. So soon as this 
was effected he had hurried back towards the Straits, and 
during one of Booke's long boards to the south-east had 
passed inshore of him. It was a curious chance that 
well exemplifies the almost incalculable hazards of the 
sea. Both fleets were short of cruisers, and it was by 
their inability to scout adequately that Toulouse lost the 
weather gage and Booke gained it. Again it was by the 
mere chance of an hour or two that Toulouse did not 



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1704 THE FLEETS IX CONTACT *7 

elude Booke altogether and find Hesse at his mercy in the 
defenceless fortress. On the other hand, had he done so, 
he would almost certainly have been caught by Booke at 
a serious disadvantage that might well have involved the 
entire destruction of his fleet. As it was, Fortune had 
fairly divided her favour, and the superiority which 
Toulouse had in the size of his ships and weight of metal 
was almost balanced by his having lost the wind. 1 

It was about five and twenty miles almost due south 
of Cape Malaga that the French were sighted, and they 
at once began to form line of battle with the wind abeam 
and heads to the southward. Seeing them thus resolutely 
interposing themselves between him and Gibraltar, 
Booke called in his cruisers and, having re-formed line, 
began to bear down to attack. But the wind was light 

1 The remarks of the Marquis da Villette, who commanded the French 
van, make it clear they did not deliberately ohoose the leeward station. He 
says they lost the weather gage through the unfortunate necessity of having 
to go to Velez Malaga for water after they first got contact— MonmeiquA's 
M/ntoires du Marquis de Villette, 154. 

As to the comparative strength of the two lines, in numbers it was 
50 French to 51 of the allies, hut both Shovell and Booke said the French 
had 17 three-deckers to their 7. Booke had not a single first-rate. Toulouse 
had two or three. The French had also over 8500 more men than the allies. 
Leake, however, considered the ships of the fleet pretty equally matched. 
He shows the allies had actually more gnns than the French, and says the 
English 80-gun two-deckers were as heavy in metal as the French 80-gon 
three-deckers. Further, he says that more of the French were smalL He 
tabulates thus :— 

•s, 80 guns and upward . 

60 ,* „ • • 

Under 60 gnns .... 

50 Tl 

His opinion, however, must be a little discounted because his advice was 
rejected and he thought the tactics of Booke and Shovell were not as bold 
as they ought to have been. If the heavy calibres of the French first-ratef 
and the large second-rates be taken into account, there can be no doubt 
they were markedly superior in weight of metal (S. W. Leake, Life o/ Sir 
Jolm Leake). All French accounts accuse the allies of having used their 
bomb- vessels in the action, but this the allies deny. 



French 18 


AiUwie 


.. M 


n M 


» 1* 


n « 



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2*3 GIBRALTAR AND MALAGA 1704 

and fitful and little progress could be made. It remained 
so all day, so that the French with the aid of their 
galleys were able to form their battle order without falling 
farther to leeward. Night fell with nothing done, but 
with darkness the wind improved, and at daybreak on the 
13th the French line was seen perfect three leagues to 
lee ward, and as the sun rose Toulouse hove-to to await 
Rooke's attack. 

Then ensued an action which is now only remembered 
as inaugurating a period during which naval tactics sank 
to a hide-bound formality and rendered decisive engage- 
ments impossible— a period during which unintelligent 
admirals, pedantically absorbed in preserving their forma- 
tion, contented themselves with fighting ship to ship and 
attempting no manoeuvres for a concentration on part 
of their adversaries* line. It is doubtful however whether 
to dismiss the action so lightly is not to misjudge the con- 
duct of the officers concerned and to create a misappre- 
hension of the lines on which sailing tactics developed. 
It must be remembered that it was only forty years since 
the older group system had disappeared and the practice 
of fleets engaging in two single lines had been fully 
adopted at the battle of the Texel in 1665. About thirty 
years later the Jesuit Paul Hoste embalmed the ideas of 
his friend and patron Tourville in bis famous treatise 
on naval evolutions. Since this work was published in 
1697 no important action had been fought in the open, 
and it may be taken as representing the thought of the 
time. It shows us that the chief end of tactics, apart 
from gaining the wind, was to isolate and double on a 
part of the enemy's force. In the early days of the new 
system the usual method of attempting this had been to 
break through the hostile line by suddenly tacking upon 
it in succession. This method had been the favourite 



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1704 TACTICAL IDKA8 OF THE HOUR 269 

one with Monk, who had used it with great boldness. 
Recently however it had fallen into disfavour owing to 
the risks it involved, and Hoste was of opinion it should 
never be attempted except under very special circum- 
stances to save a critical situation, or when the faulty 
movements of the enemy gave a favourable opportunity 
by leaving a gap in his line. So long as the enemy'e 
formation was intact, be held that doubling was never 
legitimate unless superior numbers enabled you to over- 
lap him. You might then double on his van or rear. 
In the absence of these conditions the proper method 
was for the attacking fleet to bear down all together, each 
for its opposite in the line, and then, if by hard fighting 
a section of two or three ships could be forced out of the 
line, doubling might be attempted by passing through the 
gap that had been made. 

It was this phase of expert opinion that underlay the 
much derided 'Fighting Instructions' of the British 
service. Ill-advised as they appear in the light of the 
developed system of Rodney and his successors, they never- 
theless represent a definite and logical stage of progress, 
and history cannot afford to dismiss them with mere 
contempt. To a period of active and almost fanatical 
offence, that was perhaps largely due to the vigorous 
personalities of Monk and Rupert, there was succeeding a 
more cautious but equally well-founded period of defence. 
Experts had been absorbed with the idea of doubling till 
it had become a dangerous commonplace. By a logical 
reaction they were now preoccupied with methods of 
turning to disaster the rash or ill-judged movements which 
an enemy might make in endeavouring to secure an advan- 
tage by doubling. Experience had taught them that, when 
fleets were approximately equal, the admiral who could 
preserve his line the longest had the surest chance of 



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270 GIBRALTAR AND MALAGA 1704 

finding an opportunity for a crashing concentration ; and 
thus in the naval thought of the hour the preservation of 
the line was becoming a higher consideration than attempts 
to secure a tactical advantage at the first onset. 

It was with these ideas in the air that Rooke 
went into action. For the formation which Toulouse 
adopted, D'Estries, his first captain and the real com- 
mander of the fleet, was responsible. The main strength 
was massed in the centre, and here the line was allowed 
to sag to leeward in a curve or 'bite.' The object is not 
certain. The English officers believed it foreboded an 
attempt to weather their van or rear. Possibly it was 
accidental, but it is certain that a previous example of 
the central curve occurred in Tourville's action with Tor- 
rington off Beachy Head in 1690, and it is therefore more 
probable it was deliberate. In order to facilitate a ready 
response to the movements of the English, D'Estrees 
formed his line with the wind abeam. This, according to 
Hoste, was the most vicious of all formations, since in his 
opinion it laid you open to be doubled in rear by an even 
inferior enemy with impunity. Rooke made no such 
attempt. To bis cautious nature the new defensive tactics 
must have been peculiarly convincing. Moreover he 
must have shared Shovell's opinion that, when fleets were 
practically equal, a decisive victory was not to be looked for. 
Nor was this the main object he sought. His preoccupa- 
tion was to prevent the recapture of Gibraltar, and could 
he inflict a severe enough blow on Toulouse to prevent 
his supporting the threatened siege his work was done. 
On the other hand, if, in seeking by hazardous tactics to 
secure a decisive victory, he met with a disaster such as 
those tactics were now generally recognised to court, he 
would lose not only Gibraltar but the whole command of 
the Mediterranean. For since he had no nearer port than 



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1704 THE BRITISH ATTACK 271 

Lisbon for retreat, and could not reach even that 
without passing through the enemy's line, defeat would 
mean annihilation of his fleet. That he should fight was 
absolutely necessary, but under all the circumstances, 
political as well as naval, to avoid defeat was of more 
importance than to secure an overwhelming victory, and 
it may well be doubted whether any course could be 
better than that which Booke adopted. 

Although he had fifty-three of the line to the French 
fifty-one, and might have doubled with at least two ships, 
he considered it necessary to have a reserve to watch the 
galleys. He had therefore contented himself with equal- 
ising his line to that of Toulouse and leaving two fifty- 
gun ships in reserve. As he bore down, the usual trouble 
happened. Owing to the long time he had had to pre- 
serve his line abreast, and the fact that he had to approach 
the French obliquely, the van ranged ahead of the centre 
and the centre of the rear, and considerable gaps were 
left between the divisions. Seeing this, Shovell, so soon 
as he was within half gun-shot, hove-to to wait for Booke, 
and the two opposing vice-admirals lay watching each 
other in silence, ship to ship. Shovell however was 
fourth in his line, and Villette third in his, so that the 
English van was overlapping the French by one ship. 
Here was an apparent threat to double, and Villette's 
leading captain passed the word down to him that the 
whole van must make sail to reach level with the head of 
the English line. 1 It was now Shovell's turn to fear 
being doubled, especially as he had in his division only 

1 This wis certainly the meaning of Villette's movement, which wet so 
▼ariously interpreted by both English and French observers. Villette him- 
self wrote the day after the action, * On m'avait eri4 de main en main qnli 
fallait que tonte Patent-garde fbrcast de Toilet poor gagner le reste des 
ennemis.' See his despatch in lfonmorqut, Mtmoim du UarguU d$ 
VUUU$ t 850. 



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272 GIBRALTAR AND MALAGA 1704 

fifteen sail to Villette's seventeen. He therefore seems to 
have made a corresponding movement ahead, with the 
result that he still farther widened his distance from 
the centre. It was an advantageous moment which 
D*Estr6es was not likely to let slip, especially as he 
believed, when he saw Villette making sail, he was already 
about to profit by it. Toulouse's superiority in the centre 
warranted some risk, and, if trouble came, there were 
always the galleys to get him out of it. Toulouse there- 
fore signalled for his whole line to make sail with 
the intention of passing through the gap between Rooke 
and Shovell with his own division, and doubling on the 
British vah in order to crush it before the Dutch could 
get into action. In the meantime, as he knew, his own 
rear would have ranged up to hold the British centre in 
check, and the Dutch would be left out of action. Rooke, 
though he misunderstood Toulouse's purpose, was equal 
to the occasion. Coming on under a press of sail, he had 
got within extreme gunshot when he saw the French 
making sail, and, believing they intended to weather him 
ahead of his van, he made the signal to heave-to and 
engage. His own two leading ships, under Rear- Admiral 
Dilkes, fell on Villette's rear, and thus put the two vans on 
an equality. He himself engaged Toulouse. The range 
was much too great to please him, but it was enough to 
stop the French movement. As the whole British line 
opened fire and the shot tore through his rigging, Tou- 
louse gave up his well-designed attempt, and the action 
became general in centre and van, each ship pounding her 
opposite in the line, and the rear divisions still too distant 
to engage. 

By his ^cautious tactics Rooke at the outset had 
deprived Toulouse'dTahy real hope of a decisive victory. 
It had^cqme down to sheer hard fighting and. Rooke had 



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1704 BATTLE OF MALAGA 273 

little to fear. Still he had work enough. Ship for ship 
Booke's division was seriously overweighted, but stout 
hearts and good gunnery told, and he held his own in a 
manner that elicited the most enthusiastic admiration 
from his Dutch colleagues. In the van, Shovell was able 
to do better. After four hours' hard pounding, the stern 
of Villette's flagship blew up, and he had to bear out of the 
line to extinguish the fire. The rest of his division, as he 
says, without any reason followed his example, and with 
high exultation the British van saw their opponents 
beaten to leeward. Leake was for closing in upon them 
and pushing them till the French line was completely 
broken, so that Toulouse would be compelled to fall 
back with his centre to avoid the risk of being doubled. 
There was much to be said for his advice. Booke by 
this time sadly needed relief. Not only was the superior 
weight of the enemy's metal telling severely upon him, 
but several of his division, which had formed part of the 
bombarding squadron at Gibraltar, had exhausted their 
ammunition and had to haul their wind out of the line. 
Seeing his opportunity, Toulouse began to work up to 
the gap. It was this crisis that caused Shovell to reject 
Leake's idea. The danger was acute, and he decided, 
instead of following his advantage, to draw astern and 
close up the broken line. It was a piece of seamanship 
greatly admired at the time, and although, to Leake's dis- 
gust, it left him and all the head of the British van with 
nothing to do, it probably saved the situation for Booke. 
About the same time moreover the Dutch got into action, 
and for the remainder of the afternoon so pressed the 
French rear that towards sunset it broke to leeward like 
their van. To prevent isolation Toulouse himself had now 
to fall back with the centre, and the action came to an 
end as evening closed down. 

VOL. II. T 



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S74 GIBRALTAR AND MALAGA 1704 

Each side had suffered severely, both in men and 
ships, and all night the two fleets lay where they were, 
repairing damages. As the hours wore on, the wind 
began to back till at daybreak it was westerly, and the 
French had the weather gage. The morning broke 
with impenetrable haze. When it cleared away they 
were seen forming line of battle with heads to the north- 
ward, and Booke at once hove-to in line to receive them 
with his disabled and useless ships to leeward. But it 
was soon seen that the French did not mean to attack. 
Galleys were towing shattered ships out of the line, they 
were still busy repairing rigging, and the British began to 
follow their example. So the day passed with light airs 
and calms, and in the evening Booke called his council. 
It was agreed that, damaged and short of ammunition 
as they were, they could do no good by retaining the 
position they were occupying. Having lain to leeward 
of the French a whole day, challenging an attack, they 
had done all that honour required, and no one could say 
they had been beaten. There was nothing therefore to 
prevent their making their way to Gibraltar to protect 
it and complete their refit. Thither then, after distri- 
buting through the fleet what shot remained, they resolved 
to go, but only on the understanding that, if the French 
fleet were found between them and their destination, 
it was not to be avoided. They would reach Gibraltar 
through the thick of it, or not at all. 

It was one of those Quixotic resolutions which no 
technical consideration can justify. It was thus that Sir 
Bichard Grenville had founded the great tradition when 
he lost the * Bevenge ' at the Azores. The same spirit 
was still green, and who can say that the proud resolve 
not to give way was not more than worth the risk it 
involved ? Had the thing been done it would have lived as 



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1704 A QUIXOTIC RESOLVE S75 

one of the most heroic and inspiring pages in our history, 
but fate decreed otherwise. At daybreak it seemed the 
ordeal was at hand. Some four or five leagues to wind- 
ward the French fleet shaped itself out of the lifting 
mists directly across their path. An hour or two later, 
a breeze came up from the eastward, and in stubborn 
pride the allies bore on under easy sail as though no 
enemy was there. / Each captain had been told to fight his 
own way through as best he could, and when his lockers 
were empty to press on for the rendezvous at Gibraltar, 
and shift for himself. 4 Some at least had agreed to fire their 
ships if they could not win through. As the allied fleet 
came solemnly on, the French re-formed their line to the 
northward, and in doing so gave ground to leeward. The 
wind too continued very light, and the result was that by 
four o'clock it was seen to be impossible to close before 
dark. Booke therefore hove-to to let the crippled stragglers 
close up, and ijhe desperate venture was deferred till the 
morrow. But when morning broke there was not a sigi}. 
of the enemy to be seen. Booke, concluding they had 
gone to the Straits mouth or perhaps to Cadiz to refit, 
at once made sail for Gibraltar. Still, not bo much as a 
scout could be seen in the haze that prevailed, and Booke 
held on blindly through the mists till he was forced to 
bring-to for fear of the land. So they lay all night with 
little wind and a great easterly sea. In the morning they 
heard the French had not passed the Straits. Nothing 
indeed had been seen of them, and the true state of affairs 
began to be guessed. The bold front Booke had put on 
might perhaps have frightened Toulouse into returning to 
Toulon. Still no one could tell, and it was decided to lie 
where they were, covering Gibraltar, for forty-eight hours, 
/ to let the French attack if they would. The two days 

t2 



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2176 . GIBRALTAR AND MALAGA 1704 

passed, and then, assured that Toulouse had abandoned 
the enterprise, they put into Gibraltar Bay. 

80 ended the famous episode of Velez-Malaga. Both 
sides claimed the victory. Toulouse with his fleet cut to 
pieces had returned to Toulon, boasting that he had 
driven the allies out of the Mediterranean. Te Deums 
were sung in city and camp, reaching. Marlborough's ears 
on the Danube, and damping his satisfaction with the 
crushing victory he had won ten days before Rooke 
fought. But opposite rumours reached him too as he 
was forming the siege of Landau. ' If the news we have 
here,* he wrote, * of Sir George Rooke's having beaten 
the French fleet ... be confirmed, we may hope that 
our affairs in those parts, as well as in Italy, will soon 
have a different aspect. 9 His hopes were certainly fulfilled. 
( If battles are to be judged by their fruits, it was Rooke 
' who had won. Toulouse had gone out from Barce- 
/ lona to retake Gibraltar, and Rooke had successfully 
) bairedjm way. Not only had he saved the fortress, but 
I it was he who had driven Toulouse from the Mediter- 
ranean. For all the Te Deums that were sung France 
was quick to admit her failure. From the moment of 
Toulouse's return with Jus object unfulfilled, all faith in 
I .the navy was lost ; no grand fleet was again attempted, 
• and the command of the Mediterranean was abandoned 
( to the allies. 



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CHAPTER XXXII 

GIBRALTAR AND TOULON 

By Eooke's stubborn fight, though the main hope of the 
naval campaign had not been fulfilled, the hold of the 
allies upon the Straits was secured. For the time at 
least they were one step nearer the goal, and England 
practically single-banded was clinging to it with an almost 
desperate grasp. When the battle-torn fleet anchored in 
the bay, the marines ashore fired a running salute round 
the shattered fortress, and, as evening closed in, lit up 
triumphant bonfires on its crumbling bastions. But for 
all the good face they put upon it the future was very 
dark, and the moment full of anxiety. The advanced 
troops of the Bourbon army were already crossing the 
neighbouring heights, the siege was about to begin, and 
the admirals knew the marines must face it alone. The 
state of the fleet made it impossible for it to remain. 
The condition in which the too drastic bombardment 
had left the fortress was almost as bad, but Hesse was as 
ready as ever to undertake its defence. All he asked was 
the marines of the fleet, sixty great guns and sixty gun- 
ners, and a detachment of carpenters and armourers to 
assist in the repair of the shattered works. All this, with 
six months' provisions, and two bomb-vessels with their 
tenders, the council-of-war agreed to give him. It was 
further resolved that all the ships that were fit for winter 
service should be formed into a squadron under Sir John 
Leake and be left on the station. The rest were to go 



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278 GIBRALTAR AND TOULON 1704 

home with the exception of those which were too much 
shattered for the voyage, and these, also under Leake's 
command, were to stop at Lisbon to be repaired. In a 
week all was ready, as far as could be, for the forlorn 
garrison to defend itself. On August 28, to the 60und 
of another salute, Rooke weighed, and for the first time 
in history the Mediterranean fleet sailed homewards, 
leaving a footprint behind it. 

For the time it was little more. Even as Rooke sailed. 
the Spanish army was gathered before it, and worse was 
to be expected. That Louis and the Spaniards would 
make a violent effort to recover it was a certainty. To 
the Government in England it was equally obvious that 
that attempt must not be allowed to succeed. Their pre- 
carious hold must be confirmed. True, it was not yet a 
British possession. It had been taken by an allied force, 
and the flag of Charles III. floated over it. But it was a 
British garrison that held it, and from the first there 
seems to have been little doubt as to what the ultimate 
fate of the fortress was to be. So small had been the 
assistance of the allies that its capture was practically a 
British exploit ; for years British statesmen had made no 
secret of the price they expected for their share in the 
work of preserving the balance of power ; and whether 
Hapsburg or Bourbon was eventually to secure the 
crown of Spain there was probably never much idea that 
England would loose her hold. 

So soon as Rooke came home, Sir Charles Hedges, 
the Secretary of State, wrote to Marlborough for his 
views. The Duke replied in words that show he already 
regarded the place as a British possession. f I find it 
generally agreed, 9 he wrote, 'that the post may be of 
vast use to our trade and navigation in the Mediterranean, 
and therefore that no cost ought to be spared to maintain 



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1704 GIBRALTAR BESIEGED 979 

it. But I fear the States will not easily be brought at 
present to bear any share of the expense, nor do I believe 
the King of Portugal will be willing to spare so many of 
our men as may be necessary to relieve the present 
garrison, though I know not otherwise how it can be done, 
and am not in the meantime without some apprehensions 
for the place, since it is certain it hath been besieged 
for some time past, both by sea and land, and in my 
opinion, nothing but a superior squadron can save it/ l 
9 It was true that Hesse and his marines had been hard 
pressed ; but, as Marlborough wrote, the immediate danger 
was over. Before the end of September a French 
squadron of ten of the line and nine frigates with three 
thousand troops and a siege train appeared in Gibraltar 
Bay. It had been detached from Toulon under the 
Baron de Pointis to support the Spanish force that was 
investing the place, and a fortnight later the siege was 
opened in form. Hesse sent word to Leake begging him 
to come to his aid at the earliest possible moment. But 
Leake could not move. He had found the Lisbon dock- 
yard bare. Spars, sails, cordage, everything was wanting. 
Even the two regiments which, contrary to Marlborough's 
expectation, the King of Portugal had ordered to Lagos 
at the first call for help could not be transported to 
the Straits. With Methuen, the indefatigable admiral 
strained every nerve to refit his squadron, but it was nearly 
a month after Hesse's first summons before he could patch 
it up enough to get to sea. 

Fortunately, for some reason that is not known, 
Pointis did not remain at Gibraltar. Having landed the 
troops and the siege-train, he passed on to Cadiz, leaving 
only six frigates behind him. Hesse was thus spared an 
attack by sea as well as by land, and was able to use one 

1 Despatches, L 696, November 8, 1704. 



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280 GIBRALTAR AND TOULON 1704 

of his bomb-vessels with effect against the enemy's 
trenches, till one night they pluckily burnt it. On the 
land side he had not so much to fear. During the respite 
that had been allowed him he had repaired the damage 
of the bombardment and had much improved the de- 
fences of the north front. Still day by day the enemy's 
trenches grew nearer and their fire more crushing. Hesse 
replied by dragging guns up the heights and pouring a 
plunging fire into the French works, and was able to report 
the garrison behind the crumbling walls as full of abun- 
dant cheerfulness and himself without concern. Had he 
known what was threatening he could hardly have been 
so confident. 

One dark night at the end of October, a ' forlorn ' of five 
hundred men, led by a goatherd, landed unseen upon the 
far side of the Bock, and, climbing by the aid of ropes 
and ladders to the summit of the Middle Hill, concealed 
themselves till the signal should be given for action. 
Their lodgment was but the first step in a most formi- 
dable plan of assault. They were to be supported by a 
boat attack on the new mole, similar to that which had 
captured the fortress. It was to be in overwhelming 
strength, and while the garrison were absorbed in re- 
pulsing it the concealed force was to fall upon their rear. 
The design which had so far succeeded could hardly have 
failed. Everything was ready. Hundreds of boats had 
been collected about Algeciras; the troops were on the 
point of embarking; the forlorn, still undiscovered, lay 
in momentary expectation of the signal, when in the 
very hour for action Leake came swooping into the Bay. 
It was a complete surprise. Only one of the French 
squadron which had been left on guard succeeded in 
getting to sea, and she was quickly taken. The rest were 
beached and fired by their crews. The flotilla dared not 



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1704 A NARROW ESCAPE 281 

stir, and the forlorn on Middle Hill had to be left to its 
fate. Pinched by hunger, they soon had to come out of 
their hiding place. Directly they were seen, Leake rein- 
forced the garrison, and in an hour or two the whole of 
the daring five hundred were dead or prisoners. 

Thus for the second time Gibraltar was saved. It 
was to the prompt vigour of the home authorities that 
the success was largely due. Ten days previously, on 
October 19, two convoys— one Dutch and one English — 
had reached the Tagus with stores and transports, and in 
less than a week Leake had been able to get to sea with 
thirteen English and six Dutch of the line, besides 
frigates and victuallers. Thus he not only relieved the 
place but was able also to supply it, and by his restless 
activity to afford incalculable help to the garrison. 
With a naval brigade he undertook the whole defence of 
the new mole, he enfiladed the enemy's trenches with 
his frigates, he continually threatened their camp at 
Algeciras with his boats, and generally harassed the siege 
operations in every direction, and enheartened the dwin- 
dling garrison with the presence of his ships. Constant 
reports that Pointis was preparing to come out of Cadiz 
told him his proper place was at sea. The winter storms 
wasted half his ground tackle and made his position in 
the Bay still more dangerous. Yet, in response to the 
urgent entreaties of the hard pressed officers ashore, he 
clung to Gibraltar and his galling work. Every day his 
own danger and that of the garrison increased, yet it was 
not till he heard that a second relief force had reached 
the Tagus and was about to sail for Gibraltar with only 
a couple of frigates to escort it that he put to sea to 
cover the passage of the transports and storeships past 
Cadiz. Even then, ill-manned as he was, he left a hun- 
dred men behind him to assist the overworked marines. 



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282 GIBRALTAR AND TOULON 1704 

By this time the garrison was again reduced to ex- 
tremity- Through sickness and casualties Hesse had not 
a thousand men sound enough to mount guard. The 
safe arrival of the relieving force was a matter of life and 
death* and Pointis had a fresh fleet ready to stop it. Every- 
thing had to be put to the hazard, and Leake, in spite of 
the condition he was in, and although he knew Pointis 
to be in superior force, had resolved to appear before Cadiz 
and offer his adversary battle while the transports passed. 
Bat fate was against him. Adverse winds kept him in 
the Straits, nor could he get free before he heard Pointis 
was out and had fallen upon the convoy. Seeing a fleet 
off Cape Espartel flying English and Dutch colours, the 
transports had borne up to join it. Fortunately it fell 
calm, and the French, trusting too much to their false 
colours, began prematurely to take up an enveloping 
formation. The commodore of the escort immediately 
took alarm. It was ' Out sweeps and boats I ' in a 
moment, and, before Pointis could close, all the trans- 
ports but two were out of his clutches. Some two thou- 
sand infantry besides engineers and all kinds of stores 
reached the Bay in safety, and Gibraltar was again 
relieved. Pointis returned discomfited to Cadiz, and 
Leake at the end of the year went back to the Tagus to 
refit 1 

The grip of the sea powers was closing on the gate of 
the Mediterranean, and Louis began to grow desperate. 
With the forces at his disposal he had looked upon the 
recapture of Gibraltar as a matter of a few weeks. When 
the first efforts, failed, the whole situation on the Portu- 
guese frontier had been sacrificed to form the siege. 
Still it not only held out but was growing stronger every 
day, and it was clear that if it was not taken before the 
i Letkrt Lift of L$dk$; Bayer, Hittory of Gibraltar, p. 188, note. 



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1705 TESSfi TAKES COMMAND 288 

spring the Bourbon position in Spain could not be main- 
tained. Louis resolved therefore to supersede the Spanish 
general by offering the services of his own commander- 
in-chief, Marshal Tess6. The result was only to make 
matters worse. The Spaniards were deeply hurt. In 
January 1705 9 they twice flung themselves prematurely 
upon the north front, determined to capture the place 
before Tess£ arrived. Both attacks failed, owing — so the 
Spaniards said— to the French regiments refusing to do 
their duty. Meanwhile, disease and the terrors of a 
winter siege were sweeping off their men in hundreds. 
Leake at Lisbon, on the other hand, was in constant 
touch with the garrison. He kept throwing in fresh 
supplies and troops, and Pointis, idle in Cadiz, stirred no 
finger to prevent him. 

Tess6, the moment he arrived, took in the situation at 
a glance. He saw that without the command of the sea 
the enterprise was hopeless. Assuming the character of 
Sancho Panza addressing his master, Don Quixote, he 
wrote in humorous despair to the minister Pontchar- 
train to tell him so. His disgust at the inactivity of 
Pointis he unloaded upon Conde with equal playfulness. 
1 The English/ he wrote, ' at any rate teach us that you 
may keep the sea in all weathers, for they promenade it 
like the swans in your river at Chantilly/ l Still his 
advent gave things a more formidable turn. The siege was 
renewed on more scientific lines, and, what was worse, 
Pointis, upon peremptory orders from Madrid, hardened 
his heart to come round to Gibraltar from Cadiz with 
fourteen sail. The Marshal had now what he needed, 
and he strenuously prepared for a grand attack by sea 
and land. 

1 Test* to Pontehartrain, Feb. 18, 1706 (u.), Lettr$$ ds Rett, p. 210. 
Suae to Conde, Feb. 36, Mtmoiret <U Te$$4 t p. 188 et ejg. 



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28* GIBRALTAR AND TOULON 1706 

This was the one thing that Hesse feared, and both 
Leake and Methuen grew no less anxious. Months before 
they had been told that Shovell was at Spithead about to 
sail with a squadron that would put Gibraltar beyond 
danger. Now it was known that he was not coming for 
the present. Instead, a division of his fleet was to be 
detached under Sir Thomas Dilkes and Sir Thomas Hardy, 
bat even of this there was as yet no news. In the 
Tagus, though Leake and Methuen were stirring every 
nerve, things were far from ready for sea. The ambassa- 
dor protested to the home Government that since he had 
been told to spare nothing, so that Gibraltar was kept, he 
bad nearly ruined himself. ' The importance of Gibraltar 
to England/ he wrote, ' hath made me boggle at nothing.' 
Its importance, he ventured to add, would be as great 
after the peace as during the war. ' My opinion/ he 
urged, 'is that if the circumstances of Europe should 
force a peace without the monarchy of Spain being left 
in the possession of Charles the Third, England must 
never part with Gibraltar, which will always be a pledge 
of our commerce and privileges in Spain.' 1 Leake's 
activity elicited his warmest praises; but for all the 
admiral's efforts it was not till February 25 that he was 
ready to put to sea. The very next day he was rejoiced 
with the sight of Dilkes's squadron putting into the river 
with a convoy, which brought everything he wanted. 
And not only that, for Dilkes presented him with his 
commission as Vice-Admiral of the White and Com- 
mander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. A Portuguese 
squadron, such as it was, was also ready, and within a 
week he was speeding for Gibraltar under a press of sail 
with thirty-five of the line. 

In vain the unhappy Pointis had protested against 

1 8m his top** of llsr. 7, 1705 (n.s.) in Add. MS8. 28066. 



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1705 LEAKE RAISES THE SIEGE 

what would certainly happen if he was compelled to leave 
Cadiz before he was reinforced from Toulon. Neither 
Madrid nor Versailles would listen. Both courts were 
desperate, and he had to remain at Gibraltar for Tessa's 
combined attack. His own idea was to cruise in the 
Straits and stop reliefs till his force could be strengthened. 
Lying in the Bay, he knew he was at the mercy both of 
the weather and Leake. All he could do by laying a line 
of signal stations as far as Cadiz he did, but all was of 
no avail. Both the dangers he feared fell on him at once. 
Before the combined attack was ripe, a gale came up oat 
of the Atlantic and drove two-thirds of his squadron from 
their anchors away to leeward up the Straits. He him- 
self with his flagship, the three-decker * Lys/ and four 
others of the line managed to cling on under Cape Cabrita. 
There he was still lying when suddenly, without a note 
of warning from his signal stations, the head of a fleet 
loomed up out of the blinding mist. It was Leake 
coming down on the dying gale. To the wild swans of 
the north it had come like a friend, and Pointis knew he 
was doomed. He had scarcely time to cut his cables 
before they were upon him. One ship immediately 
struck ; two others were taken by boarding after a fair 
fight; Pointis and the fifth vessel fought their way 
valiantly through, but only to be driven ashore and forced 
to burn. The rest were chased as far as Malaga, where 
they had taken refuge ; but at the sound of the fight they 
had made sail again and were soon beyond reach in 
Toulon. With these tidings Leake returned to Gibraltar, 
and as its deliverer entered the Bay a triumphant salute 
from the guns of the fortress proclaimed that the grip of 
England was set at last hard apd fast upon the Straits. 

It was no less a thing than that. Tessi frankly recog- 
nised that the game was lost. Whatever Madrid or 



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286 GIBRALTAR AND TOULON 1706 

Versailles might say, it was madness to add to the fright- 
ful loss of life and resources which the attempt had cost. 
Before the end of the month, therefore, he raised the 
siege and returned to his task on the Portuguese frontier, 
now almost as hopeless as the other. 1 

Marlborough had so far achieved his aim, and the 
situation for which he had been ready to sacrifice his first 
campaign in Flanders was in effective operation. France 
was faced on her furthest frontier in the Peninsula with 
a war nourished from the sea; and the Mediterranean, 
instead of being an easy means of communication 
that would co-ordinate her operations in Spain and 
Italy, had become for her an obstacle, and for her 
enemies a pathway she could no longer bar. At the 
time, the momentous revolution which had been set on 
foot was barely recognised — at least by public opinion. 
The capture of Gibraltar was rated at first far below 
its true value — partly no doubt because of the injudicious 
efforts of Rooke's friends to cry it up as a rival to 
Blenheim, but more perhaps because by itself it really 
was comparatively of small importance. As a station for 
the protection of commerce it was of course invaluable, 
and for this reason merchants highly valued it as they 
had valued Tangier. But strategists had long recognised 
that for the command of the Mediterranean a port in the 
Straits only capable of receiving a cruiser squadron was 
useless unless it was supplemented by the possession of a 
place that could be made into a real naval port — a place, 
that is, where a fleet could receive its winter refit. The 
prospect of destroying Toulon seemed as remote as ever, 
and each year it grew more evident that so long as the 

1 Leake's Lift Leake ; Paul Methnen's 4 Aoconnt of hii Voyage from 
Faro la Gibraltar,' March 19 to April 14, 1706 (n*), Add. MSB. 20098, 
tfTiatatf.; Ooaria, it. 124 ; Doro.Ti.6S. 



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1706 PORT MAHON 28T 

winter squadron had to retire every autumn to Lisbon., it 

was impossible to make the command of the Mediterranean^ 
tell effectively upon the war. So soon as the British 
admiral's back was turned, the Toulon privateers and 
cruisers, with Minorca for a harbour of refuge, could come 
out and play havoc down the Carlist coast, while at the 
same time the French transports and storeships could pass 
where they were wanted without interruption, and the 
commerce of Marseilles could proceed with scarcely less 
disturbance. Under such conditions the war, both in 
Catalonia and Italy, might drag on interminably, and the 
Pope and the other Italian Princes of Bourbon sympathies 
could never be made to feel the danger of their irrecon- 
cilable attitude. 

For those who knew, therefore, Gibraltar was but a 
' ' savoury morsel to whet their appetite for more. British 
Mediterranean officers had long coveted^Minorca. They 
knew it well, and in the spacious mlet of Port Mahon 
they recognised thefinest harbour in the Mediterranean, 
Events were marking it still more clearly as the real' 
key of the situation so long as Toulon remained intact. 
Every seaman and every Boldier on the spot saw that 
the course of the war was turning on its possession. 
Louis had increased its defences and garrisoned them 
with a picked body of his own marines, and the old 
cry for its possession began to be dinned into the 
ears of the British Government with ever increasing 
importunity. 

The very year after Leake had finally^ frustrated 
the attempt to regain Gibraltar the ideas of the Medi- 
terranean men were put forth in an anonymous pamphlet, 
whose popularity and influence are attested by two rapid 
editions. It was entitled ' An Inquiry into the Causes of . - 
our Naval Miscarriages/ The trouble began — so the author 



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GIBRALTAR AND TOULON 1706 

asserts — immediately after the failure at Cadiz, when 
we ought at onoe to have passed on up the Straits and 
taken possession of Port Mahon. There, he argues, we 
might always have kept a fleet in the Mediterranean 
* superior to the French, and he proceeds to set out what 
strategical results would have followed. n By stopping the 
French communications with Italy, the war there could 
quickly have been brought to an end. The trade of 
Marseilles might have been ruined and our own have 
taken its place. Majorca, with its hardy population of 
mariners— most famous of privateersmen — being fervent 
haters of France and Castile, would have declared for 
Charles III. Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia, finding the 
French unable to protect their trade, would soon have 
followed suit. Not only should we have dominated the 
Barbary states, but we could easily and naturally have 
ousted France from the leading position at the Porte. 
Other omissions he mentions — such as neglecting vigorous 
enough action against the French and Spanish colonies ; 
but before and above all he places this shortsighted failure 
to seize an adequate naval station in the Mediterranean. 
' I shall only add/ he concludes, ' that had we, according 
to the maxims of all wise invaders, first secured ourselves 
of a port and place of arms upon the skirts of their 
dominion, as we might easily have done by seizing Port 
Mahon, we should have prevented the fatal mismanage- 
ment of the war. in Italy and Spain, where sometimes the 
French and sometimes the allies have all the advantage 
of one another by a sudden run, as happens in a game of 
football; and had we kept that port after the war was 
over, which could not well be denied us, we might have 
made it a magazine and station for ships to command the 
/ Mediterranean and protect our Straits trade, and should 
; thereby have been in a condition by a naval power 



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1706 MARLBOROUGH'S VIEWS » 

< (without incurring any danger from standing armies) to 
hold the balance of Europe in our hands, which, as it is 
our natural province, is England's greatest security and I 
glory.* 1 

Here for the first tjme.We; havqf t -qft explicit public^ 
declaration of England's true position in Europe, and. oL- 
the simple policy that was necessary to secure it. It is 
no wonder that such sentiments rapidly carried conviction 
and solidified into a settled purpose. But, clearly as the 
expedient was indicated, it was long before circumstances - 
permitted its achievement. One reason for this was 
undoubtedly that it did not commend itself to Marl- 
borough's drastic notions of warfare. Secondary or 
masking operations never found favour with him so long 
as there was any possibility of a blow direct at the heart 
of things. He was still clinging to his original plan. I 
No sooner was Gibraltar secure than he was for coin- , 
pleting what he had carried so far by flinging the whole _ 
weight of the British navy upon Toulon. This was his i 
idea for the naval campaign of 1705, but the sailors pro- _ 
nounced the operation impracticable, and with his usual I 
deference to expert knowledge he gave way.* But it was 
only to bide his time, nor did he abandon his fund*- 
mental objective and adopt Minorca as the nearest > 
equivalent until he had actually tried Toulon and failed. . 

/ Had the Emperor and Savoy been able to rise to his height \ 
f of thought and been ready to support the cardinal opera- 
tion with all their force, there is little doubt, seeing the 
condition Toulon was in, that success would have been 
won. But they were each too intent on securing the 

1 HarlHan Miscellany, vol. xi. pp. 5-28, 2nd edition, 1707. 

* See Tease's * Memorandum of the projects of the enemy,' April 15, 1705 
(Mtmoires, ii. 160). He had apparently received from Versailles a complete 
report of what passed at the Supreme Council of War held before the 
Queen early in 1705. 

VOL. II. U 



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290 GIBRALTAR AND TOULON 1705 

fruits of victory to combine in an adequate effort or to 
make the necessary sacrifices to achieve it. So, instead 

_of dealing a blow that, if successful, must have brought 
France to her knees, the energy of the maritime powers 
was flittered away in a premature effort to place 'the 
Hapsburg King on the Spanish throne. 

So the war took a new turn, which kept England from 
confirming her hold upon the Mediterranean. In the 
first week in August, 1705, the Earl of Peterborough, to 
whom was committed the new plan of operations, and 
Shovell with their long-delayed fleet put into Gibraltar, 
• the ruins of which place/ says a contemporary chroni- 
cler, ' were a plain demonstration of the great courage, 
industry, and indefatigable care wherewith the Prince 
of Darmstadt had defended it against the united force 
of France and Castile.' In the British flagship was 
Charles EH., bound for Catalonia, to begin from there 
the conquest of his kingdom. For awhile it is true the 
astounding boldness of Peterborough's operations met 
with a success that seemed to justify the enterprise. 
Barcelona fell miraculously in September, and Shovell 
went home, leaving Charles king in Catalonia. Leake 
remained behind with the usual winter squadron, but as 
there was as yet no British port within the Straits, it had 
still to be based on^Lisbon^and little had really been done 
to improve the situation in the Mediterranean. 

It was there, in spite of the rejection of his design on 
Toulon, that Marlborough's eyes were more earnestly 
fixed than ever. It was there he saw more clearly each 
campaign the vital point of the war lay, and he knew 

_that if for the moment the allies had the best of it in 
Catalonia, in Italy things were as bad as they could be. 
Savoy was almost in despair, and Marlborough was doing 
all he knew to strengthen the cause in the two seats of the 



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1706 BARCELONA AND NORTH ITALY 291 

Mediterranean struggle. Heinsius, the Grand Pensionary 
of the States, who alone of Dutch statesmen could see to 
Marlborough's horizon, entirely shared his view of their 
importance. 'I am sure/ he wrote to Marlborough, 
' that on these two points will turn the good or evil for- 
tune of the common cause.' l The French were equally 
alive to the situation, and it was known that a strenuous 
effort from Toulon was to be made to recover Barcelona 
before the allies could resume command of the adjacent 
seas. Orders were sent down to Leake at Lisbon to do 
his utmost to prevent it, and Byng was hurried to sea 
with a squadron to reinforce him. Leake at once moved 
down to Gibraltar, but there he heard that Toulouse was 
before Barcelona with a fleet he could not hope to face. 
Tessi moreover had suddenly invested the place by land 
in overwhelming force. Peterborough was shut out and 
powerless, and it was clear that it would be touch and go 
whether the reinforcements arrived from England in time 
to save the Carlists' capital. 

At home, having done all in his power for Catalonia, 
Marlborough was deep in a remarkable scheme for the 
salvation of Savoy and Northern Italy. It was nothing 
less than a design to transfer thither from the Netherlands 
army twenty thousand men and himself to take the com- 
mand. Apart from his growing conviction that the 
struggle could only be definitely decided in the ancient 
centre of dominion, the exasperating way in which his 
late campaigns had been spoiled and even ruined by the 
perversity of the Dutch Government and the German 
generals made him long to be alone with Eugene. For 
to Eugene was to be committed this year the command 
of the Imperial army in North Italy, and together once 

1 Heinsius to Marlborough, January IS to 29, 1706, Vreede, Com* 
potj&ance Diplomatique tt MiUtaire to. p. 1. 

o » 



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293 GIBRALTAR AND TOULON 1706 

more the Duke knew they could carry all before them. 
With Lombardy and Piedmont in his hands and the main 
fleet on the coast of Provence, he saw his way to a dash 
into France which would give him Toulon, set the 
Cevennes once more in a blaze, and cut Louis off from 
the Mediterranean and all that it meant to the French 
power. Bold and heroic as his proposal was, he had 
almost succeeded in persuading the States to consent, 
when the Margrave of Baden, not having received the rein- 
forcements he expected, fell back behind the Rhine and 
exposed the left flank of the Netherlands' position. The 
Dutch at once took alarm. Ten thousand men were all 
they would consent to detach for Italy, and that only on 
condition that Marlborough remained to command in 
Flanders. Without abandoning his idea, as we shall see, 
Marlborough again bowed his head to the disappointment, 
and, after his wont, set himself to make the best of things 
as they stood. His reward was the immortal campaign 
of Ramilies, which gave him the whole of Flanders from 
the Meuse to the sea. 

Meanwhile Barcelona was reduced to the direst ex- 
tremity. The castle of Montjuich had fallen, and Peter- 
borough and Leake were at Valencia, not daring to 
proceed further with their inadequate fleet. It was not 
till April that they saw Byng's welcome sails. By that 
time Tease* had actually made his lodgment on the counter- 
scarp of the city, and was preparing for the final assault. 
There was not a moment to lose, and no sooner had Byng 
joined than a general chase was ordered. With every 
rag they could carry, the captains raced for Barcelona 
without order or thought of the consequences, so long as 
the leading ships could fasten their teeth in the French 
fleet and prevent its escape. It was a well-judged risk. 
Byng, having the cleanest ships, was the first to arrive, 



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1706 SUCCESSES OF THE ALLIES 

and it was to see Toulouse's rearguard hull-down towards 
Toulon. The allied admirals had missed their fight, 
but Barcelona was saved. At the first whisper of their 
approach, Toulouse, repeating Tourville's move, had fled 
and left Tess6 to his fate. For two days the gallant 
marshal strove to snatch victory from defeat. But on 
the third he was compelled to raise the siege precipitately, 
leaving all his siege train, stores, and wounded behind. 
The success was complete, and on May 10, two days 
before Bamilies was fought, King Charles was able to 
write to Marlborough an effusive letter of thanks for the 
new and convincing proofs of zeal and concern for his 
service that he had so successfully displayed. 

The immediate result of this operation was that the 
allies were able to advance from the Portuguese frontier to 
Madrid and proclaim Charles in the Castilian capital. On 
the Mediterranean side Cartagena surrendered, Alicante 
was taken by storm, Ivica and Majorca tendered their 
allegiance to Leake. Minorca was ready to do the same, 
and Charles had particularly urged its reduction upon the 
admiral. Peterborough had supported the King's proposal, 
but Leake replied that the French garrison in Port Mahon 
was too strong for his marines to master without the 
assistance of a military force. To meet the objection . 

Peterborough was for joining him with the necessary 
troops, but, before he could act, orders arrived, so he said, 
that he was to go to Italy to enhearten the Duke of 
Savoy and consult with him and Eugene for the next c 
year's campaign. The enterprise consequently had to be 
postponed till his return. By that time it was too late. 
With the approach of winter Leake had to leave the 
Mediterranean, and the finest port within the Straits had 
to be left in the hands of the French. 1 

1 The papers relating to this incident are printed in Leake's Life of 
Leaks, pp. 314, 269, 265. A letter from Wassenaar, the Dutch admiral, to 

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• "I 



294 GIBRALTAR AND TOULON 1706 

Though every one recognised the strategical import- 
ance of the place, the French sea power seemed too much 
broken for it to cause much anxiety. Moreover there 
was larger game on foot As the first fruits of bis 
resounding victory, Marlborough at last saw his way to 
realising the great idea towards which he had never 
ceased to work. Three days before liamilies he had 
written to disclose it to the Emperor and to explain 
why he had been compelled to abandon it temporarily. 
* I still keep my views/ he added, ' in that quarter, know- 
ing how important it is to you and the allies to keep the 
upper hand in Italy. We shall have twenty-eight thou- 
sand men in the pay of England and the States, and I 
shall try to increase them and go myself at the end of the 
campaign so as to be early afield there next campaign.' 1 

No sooner was Kamilies fought than he was busy 
smoothing the way. Early in the year a French refugee, 
the Comte de Guiscard, had proposed a descent upon 
Rochefort and the Charente with the object of penetrating 
to the Cevennes. Nothing could better prepare the 
ground for Marlborough's great stroke, and to this object 
the main fleet under Shovell was devoted. - The landing 
force was to be composed mainly of French refugees; 
but so soon as Marlborough saw his position secure in 
Flanders he detached some of his own regiments to stiffen 
it As the fleet was not ready for Shovell to hoist his 
flag till the middle of July, there was small chance of its 
doing anything effective. Every similar expedition in 
modern times had failed, and we may well believe that 
Marlborough expected but little directly. In any case it 
would serve as a diversion for both Italy and Catalonia, 

Leake on the subject ii misplaced among the Leake Paper* of 1708, 
AU.JW&*449,L89. 

1 Despatches, it 494, May 9. Cf. his letter to same effect to Sinsendorf , 
ML p. 497. 



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1706 MARLBOROUGH'S GREAT DESIGN »5 

and perhaps he foresaw how the move would play into 
his hands. This it certainly did. Owing to the Dutch 
contingent being behind time, Shovell missed the last of 
the summer weather, and was kept windbound in Torbay 
till the first week in September. By that time it was 
obviously too late for a campaign in Guienne, and Marl- 
borough astutely proposed that Shovell should cany on 
and strengthen the cause in the Peninsula. The States 
could find no reason for refusing, and Marlborough was a 
long stride nearer his purpose. 

At the same hour came news of still higher moment 
for the great end. In Italy Eugene had crowned his 
reputation with his most brilliant and successful campaign. 
All the summer Turin had been besieged, and it seemed 
that nothing could save it. But Eugene had achieved 
the almost hopeless task. By manoeuvres of extra- 
ordinary brilliance he had driven in the covering army, 
•and as Shovell lay windbound in Torbay he had relieved 
the beleaguered city. A fortnight later Charles III.- was 
proclaimed in Milan, but Eugene did not rest. His 
victory was followed by a series of rapid and effective 
movements, which before winter set in drove the French 
clean out of Northern Italy, and left the way open for an 
invasion of France from the south-east as completely as 
Marlborough's campaign had exposed it on the north. 

Unfortunately, on the Catalonian side, things were 
not so well. Even before Peterborough had left on his 
real or assumed mission to Savoy, the tide had begun to 
turn. Charles and his generals were learning that to 
defeat Spanish armies was not to conquer Spain, and that 
to'proclaim a king in her capital was not to detach her 
people from the crown of their choice. The nation rose 
in guerilla bands, Madrid had to be abandoned, and when 
Leake was forced to retire to Lisbon at the approach of 



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296 GIBRALTAR AND TOULON 1707 

winter, the French were able to take full advantage of 
the situation. Shovell did not reach the Tagus till 
January 1707, but he at once hurried on and landed some 
seven thousand men for Peterborough. It was all the 
fleet could do, for a higher call compelled his immediate 
return to Lisbon. 

By this time Marlborough's long-deferred plan was 
ripe, and the hour of Toulon had come. The great 
Mediterranean arsenal was to be the main objective of 
the coming campaign. Savoy and Eugene with the 
subsidised troops and an Imperialist army were to attack 
it by land. Shovell with the main fleet was to support 
them by sea, and Marlborough, although he had been 
forced to give up the idea of conducting the attempt 
himself, was preparing to back it up by a simultaneous 
invasion from the north. Shovell therefore was under 
orders to return to his base at Lisbon and prepare the 
fleet for its share in the work. In his absence Galway, 
who was now commander-in-chief in Spain, made a 
desperate attempt to recover Madrid, but it only ended in 
the fatal day of Almanza, and the Hapsburg King was 
once more confined to his Catalonian dominion. Such 
warfare could indeed only be compared to the sudden runs 
of a game of football, and could lead to no definite result. 
It was feared that the crushing victory of the French would 
allow Louis to detach troops from Spain to the defence 
of Provence, and it was clear everything depended on 
success, sudden and swift, at Toulon. Shovell returned 
to the Carlist coast in time to pick up the fugitives from 
the fatal battle, and then passed on up the Straits to join 
hands with Savoy. 

Had Marlborough been permitted to make his in- 
vasion, had the Emperor been loyal, or had Eugene even 
been left a free hand, there is little doubt that the coup de 



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1707 THE TOULON SCHEME SPOILED »7 

grdce would have been given. But the stare in their 
courses fought against the great designCi The Dutch 
would not consent to Marlborough's invasion from the 
north, and the Emperor refused to co-operate adequately 
with Savoy. The straits to which France had been 
reduced in the last campaign had caused Louis to make 
tentative efforts at peace, and the Emperor, mindful of 
the partition treaties, was obstinately determined to get 
Naples into his hands before negotiations could begin. 
To this end, regardless of the common canse for which he 
had done so little, he secured by a convention with Louis 
the neutrality of Northern Italy, which left him free to 
detach a force to the south. In vain the British Govern- 
ment protested they could take Naples for him at any 
moment when Toulon was once destroyed. The Emperor 
would not listen. It was even believed in England that he 
and others were by no means eager to see Marlborough's 
plan succeed, since the destruction of Toulon would 
leave the English and Dutch in complete command of 
the Mediterranean. 1 The end of it was that Eugene 
eventually joined the army of invasion with little beyond 
his sword. 

Even so he might have succeeded had he not been 
hampered with the Duke of Savoy for a colleague. Tess6, 
who was in command of the French army of the south, 
had an interminable line of frontier to protect with a 
wholly inadequate force. He could not tell where Eugene 
meant to strike. By a well-conceived feint he was made 
to believe that it was Franche-Comt6 that was threatened, 
and it was not till the enemy were almost crossing the 
frontier that he recognised what the real objective was. 
So well had Eugene masked his aim, and so rapid was his 

1 Alexander Cunningham, H%$L of Great Britain from ik* Revolution to 
the Acc$**ion of Goorot I., ii. 108. 



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296 GIBRALTAR AND TOULON 1707 

advance with the' co-operation of the fleet, that but for his 
colleague's hesitation he would certainly have reached 
Toulon, which on the land side was practically undefended, 
before Tesse could have gathered a garrison strong enough 
to resist even his diminished force. As it was, it was a 
Deck and neck race. So great was the danger that the 
whole Toulon squadron to the number of over fifty of the 
line were sunk to prevent their being burnt. Only two 
were kept as floating batteries. But the last precious 
hours were wasted by Savoy's stubbornness when Eugene 
was actually within striking distance. Tesse was able to 
complete an entrenched camp and to collect a garrison for 
it that made surprise impossible. Without the force that 
had been detached to Naples a siege was hopeless. For some 
time, with no small skill and courage, both fleet and army 
clung to the attempt, but a retreat soon became inevitable. 
Thus one of the best planned and most necessary 
operations of the war came to a fruitless issue. The 
situation in the Mediterranean was still incomplete, and 
it became clearer than ever that, until the French power 
of disturbance was removed by some more feasible means, 
the * game of football ' would never end. 



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CHAPTER XXXIII 

MINORCA 

Toulon remained a thorn in the side of the allies. In 
spite of the destruction that had been caused by ShovelTs 
bombardment and by the drastic measures that had been 
taken for the defence, its secondary possibilities remained 
untouched. Marlborough's great design, which ought to 
have lived as a worthy pendant to the immortal campaign 
of Blenheim, had failed, and he and every one saw that 
they must now fall back upon the minor expedient of 
masking the fortress, they could not destroy, with a naval 
force permanently on the spot. 

Acutely conscious of the main source of their difficulties, 
the English generals in Spain, in conjunction with the 
Court of Barcelona, began urging the English Government 
to keep a strong squadron all the winter within the Straits. 
Marlborough, convinced that it was now the only possible 
cure, was backing the proposal, and had given Charles's 
agents to understand that the Queen would certainly 
consent, if a suitable port were provided for a base. 
This was the old difficulty. Spezzia was offered, but 
Marlborough assured the powers concerned that it waa no 
good, for the British admirals considered it unfit to provide 
for the accommodation and requirements of ships of the 
line. Again he showed he was no man to force naval 
officers into action to which they objected on technical 
grounds, and the danger of overriding their opinions had 
just been emphasised in a way that could not be disguised. 



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aOO MINORCA 1707-8 

In returning home as usual in the late autumn, Shovell 
had encountered the catastrophe which he and his school 
had always foreboded. The difficulties of the navigation 
caused him to miss the entrance of the Channel, and the 
fleet fell among the Scilly rocks. Though most of them 
escaped, his own flagship was cast away, and he himself 
was found gasping on the shore of a lonely cove by a 
wrecker and murdered for his rings. The loss of so fine 
and renowned an old seaman could not but make a 
profound impression. His place for the ensuing campaign 
was to be filled by Sir John Leake, and though Marl- 
borough keenly desired that he should have authority to 
leave a winter squadron in the Mediterranean when his 
campaign was over, he would not hear of so unprecedented 
a measure being forced upon him against his better 
judgment. 

It is thoroughly characteristic of the greatest soldier 
and war minister that England has ever produced, that 
he fully understood where his own judgment ended, and 
where he must bow to more expert knowledge. ' I am 
making my utmost endeavour,' he wrote to King Charles 
at the end of June 1708, 'to get the Queen to allow a 
squadron to winter in the Mediterranean, although I per- 
ceive the naval officers are of a contrary opinion, and 
that they do not think that ships of war will be entirely 
safe in the port of Spezzia, where they even fear lack of 
provisions and other stores necessary to put the ships 
from time to time in a condition for sea.' On such a 
point as this the seamen's word was law to him, and he 
took care, for all his fair words to the King, that the 
navy men should not be forced from their legitimate 
position by the insistence of the Carlist Court. A week 
or two later he received the official memorandum of the 
Admiralty on the practicability of the new proposal*, and 



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1708 MARLBOROUGH ON NAVAL WARFARE 301 

sent it on to General Stanhope, who had succeeded Galway 
as British commander-in-chief in Catalonia. ' I send it/ 
he wrote, ' only for your information, that you may by 
your insinuations prevent the Court's putting too great a 
stress upon it, in case it should be found impracticable, for 
it is certain our sea officers are the best judges of what 
may be done with safety in this case/ Then in a post- 
script he adds with his own hand, ' I am so entirely con- 
vinced that nothing can be done effectually without the 
fleet that I conjure you if possible to take Port Mahon 
and to let me have your reasons for any other port that 
I may continue to press them in England/ 

At the same time he wrote to Count Wratislaw, the 
Emperor's minister, ' There is no one but admits the neces- 
sity of having a winter squadron in the Mediterranean ; but 
when all is said and done we must submit to the judgment 
of the admirals and sea officers on the safety of the port and 
other accommodation for ships of the line. It is certain 
they are the best judges, and Sir John Leake has order for 
it ; but I must tell you plainly that, so far as I can learn, 
these gentlemen do not believe any port safe and fit 
except that of Mahon. I have written to Mr. Stanhope 
to do his utmost to make himself master of it, after which 
there will be no difficulty. And pray permit me to tell yon 
once more that all you can write on this subject and all the 
orders that can be given in England must be entirely sub- 
servient to the judgment of the fleet. That is quite simple 
to understand/ To Count Sinzendorf, another Imperial 
minister, he sent the same information and the same cau- 
tion. ' The sea service,' he said, ' is not so easily managed 
as that of land. There are many more precautions to take, 
and you and I are not capable of judging them/ Still 
of the paramount strategical necessity no one was a 
better judge than himself, and on the sailors' conditions he 



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302 MINORCA 1708 

continued to press on the enterprise. Early in September 
he assured the Marquis de Prie, the Imperial envoy to 
the Pope, that he had long been convinced of the necessity 
of the squadron, and that the only difficulty was the 
admirals' insisting on a proper port being provided for it. 
• But/ he added, ' I have made representations so strong 
that I flatter myself we shall attain our object.' * 

His confidence was not unfounded. Stanhope was 
already in motion. Just as the campaign in Catalonia was 
coining to an end he had received Marlborough's urgent 
exhortation as well as orders direct from the Government 
to the same effect, and, seeing the enterprise on which his 
heart had long been set within his reach, he hurried 
from the camp at Cevera with every man that could be 
spared from the narrowed Carlist frontier, and in four 
days was at Barcelona busy with transports. 

From the fleet he had fair hope of assistance ; but 
this can only have arisen from a knowledge that Leake 
for some time past had been anxious to see Port Mahon 
at the disposal of the fleet. The admiral, in spite of what 
Marlborough wrote, had certainly no * order for it ' in 
his official instructions. They contained nothing special 
beyond general directions to do his best for the naval and 
military situation in the Mediterranean.' On entering 
the Straits therefore he had as usual busied himself with 
supporting the c game of football ' in Catalonia by trans- 
porting troops and stores, and cutting up the French 
coastwise communications. While thus engaged he bad 
received more definite orders from home. The Pope, he 
was told, had been supplying funds for an invasion of the 
Queen's dominions by ' the pretended Prince of Wales, 9 
and had even been offering prayers publicly for his success. 

1 Varlborvugh Despatches iii. 45, 471 ; iv. 81-2, 118-9, 918. 
*hfk»'*IA/4cfL4ak*,v.m. 



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• / 



1706 LEAKE TAKES SARDINIA 303 

It was an insult the Queen could not pass over, and he was 
therefore to take the first opportunity of making a demon- 
stration before Ci vita Vecchia and demanding the immediate 
payment of four hundred thousand crowns on pain of the 
last rigours of military execution in the Papal territory. 
The orders were accompanied by a covering letter from 
Sunderland explaining that he was really to carry them 
out, if it could be done without prejudice to the main 
object of the campaign, by which was meant the support of 
the Court of Barcelona. 1 At the same time Charles, whose 
Court and army were feeling acutely the pinch of his 
straitened frontier, begged him to undertake the reduction 
of Sardinia with its inexhaustible granary and its invalu- 
able port of Cagliari. By the tenor of Leake's instruc- 
tions he had no doubt that Charles's request should take 
precedence of the demonstration at Civita Vecchia, and 
especially as the Dutch admiral had insisted on referring 
the matter home before he would consent to join it. To 
Sardinia Jherefore the fleet proceeded. After a short 
bombardment Cagliari capitulated, and Leake was .able 
to inform Charles and his generals that the resources of 
the island and all the war material he had captured were 
at their disposal. 

Leake's welcome report had just reached Catalonia 
when Stanhope received his directions about Minorca. 
With his own orders had come a sealed packet for Leake, 
which he did not doubt contained instructions for the 
co-operation of the fleet, and as it was now at liberty 
Stanhope felt he could count on its support. Still Leake's 
movements were uncertain. Charles had written begging 
him, so soon as Sardinia was reduced, to fetch from 
Naples, which was now in his possession, four thousand 

1 Life of Leake, p. 884; Leake Papere, It. S8, in Add. U8S. S44S. 
The order wta dated May 4. 



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804 MINORCA 1708 

troops of those which had been so unhappily detached from 
Eugene's Toulon expedition. For the moment therefore, 
when every hour was precious, Stanhope was in no little 
difficulty. It is true, at the King's request, Leake had left 
half a dozen ships behind at Barcelona for its protection, 
but over these neither Stanhope nor Charles had further 
authority. There were sufficient transports, however, and 
Stanhope embarked in them what troops and guns he had 
secured. At the same time he sent word to Majorca, 
ordering more guns and troops to be ready to meet him, and 
with the King's congratulations to Leake and the sealed 
packet from home went a letter from Stanhope saying that 
he assumed the secret despatch related to Minorca and 
that he intended to make a lodgment there, and await the 
arrival of his fleet. 1 Whether the captains at Barcelona 
would take the risk of assisting him or not, he meant to 
go. One of them fortunately was his brother, and he 
and another resolved to stand by him. Seeing him so 
determined, the others could not long resist the temptation, 
and the last week in August the expedition sailed. 

Meanwhile Leake had moved out of Cagliari Bay to 
Pola to water his fleet and be ready for action. His 
position was one of considerable difficulty. The Dutch 
admiral had received orders forbidding him to assist in 
coercing the Pope, the troops at Naples were not ready 
to embark, and he had therefore sent to Barcelona for 
further orders. It was already the middle of August, 
fully lateior any new operation, and, as no orders came, 
Leake made up his mind to deal with the Pope -at once 
and alone. A council of war was already assembling to 
formally confirm his resolve. Everything was ready for 
sailing. His ultimatum to the Pope was actually drafted, 

■ 8Uahope to Leake, Btioekma, Augwt 13-94, 170S, Mahon, War of 
App.p.lxxL 



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1708 LEAKE'S DILEMMA 305 

when a felucca came in to the fleet with Stanhope's 
summons and the sealed packet for the admiral. Jip far 
from bidding him- support the- attempt on Minorca, it 
contained a still more urgent order to punish the Pope 
if he could do so without prejudice to the main scheme. 
It was an extremely delicate situation, and so soon as 
Leake had read the papers he laid the whole of them 
before his council. Among others was an extract from 
Sunderland's letter to Stanhope, in which he informed the 
general of Charles's prayers for a winter squadron being 
kept within the Straits. * Every one is ready to agree/ 
wrote the minister, ' that nothing could be of greater rise, 
but the great question is : How shall such a squadron be 
secure in any port of Italy from insults of the French 
by a superior force from Toulon? . . I conclude upon this 
head, unless we can take Toulon from the French or 
Port Mahon, this thing is in no way practicable with 
safety.' As there was no hope of Savoy's helping with 
Toulon he concluded : ' It remains that you should dispose 
yourselves to be masters of Port Mahon.' l 

This and the general directions about the main scheme 
were all the authority there was for supporting Stanhope. 
Still, as the general frankly wrote, it was quite impossible 
to reduce Minorca without Leake's assistance, since his 
force, though strong enough to effect a lodgment, was too 
weak to reduce Port Mahon. Under the circumstances it 
is a high testimony to the sailor's grasp of the vital essen- 
tials of the situation that there appears to have been no 
hesitation as to what ought to be done. Naval strategists, 
as we have seen, knew well enough that no Prince in Italy 
could resist the pressure of a winter squadron acting from 
a base within the Straits, and it was unanimously decided 
as the matter of the first importance to proceed at once 
1 Life of Leak*, June 89, 170*. 

VOL. II. X 



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906 MINORCA 1708 

to Minorca and to leave the Pope and the troops at 
Naples till Port Mahon was secured. It was a high and 
locid resolution not only to the great credit of the officers 
concerned, but worthy of remembrance as a lasting ex- 
ample of sagacious naval judgment for all time. 1 

Leake's action was as prompt as his. resolution. As he 
had been on the point of sailing, there was no need for a 
moment's delay. So the Holy Father, as the admiral called 
him in his undelivered ultimatum, had respite from the 
British guns, and so rapid was the admiral's movement on 
his new quest that he was before Port Mahon on August 
25. Stanhope was not there. Leake therefore sent two 
third-rates on to Majorca to pick up the troops and stores 
which Stanhope had told him were to be ready. They 
returned with their charge on September 1, and two days 
later Stanhope appeared with the main body of the force. 

He found everything prepared for him. Leake had 
already marked and surveyed a landing place, and had 
ascertained the exact strength of the garrison. It 
consisted of a thousand men, half of whom were picked 
French marines, but the rest an old Minorca regiment 
that could be counted on to do no mischief. But 
Leake was still in a difficulty. The season was far 
advanced, and, though he had authority to leave a winter 
squadron behind him, he himself was under orders to go 
home early enough to avoid a repetition of Shovell's 
disaster. It was therefore high time that he was on the 

1 These details are important in view of the fact that nearly all general 
histories from Boyer's Queen Anne downwards practically ignore Leake's 
and the fleet's share in the exploit Lord Mahon's account, which does not 
mention the fleet at all, as though Leake had not been present, is particu- 
larly disingenuous. General Stanhope's part was quite brilliant enough 
without disguising his dependence on Leake for his success (War of Suc- 
cession i* Spain, 866-5). In the Life of Leake the case for the fleet against 
Boyer is set out with all the documents on which it securely rests. Burohett 
tally supports it 



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1708 LEAKE LANDS THE TROOPS 307 

wing. Still he knew too well the high value of the enter- 
prise in hand to spoil it if it could possibly be helped. 
He therefore decided to place at Stanhope's disposal a 
strong squadron under Sir Edward Whitaker, the officer 
to whom Rooke had committed the main boat attack at 
the capture of Gibraltar. 1 And not only this, for he also 
took the responsibility of leaving behind him a large 
number of the marines of his own ships and all the bread 
and ammunition he could safely spare. In this way 
Stanhope could muster two thousand six hundred men, of 
whom not quite half were British, and with these a landing 
was at once effected at the point Leake had prepared 
about two miles from Port Mahon. The undefended 
town was immediately occupied, and, having thus seen 
everything in a fair way to success, Leake took his leave 
and went home. 

So difficult was the country between the landing place 
and the castle of St. Philip which defended the entrance of 
the Mahon inlet, that it was nearly a fortnight before 
Stanhope could cover the ground with his siege train. 
Whitaker employed the delay by sending two ships of the 
line round to seize Port Fornells on the north side of the 
island, in order to provide a safe retreat for the transports. 
The little fort was quickly reduced, and the transports 
were able to lie snug in a harbour almost as good as 
Mahon. At the same time a few hundred troops and two 
other vessels were detached against Giudadela, the capital 
of the island. It surrendered upon summons, and thus, 
when Stanhope appeared before St. Philip, its defenders 
were already half beaten with bad news. Still it presented 
no easy task. The works had been recently much enlarged 
and strengthened, and were well armed. It was on 

1 Whitaker's squadron was 18 of the lino and frigates, 1 firs-ship, 
% bomb-vessels, and 2 hospital ships, besides 8 Dutoh ships. 

13 



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906 MINORCA 1708 

September 17 that Stanhope's guns were able to open on 
the outer lines, and they quickly made an impression. 
In a few hours some breaches were opened, one of 
them opposite to where was posted a brigade under 
Brigadier George Wade, Stanhope's second in command 
and afterwards famous as the great Scottish road-maker. 
It had been Stanhope's intention to assault the next 
day, but as soon as the fire ceased Wade's grenadiers 
without orders rushed their breach. Seeing what was 
happening, Stanhope moved on in support, with the 
result that the disheartened enemy abandoned the 
whole outer enceinte in a panic, and before night Wade 
was securely established on the glacis of the castle. They 
did not wait for more. A capitulation followed on the 
morrow, and Minorca, so long desired and so long feared, 
was thus almost miraculously in Stanhope's hands. The 
Carlist sympathies of the native portion of the garrison 
hadHncrlftmbt as much to do - with the" success of the 
enterprise as the bold rapidity of Leake's and Stanhope's 
movements ; but it was none the less a brilliant operation 
that should rank at least as high as the capture of 
Gibraltar. ~~ 

From the first it was at least as highly appreciated. 
Marlborough, so soon as he heard of it, congratulated his 
importunate correspondents all round that the question 
of a winter squadron was now settled, and that the Pope 
and the Italian Princes would have to lower their tone. 
And this is what actually happened. True, the winter 
Mediterranean squadron did not yet exist. Before Leake 
left, Charles had begged him to order Whitaker to winter 
at Mahon. But, still sticking to his first position, Leake 
had refused on the ground that it was impossible till 
•Mahon was properly furnished as a dockyard with all 
naval or ordnance stores and conveniences for 



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1708 STANHOPE LOOKS AHEAD 909 

careening. With this Charles had to be content, but it 
was enough. Without troubling Whitaker to call, the 
Pope abandoned the French cause by solemnly recog- 
nising the Hapsburg claimant as King of Spain. To 
clinch matters, as soon as Stanhope's success was known 
at home.. Sir George Byng received orders to take a 
squadron there with all the necessary stores, and winter 
in the Mediterranean. Thus not a moment was lost in 
reaping the full advantage of what had been gained with 
all the good effects that had been anticipated. 

But it was not only from the point of view of the 
war that the conquest was regarded. Before Stanhope 
was well established at Mahon he had made-ttp-hig mind 
that his prize must never go out of British hands. In 
announcing his success to the Queen's Government he 
gave it as his humble opinion that England ought never 
to part with the island, since it would give the law to the 
Mediterranean both in peace and war. To this end he 
took immediate steps by astutely returning to Barcelona, 
in evidence of his zeal for King Charles's cause, the whole 
of his Spanish and Portuguese troops which he had 
borrowed, and retaining only his own British. The Court 
of Barcelona at once took alarm. It was one of the many 
times when France, stunned by the blows she had received, 
was making desperate overtures for peace, even to offering 
Marlborough four million livres to secure it on terms that 
would not completely paralyse her in the Mediterranean. 
That Minorca was in British hands was therefore no little 
cause of anxiety to the Hapsburg interest. ' Whether we 
have war or peace/ wrote Stanhope again in sending home 
'Wade with despatches, ' I cannot but hope we shall think 
of preserving Port Mahon, and indeed the whole island. 
Brigadier Wade will acquaint your lordship that I have 
had some difficulties here about the government of it which 



l 






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*10 MINORCA 1708 

are not yet over. Therefore I believe that it will be con- 
venient that a commission were sent to Colonel Petit to 
be Lieutenant-Governor of it, and instructions never to 
admit any troops but English into the castle and forts/ 
Later he suggested that the confirmation of his arrange- 
ments should be made a condition of giving the Portu- 
guese and Carlists the further assistance they were 
asking, and he never ceased to urge the strategical im- 
portance of his conquest. 'Of what consequence it is/ 
he wrote, ' with respect to France, Spain, Italy, and Africa, 
is not to be expressed,' and above all he valued it in view 
of a recurrence of war with the Dutch. Indeed it was 
the jealousy of the Dutch that was the main difficulty 
of its being settled as part of the British reward. 
Marlborough, with his wide diplomatic experience, was 
particularly anxious. 'It is a very ticklish point/ he 
wrote to Stanhope, 'and will need your greatest prudence 
in the management of it; for as soon as it is known, 
besides the improvement which the French Court and 
those at Madrid will endeavour to make of it to the dis- 
advantage of King Charles, I expect to hear loudly of it 
from Holland for the very reasons you mention.' 

Eventually Stanhope was clever enough to get bis 
way, and England was to all intents in practical possession 
of all that William had thought necessary to guarantee 
her against the danger of a French prince on the throne 
of Spain. Still the peace overtures failed and the war 
dragged on. As blow after blow staggered Louis on his 
throne, and the cry of his wounded people grew beyond 
bearing, he again and again made almost abject bids for 
peace. But the allies would not listen. Every year 
Dutch, Hapsburg, and Carlist grew more grasping and 
more feeble. Every year they departed more widely from 
their engagements to the alliance, and more entirely left 



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1711-2 CONGRESS OF UTRECHT 811 

the weight of the war upon England's shoulders. That 
at last she grew weary both of her own war party and her 
obstinate allies is no matter for wonder and little for cen- 
sure. Holland, from sheer exhaustion, had practically 
ceased to be a naval power. The war at sea had become 
almost entirely a British war. So far as England was 
concerned the victory had long been won, and when at 
last Louis appealed to her directly she resolved to fotce 
the allies to strike a balance. 

The Congress of Utrecht was the result. Of all the 
terms, uponwhich France won the intercession of Eng- 
land, there were none that caused more bitter heart- 
burning or were more obstinately clung to than those 
which confirmed her in the possession of Port Mahon and 
Gibraltar. Above all were the Dutch disturbed. It was 
impossible to disguise from themselves tfraf their century 
of naval and commercial rivalry with England was end- 
ing in her becoming beyond question or reach the one 
sea power. By securing the domination of the Mediter- 
ranean that position would be established past hope. 
Already in 1711, when Louis was trying to deal with the 
Dutch as he was now dealing with England, the Grand 
Pensionary had said that he was willing to treat mainly 
out of suspicion of what England, was trying to get for 
^herself within the Straits. 1 

So soon therefore as it was known that Louis had 
accepted the Queen's preliminaries the JDutchbecame 
stubbornly hostile. For the Queen's .conditions, included 
not only Gibraltar and Port Mahon but the concession 
of the whole Spanish slave trade, thajAsiento' aa 
it was technically called, and large commerciaTprivi. 
leges in the Spanish colonies. It meant the complete, 
supremacy of England, both as a naval and a com- 

1 Swift, Last Year* of Qustn Amu. 



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312 MINORCA 1712 

mercial power, and they strained every artifice in concert 
with the war party in England to wreck the negotia- 
tions. On one condition alone were they willing to 
withdraw their opposition, and that was that they should 
garrison Gibraltar and Port Mahon jointly with England 
and share-with her the commercial rights she was to 
obtain. 1 The English would not listen for a moment. 
The House of Commons bluntly declared that ever since 
the year 1706 the Dutch had taken no part in maintain- 
ing or acquiring the positions which had been won in the 
Straits. Prom that time they had abandoned the war in 
the Peninsula, contrary to all their engagements, and 
had forfeited all claim to share its proceeds. Fortified 
with the support of the House of Commons the Queen's 
peace Government became more firm than ever. The 
British plenipotentiaries were instructed, if the Dutch 
persisted in the attitude they were taking, to make a 
separate treaty with France. 4 For the Queen ' — so their 
instructions ran — ' was determined never to allow the 
States any share in the Asiento, Gibraltar or Port 
Mahon; nor could she think it reasonable that they 
should be upon an equal foot with her in the trade 
with Spain, to the conquest whereof they had contributed 
so little/ 

The Empire was almost as hostile as the Dutch 
and sullenly supported their protests. A deadlock was 
reached, "and Harley himself was sent over to break it. 
On the main point there was not to be an inch of con- 
cession. His instructions were ' that no extremity should 
make her Majesty depart from insisting to have the 
Asiento for her own subjects and to keep Gibraltar and 
Port Mahon/ 1 From this attitude her Government never 

• Swill, Lm$i Tmart pf Qu*n Amu. 



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1718 WARD'S WORK COMPLETED 813 

flinched. The panacea which William III. had been the 
first to make definitely an object of British policy was by 
this time thoroughly understood, and the plenipotentiaries 
came out at last from the Congress bearing in their hands 
that priceless treasure which has determined the position 
of England in Europe from that day to this. 

So in all the pomp of a European concert the seal was 
set on the work which Ward, the pirate, had disreputably 
begun. Timorously James I. had sown the seed without 
knowledge of its nature, and scarcely aware that he had 
let it fall. Cromwell, by an instinct almost as blind, 
had tilled the pregnant soil, and Charles II., by a more 
conscious move, had brought the fruit to his lips. But all 
these efforts have more the colour of some unreasoned 
intuition for dominion, some impulse of a quickening 
destiny than of a real apprehension of the sources of 
European power. It was not w till William III. brought 
with him for British statesmen a real feeling for conti- 
nental politics, that the truth took visible shape. Once 4 
established in his island realm he was quick to see how 
the ships could be made to give what his battalions 
could not achieve. First of all men he saw that the 
new and unsettled national system in Europe could 
never be brought to a stable balance till the northern 
sea power was free to assert itself in the ancient basin 
of dominion. He saw how by that means the British 
frontier could be carried unassailably up to the tenderest 
borders of the old Mediterranean States which had been 
wont to give the law to Europe and to count the nations 
of the North Sea too distant for serious calculation. 
Having divined the vital secret he never lifted his eyes 
from the end, and in peace and war, by arms and diplo- 
macy, he strove with unremitting effort to realise his aim. 

It was not his hand that achieved it. Death called 



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314 MINORCA 1713 

a halt and the work was carried to completion by his 
great disciple. When we think of all its wide results, 
when we see how far it went to fix the European system 
on its still existing lines, it seems too brilliant a jewel to 
add to Marlborough's crown. We shrink from believing 
that one human mind can have wrought so much. Yet 
the truth is no less. To the unsurpassed richness of his 
military renown we must add the greatest achievement that 
British naval strategy can show. He failed, it is true, to 
reach the goal he marked, but by his resolute and far- 
sighted striving towards it, he gained all that was possible, 
all at least that could be permanent. His failure went to 
show that, for the purposes of practical strategy, France 
was not seriously vulnerable from the south, but it proved 
that with a dominant sea power well placed within the 
Straits her Mediterranean frontier was useless to her for 
offence, and that neither for her nor for any other power 
could .the dream of the Roman Empire be revived. 

This, as has been said, is after all the greet political 
fact of the seventeenth century, and the highest claim 
to its parentage rests with the British sea power. It 
remains the abiding and perhaps the greatest attribute of 
the Mediterranean Sea— an attribute that has become 
obscured, but which is as living to-day as when the Peace 
of Utrecht acknowledged it. A time was coming when 
the Mediterranean was to have a wider meaning. As 
the course of European empire spread eastwards to the 
Indian seas, it became again the centre of the world — the 
place o( arms which dominated the imperial movements 
of the following century. From that point of view it has 
a distinct history and a distinct import. In our day, 
when the European system has grown so solid that it 
seems as though nothing could seriously disturb it, the 
new meaning has almost buried the old. The world* 



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1718 THE FOUNTAIN OP DOMINION 816 

wide empires dominate oar imagination. Yet their roots 
still lie in the European system. If that is shaken, all 
will shake. The main guarantee of its stability is the 
British power in the Mediterranean and the general and 
lasting acquiescence of Europe in the situation -which the 
Peace of Utrecht founded within the Straits is a recogni- 
tion of that vital truth. The Midland Sea remains still, 
perhaps more than ever, the keyboard of Europe. What- 
ever other attributes it may have gained, that one must 
never be forgotten. In that lies the living reality of 
those men of the seventeenth century whose work we have 
followed. In that lies our duty, whatever distractions 
may arise, to keep green the memory of those old 
strategists who guided the hand of England to the 
Straits. 



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APPENDIX 



ORIGIN OP THE LINE OP BATTLE 

Thb fighting instructions issued by Sir Edward Cecil in 1625 
have a special interest as throwing a faint light on the origin 
of the line of battle, which still remains one of the unsolved 
problems of naval history. 

The earliest instructions at present known which indicate a 
close-hauled line ahead as a tactical formation are those issued 
by Sir Walter Ralegh in 1617 for the fleet he took to Guiana. 1 " 
It would be rash, however, to assume that they were designed 
by him, or that they contain the first enunciation of the prin- 
ciple. Fleet orders were almost invariably founded closely on 
previous examples.- Ralegh was certainly not seaman enough 
to have invented an entirely new scheme ; he had never even 
been present at a fleet action in the open ; and there are many 
indications that the principle he adopted was used in the latter 
part of the reign of Elizabeth. The orders, in all probability, 
were the common form current at the time. 

The first orders which Sir E. Cecil issued followed almost 
word for word those of Ralegh, which were also probably those 
employed by Mansell in 1620, since there is no indication 
that he drew up any new ones. As issued by Cecil they 
clearly contemplate the fleet's acting in squadrons, in so many 
distinct close-hauled lines ahead. The ships of each squadron 
were intended to follow the squadronal flag into action within 
musket-shot, 'giving so much liberty unto the leading ship, 
as, after her broadside delivered, she may stay and trim her 
sails ; then is the second to give her broadside, and the third 
and fourth with the rest of the division, which done, they shall 

1 8.P. Donu ooiii 70. 



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818 APPENDIX 

all tack as the first ship and give their other sides, keeping the 
enemy in a perpetual volley. This you must do upon the 
windermost ship or ships of the enemy, which you shall either 
batter in pieces or force him or them to bear up, and so tangle 
them or drive them foul one of another to their utter confusion.' 
On the final day of sailing, however, Cecil amplified this order ' 
by a new one, which is very remarkable. It directed that 
• the whole fleet, or so many of them as shall be appointed, are 
to follow the leading ship within musket-6hot of the enemy, and 
give them first their chase pieces, then their broadside, and 
afterwards a volley of small shot ; and when the headmost ship 
hath done, the next ship shall observe the same course, and so 
every ship in order, [so] that the headmost may be ready to 
renew the fight against such time as the sternmost hath made 
an end* by that means keeping the weather of the enemy, and 
in continual fight until they be sunk in the sea or forced by 
bearing up to entangle themselves and to come [foul] one of 
another to their utter confusion.' 

Both these orders are set out in the Journal of the ' Swift- 
sure/ the flagship of the Vice-Admiral Lord Essex, and are 
apparently the work of his captain, Sir Samuel Argall of Virginia 
fame, who was one of the most accomplished seamen of his 
time. In 1617, when Balegh's orders were issued, he was 
admiral on the Virginia Station and had since commanded a 
ship under Mansell. The second order marks a distinct and 
very noteworthy advance in tactics. For the first timo we have 
unmistakably the idea of a fleet attacking not in separate 
squadrons or groups, but in one column and in succession. It 
is clearly a rude conception of the single line ahead. But, 
curiously enough, having thus, by what means we know not, 
stumbled on the final solution of the problem, Cecil im- 
mediately abandoned it for something more to the taste of his 
well-drilled mind. For some reason it did not please him, and 
he took the first opportunity of a calm to call a council of 
war and submit to it a scheme that was entirely different It 
had been prepared, not by Argall but by Sir Thomas Love, his 
own captain, whom Cecil had instructed to draw up articles 
embodying his ideas. The fleet had already been organised in 
three large squadrons, each composed of three royal ships with 
some five-and-twenty merchantmen and transports. The Dutch 



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APPENDIX 819 

contingent was to form a fourth squadron. But beyond this 
nothing had been done about ' the form of a sea fight ' in the 
event of an enemy's fleet being encountered. Under the articles 
which Love presented, there was to be a further sub-division. 
Each of the three English squadrons was to be organised in 
three divisions or ' sub-squadrons ' of nine ships, with one of 
the King's ships leading. The system of attack was also 
changed. For, instead of the nine vessels of the sub-squadrons 
attacking in succession, they were to ' discharge and fall off 
three and three as they were filed in the list ' — that is to say, 
they were still to attack in succession, but in groups of three. 
Such an arrangement was entirely new, and thus in the same 
fleet we have not only the first mention of the principle of a 
single line ahead but also of its extreme converse, the small 
1 group ' unit. 1 

Another noteworthy point in Love's proposal is that the 
Dutch were not to be bound by it. They were expressly per- 
mitted ' to observe their own order and method of fighting.' 
What this was is not stated, but there can be little doubt that 
the reference is to the boarding tactics, which the Dutch, in 
common with all continental navies, continued to prefer to the 
new English ' method ' of fighting with the guns alone. The 
two ideas demanded wholly different tactics, and it is clear 
that the Dutch ' method ' was already recognised as something 
different from that of the English. The point is important. 
For the fact that, in the Dutch fleet-orders at the outset of 
the war of 1652, there is no trace of the conception of a line 
ahead, or indeed of any order, has been taken as evidence that 
up to that time no such system can have existed in the English 
service. In face, however, of the above testimony, that the 
English and Dutch methods were different, this evidence can 
have little weight. 2 

So. far as we have been permitted to view the scene in the 
oounoil of war, the reading of Love's draft orders appears to 
have been received with something like derision. 'It was 
observed,' says the official account which Glanville drew up, 
* that it intended to enjoin our fleet to advance and fight at sea, 
much after the manner of an army at land, assigning every 

1 Glnnville'B Journal (Camden 8oe. 1883, p. 15 et «?.). 

* Garditur, Fint Dutch War (Navy Beoords Society), 1 MO. 



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820 APPENDIX 

ship to a particular division, rank, file, and station, which order 
and regularity was not only improbable but almost impossible 
to be observed by so great a fleet in so uncertain a place as the 
sea.' The first impulse was to reject the orders in mass, but 
Cecil stuck to his guns. The articles contained many excellent 
orders for sparing the men, disposing them in quarters and the 
like, and above all one strictly forbidding any one to open fire at 
more than caliber and pistol shot, and yet another prohibiting 
boarding without special order of the admiral, whereby was 
enforced the cardinal principle of Drake's school, that the ship 
must be first and last a gun carriage. The supporters of the 
articles therefore pleaded that for the sake of the good in them 
they might stand, it being understood that generally they were 
to be regarded as a council of perfection and not to be strictly 
enforced. This, after some discussion, was agreed to, and so 
the articles were passed. As understood by those who had to 
carry it out, the ' order of fight ' is thus summarised by one of 
Cecil's officers : ' The several admirals to be in square bodies ' — 
that is, each squadronal flag-officer would command a division or 
sub-squadron formed in three ranks of three files, and they were 
1 to give their broadsides by threes, and so fall off. The rear- 
admiral to stand for a general reserve, and not to engage himself 
in fight without great cause.' ' 

During the next generation there is no sign of any progressive 
development. Even the tactical idea of Ralegh's instructions is 
never again enjoined. Sir William Monson, writing about the 
time of the Ship-money Fleets, repudiates any strict order of 
battle. In Lord Iindsey's 'Instructions of 1635,' article 18, 
which alone relates to a battle, is still in the Tudor form, and the 
precedent is followed in the ' Instructions given by the Bight 
Honourable the Committee of the Lords and Commons for the 
Admiralty 9 on May 2, 1648, to Captain William Fenn, rear- 
admiral of the Irish squadron. 2 These again contain but one 
reference as to what is to be done in a fight. If occasion arise 
to engage a hostile fleet, every captain is instructed ' to leave 
the vice-admiral to assail the enemy's admiral and to match 

1 • Journal of the Expedition, v 8 J*. Dom. z. 67. 

• Liftdeey'f are in M<m*m'$ Tract*, bk. iii. ; Penn't are in Shane MSS. 
1709, t *& O. Penn gives similar ones from an 'original MS.' which he 
dales I647 f Li/4 of Pen* i. 40*. 



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APPENDIX 821 

yourself as equally as yon can, to succour the rest of the fleet as 
cause shall require, not wasting your powder, nor shooting afar 
off, nor till yon come side to side.' Thus we see that, up to 
the advent of the soldier-admirals, no definite battle formation 
was insisted on. The Elizabethan and Jacobean idea of an 
attack in succession seems to have been practised, but the 
only rule was to fight close with the guns, never to board 
an unbeaten ship, and to stand by your friends. 

No sooner, however, had the soldiers obtained the command 
than we get at least an attempt at something more scientific 
After the experience of one campaign of the first Dutch war, 
the generals-at-sea issued a set of regular fighting instructions. 
These are the next we have. They were signed by Blake, 
Deane, Monk, and Desborough at Portsmouth in March 1653/ 
and contain a clear restoration of the line ahead and the germ 
of a definite tactical system. Article 2 enjoins that at sight of 
the enemy's fleet the vice-admiral and the rear-admiral shall 
make all possible effort to come up respectively on the right and 
left wing of the admiral, leaving a complete distance for the 
admiral's squadron if the wind permit and there be room 
enough. Here we have a picture of the fleet bearing down in 
three columns at sufficient interval to allow the centre squadron 
space enough to haul its wind and form line parallel with the 
enemy, an evolution akin to the everyday military movement i 

of advancing in column and deploying. 

That a line was contemplated is clear from Article 3. It 
provides that as soon as the general — that is the commander-in- 
chief— is engaged, each squadron is ' to take the best advantage 
it can to engage with the enemy next unto him, and in order 
thereunto all the ships of every squadron shall endeavour to 
keep in a line with the chief, unless the chief be maimed or 
otherwise disabled, which God forbid. . . . Then every ship 
of the said squadron shall endeavour to keep in line with the 
admiral, or he that commands in chief next unto him nearest 
the enemy/ Other articles provide signals for one squadron 
relieving another that is ' overcharged/ and also for the fleet 
ooming into line with the admiral under various circum- 
stances. 

It was on these instructions that the remainder of the war 
1 Penn'i Naval Tract*, Sloans MSS. 8283. 

VOL. II. Y 

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322 APPENDIX 

was fought. It is not surprising therefore that in the subse- 
quent actions of 1653 we have the first definite statement of a 
formation in a single line ahead. From the Hague we have it 
recorded that on June 2, at the battle off the Gabbard, the first 
action fought after the issue of the new fighting instructions, 
the English ' having the wind, they stayed on a tack for half an 
hour until they put themselves into the order in which they 
meant to fight, which was in file at half cannon-shot.' The 
suggestion is that this was certainly not the ordinary formation 
of the Dutch, and there is no statement that they formed a 
similar order. Again, for the next battle— that of the Texel — 
fought on July 31 in the same year, we have the statement of 
Hoste's imformant, who was present as a spectator, that at the 
opening of the action the English, but not the Dutch, were 
formed in a single line close-hauled. ' Le 7 Aoust [i.e. N.S.],' 
the French gentleman says, ' je dfcouvris l'armto de l'amiral 
eomposle de plus de cent vaisseaux de guerre. Elle 6tait rangta 
en trois escadrons et elle f aisoit vent-arri&re pour aller tomber sur 
les Anglois, qu'elle rencontra le m6me jour & peu pr&s en pareil 
nombre rangez [sic] sur une ligne qui tenoit plus de quatre 
lieues Nord-Nord-Est et Sud-Sud-Ouest, le vent 6tant Nord- 
Ouesi. Le 8 et le 9 se passdrent en des escarmouches, mais le 
10 on en vint & une bataille decisive. Les Anglois avoient 
essate de gagner le vent : mais I'Amiral Tromp en aiant toujours 
consent l'avantage, et l'6tant rang6 sur une ligne parallAle a 
celle des Anglois arriva sur eux, &c.' This is the first known 
instance of a Dutch fleet forming in single line, and, so far as it 
goes, would tend to show they adopted it in imitation of the 
English formation. 1 

In this connection another point must be noted. In the 
previous year several actions had been fought, but in no one of 
them can be discovered any trace of the line on either side. 
On the contrary, we have the distinct statement that in the last 
action but one of the campaign, fought between Blake and 
De With on September 28, the Dutch awaited the English 

1 Hosts, Bvdlutumt NavdU* % p. 78. Dr. Gardiner declared himself 
ccoptieal ss to the genuineness of the French gentleman*! narrative, mainly 
oa the ground of certain inaccuracies of date and detail ; bat, as Hoete 
certainly believed in it, it cannot well be rejected as evidence of the main 
features of the action for which he used it. 



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APPENDIX 325 

attack, not in line or file, but ' in a close body.' l Three other ac- 
tions were fought before the issue of the ' Sighting Instructions ' 
of 'March 1663, and those were the battle of Dungeness between 
Blake and Tromp on November SO, 1652, that of Portland on 
February 18, 1603, and that of Beaohy Head on the 20th. So 
far as fleet tactics went the two former were probably the worst- 
fought actions of the war. At Dungeness Blake was deserted by 
half his fleet, and at Portland Monk, who had a flag for the first 
time, was left out of action altogether. It is perfectly clear 
that on none of these occasions either side formed a line. It 
was immediately after these confused actions that the ' Fighting 
' Instructions ' were issued— immediately, that is, after Monk's 
first experience of naval warfare. We can easily understand 
how galling to his strict ideas of order and discipline the lament- 
able exhibition must have been. A professional soldier and 
martinet of a pronounced order, he was regarded at this time as 
perhaps the highest authority in the kingdom on the art of war, 
and it may well have been his influence that produced the attempt 
to institute a tactical system — a thing which Blake and Deane 
had hitherto omitted to do. We cannot be certain, but we do 
know that it was in the next action off the Gabbard on June 2, 
when Monk commanded alone after Deane was killed, that we 
have the first indication of a definite tactical system having 
been attempted. That a substantial improvement was the 
result is certain : ' Our fleet/ says an eyewitness, ' did work 
together in better order than before, and seconded one another/ 
There is, moreover, the important testimony of a Boyalist 
intelligencer writing from the Hague on June 9. After relating 
the consternation which the English gunnery and refusal to 
close caused in the Dutch ranks, he goes on to say: "Tis 
certain that the Dutch in this fight (by the relation and 
acknowledgment of Tromp's express sent hither, with whom 
I spoke) showed very great fear and were in very great 
confusion, and the English (as he saith) fought in excellent 
order.' ' The next action was the one which Hoste's informant 
described, and which an English officer present oommended as 
1 a very orderly battle/ 

1 Captain John Mildmay't relation. Gardiner*! Pint Dutch War, U. 
969. 

* Clarendon M88. 46, f. 470. 

x 2 



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324 APPENDIX 

It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that the efforts 
of the soldier-admirals to introduce the line were at onoe 
successful. Though it is pretty clear that, after the new orders 
of 1653, the English practice was to form a true line of battle, 
it is equally certain that, as a rule, it was not maintained long 
after the action began. The evidence from the narratives of 
the CromwelHan and early Restoration battles is overwhelming 
that the old confusion soon set in, and there is really nothing 
to contradict it. 

The well-known passage in Pepys's ' Diary/ upon which 

Granville Penn founded his argument that the line was regularly 

used in Cromwell's time, has been shown by Dr. Gardiner to 

be incapable of bearing the interpretation he placed upon 

it. 1 Paul Hoste's definite assertion on the point is particularly 

strong, and the fact that he admits the first battle of the Texel 

began with the two fleets ranged parallel to one another in 

single lines only adds weight to his statement that the second 

battle of Texel, in 1666, was the first one in which this order 

was strictly maintained. In the absence, therefore, of direct 

evidence to the contrary, his statement will probably stand. 2 

Nor does it stand alone. There is another little-known piece 

. of testimony which thoroughly supports his assertion. It is 

contained in a tract published in 1702, entitled ' The Present 

Condition of the English Navy set forth in a Dialogue betwixt 

Young Fudg of the Admiralty and Captain Steerwell, an 

Oliverian Commander.' * They are discussing the comparative 

merits of the present and the CromwelHan time, much to the 

disadvantage of the former. Fudg, worsted at every point, 

at last in desperation claims that anyhow the modern system of 

tactics is better than the old. ■ What,' he asks, ' is your opinion 

of fighting in line?' 'I don't approve of it at all,' Steerwell 

replies. ' We never used it, and I think we fought desperately, 

and did as good service as any that succeeded us. I'll give you 

my reasons against your line. When the fleets engage in a 

line, supposing the admiral's post to be in the centre and the 

fight be begun by the windward squadron, the ship first begun 

i O. Penn, Lift of Sir William Penn, 1 401 ; English BUtorical Review 
xiii. MS ; Pepys'i Diary, July 4, 1666. 

■ Evolution* Novate*, pp. 42, 78. 

■ DriL Mu*. 686, d. 2 : a volume of naval tracts. 



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APPENDIX 335 

can only bo supported by its second ; for tbe admiral, by reason 
of tho smoke, cannot see how to send her convenient succour, 
for signals are useless soon after the commencement of tbe 
action. Now, when we fought without a line, every one made 
the best of his way to engage the enemy. We looked for no 
signals, but when we saw one of our ships overcharged by the 
enemy we immediately bore down to her assistance ; and if we 
saw one of our own ships grappled by a fireship we came 
immediately to her assistance, and, after we had cleared her, we 
sheered off and stood away to the best advantage.' He then 
cites La Hogue as an instance of the inflexibility of the line 
preventing a complete victory. ' For my part,' says Fudg, ' I 
don't understand fighting, but it is a strange thing that the 
navy officers of all nations should be mistaken in the politic 
part of fighting.' ' For my part,' answers Steerwell, ' I never 
saw fighting in line ; but this I am certain of, that, if our 
officers aro right in their method of fighting, they don't 
manage their tacks to the best advantage,' meaning they are 
too ready to haul out of action. 

Tho evidence of this dialogue is not of course incontestable. 
Wc cannot be certain of its authenticity ; still, the whole tone of 
it suggests that it may well have been written by a man who 
had served in his youth in the Gromwellian navy. 

For the fleet of Penn and Venables that went to the West 
Indies, a set of ' Fighting Instructions ' practically identical with 
those of 1653 was signed by Blake, Monk, Desborough, and 
Penn on March 31, 1655, and we may take it as certain that 
they were tho same that were used by Blake and Montague off 
the coast of Spain in the same war, although no copy of them 
seems to be known. 1 What makes it certain that these in- 
structions represent the lost word of the Gromwellians is that 
they were adopted for the second Dutch war under Charles II., 
and formed the basis of those under which it was fought 

This fact, which has a most important bearing on the whole 
question, rests on tho secure basis of the ' Sea Book ' of the 
1 Royal Charles,' the flag-ship of the Duke of York, which still 
exists among the invaluable navy papers of Lord Dartmouth. 
The first ' Fighting Instructions ' that it contains, which we may 
presume were largely inspired by Sir William Penn, his Captain 

1 G. Penn, Lift of Pmn, ii 76, where Penn's orders are set out in folL 



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326 APPENDIX 

of the Fleet, are practically identical with those of 1653 and 
1655. They are not dated, but are immediately followed by 
three 'Additional Instructions' which further emphasise the 
importance of endeavouring to keep a single line. These are 
dated April 10, 1665. Then follow a set of ' Sailing Instructions/ 
dated November 16, 1666, and these again are followed by a 
further set of ' Additional Instructions to be observed in the 
next fight.' This last set contain further directions for keeping 
the line and, for the first time, instructions for a tactical move- 
ment for cutting the enemy's line and concentrating on the 
isolated portion. They also introduce an article imposing the 
penalty of death upon a commander who, being out of the line, 
endeavours to fire over it at the enemy. 

These new provisions are clearly from their position in the 
' Sea Book ' not earlier than the ' Sailing Instructions ' of 
Nov. 16, 1666. This enables us to fix the date of the famous 
• Fighting Instructions ' of the Duke of York, upon which it is 
usually supposed the second Dutch war was fought. For 
these • Instructions ' incorporate the second set of ' Additional 
Instructions,' and were therefore subsequent to Nov. 16, 1666. 
As no action wis fought after that date it is clear we must 
regard the war as having been fought under Blake's and Monk's 
' Instructions ' of 1653, as amplified by the ' Additional Instruc- 
tions ' of April 1665. 1 

Summing up the general results of this series of ' Instructions ' 
we may say, firstly, that the close-hauled line ahead appears to 
have been a gradual and normal development, starting in 
Elizabethan times, halting during the period of peace between 
Charles I.'s war and the Commonwealth, and revived and 
solidified when the soldier-admirals brought their instincts for 
a tactical system to bear upon naval warfare. 

Secondly, that although the line was conceived as a tactical 

1 It is unnecessary here to set out the articles in detail, as it is intended 
to publish the whole of Ihem in a forthcoming volume of the Navy Records 
Society, at whose disposal Lord Dartmouth has kindly placed the originals, 
and by whose courtesy I have been permitted to see them. A copy of the 
complete set of ' Instructions ' will be found in Oranville Penn's Life of Penn t 
iL 605. Another and amplified set is among the Dartmouth MSS. counter- 
signed • W. Wren,' who was secretary to the Duke of York from 1667 to 
167S. This is probably the final form. Copies of all the earlier sets are 
also in HarUia* U8S. 1347, but in some chronological confusion. 



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APPENDIX 327 

system in the first Dutch war, its advocates were not able to 
enforce it till practice and experience, about the end of the 
second war, had produced minds that believed in it and the 
skill to use it. This is all that can safely be extracted from the 
famous conversation between Penn and Pepys about the 'Four- 
Days' Battle ' in the first week of June 1666. The passage in the 
1 Diary "is as follows : ' Sir William Penn came to me and we 
talked of the late fight. He says we must fight in line, whereas 
we fight promiscuously to our utter and demonstrable ruin, the 
Dutch fighting otherwise, and we whenever we beat them/ 
The inference is clearly, not that the Dutch fought in line and 
that we did not, but that, although the line was known and 
approved by such men as Penn, it was observed in some actions 
and not so well in others, owing to the fact, as Penn himself 
explained, ' that our very commanders, nay our very flag officers, 
do stand in need of exercising amongst themselves and dis- 
coursing the business of commanding a fleet/ 

It must also ta remembered that Penn was not present at 
the battle, and that after all this is only Pepys's gossipy report 
of what be said. It could not in any case stand against the 
clear and direct testimony we have that the battle was fought 
in line. We know from the official narrative that, as the enemy 
were sighted, Monk made the signal for ' line of batalia,' and we 
have a contemporary plan showing the two fleets engaged in 
parallel single lines. 1 We also know that it was in this very battle 
that Armand do Gramont, Comte de Guiche, was so deeply im- 
pressed with the l)oauty of the English line. ' Sur les six heures 
du matin/ he says of the second day's proceedings, • nousaper- 
(ftmes la flotte des Anglois qui revenoit dans un ordre admirable i 
car ib marchent par le front comme seroit une armto de terre, et 
quand ils approohent ils s'etendent et tournent leurs bords pour 
combattre, parce que le front a la mer se fait par le bord du 
vaisseau.' Again, later on he says : ' Ken n egale le bel ordre 
et la discipline des Anglois : que jamais ligne n'a M tirfe plus 
droite que celle que leurs vaisseaux forment.' He further makes 
it dear that the Dutch captains neither approved nor observed 
the rigid line, believing that a looser formation gave a better 
chance for their boarding tactics. Later on in the action, how* 

'+ » See • Narrative * and the plan entitled • A Model of the Fleets ss they 
were drawn op to fight ' in Add. MSS. 32004, f. 1S7. 



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328 ^APPENDIX 

ever, he says thai ' De Ruyter de son cdte appliqua toute son 
industrie pour donner une meilleure forme a sa ligne .... 
Enfin par oe moien nous nous remlmes sur une ligne parallele 
.a celle des Anglois.' Guiche himself had no doubt as to 
which was the better system. In his final criticism of the 
actions he says : * A la verite 1'ordre admirable de leur armee 
doit toujours etre imite et pour moi je sais bien que si je etois 
dans le service de mer, et que je commandasse des vaisseaux du 
roi, je songerais a battre les Anglois par leur propre maniere 
et non pas avec celle des Hollandais et de nous autres, qui 
est de vouloir aborder.' It is abundantly clear therefore that 
Guiche at any rate regarded the new line of battle as an 
English device to develop to the utmost their favourite method 
of fighting — that is, crushing the enemy by gunfire— as opposed 
to the boarding tactics adopted by a'll other nations. 1 

We are further entitled to assume that the new battle 
formation arose out of the ' Fighting Instructions ' of 1653, 
since we now know that it was under these ' Instructions ' as 
amended by the Duke of York the battle that Guiche describes 
was fought, and that it was also under them was fought the 
battle of June 3, 1665, off the Texel, at which Hoste says the 
battle order of two opposing parallel lines close-hauled 'fut 
ezactement garde pour la premiere fois.' 

Finally we may say that the oft-repeated assertion that the 
line ahead was invented by the Dutch and copied from them by 
the English does not rest on any shred of direct evidence that 
lias yet been produced. The impression appears to have arisen 
from reading into Penn's remarks to Pepys something that he 
certainly did not say, and disregarding something that he did 
say. Against any such interpretation of Penn's meaning we 
have firstly all the direct testimony given above that the English 
were at least attempting to flght in a strict line when the Dutch 
were still content with their old scrambling group tactics, and 
secondly the unimpeachable fact that Tromp's orders of June 20, 
1652, contain no reference whatever to a line of battle but only 
to subdivision^ groups. 3 

1 Htmoire* du Count* de Guiche conccrnant les Provinces- Units des Pays- 
Bas\eic^ servant de supplimcnt d eenx tfAubry dn Maurier et du Comte 
eTEsirades, pp. 249, 251, 255, 266, London, 1744. 

■ Gardiner • First Dutch War, I 821. 



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APPENDIX 329 

The belief that the organisation of fleets into squadrons 
was also a Dutch invention is still more difficult to account for. 
Even Dr. Gardiner, whose caution in dealing with naval tactics 
is exemplary, shared it. ' The division into three squadrons,' 
he says, ' which had been first displayed in the battle off Port- 
land (Feb. 1653), was imitated from the Dutch practice.' ■ Yet 
nothing is more certain than that the division into three or 
moro squadrons had been employod in every English fleet of 
sufficient size for a century at least, and in every large Mediter- 
ranean fleet from time immemorial. Apart from this it is 
certain that Blake's fleet in 1652 was divided into the usual 
three squadrons, under the admiral, vice-admiral, and rear- 
admiral. In Vice- Admiral Pcnn's letter to an intelligence 
officer of the Council of State, dated October 2, relating to 
the action off the Kentish Knock, he says : ' Our General not 
having above three of his squadron . . . and I with most of 
my squadron very near him, I sent to know of the General if 
I should leave him and bear up among the enemy with my 
squadron.' And again : ' Wo ran a fair berth ahead of our 
General to give room for my squadron to lie between him and 
us.' * It is possible that Dr. Gardiner was thinking of the nine- 
fold division which was established by the 'Fleet Orders' of 
January 1653. By these orders each of the three usual squadrons 
was assigned its distinguishing flag — red, blue, and white respec- 
tively — and each was divided into three sub-divisions under 
their respective admirals, vice-admirals, and rear-admirals. 
Such an organisation was of course peculiarly well adapted to 
the group system of the Dutch, and may possibly have been 
adopted directly from them. We know, at any rate, that 
Tromp had organised his fleet on this system as early as June 
20, 1652. Still it may be doubtod whether even this idea was 
purely Dutch, sinco, as we have soen, Sir Edward Cecil 
attempted to introduce a similar system of 'sub-squadrons' as 
early as 1625. 

1 Commonwealth avd Protectorate, ii. 820, and ef. 156. 

* Gardiner's Vint Dutch War, i. 276. For the squadronising of 
Henry VllL's fleet in 1545 see Drake and the Tudor Navy, L 51 et $eq. ; for 
that of 1588, ibid. ii. 177-8, 244-6 ; for that of Drake and Norrey* in 1580, 
ibid. 824-6. For the first use of sqnadronal flags in 1596, Naval MueeUany 
(Navy Becords Soc.), i. 28 et seq. 



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INDEX 



AniOAiL,' the, i. 62 

Actions, naval, i. 80, 31 ; Ribera . 
ami Veniero (1617), 48, 64 ; off 
Gibraltar (1618), 87, 88; Cape 
Gata (1643), 160; Orbitello (1046), 
172 ; Blako nnd De With (1652), 
198 ; Monte Christo (1652), 251- . 
253 ; Kentish Knock, 258; Leghorn, ! 
266-7; North Foreland, 270; Four ! 
Days' battle, ibid*; Dardanelles, J 
297 ; Lowestoft, ii. 56 ; in Second ' 
Dutch War, 60, 61, 70; Solebay 
and Texel (1673), 75 ; Stromboli, 
93 ; Augusta, 95 ; Beachy Head, 
145, 270; La Hogue, 146, 149, 
163; Malaga, 271-8; Texel 
(1665), 268 

Adams, Captain Thomas, i. 283 n., 
303 n. * 

Admiral, rank of, ii. 176 n. 

Admiralties, Dutch, i. 239, 242; 
French, 164-5, ii. 65; Spanish. 
(See Almirantazgos) i 

Admiralty (English), Cran field's 
reorganisation of, i. 79-80 ; Henry 
VIIL'fl, 164; Elizabeth's, 165; 
Buckingham'^ 165; under Com- 
monwealth, 189, 194. {See also 
Cranfield) 

Adriatic, i. 8, 14, 15, 86, 45<*seg., 
54, 59 ; wedding of the, 61, 64, 
156, 171 ; French operations in, 
ii. 217-8, 280-1, 237 

' Advance,' the, i. 248 

• Adventure/ the, i. 211, 217 u*, 229- 
230 

£)gean Sea, i. 299. (See also Archi- 
pelago) 

/Etna, ii. 95 

Aix-la-Chapelle, treaty of, ii. 64, 66 

Albania, i. 47 

Albert, Archduke, governor of 
Spanish Netherlands, L 55, 89, 
101 i 



Alboran Island, ii. 82 u. 

Albucemas, i. 831, ii. 82 n. 

Albuquerque, Duke of, ii. 86 

Alcudia Bay, i. 120-1, 304, 314 n. 

Alexandria, i. 14, 28 

Algeciras, ii. 280-1 

Algiers, i. 7, 12, 15, 17, 51-2, 93-4. 

118; its reputation, 124; Blako 

at, 812; Sandwich at, ii. 24-6; 

Lawson at, 27,42; All in at, 70; 

Duquesne at, 140; Dey of, i- 12, 

311 

— expeditions against, i.HSet aeq~* 
169, 307-8, ii. 11, 22.5. 44, 70-1, 
99 

— naval power of, 1. 15, 51, 88 

— redemption of captives at, L 240, 
ii. 59 

Alicante, i. 117-8, 121, 124, 127, 
130, 218, 303, 318-4, 316, ii. 173, 
179, 182, 293 

Alicudi, ii. 90 

Allin, Admiral Sir Thomas, com- 
mander-in-chief in Mediterranean, 
ii. 47, 49-50. 70-1, 112, 115, 184 

Almanza, battle of, ii. 296 

Almirantazgos, i. 147, 151 

Almonde, Admiral Philip van, ii. 
198, 211, 229, 238 

Altea Bay, ii. 246 

Amazons, North's expedition to the, 
i. 102 

America, North, English colonies in, 
ii. 62, 66 

• Amity,' the, i. 288 n., 306 ft., 814-5 

• Andrew,' the, i. 283 n., 806, 822 m. 
Anne, Queen of England, ii. 202, 

230, 240-1, 298, 800 

Anne of Austria, Queen Begent of 
France, L 178 

* Antelope,' the, i. 114, 180, 248, 
259 

Appleton, Csptain Henry, comman- 
der-in-Chief in Mediterranean, 



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INDEX 



L 240, 243; at Leghorn, 244; 

blockaded by Dutch, 247-254, 

257-60; his mistakes, 261; de- 
struction of his squadron, 264-6 
Apuglia, L 287 

Aragon, Don Otavio de, i. 25, 26, 69 
Archipelago, i. 26. (See also iEgean 

Sea) 
Ai&dL Sir Samuel, i. 114, 152, ii. 318 
Arlington, Henry Bennet, Earl of, 

ii.130 
Armada Invincible, La, Osana's 

ode to, i. 21. 24 
Armament of men-of-war, i. 29, 114, 

197-8, it 267 ». 
Army, standing, its influence on 

navy, i. 195-6, 225. (See also 

New Model. Soldiers) 
Ascham, Anthony, murdered at 

Madrid, i. 209 
Asiento, the (Slave trade), ii. 311-2 
•Assurance,' the, L 229-230 
Aston, Sir Walter, ambassador at 

Madrid, i. 104, 117, 122, 124 
Augsburg, league of, ii. 144; war 

of, 145 e t seq. 
Augusta, battle of, ii. 95-6 
Austria, Don John of. See John 

of Austria 
Aylmer, Admiral Matthew, Lord, ii. 

135, 173 
Ayscue, Admiral Sir George, i. 200, 

237, 241-2, 263 
Azores, I 15; expedition to (1597), 

70, 151 ; Penn at, 228-9, 236-7, 

tt\ 199, 262 



Baas, Baron de, i. 279 

Baden, Margrave of, ii. 253, 292 

Badiley, Admiral Richard, renr- 
admiral off Lisbon, i. 210-12, 
215-6; sent into Mediterranean, 
237, 240, 243, 245; tries to join 
Appleton, 247; his antecedent^ 
248-9 ; intercepted by Van Galen, 
249-54; tries to release Apple- 
ton, 257-66; driven from the 
Mediterranean, 267 ; comes home, 
269; returns to Straits as Blake's 
vice-admiral, 279, 282-3, 295, 
297 ; at Porto Farina, 806-8; vice- 
admiral to Blake and Montague, 
822,327,330; death, 334 

Balearic Islands, 1 294, 802, 813, ii 
40,166,173 

Ball, Captain, L 229-80 

fiatie,L163,834,ii.24,31 



Banks, Chevalier, i. 303 ». 
Barbarossa (Turkish admiral), i. 7 
Barbary States, naval power of, i. 6, 
7, 13, 18, 19, 23, 298-9, ii. 70; 
treaties with, i. 301,312, 825,339, 
ii. 33, 47, 99, 230, 237. (See also 
Algiers, Morocco, Tripoli, Tunis) 
* Barbary,' the, i. 114 
Barcalongas, ii. 79 
Barcelona, 1. 169 ; taken by French, 
245, 254; retaken, 256, ii. 87; 
threatened by Noailles, 159, 
I 161-2 ; relieved by Russell, 164-5, 
( 174, 179 ; taken by French, 186 ; 
I Booke at, 245 ; relieved by Byng, 
| 291-3; 262-3, 299, 302-4 

Barillon, French ambassador, con- 
I cerned in evacuation of Tangier, 
ii. 107-8, 110, 117, 127, 130, 137 
Barker, Andrew, his book on Ward 

and Danttkcr, i. 13 
Barneveld, Johifcof, i. 36, 42 
Barrier fortresses, the, ii. 193,195-6 
; Bart, Captain, i. 252 

Batten, Captain William, Vice-Ad- 

i miral of England, i. 185; turns 

i Royalist, 186-7; returns to Par- 

I liament, 187 

Battles. See Actions 

Bavaria, Duke of, ii. 187, 190, 239, 

253 
Bayes, Marquis of, i. 332 
• Bayona Islands, i. 160, 327 
: Beaufort, Francois de Venddme, Duo 
j de, ii. 84; at Gigcri, 47-9; at- 
tempts concentration in Channel, 
53-5,58-62; killed, 68, 70 
Beaulteu, Sieur de, i. 18 
Beckman (or Boeckmann), Sir Mar- 
, tin, ii. 89-40, 178 
t Belasyse (or Bellasis), John Lord, 
governor of Tangier, ii. 50 
— General Sir Henry, ii. 214 
Belem Castle (Lisbon), i. 20 
Belle Isle, L 167 

Benbow, Admiral John, ii. 199, 
j 212 

' Bentinck. &* Portland 
I Berkeley of Stratum, John, 8rd 
| Lord, ii. 159-60 
Berry, Adm. 8ir John, ii. 126, 184 
' Betty,' the, L 813 
Beuzus, i. 331 n. 
Bishop, James, a pirate, i. 15, 18 
Biserta, naval station of Tunis, i. 26, 

89,235 
Blake, Capt. Benjamin, L 229-80, 
283*., 808 n. 



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INDEX 



333 



Blake, CoL Robert, general-st-sea, 
i. 191-8; at Kinsale, 201-3 ; pur. 
sues Rupert, 205-6 ; before Lisbon, 
807; arrests Brazil ships, 208; 
joined by Popham, 209; blockades 
Tagus, 210-2; in sole command, 
213; engages Rupert, 218; cap- 
tures Brazil fleet, 214 ; raises the 
blockade, 215-6; his chivalry, 
217; enters the Straits, 218-9; 
effects of his work, 221, 224.7, 
231; superseded, 222; his 
triumph, 223 ; commander* in- 
chief, 241-2; fights Tromp, 243, 
245-6 ; seises the French trans- 
ports, 253-5 ; in First Dutch War, 
258, 261, 263, 266, 268; legends, 
274 ; mission to the Mediterranean, 
274-6 ; alann of the Powers, 278; 
he sails, 281-2 ; his fleet, 283 n.\ m 
its effect in France, 284-5; his* 
objective, 286; holds the Straits, 
287; his cruiser discipline, 288; 
misses Guise, 289; at Leghorn, 
291-3, 297-8; turns Crusader, 
299-300; operates against Tunis, 
300-6; bombards Porto Farina, 
307-9; his further intentions, 
311 ; ordered to Toulon, 312 ; his 
orders changed, 313 and note ; at 
Malaga, 314-5 ; end of his cruise, 
316-7; its effects, 818-20; asks 
for a colleague, 321 ; his abortive 
campaign against Spain, 322-88 ; 
its moral effect, 327-30; his 
death, 834 ; his tactics, ii. 820-3 

Blavet, i. 143 

Blenheim, battle of, ii. 264, 286, 
299 

Blockades, i. 28, 827, ii. 88, 98. (Set 
Kinsale, Lisbon) 

Boer, Admiral van, i. 253 

Bohemia, revolution in, i. 83, 96, 
100, 108 

Bomb-vessels, ii. 140, 153, 158 n., 
177, 230, 267 n., 286 

Bombardments, i. 306-9, ii. 24 

Bombay, ii. 5, 7, 9, 17. 

• Bonaventure,' the, L 244, 257, 259 

•Boneta' sloop, ii. 79*. 

Booms as harbour defences, i. 128, 
ii. 25, 71, 224 

Booth, Captain Sir William, ii. 
134-5 

Bordeaux, i. 205, 220, 258 

Bordeaux, Marquis de, i. 278, 381, 
284-6, 291, 803 n., 805, 811 

Boufflers, Marshal, iL 186 



; Boyes, Captain, i. 127 n. 

1 Bragansas, revolt of the, ii. 4; 

| English marriage, 4-9, 7 

Brandenburg, Elector of, iL 16 
I Brazil, Dutch in, L 145, 151, iL 
1 28 
— fleets, L 208, 214, 221-2, 297-9, 

231, 826, ii. 262 
Brest, i. 240, 255-6, 278, 289, iL 
149-50; attempt to destroy, 155- 
160 ; in war of Spanish suooessioa, 
199. 211-2, 218, 245 
Breues, Monsieur de, hit mission to 
• Barbary, i. 13 n. 

Breze, Duo de. Grand Matter of 
I Navigation, i. 168; his Mediter- 
ranean campaigns, 169-72, 176 
I Bridgewater, i. 192 
1 'Bridgewater,' the, L 283 fk, 809, 
323 n. 
Brigantines, iL 158 
. Brill, i. 36 

Brindisl as naval station, L 45-9. 
i 48, 58, 59, 60-8, 262 
! Bristol, L 201; siege of, 192 
Bristol, George Digby, Earl of, iL 7. 

(See also Digby) 
•Bristol,' the, i. 822 
• Britannia,' the, ii. 156 
Bruce, Colonel Henry, L 155-9, 890, 

824 
1 Bucentoro,' the, i. 61 
Buckingham, George Villiers, Duke 
of, i. 62, 69 ; Lord High Admiral, 
79-80, 84-5, 98-4, 104, 129, 190 
134, 187; as war minister, 199, 
144, 147-50, 152 ft $eq., 189-90, 
268 
Buenos Ayres, ships from, iL 245 
Burchett, Josiah, Admiralty Secre- 
tary, iL 141, 167 n.; on origin of 
the Marines, 906-9 
Burghley, William Cecil, Lord, bis 

naval administration, L 69, 165 
Burlings, the, L 210 
Burnet, Bishop, L 914-5, iL 17, 

141, 210, 282 
Business men at the Admiralty, 

i. 75-81 
Button, Admiral Sir Thomas, L 119- 
114, 121, 128, 126-7, 180-1, 199, 
152 
Button, Lieutenant, his nephew, 

L127is. 
Buiemo. Su Albuoemai 
Byng, Admiral Sir George (Viscount 
Torrington), L 2; iL 78 m* 228-4, 
287, 246, 256; bombards Gib- 



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354 



INDEX 



raltar, 258-60; at Malaga, 264- 
965, 991-9, 809 



Gabbssa, L 808 «. 

Cabrita, Gape, H. 985 

Cadiz, L 85 ; its strategic Importance, 
iL 85-6. 188-9, 197, 909, 917; 
expedition against (1596), i. 69, 
111, (1625) 146, 160, it 6; 
ilanseU at, L 180-1 ; as British 
naval base, L 910, 214-8, 931, 
837, 986. 813, 316 -7, ii. 154, 160, 
167-71, 174; as Dutch base, iL 
28 ft sec- 85, 50, 80, 86, 147; 
blockaded by Blake, i. 899-88; 
in war of Spanish succession, ii. 
194, 197, 909-4, 210; failure to 
take, 914-9, 931, 984, 245, 259, 
954-5, 969, 279-85 

Cagliari, L 190, 919, 984, 986 ; as 
British base, 809-4, 810-19; 
taken by Leake, ii. 803-4 

Calabria, L 987 

Calais, L 955, 980, ii. 188 

Callenburgh, Admiral Gerard van, 
iL 151, 154, 160, 173, 189 

Canaries, trade with, L 904 

Candia, siege of, i. 297, 999, ii. 67- 
69, 70 ; a school of arms, 114 

Gandiote war, L 995-800, 804, ii. 
67-70 

Canea,L995 

Cape Verde, iL 44, 47 

Carew, Sir George (Earl of Totnes), 
L139 

Carleton, Sir Dudley (Lord Dor- 
chester), L 89, 90, 105, 107, 157 

Carniola, L 85, 48 

Carracks, East Indian, i. 14 

Cartagena (Spain), i. 19, 118, 198 ; 
Blake at, 919-90, 813-4, 816, 
IL993 

— (Spanish Main), iL 186 

Carteret, Sir George, Treasurer of 
the Navy, ii. 13, 38 

Casale,iL179,185 

Cascaes Bay, L 906, 208 

Caason, Edward, L 301, 311-2 

Caatellamare, L 287-9 

Cestleha ven, L 202 

Catatonia, operations in or against, 
L 168-9, 178, 199, 819, iL 87, 
104, 148, 154, 157, 159, 174, 181, 
941, 945, 949, 990 et **., 801-9 

Catherine of Bragania, L 10 

Catinat, Marshal, ft. 148, 196, 901 

Cave, Captain Easabey, L 114 w. 



Cecil, Sir Edward, Viscount Wimbler 
don, L 152-60, ii. 6, 817-20; his 
nickname, i. 161 
Celidon, Gape (Cyprus), action off, 

i. 31 36 
• Centurion,' the, i. 62, 114, 313 n. 
Cette, ii. 234 

Ceuta, L 123, ii. 36, 189, 190 
Cevennes, Protestant rising in, ii. 

234-5, 237, 292, 294 
Cevera, ii. 302 
Gezimbra Road, L 807 
Channel guard, i. 10, 240-2 
Charente, River, ii. 294 
Charles I. (of England), as Prinoe 
of Wales, i. 34, 79, 113; his 
marriage, 84, 89, 134, 137 ; King, 
143 ; his naval policy, 162-3, 180- 
182, 195, 248; his death, 188 
Charles II. (of England), in exile, 
i. 186-7 ; lands in Scotland, 241 ; 
his marriage, ii. 4-9 ; his devotion 
to Tangier, 10, 45, 116-7, 122-3, 
142 ; said to favour its evacuation, 
192-3; his farewell to it, 141; 
his imperialism, 19-90, 39-8, 
141-2, 313; tortuous relations 
with Louis XIV., 83-4, 89, 102 ; 
approached by William of Orange, 
97-8, 102, 104; his political 
triumph, 124; ceases to reign, 
126-9; death, 144; as a naval 
expert, 141-2 
Charles V. (Emperor), i. 8, 9, 124, 

ii. 257 
Charles II. (of Spain), ii. 187 ; death 

of, 193, 195 
Charles III. (Archduke of Austria 
and titular King of Spain), ii. 190, 
904-5, 238, 245, 248-9, 278, 290, 
293, 295-6, 299, 800, 303-5, 808- 
810; authorises Books to take 
Gibraltar, 956 
' Charles ' galley-frigate, ii. 78 
Charles Gustavus (of Sweden), L 

329 ii 81 
Chateau-Renault, Comte de, ii. 155, 

161, 196, 199, 212-3, 218, 220-6 
Chatham, i. 186, 242 ; Dutch at, ii. 

62, 74 
Chercel, i. 96 
Chidley. See Chadleigh 
Chios, i. 26 
Chits, the, iL 107 
Cholmley, Sir Hugh, engineer, iL 

87, 64, 76 
Christina, Queen of Sweden, i. 836 
Chudleigh, Captain John, L 114, 152 



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INDEX 



335 



Churchill, Admiral George, it 909, 
282 

Cinque Porte, i. 91 

Cisneros, Don Josef, il. 222 

Ciudadela (Minorca) taken, ii. 807 

Civil war (in England), i. 164 j re- 
newed at sea, 188 

Civita Veechie, L 278, 292, 880; 
Anne orders naval demonstration 
at, ii. 808-5 

Clarendon, Edward Hyde, Earl of, 
attitude to the Bragansa marriage, 
ii. 7-9; and to sale of Dunkirk, 
12-14, 16 »., 182 

Gobham, Capt Nathaniel, i. 288 w., 
806 

Coke, John, at the Admiralty, i. 
75-6; 'his report on the navy, 
76-9; on naval administration, 
80; his minute as Secretary, 
91-2 148 

Colbert, Jean Baptiste, i. 257 n., ii. 
8, 82, 85, 47, 54-5, 57, 64-5; 
covets Tangier, 72-8, 84, 96, 207 

Colonies as subjects of reprisal, i. 
275 

Colonna, Admiral Fabrisio, i. 1 

Commerce destruction, heresy of, i. 
231 

Commerce protection, theory of, 
revolutionised, i. 225-8; Dutoh 
system of, 239, 242; English, 
240, 243 ; under Commonwealth, 
ii. 22 ; under William III., 152-8 

Commissions, Royal, on corsairs, 
i. 51 ; on navy, 70 et seq. 

Commonwealth, the, its position 
in Europe, i. 179, 199, 204, 224-5 ; 
threatened by naval coalition, 201, 
207, 215 ; takes a high tone, 214, 
219, 221; naval administration 
of, 242-8 

Como, Lake, i. 108 

• Concepcion,' Nuestra Seftora de, i. 

30 n. 
Conde, Louis II. de Bourbon, Prince 

of, i. 172-8 ; tempted by Masarin, 

174-5, 177 
Conde 1 , Henri Jules de Bourbon, 

Prince of, ii. 288 

• Consilium JEgyptiaoum,' Leibnitz's, 

ii. 60 
'Constant Reformation,' the, L 85, 

114, 180, 186, 211-2, 219, 282, 

286 
'Constant Warwick,' the, i. 188-4, 

186-7, 195, 210, 244, 249, 250-1, 



Constantinople, L 7, 28, 810 

Contraband of war, i. 131, 827 

« Converting ' the, i. 114 

Convoys, West Indian and American, 
i. 15, 25, 84, 228-9; growth of 
system, 226-8. (See also Plate, 
Smyrna, and Brazil fleets) 

Conway, Sir Edward (Viscount 
Conway), Secretary of State, L 
148 

Coote, Sir Charles, i. 200 

Corsairs, the Barbery, rise of their 
power, i. 7; success of, i. 20; 
defeats of, i. 20, 24-6, 89, 99, 
124-5, 285; political aspect of. 
i. 51-2, 62, 86, 88, 90, 9*-7, 116, 
119, ii. 11, 99-100, 102; treaties] 
with, i. 90, 92; coalitions against, 
i. 90, 91, 108, 105-7, 115. (See 
also Barbery States, Algiers. 
Tunis, Tripoli, Salee, 6c) 

Corsica, i. 8, 150, 173, 285, 250; as 
a possible English base, 281 

Corufla, ii. 27, 57, 208, 210-11, 
218 

Cottington, Francis, Lord, at Madrid, 
i. 05 

Cotton, Sir Robert, as naval re- 
former, i. 72 et **g. 

Cotton, Sir Thomas, i. 72 

Council of war, the supreme, L 
139-40, 145-50 

' Cooronne,' la, i. 180 

Cox, Captain Owen, 1. 249-61, 257, 
259, 260, 262-8 

Cranfield, Sir Lionel (Earl of Mid- 
dieses), i. 74 ; his naval reorganU 
sation, 75 et ate., 84-5, 92, 165 

Craven, Captain,!. 282 

Crete, i. 6. (See Candia, Candiote 
war) 

Crews, organisation of, i. 29 

Cromwell, Oliver, influence on and 
use cf the navy, i. 154 ; his Irish ex- 
pedition, 200-8; in Scotland, 241; 
Protector, 270; his foreign policy, 
271 et $eq. ; his use of the Medi- 
terranean, 278-4, 276, 281-2, 819, 
ii. 2, 15; as crusader, i. 296-8; 
his relations with Blake, 804, 
815-7 ; his Protestant policy, 811, 
829, ii. 2, 16 ; promotes Montague, 
i. 821 ; his designs on Cadis and 
Gibraltar, 828 et ass.; abandons 
them, 888-4, 841, ii. 5, 206; 
permanence of his influence, ii 
1-8, 20-2, 88, 67, 818 

Cromwell, Richard, i. 840 



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Groston, Captain, a pirate, i. 14 

Peter, L 57 

Cruisers, L 181, ii. 214 n. 
Curtis, Captain Edmund, i. 308 n. 
Cattanee, Captain Roger, i. 288 w., 

808 n. 
Qjprua, L 6, 14, 81, 86, 295 



Dalsutia, L 47 

Dan, Father Pierre, his ' Hist, de 

Barbaric,' i. 13 n. 
Danbr, Thomas Osborne, Earl of, ii. 

107-9, 168 
Danube, ii 289, 248-4, 248, 253, 276 
Danzer, Simon, the pirate (also 

Dansker and Le Danseur), i. 12, 

13, 15-18, 20, 71 ; his end, 18 n. 
Dardanelles, L 89, 297, 299 
Dartmouth, George Legge, Lord, 

commands at the evacuation of 

Tangier, ii. 129-40 
Dams, John, a writing master, i. 59 
Deal L 185 
Deane, Sir Anthony, shipwright, ii. 

78, 176 tk 

— Colonel Richard, general-at-sea, 
L 191 ; at Kinsale, 201-4; in the 
Forth, 241, 268; ii. 321, 823 

* Defiance ' sloop, ii. 79 n. 
Delaval, Admiral Sir Ralph, ii. 146, 

150 
Denbigh, William Feilding, 1st Earl 

ot L 152 
Deptford, i. 86, 185, 194, 242 
'Destiny,' the. Set 'Convertine' 
« Devil of Denmark,' the, i. 62 
•Diamond,' the, L 283 n M 80S n,, 

806 n. 
Dieppe, i. 144-5, 255 
Digby, George. See Bristol 

— Sir John (Earl of Bristol), i. 
51-2, 73, 90, 105 ; rebuffs Gondo- 
mar, 108-9; his reliance on the 
fleet, 131, U. 7 

Dilkes, Admiral Sir Thomas, ii. 272, 

284 
Dodge, Captain, L 127 n. 
•Dolphin,' the, L 283 n. 
Donauwdrth, iL 262 
Doria, Giannandrea, L 1, 7, 24, 27 
Dorset, Charles Sackville, Earl of, 

ii.168 

• Dorsetshire,' the, it 259 
Double-sloops, ii 79 n. 
Dow Castle, i. 99, 185 

— treaty of, iL 88, 106 
•Dragon,' the, L 62, 313 n. 



Dragones, small French cruisers, 1. 
181 

Drake, Sir Francis, i. 1, 23,84, 42, 45, 
68, 81, 98, 102, 110-1, 134, 146, 
189, 191, 200, 231, 301, 320, ii. 21 ; 
publication of his exploits, i. 101 

'Dreadnought,' the, i. 129, 180 

Dryden, John, his epitaph on Fair- 
borne, ii. 120 

Dunbar, battle of, i. 233 

Dunkirk, i. 102, ii. 72, 132 ; as naval 
centre, i. 147 ; new frigates of, 
181-4; taken by France, 245; 
retaken by Spain, 255-6; Crom- 
well's views on, 280, 283, 838 ; in 
English hands, 339; as a sub- 
stitute for Gibraltar, ii. 2, 15; 
relinquished for Tangier, 11-16; 
real intention of its sale, 17-21; 
disposal of its .garrison, 26, 132 

Dunkirkers, piracies of, i. 148 

Du Quesne, Admiral Abraham, i. 
174, 176, ii. 81, 84-5, 47-8, 53, 59, 
86, 88, 104, 124; his campaign 
against De Ruyter, 89-96; on 
English warfare, 103 ; bombards 
Algiers, 140 

Dussen, Admiral van der, ii. 258, 
262 

Dutch, successes of, i. 22, 27, 251-3, 
258, 266-7 ; defeats of, 258, 264, 
270 ; naval power of, i. 27, 67, 179, 
! 236, 24?- 3 ; its exhaustion, ii. 283, 
2 17, 310-1 ; policy of, i. 36, 37 ; sup- 
! port Venice, 45 et sec., 55, 60-4, 86 
et seq. t 94, 101 ; hostility to Portu- 
guese match and Tangier, ii. 7, 23, 
24 etseq. ; blockade Tangier, 51 ; ob- 
struct Marlborough's stratcgy,291- 
292, 295, 297; relations with Bar- 
bery corsairs, i. 90, 94, 97-8, 105, 
111, 118, ii. 23, 67 ; with England, 
i. 129-80, 238 et seq., 270, ii. 44, 73, 
74, over Gibraltar and Mahon, 
310-2; with France, i. 143, 170, 
245-7, 254-6, ii. 62 ; with Spain, 
i. 100, 123, 131 ; renewal of war 
with, 145 ; peace with, 178, ii. 46-7; 
league with, 84, 97; with Portugal, 
ii. 23 ; East India Company of, i. 
129, 151, ii. 44 

Duteil, Sir John Baptist, ii. 76-7 



Eirxino, Captain Anthony, L 283 n. 
Edward, an English corsair, i. 13 n. 
Egypt, fleet of, i. 27-8; strategical 
aspect of, ii 69 



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INDEX 



337 



7 



El Araish, i. 20 

Elba, i. 178, 338, ii. 103. {See also 

Porto Longone) 
•Elias,'the7T.388n.,818 
Elisabeth, Queen of England, L 

33-4 
Elisabeth, Princess of England, 

Queen of Bohemia, i. 83, 60, 96, 

131 188 
• Elisabeth,' the, 1. 345, 363 
Elisabethan traditions. See Navy, 

British 
Emperor, the. See Charles V„ 

Matthias, Ferdinand, Leopold 
Empire, the, i. 83, 143. {See also 

Hapsburgs) 
Enemy's goods, dootrine of, L 13, 

338,346 
England, sea power of, i. 7, ii. 84 
' Entrance/ the. Set * Happy En- 
trance* 
Espartel, Cape, ii. 163 ; action at, 383 
Essex, Robert Dcvcrcnx, 2nd Earl of, 

i. 53, 68, 70, 111, 151, 160 
3rd Earl of, i. 153, 158, ii. 

818 
Estimates, Navy, (1618) i. 76-9 
Estrades, Godef roi, Comte d\ ii. 14 n., 

15, 33 ; his warning about Tangier, 

73-3, 106, 109 
Estrees, Jean, Comte d\ ii. 74 
- Victor Marie, Due d\ ii. 149, 154, 

870-3 
Eugene of Savoy, Prince, it. 196, 

301, 317, 335, 338, 381, 343, 364, 

391,393; his attempt on Toulon, 

395-6 
•Europe,' Tangier careening hulk, 

ii. 100 
Evelyn, John, ii. 118 
Evertsen, Admiral Cornells, the 

« Elder, 1 i. 37, 71 

the •Youngest, 1 ii. 81, 103 

• Jan, i. 343 

Exterritoriality, i. 831 



Fairbornb, Sir Palmes, deputy* 
governor of Tangier, ii. 144-5 ; his 
heroic defence. 118-9 ; his death 
and epitaph, 130 ; his son, 311 

— Admiral Sir Stafford, ii.311, 318. 
315 ; on naval strategy, 334, 336, 
346 

•Fairfax/ the, i.195, 339 

Fajardo, Admiral Don Luis, i. 15- 
30, 87, 57-8 
Fame,' the, L 803 



Far East, the, Cromwell's policy as 
to, ii. 3, 6 ; Charles It's, 17, 33 

Faro, ii. 330-1 

Faversham, i. 10 

Favignano, i. 387 

Fearne, Sir John, an English corsair, 
i. 41, 57, 114, 131 «., 153 

Ferdinand of Grata, Duke of Styria, 
i. 35, 87, 47, 156 ; King of Bohe- 
mia, 50; Emperor, 96, 157 

Ferriere, Chevalier de la, L 346, 348, 
354 

Feuillade, Marshal d'Aubusson, Due 
de la, ii. 103 

Fes, Emperor of, ii. 39 (tee Guy- 
Ian) ; Colonel Kirke at, 131-3 

Filicudi, ii. 93 

Finale, ii. 178, 193 

Finisterre, Cape, ii. 155, 318, 331 

Fire-control, i. 353 

Fireships, L 135, 137 *k, 167, 169, 
173, ii. 54-5, 79 fk, 158; as light 
cruisers, 160 n. 

Fitsgerald, Colonel, at Tangier, ii. 
45, 47 

' Five Wounds,' the, Osuna's squad- 
ron, i. 39 

Flags, i. 118 

Flanders. See Netherlands, Span- 
ish 

Fleets, Doris's (1601), i. 7; Spanish 
(1609), 16-7, 19, (1611) 34, (1614) 
37 ; Dutch (1616), 36 ; Mansell's, 
113-4; Blake's, 383 n. 

Florentines, their sympathy with 
England, i. 393 

Fonteny, Chevalier de, i. 311 a. 

Food supply, i. 87 

Forbin, Comte de, 11. 317 

* Foresight,' the, i. 383 n\, 803 n., 
306 n. 

Formentara, i. 319, 813-6, ii. 173 

Fornells (Minorca) taken, ii. 807 

'Four Points,' resolution of the, L 
139 et $eq., 144 

Frampton, Captain, i. 137 n. 

France, policy of, i. 50, 135 et seq^ 
148 et $eq. t 158, 199, 383, 373; 
lawless treatment of English 
commerce by, 1. 304, 316, 338-9, 
234 ; Cromwell's attitude to, 273-3, 
305 ; in the Candiote war, ii. 67- 
68; growing power in the Medi 
terranean, ii. 143, 149; domina 
tion of, under Louis XIV., 84-5. 
Naval power of, 1. 138; revival 
under Richelieu, 164 et $eq.; in 
the Mediterranean, 17U8, 330 



VOL. II. 



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INDEX 



226, 319; Colbert's revival, ii. 

8,9; hi* failures, 30, 33-5, 65. 74. 

75 ; his success, 84 ct see;., 96, 101 ; 

its decline, 175, 200 
Franche Comte, ii. 297 
Francis L (of France), L 8 
Fregatss. See Frigates 
Frewen, Lieutenant, i. 127 n. 
Frigates, new type of, i. 181-8, 195, 

197 
Foentes, Conde de, at Dunkirk, i. 

181 

Gaeta, i. 171 

Galeasse of war (Venetian), i. 14 

Oaleazze di Mercantia, i. 14, 48 

Galen, Admiral Johan van, i. 238 ; 
commands in Mediterranean, 247 ; 
his operations against Applcton 
and Badiley, 248-54 

Galleons. See Sailing men-of-war 

GaUey-frigates, ii. 78-9 

Galley-slaves, i. 24-5, ii. 77 

Galleys, 1 15, 25-6; 31, 36-7, 94-5, 
130-1, 166, 170-2, 174, ii. 54, 
58. 65-6, 69, 91-3, 111, 181, 266, 
274; last, in the English navy, 
i 77. it 76-9 

Gallixabras, 1 182 

Galway, Massne de Ruvigny, Karl 
of, ii. 178-9 ; on value of Mediter- 
ranean fleet, 184-5; commands 
in Spain, 296, 301 

Gata, Cape, i. 169, 218 

Genoa, i. 8 t 38, 49, 214-5, 249, 258, 
262, 279, 282, 292, 303, ii. 32, 
230-1; strategic importance of, 
L 8, 33, 35, 50, 108, 135-8, 280-1, 
292, ii. 148; galleys of, i. 34, 
ii. 76 ; designs to occupy, i. 38 ct 
tq^ 108, 135-8, 143, 146, 150, 
161 ; Longland's proposals as to, 
L 280-1, 292 

Gentillot, M. de, French Envoy, 
i.256*. 

George of Denmark, Prince, Lord 
High Admiral, ii. 202, 209 

George of Hesse-Darmstadt, Prince. 
Set Hesse-Darmstadt 

• George' (or 'St. George '), the, 
Blake's flag, i. 210, 283 »., 322 n. I 

Gerona, ii. 161, 164 

Gibraltar, L 86, 45, 115, 117, 123, | 
230, iL 110, 186, 148; flrst pro- 
poaal to take (1625), L 155-9 ; 
BUke at, 287-90, 813; Crom- 
well's design on, 823 ct s*g., ii. 
t, 206 Spanish tears for 27 ; 



Allin's disaster at, 49 ; Wheler's, 
135 ; Louis's anxiety for, 194, 
197 ; Rooke's first instructions as 
to (1702), 203-4, 212; decision to 
attack (1704), 255-6 ; capture of, 
258-61 ; attempts to recover, 
262-76 ; defence of, 277-86 ; its 
value, 286-7, 289; as English 
naval station, 290-1, 811-2 ; 
military and naval works at, i. 
159, ii. 197-8, 257 

Gibraltar, Bay of, i. 1 ; disaster in, 
ii. 153 

— Straits of, i. 40, 60, 87, 123-4 ; 
Penn in, 236 : strategic signifi- 
, canoe of, 319-20, ii. 2, 5, 15 

Gilford, Captain, i. 12 

Gigcri, French disaster at, ii. 48, 50 

Godolphin, Sydney, Earl of, ii. 233, 
240-1 

Goes. Admiral Philips van dor, ii. 
147-8 

* Golden Lion,' the, i. 11 

' Golden Phoenix,' the, i. 114 

GoleU, La (Tunis), i. 18, 20, 805, 310 

Gondomar, Don Diego Sarmiento de 
Acuffa, Conde de, i. 37, 39, 41-2, 
52, 56, 61-2, 81, 83-5, 89, 99- 104, 
106-9, 115, 119, 129, 130, 132-4 

Gorec, i. 186 

Gorges, Sir Ferdinando, i. 57, 144, 
146 

Gradisca, sioge of, i. 37, 43, 48. 156 

Grand Alliance, ii. 144, 149 ; (1701) 
196, 198 

Grand Master of Navigation 
(French), i. 165, 168, 172-3 

Gravelines, battle of, i. 68; taken 
and retaken, 245 

Gray, Colonel, i. 99, 100 

Grcbnerus, prophecy of, i. 201, 205 

Greenwich, Naval School at, founded, 
ii. 135 

Grenville, Sir John (Earl of Bath), 
i. 241 

— Sir Richard, Admiral, i. 241, ii. 
274 

— Colonel Sir Richard, ii. 6 
Greville, Sir Fulke (Lord Brooke), 

Treasurer of the Navy, i. 68, 70, 
75, 77, 139 

Guiehe, Armand Comte de, on Eng- 
lish tactics, ii. 826-7 

Guienne, operations against coast of, 
ii. 232, 295 

• Guinea,' the, i. 195 

Guinea, English factories destroyed 
in, U. 49 



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Ouiscard, Com to de, ii. 394 

Guise, Henri II., Duo de, bis first 
Neapolitan venture, i. 175-6 ; bis 
second, 278, 280, 282, 284 ; its 
failure, 288-91, 811, ii. 86 

Gulf squadron (Venetian), i. 14, 48 

Gunnery, i. 178, 214, 252 

Gunpowder plot, i. 44 

Guns. See Armament 

Oustavus Adolphus, wants English 
fleet in Baltic, i. 162; allied with 
France, i. 166 

Guylan, Sultan of Morocco, ii. 86; 
beaten by Teviot, 37-8 ; intrigues 
with Spain, 39; again defeated, 
40-3, 52, 60, 119 



Hirn, Admiral Jan de, ii. 96 

— Captain, i. 253 

Halifax, Goorgo Saville, Marquis of, 

ii. 128, 130 
Hall, Captain Edward, i. 227-82, 

235-6, 239, 240 
Hamilton, Captain, i. 156 n. 
Hampden, Sir John, i. 114 
•Hampshire,' the, i. 283 n., 808, 

ii. 98 
'Happy Entrance,' the, i. 85, 248, 

822 n. 
Hapsburg system, i. 9, 17, 85, 43, 

73, 84, 89, 134-7, 161, 166 ; broken 

by Mazarin, 179; revived, ii 84, 

149 
Hapsburgs, the, i. 8, 38, 83, 162, 

ii. 187 
Hardy, Admiral Sir Thomas, ii. 

222-3, 225, 284 
Harley, Sir Edward, governor of 

Dunkirk, ii. 16 n. 

— Robert, Earl of Oxford, ii. 812 
Harman, Captain John, i. 283 n., 

303 n. 

— Captain Thomas, ii. 81 
Harris, Captain Christopher, i. 114 
Haughton, Captain Robert, i. 114, 

127 n. 
Haultain, Admiral William de Zoete 

so called, i. 105, 123, 144 
Havre, i. 18 
Hawkins, Sir John, Treasurer of the 

Navy, i. 23, 25, 68-70, 102, 165, 

189 

— Sir Richard, i. 98, 109, 112-4, 
123, 126-7, 180-1, 139, 152 

• Hector,' the, i. 283 n. 
Hedges, Sir Charles, ii. 278 
Heidelberg, L 184 



Heinsius, Grand Pensionary, ii 170, 

291 
Helvoctsluys, i. 189, 269 
Henri IV. (of France), i. 18 si, 17 
Henrietta Matia, Queen of England, 

i. 137-8, 144; opposes Portuguese 

match, ii. 7-8 

• Henrietta Maria,' the, i. 190 
Henrietto d'Orleans, ii. 83 
Henry, Prince of Wales, i. 113 
Henry VIII. (of England), his navml 

reforms, i. 164, 183 
Herbert, Admiral Sir Arthur (Earl 
of Torrington), oommands in the) 
Straits, ii. 114-6, 1256, 270; at 
relief of Tangier, 118-9; recalled, 
128 ; his school of Mediterranean 
officers, 184 5 

• Hercules,' the, i. 62, 114 
Hesse-Darmstadt, Prince George of, 

ii. 214-6, 220, 222, 225, 249-30 ; 

at Gibraltar, 255 6, 264-5, 277-86, 

290 
Hickes, Captain Jasper, ii. 259-60 
Hill, Mr. Richard, Envoy to Turin, 

ii 247—8 
— Captain William, i. 288 fk, 800 
Hispaniola, i. 821 
Holmes, Admiral Sir Robert, reprisals 

by, ii. 44, 46, 56, 108 
Holy League, i. 7 

• Honest Seaman,' the, i. 232 
' Hopewell,' tho, ii. 110 
Hopsonn, Admiral Sir Thomas, L> 

153, 215, 218; at Vigo, 224-5 

Hospital ships, ii. 158, 230 

Hostalrich Castle, il 161 

Hoste, Pere Paul, on tactics, ii. 264-0 
and Appendix 

Howard of Effingham. See Notting- 
ham 

Howards, party of the, i. 75, 81 

Hughes, Captain Thomas, i. 114, 
126. 127 n. 

Huguenots, i. 143 ei atg n 153, 162, 
311, ii. 178 

Hungary, ii. 228, 281 

Hyeres Islands, as naval position, 
i. 167, ii. 178, 250, 258 



Illyriax pirates. See Usoocchi 
Imperialism, Cromwell's, L 1 ; 

Monk's, ii. 18-21; Charles H/a, 

ii. 17-18, 74, 141-2 
Imperialist armies, ii. 196, 281, 248 : 

weakness of, 251, 891-2, 296-7 
Inohiquin, William O'Brien, 2nd 

it 



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MO 



INDEX 



Earl of, governor of Tangier, ii. 

106,114 
Ireton, Major-General Henry, i. 194 
Italy, neutralisation of, ii. 185 
Ivica,iL293 



Kinsale, i. 118 ; Rupert at, 200 
Kirby, Captain Robert, i. 288 n. 
Kirke, Colonel Percy, ii. 120-2 

governor of Tangier, 124-6 
Kirke's Lambs, ii. 121 



Jamaicl, L 821, 828 ; rumour of its 
■ale, ii 107 

James L, reign of, i. 8, 4, 10, IS ; 
Osuna's estimate of, 22 ; as bead 
of Protestants, 88-4, 87-9, 41-2 ; 
his corsair commission, 51 ; 
Mediterranean policy, 56, 62, 65, 
84, 88; interest in navy, 67, 85, 
142; sacrifices Ralegh, 81; vacil- 
lation of, 89, 98, 107-9 ; promotes 
coalition against corsairs, 90 et 
sec., 96-8, 147 ; his false strategy, 
140 ; death, 141 ; naval results of 
his reign, 141-2, 821 

James DL, deposition of, ii. 144; 
invades Ireland, 145; attempt to 
invade England, 183. (See York) 

James Stuart, • the Old Pretender/ 
ii.802 

* James ' galley-frigate, ii. 78 

Jenkins, Sir Leoline, ii 126 

Jennings, a pirate, i. 15 

Jersey, i. 241 

'Jersey,' the, L 822 n. 

Jesuits, L 16 

Jews banished from Tangier, ii. 126 

Jigelli f iL48 

John of Austria, Don (at Lepanto), 
i i, 7, 108 

Don (1650 Ac), i. 209, 220, 254 

Jones, Colonel Michael, i. 200 

Jordan, Admiral Sir Joseph, i. 187, 
229, 282-8, 818 n. 

Jumper, Captain William, ii. 260-1 



i (Tunis), L 24 
Kara Osman, Bey of Tunis, i. 12, 14, 

18 
Kaston. See Croston, Captain Peter 
Kats, Captain, i. 245-7 
Kendal, Captain William, i. 288 is. 
•Kent,' the, L 288 n* 802 ft, 
Kerkenna Islands, L 24 
Kerkhoven, Admiral Melchior van 

den, L 61 
Keroualle, Louise do. See Duchess 

of Portsmouth 
Ketches, iL 79 

EHUpew, Admiral Henry, IL 146, 150 
Kin^s Own Regiment, the, iL 120 



Ladenbobg, ii. 248 

Lagos Bay, i. 210, ii. 147, 220-3, 279 

Lande, Chevalier de.la, i. 217 

' Langport,' the, i. 283 n., 303 n. 

Languedoo canal, Richelieu's pro- 
ject, i. 106 ; revived in reply to 
Tangier, ii. 35, 111; commenced, 
64-6; opened, 124 

Lanzerote (Canaries), i. 88 

Larache. See El Araish 

Lawson, Admiral Sir John, i. 822 ; 
at Algiers, ii. 25, 27, 29, 33 ; his 
confidence trick, 28 ; at Tangier, 
28-9; harries corsairs, 33; at 
Toulon, 34; saves Tangier, 36; 
contracts for the mole, 37 ; re- 
newed activity against corsairs, 
42 ; again saves Tangier, 43, 44 ; 
shadowing De Ruyter, 46-7 ; death, 
56 

Lea, corsairs at, i. 58 

Leake, Admiral Sir John, ii. 236, 
245, 255 ; at Malaga, 265, 267 n,, 
273; saves Gibraltar, 277-86; 
commands in the Mediterranean, 
290-6, 300-2 ; takes Sardinia, 303 ; 
ordered to coerce the Pope, 803-4 ; 
his dilemma, 305; prepares cap- 
ture of Minorca, 806-7, 308 

Leghorn, i. 234-5, 244, 289 ; Apple- 
ton blockaded in, 247-54, 257- 
266; action off, 266-7; Blake at, 
291-4, 297-8; Stokes at, 835-6; 
works at, ii. 82, 64, 76; English 
galley at, 77; Shovell at, 280-1, 
237-8 

Leibnits, Gottfried Wilhelm, Graf 
von, his advice to Louis XIV., ii. 
69 

• Lennox,' the, u. 259 

•Leopard,' the, i. 244, 259 

Leopold I., Emperor, ii. 144, 201, 
208-9, 241, 294, 296-7 

Lepanto, battle of, i. l r 6, 7, 19, 
ii. 103 

Lerin Islands taken and lost by 
Spain, i. 166-8 

Lesdiguieres, Marshal, i. 188, 146 

Levant Company, i. 51, 246, 248-9, 
266 *., 262, 277, 297, 810, iL 67, 
117 



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INDEX 



841 



Levant convoys i. 215, 280, 287, 
244-5, 275 
•^ Levenatein, Count, t. 48, 58, 54, 50 

Leveson, Admiral Sir Richard, i. 70, 
76, 202, 307 

'Lion,' the, i. 114, 180 

Lionello, Venetian ambassador, i. 
38-40 

• Lion's Whelp ' pinnace, i. 10, 11 

Lions, Gulf of, ii. 148 

Lisbon, Hupert at, i. 206-18, 281 ; 
Nieuohese at, 288; as English 
naval station, i. 327, 832, 834, ii. 
5, 204, 236, 238-40, 245, 252-4, 
270, 290-1, 295-6 

•Little John/ the, i. 12, 14 

Lloyd, Captain John, i. 283 n. 

— Captain (query same as above), 
i. 325-6, 333 

Loekhart, Sir William, i. 883, 336, 
838—9 

Lombardy, i. 8, 33, 43, ii. 292. (See 
also Milan, Milanese) 

London, charter of, ii. 128 
. Longboats, i. 119 

Longland, Charles, navy agent at 
Leghorn, i. 243; his advice dis- 
regarded, 246-8; during the block- 
ade, 248-9, 253-4, 257-9, 262, 264 ; 
urges a new fleet, 276-7, 279 ; his 
remarkable suggestion to Crom- 
well, 280-3; on Guise's escape, 
289; his design on Naples, 330, 
341 ; 295-7, 804, 811, 818, 327 

Lord High Admiral, office in com- 
mission, ii. 125 

Loretto, i. 327 

Louis XIII. borrows English ships, 
i. 143^6, 147 

Louis XIV., i. 250, 284; relations 
with Cromwell, 311 ; supports Bra- 
ganza marriage, ii. 8-9; covets 
Dunkirk, 13 ; slarmed at Tangier, 
31-2 ; seeks a footing in Barbary, 
84, 47-9, 50 ; joins Dutch, 52, 55, 
63; his naval strategy, 59-61; 
war with Spain, 62 ; begins ship 
canal, 64-6 ; his increasing power, 
66; Levant policy, 68-9; entan- 
gles Charles II., 72 et wg., 83, 
124; Sicilian policy, 84 et eeq.; 
his senith, 143; policy against 
Grand Alliance, 144, 149 ; his re- 
spect for Tourville, 168-4, 174; 
his position shaken by Russell's : 
fleet, 175-6, 179, 182; his counter- 
stroke, 183 ; secures peace, 185-6 ; | 
negotiates Partition treaties, 187 I 



et eeq. ; foiled by William 13L, 
192-3; prepares for war, 194-7; 
recognises James IIL, 900; in 
war of Spanish succession, 234, 
237, 280-3 ; tries to make peace, 
297, 309, 311 

Louvois, Marquis de, ii. 69, 84 

Love, Captain 8ir Thomas, L 114, 
152, ii. 31&-0 

Lucca, duchy of, L 817 

Lyme, siege of, i, 192 

•Lys,'the,ii.285 



Madagascar, ii. 20 
Madeira, i. 235 

Madrid, congress at, L 43, 46 ; peace 
of, 50; Carlist occupation of, ii. 

292, 295-6 

Mahon, Port See Port Mahon 
• Maidstone, 1 the, i. 288 n., 808 
Mainwaring, Sir Arthur, L 118-4, 

128 n. 
— Sir Henry, i. 56-8, 86, 99-100; 

remarkable proposal of, 98-4 
Majorca, i. 802-4, 811, 827-9, IL 

293, 804, 306 

Malaga, i. 117, 128-5, 160, 215, 
218, 280; Blake at, 814-6; 
Captain Smith's attack on, 821 ; 
Booke at, 258-4, 262; battle of, 
270-6 

Malta, i. 7, 27, 235 ; as English baas, 
ii. 100, 230-1; knights of, L 7, 
287, 295, 802, ii. 67, 101 ; galleys 
of, i. 24, 801 

Mamora. See Mehdla 

Man, Isle of, i. 241 

Manchester, Edward Montagu, Earl 
of, i. 821 

Mansell, Sir Robert, Treasurer of 
the Navy, i. 70 et eeq. ; resigns, 
76 ; Vice-Admiral of England, 98 ; 
expedition to the Straits, 108-4, 
106-9; its object, 110-2; officers 
and fleet of, 112-4 ; his instruc- 
tions, 106, 115-7, 121-2; his 
proceedings, 1 16-7 ; before Algiers, 
118-9 ; retires and cruises, 119- 
125; attacks Algiers, 125-8; his' 
force reduced, 180; recalled, 131- 
138 ; on council of defence, 189 ; 
action in Parliament, 148-50, 
152, 276, 801; compared with 
Blake, 807-«; 817-« 

Mansfeldt, Count, L 141, 145 

Mantua, L 887 

Mardyok, i. 245 



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34S 



INDEX 



Man claosum, i. 8 

•Margaret 'galley, ii. 77 

Marlborough, John Churchill, Duke 
of, his use of the navy, i. 154 ; 
betrays Brest design, ii. 160, 1G7; 
in command in * Holland, 196 ; 
negotiates Grand Alliance, 198- 
200; successes of, 216, 235; his 
naval projects (1703), 227-9, 236; 
his great design (1704), 238-45, 
251; Blenheim campaign, 248, 
253, 264, 276 ; on retaining Gib- 
raltar, 278.9; wants to operate 
on Toulon from Italy, 289-92, 
294-7; presses occupation of 
Minorca, 299-802 ; Louis tries to 
bribe, 809 ; as promoter of Medi- 
terranean policy, 199, 204-5, 209, 
217-8, 228-9, 231-3, 247; his 
conception of naval strategy, 242- 
243, 248, 314; his respect for 
naval opinion, 300-1 

Marseilles, i. 17, 166, 235; revolts, 
245; Stokes at, 336, ii. Ill, 149, 
177-8, 181 

Mattel, Marquis de, ii. 48 

Martin. Captain Stephen, ii. 224 

Mary, Queen of England, ii. 98, 169 

•Marygold,'the,i.U4 

Masaniello, his revolution at Naples, 
i. 172-5 

•M&thew,*the,i.62 

Matthias, Emperor, i. 96 

Maurice, Prince, i. 187, 192, 200, 
220 

Maxaim, Cardinal, his naval policy, 
L 169-170, 173, 175, 232 ; designs 
on Naples and Sicily, 171-8, ii. 
192; attempts naval coalition 
against Commonwealth, i. 201-2, 
205; his growing fear of it, 233 ; 
courts the sea powers, 245; his 
naval efforts, 246; seeks Crom- 
well's alliance, 257, 305, 829, 333 ; 
alarmed at Blake's fleet, 277; 
fresh design on Naples, 278-9, 
280-5 ; Blake frustrates it, 290-1, 
819, 803 n. ; seeks co-operation of 
English fleet, 836-9; and forces 
peace on Spain, 841-2; death, 
iL8 

Medals,!. 22 

Medina-Celi, Duke of, ii. 25, 39 

Medins-SidonU, Duke of, i. 58, 323 

Mediterranean, strategic aspects of, 
L 4 1 weq „ 150, 166, 170-1, 271 et 
sef ^ 128, iL 18, 69, 84, 148-4, 
184-8; balance of power in, i. 



98, 101, 112, 135, 188, 156, 164-8, 
170, 294 6, ii. 73, 166, 179, 188- 
192, 314 5; English expelled 
from, i. 267 ; communication 
with, 313 u. ; true policy as to, 
begun at Restoration, ii. 33, 813 ; 
growth of English power in, 
62-3; its founders, 135; main 
fleet in the, 162-3; proposal to 
winter in, 166 ; as a French lake, 
192 ; the final settlement, 813-6 ; 
concentrations in or from, ii. 63- 
62, 85-6, 146, 152, 154 etseq.. 161, 
183.4. 234, 243, 245, 251-3 

Mediterranean squadrons (English), 
origin of, i. 51 ; used as diplomatic 
weapon, 91 -4, 98, 108-9, 130-3, 134, 
224-5 ; growth of the idea, 238-9 ; 
made permanent, 240; re-estab- 
lished, 274 et aeq.; proposal of 
Charles II.,ii.73 5; under William 
III., 151-3; as division of one 
main fleet, ii. 229 

Mehdia, t. 27, 67-8 

Melazzo, ii. 89-90 

Mendosa, Don Bernardino de, i. 
81 

4 Merchant Bonaventure,' the, i. 114 

1 Merchant, Rojal,' the, i. 62 

Merchantmen, English armed, i. 54, 
56, 62, 65, 86, 114, 248-54 ; as 
naval reserve, 66-7, 77-8; dis- 
credited, 195-6, 209, 226-7 ; re- 
fuse to serve, 258, 262 

1 Merlin/ the, i. 306 n. 

1 Mermaid, 1 the, i. 283 n., 302 n., 
30G n 

Messina! i. 7, 24-7, 46, 49, 89, 95, 
220, 235, 249, 260; revolt of, ii. 
86-7; occupied by French, 88- 
103, 166, 190, 244 

Methuen, Sir Paul, ii. 219-23, 225, 
250, 262, 279, 284 

Midland Sea, ii. 110. (See Mediter- 
ranean) 

Milan, i. 85-7, 135, ii. 295 

Milanese, the (Spanish Province of 
Milan), i. 43, ii. 190, 193, 199. 
(See also Lombardy) 

Milford Haven, i. 203 

Minorca, i. 120, 125, 234, ii. 173, 
191, 287, 293; occupation of, by 
English, 303-8. (See also Port 
Mahon) 

Mitchell, Admiral Sir David, ii. 178, 
182-8, 217 

Mocenigo, Lussaro (Venetian ad- 
miral), i. 295-7, 299 



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M 



Modena, i. 887 

Monaco, Prince of, i. 174 

Monk, General George, Duke of 
Albemarle, i. 101, 200, ii. 63; 
general-at-sea, i. 268; his ante- 
cedents, 268-9 ; his naval strategy, 
269-70, 277; defeats the Dutch, 
270, 277; promotes Bragansa ! 
marriage, ii. 4.6; Duke of Albe- \ 
marie, 7 ; on Tangier and Dan- , 
kirk, 9 ; advises sale of Dunkirk, l 
12-16, 18-21; as war minister, 
27; on Tangier council, 88; in I 
Second Dutch War, 56-61; his 
influence on tactics, 269, 328, 326 

Monmouth, James, Duke of, i. 99, 
104 

Monson, Sir John, ii. 76 

— Admiral Sir William, on Mediter- 
ranean power, i. 41, 150; naval 
criticisms by, 114, 128 n., 151, 
152, 307, 320 

Montague, Colonel Edward, joint- 
admiral with Blake, i. 321 et acq, ; 
his 'defeat at Gibraltar, 328-6, 
833; on blockade, 327; despatch 
of, 331; ordered home, 333; his 
Mediterranean opinions, 340, ii. 7. 
(See Sandwich, Earl of) 

— Ralph (afterwards Duke of), ii. 
72-3, 106-9 

Monte Christo, Badiley's action at, 

i. 251-3, 258 
Montjuich Castle (Barcelona), ii. 292 
Mootham, Captain Peter, i. 283 n. 
Morca, the, i. 299 
Morice, Sir William, ii. 13 
Moriscos, expulsion of the, i. 19, 

35 m„ 71, 111 
Morocco as source of supply, i. Ill 
Moy Lambert (Dutch admiral), i. 

97 
Muley Ishmael, Sultan of Morocco, 

ii. 114, 121, 135 
Munden, Admiral Sir John, ii. 199, 

210, 212 
Munster, i. 200, 202-3 
Mutiny, naval, of 1648, i. 185-7 ; at 

Lisbon, 267 



Namuh, ii. 143, 159, 180, 182 
Naples, port of, i. 24, 260, 260,262-3, 

813, ii. 166; in war of Spanish 

succession, 201, 227, 281, 244-5, 

297-8, 808-4 
Maples, Kingdom of, i. 6, 87, 101 ; 

Masarin's design on, 170-7, 278-9, 



287; Longland's, 880. 841, ii. 
190 ; fleet of, i. 24 
Narbonne, Gulf of, ii. 234, 287 
Narbrough, Admiral Sir John, com- 
mands in Straits, ii 88-9, 98-103, 
104, 112, 115 

* Nastby,' the, i. 322 

Nassau, Count Ernest of, i. 86, 89, 
40, 43, 45, 47 

National Defence, i. 189-40; Com- 
mittee of. See Council of War 

Naval brigade, ii. 119 

— construction, i. 181-5, ii. 78-9, 
104 ; Pepys on, 101 

— science, i. 27, 29, 86, 87, 184, 
195-6, ii. 65 ; Blake's advance in, 
i. 320 ; Cromwell's influence on, 
ii. 1-2; Monk's, 20. (See William 
III., Marlborough, and Appendix) 

Navarino, i, 6, 27, 95 

Navigation Acts, i. 242 

Navy, British, decline of, L 67-72; 
commissions for reform of, 71 
et seq.; report on (1618), 76 et 
scq. ; increase of, 84-5 ; under 
Charles I., 180-2; under Long 
Parliament, 182-6; under Com- 
monwealth, 187-8, 198, 240, 243; 
under Charles II., ii. 104, 125, 142 ; 
under William III., 150 n., 159, 
200 ; ohanged conception of, L 
195-6, 225-8; distribution of, 
under Cromwell, i. 275 ; politics in, 
i. 184-6, ii. 146. (For foreign 
navies, eec Dutch, France, Spain) 

Nelson compared with Blake, L 800 

•Neptune,' the, i. 114 

Netherlands, the Spanish, L 8, 55, 
273, ii. 104 ; as buffer state, & 
193 

Neutral righto, i. 18, 181, 188, 946, 
258-40, ii. 827 

Nevell (or NeviU), Admiral John, 
ii. 154, 157, 160, 173, 178 

New Model Army, its influence on 
navy, i. 188, 185, 190, 196. (See 
also Soldiers) 

• Newcastle/ the, L 283 i^ 802 w., 

806 
Newfoundland, ii. 56; fish fleets 

from, i. 286, 288-9 
Newmarket, ii. 98 
Nice, Masarin's views on, L 171; 

Cromwell's, 829; in war of 

Spanish succession, ii. 240-1, 

244-5, 248, 250, 254 
Nioholsburg, i. 157 
•Nieodemus,'tho,i.l82 



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S44 



INDEX 



Kieuehese, Admiral de. i. 278, 380, I 
282-4, 286-8, 290, ii. 80 I 

* Nightingale,' i. 245 j 
Kixon, Captain. I. 813 n. | 
Noailles. Marshal Anne Jules, Duo 

de, U. 148, 154, 159, 161, 174-5 ! 

* Nonsuch • ketch, i. 283 n. 
Konnanbr, Marquis of, ii. 168 
Norreys, Sir John, i. Ill i 
North. Captain Roger, i. 102 

North Sea, strategic aspects of, ii. 5ft 
Northampton, Henry Howard, Earl , 

oti.73 I 

Northern Sea Powers, their influence j 

in Europe, i. 5, 43, 50-1, 60, 88, 

96. 110-2, 138, 224, 238, ii. 103, 

143 
Northumberland, Earl of, Lord High 

Admiral, L 182 
Norwood, Colonel, ii. 60, 62 
Nottingham, Charles Howard, Earl 

of. Lord High Admiral, i. 52, 165 ; 

his eril influence on nary, 68 et 

*q.\ fall of, 79-81 
Kymwegen, peace of, ii. 104-4} 



Oaks, transition from, to sails, i. 2, 
36-7 ; continued use of, in sailing 
Teasels, 235, ii. 78-9 

Ocean squadron (of Spain), i. 16, 27, 
39, 40, 45-6, 71, ii. 203 

Oeiras Bay (Lisbon), L 207, 211 

Officers, L 29 

Oran, ii. 178, 189, 190 

Orange, Frederick Henry, Prince of, 
L146 

Orbitello, L 172, 827, ii. 192 

Ormonde, James Butler, 2nd Duke 
of, iL 203, 214-5, 218-9, 220, 225-6 

Ossory, Thomas Butler, Earl of, ii. 
117-8 

Ostend, siege of, i 21 ; as a naval 
station, 205 

Osuna, Don Pedro Telles Oiron, 
3rd Duke of, his youth, i. .21-8 ; 
Viceroy of Sicily, 23-4; naval 
reforms of, 25 et sea. ; Viceroy of 
Naples, 29 ; adopts English naval 
orjpuiisation, 29 et aw., 84, 86, 87 ; 
bis design against Venice, 44 et 
sag., 52-5, 59, 60, 78, 84, 86-9, 95, 
100-1, 124, 151, 156-6, 820 



Facx, Captain Henry, L 288 n. 
Paddle-Teasels, 1 181 
Padilla, Don Martin da, 



Palamos, ii. 169, 161, 181 
Palatinate, i. 99, 101, 108, 131-2, 

134 et srq., 145 
Palatine, Frederick, Elector, i. 83, 

50, 83 ; King of Bohemia, 96-9, 

110, 146 
Palermo, i. 17, 209, ii. 88-9, 96-7, 

244 
Palmer, Captain Sir Henry, i. 114, 

127 n., 128 n., 152 
Palos, Cape, i. 218, 308 

♦ Paragon,' the, i. 245, 264 
Partition treaties, ii. 186-92; hos- 
tility to, 195 

Paul, Chevalier (Frenoh admiral), i. 

170, 173, 176, 284, 826-7 
Pay in the navy, i. 194 
Peacocke, Captain, i. 127 ft. 

* Pearle,' the, i. 806 n. 
Pembroke, Thomas Herbert, Earl of, 

ii. 212 

• Pembroke,' the, ii. 222 
Penington, Admiral Sir John, i. 114, 

144-6, 152, 183 

Penn, Admiral Sir William, i. 200, 
222-3; his cruise (1651), 228-32; 
of the old school, 222, 232 ; in 
chase of Bupert, 234-6, 244; holds 
the Straits, 236-9; goes home, 
243; in the West Indies, 304-5, 
812, 810, 320; ii. 320, 325-8 

Pepwoll, Captain, i. 127 n. 

Pepys, Samuel, Secretary to the Navy, 
his error regarding introduction of 
frigates, i. 183-4; on increasing 
the navy, ii. 100-1 ; on the Tan- 
gier council, 115 and note ; in the 
Tower, 125, 129 ; his part in the 
evacuation of Tangier, 129-38; 
his strictures on the Cabinet, 
139-40; on French in the Medi- 
terranean, 140; receives report 
on Gibraltar, 197; comments by 
him, i. 322, ii. 11, 78, 104, 106, 
142, 823, 826 

1 Percy,' the (or • La Pence '), i. 802 

Personnel. See Crews, Officers, 
Soldiers 

Peterborough, Henry If ordaunt, Earl 
of, 1st Governor of Tangier, i. 11 ; 
his fleet, 26, 28, 30; his instruc- 
tions, 32-8 ; superseded, 86-7 

— Charles Mordaont, Earl of, ii. 
290-3, 295-6 

Petit, Colonel, ii. 810 

Peyton, Sir Henry, i. 56, 62, 86 

Pheasant Island, ii. 8 

Philiben of Savoy. See Savoy 



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345 



Philip II. (of Spain), i. 00; naval 
revival under, 226, ii. S, 257 

Philip HI., i. 15-6, 23, 26, 89, 90 ; 
death, 124 

Philip IV., i. 124 ; recognises Com- 
monwealth, 221, 223, 233, ii. 257 

Philip V. of Spain and Duke of 
Anjou, ii. 189, 193 

Philippeville, ii. 34 

'Phamix,' the, flies Blake's flag, 
i. 217; in the Mediterranean, 245; 
capture of, 252-8; recaptured, 
260-1, 263, 822 n. 

Piedmont, ii. 148, 241, 292 

Pierre, Captain Jacques, i. 27, 80, 
31, 44 ; at Venice, 49, 55, 60, 68 ; 
his execution, 64 

Piombino, i. 173, 264 

Pirates (English), i. 13-6, 18, 28, 67, 
241. (See also Corsairs, Barbary 
States) 

Pisa, i. 261 

Plague in London (1G25), i. 145; 
(1665), ii. 57 

Plate fleet, i. 155, 160, 161, 840; 
Blake's orders as to, 313 ; escape 
of, 322-3; taken, 832; fears for, 
ii. 23-9 ; in war of Spanish 
succession, 196, 199, 210-3,219- 
222 ; at Vigo, 223 et eeq. 

Plymouth,!. 10, 12, 151, 153, 155 

• Plymouth,' the, i. 288 n., 802, 306, 
322 n. 

Pointis, Baron de, ii. 186 ; operate 
to recover Gibraltar, 279-85 

Pola, ii. 804 

Ponta Vedra, ii. 208 

Popes : Clement VII., i. 7 ; Paul V., 
24, 43, 46; Urban V1IL, 135; 
Innocent X., 171, 278-9, 292; 
Alexander VII., his fear of the 
English sea power, 328-30, ii. 7 ; 
Clement IX., 67; Clement XI., 
threatened by Leake, 303-6 ; sub* 
mits, 308-9 

Popham, Colonel Edward, general- 
at-sea, i. 190-5, 201-2, 205 ; sails 
for Lisbon, 208, 256 n. ; demands 
revolted ships, 209; returns to 
Channel, 213, 215 ; death and 
burial, 241 ; 227, 268 

Popish plot, ii. 88; its effect upon 
Tangier, 105 et seq. 

Porter, Captain Thomas, i. 114 

Portland, William Bentinok, Earl 
of, ii. 87-8, 186, 191 

Port Louis, ii. 212, 215 

Port Mahon, ii. 29, 40; as English 



base, 70, 166, 191; as French 
base, 194 ; design to secure, 299* 
293, 301, 305-6 ; capture of, 306-8 ; 
its retention, 309-12; its stra- 
tegical importance, 286-7, 805-6, 
310 

Porto Farina, Blake's operations 
against, i. 300-2 ; bombarded, 
805-7, 317 n. ; reconstructed, 885 

Porto Ferrajo (Elba), i. 262-5 

Porto Longone(EIba),i. 251-4, 257-8, 
262, 837, ii. 78 

Portsmouth, i. 11, 186, 204 

— Louise de Keroualle, Duchess of, 
ii. 107, 127 

Portugal, revolts from Spain, L 179, 
199 ; its attitude to the Common- 
wealth, 207-10; changes front, 
216, 221, 228; supported bj 
France, 279 ; overawed by Blake, 
326, 328 ; English alliance with, 
ii. 2, 4, 66; makes a bid for 
Tangier, ii. 130-1, 186-7 ; attitude 
to Grand Alliance, 208-4, 215, 
219-20, 225, 227, 284; joins it, 
286-9, 243, 251 

— King of, John IV., i. 174, 206-7, 
214-5 

Prague, battle of, i. 110, 121 

• President,' the, i. 195 
Preston, battle of, i. 187, 191 
Prie, Marquis de, ii. 802 

• Primrose,' the, i. 114 

« Prince! Royal,' the, i. 80 *., 77, 248. 
(See also * Resolution ') 

• Princess,' the, i. 801 

1 Princess Mary,' the, i. 288 *., 806 «. 
Prize money regulated, i. 189 
Protestant Leagues, i. 88, 99, 135-6, 

153, 162, 272, 280, 829, ii. 16, 144 
Provence, i. 8, 165-8, 246; operations 

against coaBt of, 804, 811, ii. 182, 

240, 292 
Pyrenees, peace of, i. 841-2, ii. 8, 

13,22 



Qvast, Admiral Hildebrant, i. 58 



Raousa, i. 47, 48, 58 

• Rainbow,' the, i. 114, 180, 822 n. 

Rainsborough, Colonel Thomas, 

naval commander-in-chief, L 185, 

191 
Ralegh, Sir Walter, released, i. 84; 

his last expedition, 87 et *eq.; 

his views on the Mediterranean, 



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INDEX 



40-1; hit dying declaration, 42; 

his death and canonisation, 81-3 ; 

44. 4&-7, 113, 136, 280, ii. 317-8 
Bamilies, battle of, ii. 292-4 
Bamming, i 318 
Bating of ships, i. 77, 196-7 
Batisbon. trace of, ii. 143 
Baymond, Captain George, i. 114 
Recusant a Catholic, i. 11 
•Reformation.* the. See 'Constant 

Reformation ' 
Beggio,ii96 
Benaud, a French engineer at 

Gibraltar, ii 197-8 
Reprisals, French and English, i. 

209, 216-8, 228, 233, 235, 238, 

246 - Blake's, 254-6; on colonies, 

275 

* Resolution,' the, i. 208, 248. (See 

also • Prince Boyal ') 
Restoration, the, connection of 

Mediterranean policy with, ii 4 

e/stg. 
•Restore,* the, i 114 
Bets, Due de, L 166 
" Revenge,' the, i. 241 
Rhe\ Isle of, i. 261, 268 
Rhodes. Island of, i. 6; knights of. 

See Malta, Knights of 
Ribera, Donna Catarina Enrique* 

de,L30n. 

— Admiral Francisco de, i. 30-3, 
36, 45-6, 4*-9, 50, 54, 151 

Rich, Robert, Lord, i. 38 
Richelieu. Cardinal, i 137-8; his 

naval policy, 146, 164-8, 170, 173, 

180, 232 

— Due de, as admiral, i. 176 
Rieqnet, projects Langnedoc Canal, 

u.85 
Riff coast, i 831 
Riviera, L 8 
Rochefort, ii. 212, 294 
Rocbelle, La, i. 143, 146, 153, 162, 

255, ii 210 
Rochester, i 67, 185 
Rochester, Robert Carr, Viscount, i. 

73; John Wilmot, Earl of, ii 128 
-Roebuck, 9 the, i 218 

• Romagna,' the, i 829 

Rooks, Admiral Sir George, i. 2 ; at 
eradiation of Tangier, ii 185-6 ; 
with Smyrna convoy, 146-8; at 
the Admiralty* 154, 167-8, 176, 
179-80; relieves Russell, 182-8; 
recalled, 183 ; commander-in- 
chief, 196; objects to winter 
198, 209, 218; his 



orders, 199 ; his obsolete strategy, 
201-2; his instructions, 202-4; 
opposes Marlborough's plans, 209- 
213; sails for Cadiz, 213; his 
obstruction there, 214-6; his 
fresh orders, 217-6 ; reprimanded, 
219; starts home, persuaded to 
try Vigo, 223; refuses to hold 
it, 225; whitewashed, 226; on 
council of defence, 227-8 ; refuses 
Mediterranean command, 229- 
230; again obstructs, 282 ; in Bay 
of Biscay, 235 ; at Lisbon, 239- 
240; his instructions (1704), 240- 
244 ; enters the Straits, 245-6 ; 
feints at Barcelona, 249-50; 
forced to fall back on Shovell, 
251-3; attacks Gibraltar, 255- 
262 ; his difficult position, 262 ; 
brings Toulouse to action, 204-8 ; 
his tactics defended, 268-70; at 
battle of Malaga, 270-6; goes 
home, 278, 286 

Rosas, ii. 148, 159, 161 

1 Boyal Catherine,' the, ii. 252 n. 

1 Royal Charles,' the, ii 825 

'Royal Exchange.' the, i. 162 

Royalists, rising of, 1648, its naval 
aspect, i 185; fleet of, 185-8, 
241 ; in the Highlands, 273 

•Ruby,' the, i 223 n., 306 u. 

Rupert, Prince, i. 187 ; at Kinsale, 
200, 202-3 ; his escape, 203-4 ; at 
Lisbon, 206-10; tries to break 
out, 211-3; engaged by Blake, 
213- 4 ; allowed to escape, 214-7 ; 
enters the Mediterranean, 218- 
222, 225 ; at Toulon, 229, 832-4 ; 
Mazarin's attitude to, 233 4; 
puts to sea, 233; evades l'enn, 
234-5; his failure, 236-7; as 
British admiral, ii 56-7, 60-1, 
269 ; mentioned, i. 238, 244, 248, 
261, 263, 313, 816, ii. 20, 88, 70 

Russell, Admiral Edward (Earl of 
Orford), ii 146, 149 ; commander- 
in-chief, 150-3; his instructions 
for the Straits, 154-5 ; his action 
thereon, 156-60; ordered to re- 
main out, 165-71 ; his objections, 
171-8 ; winters in Cadiz, 174-7 ; 
attempts Toulon, 178-82, 192; 
resents his orders, 180; goes 
home, 182; thwarts an invasion, 
188 
— Sir William, Treasurer of the 

Navy, i 76 
Russia, rise of, i. 2 



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347 



Rutherford, Lord, 2nd Governor of < 
Tangier. See Teviot 

Buvigny. See GsJway 

Bay tar, Admiral Michiel Adrians- 
soon de, defeated by Blake, i. 258 ; 
sent to watch Sandwich, ii. 23-9; | 
his great cruise, 44, 46-7, 49-50 ; 
his opportune return, 50 ; in chief 
command, 60-1, 75 ; in the Medi- i 
terranean, his last campaign, 88- 
96 

Bye House plot, its effect on Tan- 
gier, ii. 128 

Byswick, congress of, ii. 185-7, 198, ' 
200 



Sackvillk, Colonel, Governor of Tan- 
gier, ii. 119-120, 122 

Sailing vessels as men-of-war, L 2, 
18, 27 e* sec.., 36-7, 155 

St. Angelo, castle of, i. 330 

St. Helen's Road, ii. 131 

St. John, Oliver, Viscount Grandison, 
i. 139 

St. Julian's Castle (Lisbon), i. 207 

•St. Louis,' the, i. 167 

8t. Mary, Cape (Portugal), ii. 253 

St. Maryport (Puerto Santo Maria, 
Cadiz), i. 159, ii. 215 

St. Philip (Mahon), ii. 307 

St. Sebastian, ii. 192 

St. Vincent, Cape, i. 12, 15, 116, 160, 
ii. 147; its strategical aspect, i. 
320, ii. 27 

Sakell, a pirate, L 15 

Salamanca, i. 21 

Salee, rise of, i. 20, 27 ; as corsair 
port, 57, 148, 247, 327, 331, ii. 36, 
38,99 

Salina, ii. 90 

Salvetti, Amerigo (alias Alessandro 
Antelminelli), Tuscan envoy in 
London, i. 91, 101-2, 107 

Samos, i. 26 

• Samuel,' the, i. 114 

San Domingo, i. 812 

San Lucar, i. 155, 157-9 

San Salvador (Brazil), i. 151 

Sandown (Kent), L 185 

Sandwich, Edward Montague, Earl 
of, commander-in-chief, ii. 11 ; 
supports sale of Dunkirk, 12-14, 
18-21 ; sails for the Straits, 22 ; 
watches Tangier, 23-9; occupies 
it, 80-1, 82 ; fails as admiral, 56 ; 
ambassador to Spain, 57, 64, 66, 
176. 'See also Montague) 



8anta~Crus, 2nd Marquis of, L 24- 
25, 36, 45-6, 49, 87, 161; * 
the Lerins, 166 

Santo Maria delta Letters, 
of, ii, 102 

' Sapphire,' the, i. 822 n. 

Sardinia, i. 7, 18, 116, 150, 173, 219, 
221, 234, 250, 285, ii. 190; Sir 
W. Temple's suggestion as to, iL 
53 ; occupied by Leake, 803 

Savoy, i. 9, 33, 85, 38-9, 48; 
Ralegh's opinion on, 40-1 ; policy 
of, 184-9, 279, iL 149, 175, 181-2, 
192, 235, 238-9, 247-8, 289, 290, 
297-8; strategical value of, iL 
148 

— Prince Emanuel Philibert of, L 
27, 95 7 

— Prince Eugene of. See Eugene 

— Dukes of, Charles Emanuel I., 
i. 35, 39, 97, 186, 329; Victor 
Amadeus II., ii. 148, 178-9, 185, 
192, 235, 240, 247, 293, 297-8 

Sawkeld. See Sakell 
Scandinavian Powers, i. 184-5, 162, 

174, 201 
Scarnafissi, Count of, Savoyard 

envoy, i. 38-40 
Schellenberg, battle of, ii. 258, 262 
Schiedam, i. 192 
8chomberg, Frederic Armand, Duke 

of, opposes sale of Dunkirk, iL 

15-16 
Schonenberg, Count, ii. 197 
8cilly, i. 12 ; Rupert's intended base, 

203 ; taken, 241 
Seamanship, French, ii. 59 ; Condi 

on English, 288 
Seamen, their objection to land 

service, i. 323 
Search, right of, i. 18, 257 ft. (See 

also Neutral Bights) 
Sebu lliver, i. 57 
Self-denying ordinance, its effect on 

navy, i. 188 
Seville, i. 155 
Seymour, Sir Francis, arraigns 

Buckingham, i. 149 
• Shackerloo,' the, ii. 80-1 
Sheathing of ships, i. 286 
8here, Sir Henry, engineer, ii. 76, 

79; on Tangier, 80; demolishes 

its works, 187-9 
Ship-money fleets, L 168, 182, 190, 

195, ii. 320 
Shirley, Sir Anthony, L 16-18, 90 

— Sir Robert, L 57 

— Sir Thomas, L 17 n. 



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Sbowell, Sir Cloudeslcy, ii. 98, 125 ; 
resists evacuation of Tangier, 135- 
136, 146; at Brest, 159-60; on 
vsdue of numbers, 211 ; operates 
against Plate fleet, 212-3, 218, 
221-5; commands in Mediterra- 
nean (1703), 230 ; bis instructions, 
230-6; bis campaign, 237-8; 
shadows Brest fleet, 246-8 ; junc- 
tion with Rooke, 252-4 ; in Malaga 
auction, 270-3; again commander 
in Mediterranean, 290; his attempt 
on Toulon. 294-7 ; death, 300 
Shrewsbury, Charles Talbot, Duke 
of, ii 150-1 ; correspondence with 
Admiral Russell, 156-7, 162, 165, 
170-2, 176; favours Mediterranean 
policy, 168-9 
KcOj, evil slate of, i. 23-4, 87; 
Mazarin's designs on, 170, 278- 
279; threatened by Blake, 828; 
Louis XIV.'s invasion of, 86-103 ; 
he fears English interest in, 190 ; 
in war of Spanish succession, 281, 
244-5, 284; fleet of, I 24; stra- 
tegic importance of, L 6, 23, 174- 
175; revolution in, i. 173 
Sidney, Henry, Earl of Romney, il 

158-9 
Sinzendorf, Count, iL 301 
Skager Back,!. 239 
Skippon, Major-Gencral, L 191 
Slaves, liberation of Christian, i. 26, 

301, 312. 835 
Sloops, introduction of, ii. 79 ft. 
Smith, Admiral Sir Jeremy, ii. 54-5, 
58-60 

— Captain John, L 288 «.; his 
exploit at Malaga, 331 

Smyrna, 1 245, 301 

— fleet (Dutch) seised, iL 49-50, 
103-4 ; (English) disaster to, 146, 
179,181 

8myth, Sir Thomas, naval reformer, 

L76 
Soldiers, in Spanish navy, L 29 ; as 

reserve crews in English, ii. 177, 

207; as naval officers, i. 152-4, 

161-2, 184-*, 188-96, 222-8, 288, 

ii.20 
•8ophia,' the, L 283 n. 
8oubise, Benjamin ds Bohan, Duo 

de,L143 
8ound,the,ii31 
Southampton, Henry Wriothesley, 

3rd Earl of,L 52, 68, 95 
— Thomas, 4th Ban, ii 12-13, 18- 

21,38 



* Southampton,' the, i. 62 

* Sovereign of the Seas/ i. 180, 243 
Spain, maritime power of, i. 5-7, 15, 

23-4, 30-2, 320 ; its weakness, 34, 
87, 84, 100 ; its revival, 147, 151, 
226 ; declines, ii. 3-4, 184 ; Medi- 
terranean policy of, i. 100, 209, 
220, 226; courts the Common- 
wealth, 221, 223, 225, 255 ; Crom- 
well's relations with, 272 ct sea. ; 
big war with, 321 et seq. ; position 
after peace of Pyrenees, i. 8-4; 
opposes occupation of Tangier, 7 
et uq.; proposed alliance with, 
62 ; declining power of, 166 

Spanish Main, i. 35 

Spanish succession, ii. 187-8; war 
of, 200-314 

Spartivento, Cape (Sardinia), i. 116 

* Speaker,' the, i. 195, 822 n. 
Spezzia, ii. 299, 300 

Spinola, Ambrogio, Marquis, i. 21, 
55, 101 ; invades Palatinate, 108 

— Frederigo, i. 21, 22, 26, 70 
' Sprag,' double-sloop, ii. 79 
Spragge, Admiral Sir Edward, ii. 70 ; 

at Bougie, 71-2, 115 

Stanhope, General James, 1st Earl, 
ii. 301-10 

SUyner f Adm. SirRichard,i.283 n., 
287, 302, 806 ; captures Plate fleet, 
332, 334 ; occupies Tangier, ii. 30 

8tokes (or Stoakes), Captain John, 1. 
283 n. ; succeeds Blake in Mediter- 
ranean, 834; demonstration at 
Tunis, 335; at Tripoli, 838-9; 
recalled, 340-1, 342, ii. 2 

— Captain (? same as above), i. 
127 n. 

Stora, ii. 34, 47 

Strategy, i. 27, 93-4, 134, 136-40, 

150-1, 205; radical change in, 

227, 236, 299, 319-20, 327, ii. 

144-6; French defensive, 163, 

182-5, 200-2 
Stroinboli, ii. 90 ; battle of, 93-5 
.Stuarts, their relation to continental 

politics, i. 199 ; privateers of, 204. 

232, 241 
Submarines, i. 181 

* Success/ the, i. 283 n., 806 
Saltan of Turkey, Achmed I., i. 13 ; 

Mustapha L, 94 
Sunderland, Robert Spencer, 2nd 
Earl of, proposes sale of Tangier, 
ii. 106-7, 109, 116, 127-8, 130 

— Charles Spencer, 3rd Earl of, ii. 
303,806 



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INDEX 



649 



• Swallow,' the, i. 191, 119, 23* 

• 8wan,' the, i. 183 

Swart, Captain (Dutch), i 252 
Sweden in the Triple Alliance, ii 68. 
(See Christina, Charles GosUtos) 
1 Swiftsure,' the, ii. 318 
Symonds, Captain John, L 283 n. 
Syracuse, ii. 95, 97 



Tactics, i. 81 »., 54, 118, 125-6, 154, 
167, 19G, 251-2, ii. 91-4, 268-73 
and Appendix 

• Talent,' the, i. 256 *. 

TaU, Captain, i. 127 n. 

Tanfield, Sir Francis, i. 114, 127 n. 

Tangier, i. 325 ; offered to Monk, ii. 
5 ; importance of, 9 ; preparations 
to occupy, 11, 22-9 ; substitute for 
Dunkirk, 12-15: symbol of im- 
perial policy, 17-21 ; occupation 
of, 80-1 ; first attempt to oust 
England from, 35-6 ; naval workB 
begun, 37-8, 45; new design 
against, 39-40; Teviot's defence 
of, 40-2 ; disaster at, 42-3 ; grow- 
ing importance of, 45-9, 51-2; 
reported sale of, 50 ; during Second 
Dutch War, 51-3, 55, 59-60 ; pro- 
gress during Triple Alliance, 63-4, 
69 ; mobile defence of, 76-9 ; French 
fleet at, 86; Louis XIV.'s design 
against, 104 el seq-, 122, 194; 
jealousy of Parliament as to, 106- 
107, 122-3 ; the last siege, 113-20 ; 
its knell, 122-3; Portuguese bid 
for, 130-1, 136-7. Evacuation 
of, decided on, 126; its political 
object, 127-8; secret preparation 
for, 128-33; naval opposition, 
183-5 ; overcome by Pepys, 136 ; 
demolition begins, 137-8 ; lamen- 
tations of merchants, 188-9 ; eva- 
cuation complete, 139-40 ; its epi- 
taph, 141; the sequel, 143-4; 
Booke at, 258 

— council, ii. 88, 64, 129 

— garrison of, ii. 26, 63, 113, 117, 128 

— governors of. See Peterborough, 
Teviot, Belasyse, Middleton, Fair- 
borne, Ossory, Sackville 

— municipality of, ii. 63, 139 

— naval works at, ii. 82, 87-8, 68-4, 
74, 76, 80, 138-4, 187-40 

— as naval station, ii. 80-2, 98, 110- 
113, 115, 124-5, 184, 186 

— as harbour of refuge, ii 51-2, 112, 
188 



Tangier as trading centre, ii. 113, 188 
— regiments of (the Queen's), ii. 114, 

(King's Own) 120 
Taormina occupied by French, iL 97 
Taranto, Gulf of, i 287 
Tarpaulin officers, ii. 184-5 

• Tartan,' small sailing vessel, i. 29 
Taunton, siege of, i 192 

: 'Taunton,' the, i 283 ^ 802** 
I 322n* 

! Temple, Sir William, ii. 68, 88, 116 ; 
j on Mediterranean power, it 52-3 
: Teneriffe, i. 334 
Ter River, iL 161 
Tesse, Marshal, ii. 288-6, 291-8 
Tetuan, i. 124, ii 86-7, 178; as 

English victualling depot, L 884, 

ii. 364-5 
Teviot, Andrew Rutherford, Earl 

of, Governor of Tangier, ii 86-7 ; 

defeats Guylan, 88 ; terror to the 

Moors, 40-1 ; death, 42-8 
Texel, the, i 86, ii 28, 56. (Sat 

Actions) 
Thames, Barbery corsairs in, i 58 ; 

blockaded by Royalists, 186; 

Dutch in, ii. 61-2, 70 
Thirty Tears' War, i 88, 50, 88, 96, 

110, 161, 166, 201; end of; 287, 

295 
Thorowgood, Captain Charles, i 240 
Three-deckers, the first, i. 180 ; un- 
seaworthiness of, ii 162, 180, 209, 

213 

* Tiger,' the, ii 81 

Toledo, Don Pedro do, Governor of 
Milan, i 85, 86, 64, 107 

Tollemache (or Talmash), General 
Thomas, ii. 160 

Tor, Captain de, i 18 

Torbay, i 322 

Torre Annunciate (Naples), i 289 

Torrington. See Byng and Herbert 

Toulon, naval port begun, i 166-7; 
its squadron established, 168, 172, 
176 ; Rupert at, 221, 229, 282-4 ; 
rebellious, 245-6, 250; action of 
its squadron, i 176, 254, 278, 812, 
ii. 47, 53, 77-9, 87 et a*., 104, 
236, 276 ; as English base, i 838, 
340-2, ii. 34; its progress as a 
naval port, ii 124, 140, 149, 164, 
234 ; naval architecture at, ii.78; 
projects of attack on, ii 165, 168, 
177-82 ; Marlborough's, 205, 
217, 281, 285, 248-5, 247-8, 250,. 
286-7, 289-92; Eugene's 
Snovell's failure at, 296-9, 806 



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INDEX 



Toulouse, Louis de Bourbon, Comte 

de, ii. 217, 234, 246-8, 250 ; evades 

Booke, 252-3; attempts to re- 

cover Gibraltar, 262-76 
Tourville, Admiral Anne Hilarion 

de Cotentin, Comte de, ii. 145; 

surprises Smyrna fleet, 146-8, 

149, 152, 154-6, 161 ; his strategy, 

163-4, 167, 173-5, 177, 268-76, 

291-8 
Trapani (Sicily), L 25, 80, 235, 

293-4, 298, 300, 306 
Trieste, i. 35, 100, 156 ; ii. 201 
Triple Alliance (Sir W. Temple's), 

iL 68-4, 66, 83 ; (Hapsburgs and 

Dutch), 84, 88 
Tripoli, L 298, 312, 827 ; Stokes at, 

338-9; Lawson at, ii. 38; Nar- 

brough at, 98-9, 100 
Tromp, Admiral Marten Harperts- 

xoon, threatens Scilly, i. 241 ; 

fighU with Blake, 247-8, 255; 

defeat* him, 258 ; killed, 270 

— Cornelia Martenszoon, i. 239 ; in 
the Mediterranean, 253, 260 

Tunis, i. 7, 12, 28, 30, 57, 294, 
298-9 ; Blake at, 300-11 ; Stokes 
at, 885 ; Lawson at, ii. 33 ; Bey 
of, Kara Oaman, i. 12, 14, 58 

Turenne, Henri, Vicomte de, L 285, 
291 

Turin, capital of Savoy, i. 136 ; ii. 
247,295 

Turks, i. 16 ; naval power of, 6, 27, 
31; defeated, 31, 36, 267; English 
attitude to, 297. ii. 67; they 
assist the French, 148. (See also 
Gandiote War) 

Turner, Captain, i. 127 n. 

Tuscany, Grand Dukes of (Ferdinand 
I.), i. 12, 91, 174, 244 ; his be. 
haviour during First Dutch War, 
248-84, 261, 263; trims again, 
278; his reception of Blake, 
292-8; of Stokes, 336 ; (Cosmo 
m.) v ii. 76, 280, 287-4 

— Spanish ports in, i. 171, 209, 
257, ii. 192. (See also Orbitello, 
Piombino, Porto Longone) 

Two Sicilies, i. 6. (See Maples and 



Utrecht, congress of, ii. .811-2; 
peace of, 313-5 



Sicily) 
Tyrol the, 



its relation to the Medi- 
L 108, 134 



•Umoonff,' the, L 283*., 306, 822 n. i 
Uscoochi or Isoocohi, L 47, 49, 156 
Usheni,ii.l83 



Valbrlle, Admiral de, i. 802 n., ii. 

86-8 
Valencia, i. 89, ii. 292 
Vallis, Captain Thomas, i. 283 n. 
Valtcllina, i. 108, 134-5, 146 
Vano, Sir Henry (the younger), 

President of the Admiralty, i. 

194 

— Charles (brother of above), envoy 
to Lisbon, i. 206-7, 209, 210 

• Vanguard, 1 the, i. 114, 144 

Vauban, Marshal de, his work at 
Toulon, ii. 124 

Vaudois, the, i. 329 

Velasco, Don Francisco do, ii. 249 

Velez-Malaga, Rupert at, i. 218; 
battle of, ii. 270-6 

Venablcs, General Robert, i. 820 

Vemlome, Ct'sar, Due de, i. 232, 245- 
246, 255-6, ii. 34 

Venice, naval power of, i. 6-8, 14, 
60, 156, 295-7 ; strategic position, 
35, 59, 65, 90, 96 ; as bulwark of 
Christendom, 295-7, ii. 67; polioy 
of, i. 8, 9, 33, 35, 87, 135-7; 
diplomacy of, i. 84-38; relations 
with England, i. 13, 43-4, 55-6, 
60-2, 66-7, 86, 93, 162, 259, 262- 
264, 295-9, ii. 230 

Venice, gulf of, i. 8, 33, 101. (See 
Adriatic) 

Veniero, Venetian admiral, i. 47-8 

Vero, Sir Francis, i. 21 

— Sir Horace, i. 56 
Veres, the fighting, i. 139 
Verney, Sir Francis, i. 16, 18 
Verschoen, Dutch admiral, ii. 96 
Viareggio, i. 337 

Vice- Admiral of England, i. 76, 149 
'Victory,* the, i. 129, 130 
Vidasabal, Admiral Don Miguel de, 

i. 87-8 
Vienna, i. 108 
Vigo, i. 228-30, ii. 208 ; Plate fleet 

at, 221-5, 229 
VillafTanca (Savoy), i. 829, ii. 240, 

245, 246, 250 

— Marquis of, i. 85 

Villetto, Marquis de, ii. 267 n^ 271-8 

Virginia, i. 73, 114 

Vivonne, Due de, ii. 86 ; French 

Viceroy of Sicily, 88-9; recalled, 

102 
Vulcano (Lipari Island), i. 90 



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INDEX 



861 



Wade, General George, ii. 308-9 

Waiter of the Wool fleet, i. 72 

Wake, Sir Isaac, enyoy to Savoy, 
i. 136-7 

Walmer, i. 185 

Walsingham, Captain, i. 127 n. 

Ward the pirate, i. 10 et seq., 18, 21, 
34, 71, 155, 294, ii. 313 

Warwick, Robert Rich, Earl of, Lord 
High Admiral, i. 183, 185-9, 259 

* Warwick ' pinnace, i. 314 n. 

Watte, Sir John, i. 152 

West Coast (of Africa), ii. 56. (See 
also Guinea) 

West Indies, llupert's designs on, i. 
233; Ayscue sent to, 237, 241-2; 
Cromwell's design on, 275, 279, 
282, 304-5, 316, ii. 20 ; English 
conquests in, 62, 66 ; in the par- 
tition treaties, 189-92 ; in war of 
Spanish succession, 204, 220 

Westminster, peace of, ii. 80 

— Abbey, burials at, i. 241 

Westphalia, peace of, i. 239 

Wilder (or Wheeler), Admiral Sir 
Francis, ii. 135 ; sent to the 
Straits, 151-3 

4 Whelps,' small cruisers, i. 181. 190 

Whetstone, Captain, i. 835 ; at Tou- 
lon, 338 9 ; arrested, 3 40 

Whitakor, Admiral Sir Edward, at 
Gibraltar, ii. 259-61 ; at Mahon, 
307 

Whitby, ii. 37 

Wliitclocke, Sir James, i. 73 

Wilks, Ren r- Admiral, ii. 250, 262 

William III. (of England), his influ- 
ence on naval science, i. 154 ; seeks 
English wife, ii. 97-8, 104 ; effect 
of his accession, 144 ; first cam- 
paign as King, 144-6; national 
confidence in, 150 ; his orders to 
Admiral Russell, 155-9, 165-71, 
179-80; abandons the Mediter- 
ranean, 184-5; makes peace, 188; 
demands guarantees in Mediter- 
ranean, 188-92; distrusted in 
England, 194-5 ; prepares for war, 



196-200; his death, 209; and 

work, 313; as a naval strategist, 

144-6, 149-58, 165-72, 176-7, 191. 

202, 247 
Wiiloughby of Parham, Lord, L 161- 

162, 186 
Wimbledon, Viscount See Cecil, 

Edward 
Windsor, ii. 130 
Winker, Captain, i. 127 n. 
Win wood, Sir Ralph, I 36-7 
Wishart, Admiral Sir James, ii. 

222; at Malaga, 264.6 
With, Jan de, Grand Pensionary, ii. 

97 
— Admiral Witte Cornelia de, on 

English gunnery, L 198; fights 

Blake, 258 
Witheridge, Capt Edward, i. 283 is. 
Witte, Captain Passchier de, ii. 80-1 
Wolstenholme, Sir John, natal re- 
former, i. 76 
Woolwich, i. 242 ; dockyard at, 322 
1 Woolwich ' sloop, ii. 79 n. 
Worcester, battle of, L 236 
* Worcester,' the, i. 240, 283 *., 300, 

306 
Wratislaw, Count, ii. 301 
Wynter, Admiral Sir William, i. 

189 



See 



' Takmouth,' the, ii. 259 
York, Charles, Duke of. 

Charles, Prince of Wales 
— James, Duke of, in exile, i. 187 ; 
as minister of marine, ii. 18, 
38; as admiral, 56, 61, 76; bill 
to exclude, 113, 128, 125, 127- 
129 ; forces the evacuation of 
Tangier. 128-9, 137 ; his ' fighting 
instructions,' 825-6. (Set Ja 
II.) 



Zaxttb, i. 249; as English 

385 
1 Zouch Phoenix, • the, 1 114 



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